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I Introduction
I.1 The Research Questions
With the burst of the American housing bubble in late 2007 and the subse-
quent financial crisis that reached its climax with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, skyrocketing unemployment and full-blown 
economic recessions became a global phenomenon in 2009. While the 
economic, political and social repercussions were felt worldwide, Euro-
pean policymakers were in particular reminded of both the vulnerability 
of their deeply institutionalised social welfare systems and – at the same 
time – the importance of adequate institutions, being able to cope with 
rising unemployment and growing inequality. This situation, however, is 
nothing new. Since the age of urbanisation and industrialisation, Europe-
an nations have, from time to time, been exposed to deep and prolonged 
economic downturns, resulting in mass unemployment. The Great De-
pression of the 1930s, the years following the oil crises in 1973 and 1979, 
and more recently, the recessions after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the first Gulf War, and the European currency crisis in the early 1990s all 
resulted in significant increases in unemployment levels.
 When faced with severe economic, political, and/or social challenges, 
policymakers begin to “look abroad” to see what other countries are doing 
(Casey 2009, 103). Already during the creation and expansion of initial 
welfare state structures in late 19th century, policymakers sent delegates to 
neighbouring countries in search for institutional alternatives and solu-
tions to pressing problems. Such eﬀ orts to learn from others were sub-
stantively improved after World War II (WWII) when the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was created in 1960, as 
an international, mainly European, body to promote policy convergence 
and to enhance transnational learning. During the 1990s, European policy-
makers placed even more emphasis on transnational lesson-drawing, not 
only by initiating the elaborate OECD Jobs Study (1992-1994), but also by 
launching the European Employment Strategy (EES) in 1997.
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 Given that policymakers have frequently faced unemployment chal-
lenges throughout the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, and given 
that they have repeatedly and often systematically been exposed to, or 
actively solicited, new ideas from abroad, the following questions arise:
(1) Do national labour market policy reform efforts exhibit covariation 
across Western Europe, and if so, how and why?
(2) What impact, if any, have the recommendations of international or-
ganisations such as the OECD and the EU had on national reform 
agendas?
(3) Have recent reform activities, in the context of the OECD Jobs Study 
and the EES, fundamentally transformed the historic composition of 
national labour market policy regimes, and if so, to what effect? 1
By systematically addressing these three interrelated questions, this book 
seeks to fulfil two purposes. At the empirical level, it aims to provide an 
account of labour market policy making and to delineate the institutional 
pathways taken by six European countries. While the “history” of labour 
market policy and its evolution is interesting and relevant in its own right, 
the main purpose of this book, however, is analytical and theoretical. 
Hence, it aims at objectively analysing the forms of institutional evolution 
– thus addressing questions pertaining to institutional convergence, per-
sistence, and divergence – and explaining the direction of change taken by 
policymakers. The book’s main contention is that the evolution of institu-
tions is not simply determined by prevailing historical trajectories, eco-
nomic conditions, or the strength of actor coalitions engaged in struggles 
over distributional outcomes, but also reflects policymakers’ changing 
beliefs. In other words, I attribute a causal role to normative and cogni-
tive ideas, thereby opening up the opportunity to take mutual learning 
and transnational policy diffusion seriously. This study therefore revisits 
the traditional core of historical institutionalist analysis (e.g., Hall 1986; 
1989; 1993), while also offering an additional avenue to explain gradual, 
yet transformative institutional change, thus contributing to the promis-
ing research agenda launched by Kathleen Thelen and Wolfgang Streeck 
(Thelen 2003; 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005). This book offers an actor-
centred, historical-institutionalist approach (ACHI) to the explanation of 
labour market policy regime change that combines (reflexive) agency with 
historical trajectories. Accordingly, despite its focus on one particular 
policy nexus – labour market policy – the suggested approach may have a 
wider applicability in the study of the political sphere.
COMPETING PREDICTIONS ABOUT LABOUR MARKET POLICY REGIME
I.2 Competing Predictions about Labour Market Policy Regime 
Change: The Argument in Brief
Most work on welfare state reform explicitly focuses on either domes-
tic institutional settings or international economic structures to explain 
questions of institutional continuity and change. With respect to the for-
mer, many social scientists, in particular historical institutionalists, argue 
that institutions emerge out of political struggles, and once established, 
these institutions generate particular paths, which “lock in” actors’ prefer-
ences and societal expectations, thus constraining policymakers’ room to 
manoeuvre (e.g., Immergut 1990; Pierson 2001b). Moreover, not only do 
nationally specific institutional configurations condition policymakers’ 
strategies, but countries also cluster into specific groupings with distinct 
systems of economic and welfare institutions (e.g., Iversen and Wren 1998; 
Esping-Andersen 2000a; Esping-Andersen 2002; Rothstein and Steinmo 
2002a; Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004; Sapir 2006). Each group-
ing, in turn, faces a particular, rather than a common, set of public policy 
challenges and thus a “one-size-fits-all” institutional response is neither 
feasible nor probable. As such, most scholars writing in the historical-
institutionalist tradition either predict institutional stability, which is in-
duced by institutional “veto points” and causal mechanisms associated 
with path dependency, or argue that countries will adapt existing institu-
tions in regime-specific ways, which are most adequate to the problems at 
hand. In either case, authors associated with this “path-dependency hy-
pothesis” predict the reproduction of regime-typical sets of institutional 
configurations and sustained diversity.
 In turn, authors who focus on economic globalisation – defined as in-
creased international mobility of capital, goods, and services – typically 
argue that policymakers have no choice but to gradually accept the advanc-
es of neo-liberalism (e.g., Gilbert 2002; Goldberg and Rosenthal 2002). 
A common argument is that the “exit option” of internationally oriented 
businesses has disproportionately empowered capital to the detriment of 
organised labour. Consequently, governments find themselves in a “race 
to the bottom”, cutting costs and regulations to prevent the off-shoring 
and outsourcing of domestic firms in an attempt to attract new investors 
with business-friendly environments. This scenario accentuates, inter 
alia, the perceived need to reduce expenditures for the welfare state, to 
further weaken organised labour, and to deregulate labour markets. These 
tendencies are further amplified in the European context by the tight fi-
nancial corset arising from the Economic and Monetary Union’s (EMU) 
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national debt and inflation targets. A common conclusion is that policy-
makers have little choice but to restructure their welfare states along U.S. 
lines, i.e., they need to withdraw state responsibility (to reduce costs) and 
strengthen individual responsibilities (through sanctions), while increas-
ing labour market flexibility (by removing employment protection legisla-
tion and other institutions that interfere with market forces). In short, in 
contrast to the first set of scholars who predicted continued institutional 
diversity, if not divergence, the authors associated with the “globalisation 
hypothesis” predict a convergence of labour market policy regimes, com-
monly associated with dismantling existing structures and a switch to an 
institutional path that will eventually lead toward one common neo-liber-
al destination.
 While these sets of authors predict entirely different institutional out-
comes, they both rely heavily on structural factors, including path de-
pendency or global economic forces, to explain institutional stability or 
convergence. This book takes a different view, both with regard to the 
observed institutional outcomes and the primary explanatory sources. 
While there is no doubt that national, historical trajectories and global, 
structural forces strongly condition policymakers’ behaviour, I argue that 
innovative actors can overcome both “path dependency” and the “golden 
straightjacket” associated with economic globalisation.2 As political ac-
tors (deliberately) “mix and match” institutions from various regimes, 
other institutional outcomes than persistence in institutional diversity 
and uni-modal convergence are analytically possible, including a process 
of institutional hybridisation.
 In order to be able to theorise about this process of hybridisation, we 
need to first carefully trace the origins of national labour market policy 
regimes; second, establish a benchmark against which subsequent insti-
tutional changes can be assessed; third, define a set of objective criteria 
with which we can “measure” the degree and direction of change; and 
fourth, identify a set of causal mechanisms that allow for the emergence 
of such distinct trajectories. It is a rapidly growing body of historical-
institutionalist literature about gradual, yet transformative institution-
al change that specifically provides the analytical tools to address the 
fourth of these steps (Thelen 2003; 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005a). 
The underlying assumption in this literature is that institutions evolve 
over time and, even though processes are often slow and incremental, 
they can nevertheless result in path-breaking institutional changes. To 
capture such institutional developments analytically, Thelen and Streeck 
propose a set of five causal mechanisms that describe reoccurring pat-
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terns, namely displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and exhaustion 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 19ff ). In her subsequent work with Peter Hall, 
Thelen argues that the most promising way to locate the sources of these 
mechanisms lies with actor coalitions that are powerful enough to suc-
cessfully pursue their (rational) interests (Hall and Thelen 2009). While 
this approach has generated valuable new insights, I concur, however, 
with Anton Hemerijck, who argues that the focus on the material inter-
ests of powerful coalitions unnecessarily limits actors’ motivations. This 
analytical shortcut, in turn, may then produce an incomplete picture of 
institutional development as the “processes of welfare reform are multi-
dimensional and highly reflexive and knowledge intensive endeavours” 
(Hemerijck 2007, 23).
 In other words, this book builds on Thelen and Streeck’s approach by 
focusing in a systematic and analytical manner on actor constellations 
(who holds power) and actor coalitions (who is aligned with whom). It 
does also, however, and perhaps more importantly, take the role of cogni-
tive and normative ideas seriously. Hence, I follow Hugh Heclo’s (1974) 
influential writings by analysing political processes as exercises of both 
“puzzling” and “powering”, while adopting an ontology that perceives ac-
tors as being reflexive rather than instrumentally rational. I argue that it 
is precisely during phases of puzzling and reflexivity that international 
organisations such as the OECD and the EU play an important role, since 
they provide an avenue for the diffusion of new ideas and contexts for 
mutual learning. My main argument in this book is thus that actors have 
repeatedly reassessed their normative and cognitive beliefs about labour 
market policy and labour market governance, which in turn, triggered the 
patterns of transformative change that Streeck and Thelen have identified. 
Such reassessments occurred three times during the post-war period. The 
first reassessment occurred in the mid-1960s, when the OECD diffused 
new – Swedish – ideas about active manpower policy and a “modern” 
Public Employment Service (PES). Inspired by the OECD’s proposals, 
political agendas were altered and new policy outputs initiated in many 
Western European countries.3 This “manpower revolution” effectively led 
to a partial convergence of institutions across regime types.
 The oil crises of the 1970s, in turn, triggered a second phase of reassess-
ment about labour market policy regimes, which, however, led to diver-
gent responses and the emergence of three “worlds of welfare capitalism”. 
This divergent policy response can best be explained by (a) the absence 
of a single, coherent set of “best practices” which had been present in the 
1960s; (b) the emergence of monetarism as a new, competing economic 
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paradigm to the previously dominant Keynesian views; and (c) the associ-
ated political struggles over new and old policy ideas.
 In the mid-1990s, the OECD – and this time also the EU – began ar-
ticulating yet another set of new ideas about welfare and labour market 
reforms, reflecting, reinforcing and/or altering national actors’ beliefs. 
The common ground of these two organisations was the concept of “ac-
tivation”, which originated – in the European context – in the UK dur-
ing the late 1980s, and was subsequently refined by Denmark in the early 
1990s. This “new” concept of activation had successfully revived, but also 
repackaged and updated, the decade-old Swedish ideal of the “work line” 
(arbetslinjen), and entailed both positive and negative incentive structures 
– or rights and obligations – combined in such a way that jobseekers are 
incentivised to find their way (back) into gainful employment. Work is in-
creasingly seen as the “best form of welfare”, replacing traditional norms 
of “de-commodification” associated with Conservative and Scandinavian 
welfare regimes (cf., Esping-Andersen 1990).
 Moreover, New Public Management (NPM) ideas, first endorsed in the 
UK during the 1980s (McLaughlin and Osborne 2002, 1), have refocused 
the roles and responsibilities of Public Employment Services.4 While 
NPM ideas varied both across time and space, the central message was 
always the same: public administration should emulate private business 
practices by focusing on customers and results (Christensen and Lægreid 
2001, 109). Accordingly, both the EU and the OECD no longer saw PESs as 
state bureaucracies simply administering the unemployed, but envisioned 
them as “modern service providers”, capable of effectively and efficiently 
delivering specialised services to an ever-growing clientele in an outward-
looking fashion. The most important elements of this new PES “service 
model” included: the use of management-by-objectives and advances to-
ward decentralisation; rigorous, independent, and comprehensive labour 
market policy evaluations; merging of – or at least closer collaboration 
between – regimes for social assistance and unemployment benefits; 
active promotion of new local partnerships; competitive tendering for 
service provision; removal of restrictions of private employment service 
agencies; and finally, the expansion of self-help services and individual, 
in-depth case management (OECD 1997a; Commission of the European 
Communities 1998; 2000; Weishaupt 2010a).
 Finally, both the EU and OECD gradually came to an agreement on 
the necessity for “constructive” state interventions to create more inclu-
sive labour markets. This shift entailed a new political agenda and the 
endorsement of employment-promoting public policies. With respect to 
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the former, policymakers shifted from a focus on reducing unemployment 
– and its theoretical foundation, the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment (NAIRU) – to raising overall employment levels, which 
necessitated the activation of so-called “inactive” persons, or persons that 
are neither in employment nor in receipt of employment-related benefits. 
With respect to the latter, the EU and the OECD increasingly promoted 
the development of state-sponsored active-ageing policies, lifelong learn-
ing strategies, and the expansion of (public) provision of childcare to en-
able workers to postpone their exit from the labour market and to recon-
cile work and family life. In 2002, the EU’s heads of state and government 
“quantified” these ambitions by setting targets for female and older work-
er employment rates, as well as for childcare places and the participation 
rate of adult workers in lifelong learning measures (Council of the Euro-
pean Union 2002). Likewise, by 2005/2006, the OECD argued that state 
interventions were necessary to reach female employment rates above 60 
percent, and that “appropriate help and encouragement” was needed to 
improve the employability of older workers (OECD 2005a; OECD 2006c).
 In summary, the gradual diffusion of these three sets of congruent and 
mutually supportive ideas – originating mainly from the Anglo-Nordic 
worlds of welfare capitalism, and further developed by both the OECD 
and the EU – led to a process of institutional hybridisation and the emer-
gence of an “activation paradigm”, which increasingly blurred the differ-
ences between traditional welfare state clusters.
I.3 Research Design, Case Selection, and the Evidence
Research Design
This book relies on an epistemology that straddles interpretivism and 
positivism, a historical-institutionalist ontology with an actor focus, and 
a qualitative methodology. The epistemology is interpretivist as well as 
positivist because the main goal of this study is to detect, understand, 
and subsequently explain general patterns of institutional evolution in a 
carefully selected arrangement of cases. However, rather than (statisti-
cally) testing a set of mutually exclusive hypotheses as is typically done in 
positivist scholarship, my main aim is to reveal causal mechanisms, which 
offer explanations of how certain institutional outcomes are possible, or 
even probable, and why (cf., Lin 1998). This is to say, I show what the 
general patterns of institutional evolution look like in practice and offer 
insights such as “X leads to Y through steps A, B, C” (George and Bennett 
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2005, 141). Likewise, my goal is not to discover a set of singular, invari-
ant laws that hold in every instance. Instead, I propose a “middle-range” 
theoretical approach that systematically connects analytical propositions 
with empirical patterns in a context that has deliberately been delimited 
to Western Europe. As such, my epistemological view is not “dogmatic” in 
the sense of seeing interpretivist and positivist research as mutually ex-
clusive worldviews. Rather, I concur with Lin (1998, 167) who argues that 
positivist research seeks to answer “what” questions, identifying causal 
relationships, while interpretivists answer “how” questions, identifying 
causal mechanisms. Accordingly, in my view, positivism and interpretiv-
ism are complementary rather than competitive, and both schools share 
the conviction that the pursuit of empirical knowledge is and should be 
driven by social science theory.
 My ontology, or the underlying premises about the “character of the 
world”, is historical institutionalist (cf., Hall 2003a). In this sense, this 
book explicitly assumes that any political process or institutional devel-
opment is contingent on historical events, their trajectories, and pre-
vailing institutions (cf., Rothstein and Steinmo 2002a, 16). In this way, 
both history and institutions matter, as the former provides a context in 
which actors make their decisions, while the latter condition and con-
strain actors’ behaviour. Following the writings of Sven Steinmo (2009), 
I also share an evolutionary view of the political world based on the as-
sumption that political processes and outcomes are fundamentally dif-
ferent from the physical world, where we can discover constant laws. Po-
litical processes and outcomes are more like living organisms studied in 
biology. In this sense, I perceive institutional continuity and change as 
being characterised by evolutionary processes in context-specific ways 
rather than by (linear) chains of independent events. In this evolutionary 
context, I assume that the world is occupied by purposive actors, whose 
preferences are not exogenously given or assumed (as it is typically the 
case in rational choice institutionalism), but are seen as endogenous. Al-
lowing for endogenous preference formation means that I am sensitive 
to national contexts and particular actor constellations from which I de-
velop propositions about what it is that actors “are trying to maximize and 
why they emphasize certain goals over others” (Steinmo and Thelen 1992, 
9). Moreover, actors are also seen as “boundedly rational” and “reflexive”. 
Actors are boundedly rational because they are seen as having a limited 
ability to (a) comprehensively solve complex problems, i.e., to find an un-
ambiguous Pareto-optimal institutional solution, and (b) to fully predict 
the consequences of their actions and the policies they put in place. They 
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are “reflexive” insofar as they constantly react to and learn from changing 
environments. In other words, actors’ preferences are constantly in flux 
as they continuously adapt to the changing socio-economic environment 
and critically (re-)evaluate common practices and established institutions 
when exposed to new information or ideas (cf., Whitford 2002; Hemerijck 
2007).
 Because a historical-institutionalist ontology is at odds with assump-
tions generally required for standard regression analyses, this study ap-
plies the method of systematic process analysis to a small-n of case stud-
ies against a larger comparative backdrop. More specifically, this study 
does not apply a large-N technique for which I would need to assume unit 
homogeneity, “which is to say that, other things being equal, a change in 
the value of a causal variable x will produce a corresponding change in 
the outcome variable y of the same magnitude across all the cases” (Hall 
2003a, 382). Rather, it relies on a small-n comparison, which allows me to 
(a) thoroughly examine both the processes unfolding in each of my cases 
and the institutional outcomes in those cases, while (b) referring to, and 
building on, some prominent predictions of institutional change, and to 
(c) assess the validity of their rivals (cf., Hall 2003a, 393). In order to in-
crease the validity of my findings, I not only offer a detailed account of 
the institutional processes, but also propose an analytical grid through 
which the main dimensions of institutional change and continuity can be 
systematically and objectively assessed.
Case Selection and Evidence
The small-n of cases selected in this book includes three pairs of mature 
European welfare states: Sweden and Denmark, Austria and Germany, 
and the United Kingdom5 and the Republic of Ireland (henceforth Ire-
land). These six countries allow for three paired, cross-case comparisons 
and include representative cases from all of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
worlds of welfare capitalism, including the Social Democratic (or Nor-
dic), the Conservative (or Continental), and the Liberal (or Anglophone) 
cluster. Esping-Andersen’s seminal work has become the cornerstone for 
most scholars interested in welfare state developments and will also be 
used here as a point of reference. Using pairs from various regime typolo-
gies increases the range of contexts and thus the variance on the main 
explanatory factors, including institutions, interests, and ideas. The six 
selected cases are characterised by both regime specificities and country 
differences, which will allow me to also assess the impact of institutional 
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contexts and historical trajectories in a comparative “most similar” and 
“most different” framework (cf., Przeworski and Teune 1970).
 Finally, the evidence for this book is based on a careful evaluation of the 
secondary literature as well as a wide range of primary sources, including 
media reports, policy papers, legislative documents, and a series of ap-
proximately 100 semi-structured interviews conducted with policymakers 
and stakeholders between 2006 and 2009 (for a detailed list, please refer 
to pages 315ff ). The first round of mainly exploratory interviews was con-
ducted in spring 2006, where I gathered initial evidence, and conversed 
with experts, academics, and public officials to learn more about salient 
debates, crucial publications and other important sources of information 
that I could not have known without these on-site encounters. The second 
round of interviews was conducted over a longer period during the first 
half of 2007. The aim of this round of interviews with key individuals close 
to the policy-making process was to learn more about the fine-grained 
processes of policy formation, policy making, and policy implementation 
through detailed discussions. A third round of interviews was concluded 
in January 2008 and deliberately targeted officials in the national Public 
Employment Services and related ministries to learn more about the daily 
activities of policy delivery. The first three interview rounds were held in 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland and the UK, while a fourth and final 
round was conducted in August 2009 in Stockholm to corroborate my 
findings and interpretations of the two Nordic cases.
I.4 Book Outline
The book will proceed as follows. Following this introductory chapter, 
chapter II outlines my theoretical approach in greater detail, including a 
succinct definition of institutions, an outline of historical institutional-
ists’ core assumptions and predictions about institutional stability and 
change, a discussion of the main critiques of historical institutionalist 
scholarship, and a presentation of the current literature on various pat-
terns of gradual, but transformative institutional change. It then synthe-
sises the existing literature and proposes incorporating three actor-cen-
tred mechanisms into the historical-institutionalist approach, including 
reshuffling, realignment, and reassessment. While the first two mecha-
nisms are mainly concerned with actor constellations and actor coalitions 
respectively, i.e., power struggles over resources, the latter mechanism 
focuses on the causal role of normative and cognitive ideas, shaping pub-
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lic policy-making processes and outputs. Th ereafter, I oﬀ er an analytical 
distinction between three possible institutional trajectories, ranging from 
sustained diversity, if not divergence, to uni-modal convergence at the ex-
treme ends, and hybridisation, potentially leading to partial convergence, 
neo-divergence and neo-convergence in between. I close chapter II with 
the presentation of four analytical dimensions of convergence/divergence: 
ideational, organisational, ﬁ nancial, and work incentives. Th is last dimen-
sion includes an analytical grid that diﬀ erentiates positive and negative, 
ﬁ nancial and non-ﬁ nancial incentives in labour market policy regimes.
 Part I of the empirical analysis is divided into two chapters, capturing 
the origin and crisis of European labour market policy regimes. Chapter 
III comprises a historical reconstruction of the origins of labour market 
policy regimes in the late 19th century and the emergence of the “manpower 
revolution” during the 1960s. Th is chapter begins with brieﬂ y tracing the 
origins of unemployment insurance (UI) schemes, labour exchanges, and 
large-scale public works projects during the late 1800s and early 1900s. 
Th e analytical focus is placed, however, on the 1950s and 1960s when a 
new labour market policy paradigm gradually emerged, resulting in path-
setting institutional change. More speciﬁ cally, this new paradigm led to 
the establishment of a legal basis for active labour market policies in most 
Western countries, while also creating the organisational foundation to 
implement active labour market policies on a national scale through the 
establishment and/or modernisation of tripartite Public Employment Ser-
vices.6 I further show that this “manpower revolution” was the immediate 
result of the active propagation and diﬀ usion of Swedish “best practices” 
by the newly founded OECD, whose Manpower Commission was chaired 
by Swedish trade union economist Gösta Rehn, one of the two founding 
fathers of what became known as the Swedish Model (cf., Wadensjö 2001).
 In chapter IV, I demonstrate how the initial oil shock in 1973 shifted 
national policy agendas away from supply-side-oriented to demand-side-
orientated manpower measures. At that time, the underlying assumption 
of policymakers was that the crisis would be temporary, and therefore, the 
responses needed to be designed in a way that cushioned temporary hard-
ships of jobless workers. The second oil shock in 1979, however, shattered 
the hopes of many governments to “wait out” the economic downturn, 
and many policymakers abandoned – some did so involuntarily – Keynes-
ian strategies that were based on deficit spending. The parallel emergence 
and consolidation of monetarist theory, which was inspired by the schol-
arship of Nobel Price winners Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps, trig-
gered a “battle” over economic, labour and social policy ideas, and the 
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pursuit of three different strategies to overcome the crisis: (a) a Nordic, 
mainly Swedish, “social investment state” response that prioritises the 
expansion of the welfare state and the public sector; (b) a Continental 
“labour shedding” response, which relied heavily on a reduction of excess 
labour; and (c) an Anglophone “invisible hand” response, based on mar-
ketisation, privatisation, and deregulation. Hence, I argue that the 1970s 
and, even more so, the 1980s were characterised by ideational and institu-
tional divergence, which led to the crystallisation of three distinct reform 
patterns (cf., Esping-Andersen 1996, 15ff; Siebert 1997, 41; Palier 2004, 1). 
The core principals of each of the three clusters are briefly summarised at 
the end of chapter IV and serve as a “benchmark” against which contem-
porary reform processes and outcomes are measured.
 Part II of the empirical analysis is divided into three chapters, covering 
roughly the past 20 years during which – so I argue – an “activation para-
digm” emerged. Chapter V focuses on the international level and traces 
how the OECD and the EU interpreted the causes of, and remedies for, un-
employment, underemployment and underachievement. In this  chapter, 
I compare and contrast the normative and cognitive ideas that underlie 
the assumptions and prescriptions of both international organizations. I 
outline why the OECD launched the 1992-1994 Jobs Study, briefly sketch 
its mainly “neo-liberal” findings, and show how the OECD – after a series 
of evaluations – gradually reassessed many of its core assumptions and 
prescriptions. Over time, the OECD not only began to promote activa-
tion policy, the modernization of public employment services in line with 
New Public Management writings, and the newly emerging concept of 
flexicurity, but the OECD also acknowledged the economic validity of the 
“Nordic welfare model”. Consistent with this new outlook, the OECD is-
sued recommendations for state-led interventions with respect to lifelong 
learning and the reconciliation of work and family life. I also trace the 
origins of the EU’s European Employment Strategy and explain why the 
EU launched its own benchmarking process, in addition to, but separate 
from, the OECD’s. The EU’s reassessments following critical reviews of 
the EES are also portrayed, which led to – after a reshuffle in the Commis-
sion – the launch of a revised EES that focuses more on “growth and jobs” 
and less on social equity goals. As a consequence, so I argue, an “activa-
tion paradigm” consolidated, and the EU gradually became more “liberal” 
and the OECD more “social democratic”.
 Chapter VI shifts the focus back to national institutions and assesses 
to what extent the cognitive and normative ideas articulated by both the 
EU and the OECD have been translated into new national policy agendas 
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and public policies. For this purpose, an analytical overview of recent in-
stitutional developments is presented, which includes an assessment of 
the four dimensions of labour market policy regimes outlined in chapter 
II. The primary focus is on the same six cases analysed in chapters III 
and IV, but descriptive statistics are presented for – with occasional ref-
erences made to – the other EU-15 countries, except Luxembourg. This 
chapter identifies an ideational and discursive shift in national politics 
across Western Europe, which has been translated into significant or-
ganisational and programmatic changes. It is argued that policymakers 
increasingly pursue similar goals based on shared problem definitions – 
albeit with strategies filtered through national contexts – which has trig-
gered a process of institutional hybridisation, characterised by both, par-
tial convergence and persistence in national diversity. Partial convergence 
is demonstrated with the emergence of an “activation paradigm”, which 
rests on three pillars: (a) activating labour market policies, including early 
interventions, case management, and conditional benefits; (b) a modern, 
customer and results-oriented PES, governed in a managerial style; and 
(c) a more inclusive, employment-promoting welfare state, that mobilises 
also women, older workers, and otherwise “inactive” persons. Persistence 
in differences, in turn, is visible in governments’ expenditure efforts and 
their sources of funding.
 Chapter VII asks how these transformative institutional changes have 
occurred in the context of national politics. For this purpose, the evolu-
tion of labour market policy from the mid-1990s until about 2008 is care-
fully traced in the two illustrative cases of Germany and Ireland. Both of 
these countries are important cases in analytical terms. Germany is the 
archetypical Bismarckian welfare state and co-ordinated market econo-
my, characterised by a complex system of veto points. Hence, the German 
model has often been described as prone to incremental, institutional 
adaptations and path-dependent evolution (e.g., Manow and Seils 2000; 
Wood 2001). As such, it is a “least-likely” case for radical change and insti-
tutional transformation (George and Bennett 2005, 121), and yet, we ob-
serve various reforms that could be interpreted as “path breaks” and “path 
departures” (Ebbinghaus 2005). Ireland, in turn, has pursued a deliberate 
course of institutional hybridisation (NESC 2005a), seeking to reconcile a 
liberal labour market with neo-corporatism and welfare expansion. Thus, 
both countries can serve as principal cases in the tracing of how institu-
tional legacies affect such reform efforts and how “champions of institu-
tional change” find the necessary “support, allies and relays to turn a frag-
ile initiative into a new institutional path” (Djelic and Quack 2007, 165). 
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In this chapter, I argue that both countries adopted similar institutional 
trajectories despite different welfare traditions, different partisan compo-
sitions, and different economic circumstances. More specifically, I trace 
the developments that have led to (1) the introduction of activating labour 
market policy; (2) the introduction of childcare strategies that challenge 
these countries’ underlying norm of the male breadwinner model; and (3) 
the (partial) replacement of demand-reducing, “early exit” programmes 
with active ageing and lifelong learning strategies. While “power politics” 
certainly shaped the timing and content of the new public policies ad-
opted by the respective parliaments, the similarity of these two countries’ 
trajectories further emphasises the importance and reality of the EU/
OECD’s influence and the cognitive/normative reassessments of policy-
makers.
 Chapter VIII concludes by summarising the responses to the three cen-
tral questions posed in the introduction and presents a brief reflection on 
the effects of the global financial and economic crisis on the future of the 
“activation paradigm”.
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II Theoretical Approach
II.1 Introduction
Can modern European welfare states withstand contemporary pressures 
associated with economic globalisation, capital mobility, persistent, often 
long-term un- and underemployment, the shift from manufacturing to 
service economies, ageing societies, and changing gender roles and family 
structures, or will they converge on a minimalist, individualistic, US-style 
model? This substantive, empirical and theoretical puzzle is at the very 
heart of most welfare state scholars’ research. Facing the most severe fi-
nancial and economic crisis in 60 years, many researchers have also begun 
asking how well European welfare states are prepared to cope with rising 
levels of unemployment, whether current institutional arrangements are 
sustainable, and how well they are equipped to generate job growth once 
the crisis comes to an end. In order to tackle such complex questions 
about the future of European welfare states, scholars need to have a good 
understanding of welfare states’ past and present forms and functions, 
that is, they need to understand their origins and evolution.
 Since the mid-1980s, a variety of new theoretical approaches have 
emerged offering explanations of social and political phenomena, com-
monly referred to as the New Institutionalism (Steinmo and Thelen 1992). 
Three varieties within this New Institutionalism are commonly identi-
fied:1 Sociological Institutionalism, Rational Choice Institutionalism, and 
Historical Institutionalism (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997). With respect 
to welfare state development, it is scholars associated with the histor-
ical-institutionalist school who have produced a substantial amount of 
the most influential scholarship on welfare states (e.g., Esping-Andersen 
1990; Pierson 1994; 1996; Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Hall and Soskice 
2001; Pierson 2001b; Rothstein and Steinmo 2002b; Streeck and Thelen 
2005a; Ebbinghaus 2006; Palier 2010). In light of these seminal works, 
historical institutionalism is often said to have emerged as the dominant 
approach to explaining welfare state trajectories and institutional evolu-
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tion more generally (Amenta 2003, 91f ), while countless scholars use their 
findings as the starting point for their own research.
 This book also falls in line with historical-institutionalist thought and 
aims to make three analytical contributions; two that are generally use-
ful when analysing processes of institutional evolution, and one that is 
specific to the topic of this book. First, this book contributes to ongoing 
debates on regime type divergence and convergence by succinctly sum-
marising and analytically fine-tuning the welfare state regime change 
trajectories theorised about in the literature.2 Second, it aims to develop 
a synthesis of leading historical institutionalists’ work, while introducing 
three additional actor-, in contrast to, process-oriented causal mecha-
nisms with which gradual and yet transformative patterns of institutional 
evolution can be explained. And third, this book offers an analytical tool 
kit for systematically analysing temporal and cross-national institutional 
changes in labour market policy regimes, which is considered an impor-
tant area in the field of welfare state studies. In summary, my aim is to 
conceptualise political processes of institutional continuity and change 
and utilise existing and novel analytical tools that help us understand 
how certain kinds of institutional change become possible, or even prob-
able, and why.
 Considering these ambitions, the following chapter is divided into six 
sections. First, I offer a succinct definition of institutions; second, I out-
line historical institutionalists’ core assumptions and predictions about 
institutional stability and change; third, I discuss the main critiques of 
historical institutionalist scholarship and present the current literature 
on various patterns of gradual but yet transformative institutional change; 
fourth, I synthesise the existing literature and propose three new actor-
oriented modifications to the historical institutionalist literature; fifth, I 
analytically distinguish three possible institutional outcomes, which are 
derived from the existing literature; and sixth, I present an analytical grid 
to objectively assess institutional reform trajectories in the area of labour 
market policy regimes.
II.2 Defi ning Institutions
Welfare states comprise various sets of institutions, both formal and in-
formal. Strikingly, and despite the rapid growth of institutionalist scholar-
ship, historical or otherwise, there is no single, commonly accepted defi-
nition of an institution. While many researchers refer to Douglas North’s 
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(1990, 3) seminal definition of institutions as “the rules of the game in a 
society or, more generally ... the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction”, not everybody can agree on this definition, nor is it 
– due to its breadth – particularly helpful in every study. For instance, 
Streeck and Thelen (2005b, 10) argue that modern economies are politi-
cal economies, i.e., they are governed by politics, in which key rules are 
formalised. Accordingly, informal rules such as the institution of a hand-
shake in a German business meeting, while certainly important, need not 
be included. They consequently argue that the focus should be placed 
on “formalized rules that may be enforced by calling upon a third party” 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 10, emphasis added).
 Accordingly, in this book, I define institutions as formalised rules, 
which are enforceable by a third party. Such a definition has important 
analytical advantages. In contrast to definitions used by many sociologi-
cal institutionalists, informal institutions are explicitly excluded, which 
sharpens the study’s analytical precision. More specifically, when in-
formal elements are included in the definition, it becomes difficult to 
objectively determine an institution’s constitutive parts. Moreover, and 
perhaps more importantly, I argue that it is precisely the informal under-
pinnings of an institution that condition its stability. Therefore, informal 
elements become part of the explanans of formal institutional evolution, 
i.e., the explanandum (use of terms based on, Hempel and Oppenheim 
1948). Similarly, the definition put forward by these two authors has an 
important advantage to those institutionalists – typically scholars that 
are identified as applying a particular interpretation of rational-choice 
institutionalism – that see institutions as providing order to a “chaotic 
world”. In other words, while these “rational choice” scholars see institu-
tions as equilibrium outcomes3 that are voluntarily created in order to 
induce stability into collective action (e.g., Krasner 1991; Shepsle and 
Bonchek 1997), Streeck and Thelen’s definition highlights authority and 
obligation. Stressing the “obligatory” rather than the “voluntary” charac-
ter of institutions, in turn, means that institutions no longer need to be 
based on functionalist assumptions as actors may be obliged to follow an 
institution even if it is against their will (Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 11). 
Adopting a non-equilibrium and non-functionalist based interpretation 
makes institutions subject to evolution, in contrast to stasis, a process 
that is driven “if by nothing else, by its necessarily imperfect enactment 
on the ground, in direction often unpredictable” (Streeck and Thelen 
2005b, 16). This is to say that institutions are continuously contested or 
reinterpreted and policymakers need to continuously adjust and revise 
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institutional design decisions if institutions are to persist (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005b, 16).
 To summarise, while the definition adopted in this book is not without 
its problems, it has certain advantages. On the one hand, it is narrow 
enough to avoid theoretical indeterminacy by explicitly focusing on for-
malised and consciously designed rules, while it also avoids theoretical 
over-determinacy that necessarily comes with scholars who adopt func-
tionalist assumptions about institutions. On the other hand, this defini-
tion is broad enough to allow for the inclusion of formalised structures, 
which are typically based on codified rules, laws, or constitutions (e.g., 
vocational training systems or Public Employment Services), and pub-
lic policies, i.e., programmes issued by governments with the intent to 
regulate the life of citizens and achieve particular societal goals (e.g., 
early retirement schemes or occupational training measures for the un-
employed).
II.3 Historical Institutionalism: Explaining Continuity
Historical-institutionalist analyses offer important mid-range theoretical 
insights and typically share two focal points, namely history and institu-
tions, which enable us to better understand government, politics and pub-
lic policy (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 696). The focus on history implies 
that historical-institutionalist researchers take the temporal dimension 
of their study seriously, i.e., they analyse politics as a “film” rather than 
as one or more “snapshots”, as is often done in game-theoretic scholar-
ship (Pierson 1996b). Historical institutionalists argue that politics is con-
tingent on past events, and therefore historical legacies need to be part 
and parcel of any explanation of institutional development. Institutions, 
in turn, are often used as both independent variables, i.e., they are used 
as explanatory variables (the setting), and dependent variables, i.e., as the 
phenomenon to be explained (the outcome).
 The strength of historical institutionalists’ analyses is seen in ex-
plaining welfare state origins and, in particular, their trajectories. For 
this purpose, historical institutionalists build on three sets of explana-
tory variables, including (a) societal interests and their power vis-à-vis 
competing interests, (b) institutional arrangements that underpin pol-
itics and markets, and (c) ideational factors, constraining or enabling 
welfare state trajectories (cf., Hall 1997). Their main argument, in turn, 
is usually undertaken in two steps, including an interest-based expla-
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nation of institutional origins, and an institutions-based explanation of 
structural continuity.4 Accordingly, when explaining welfare state origins 
and initial trajectories, many historical-institutionalist scholars identify 
societal “power resources” or “class struggles” as the main variables (Es-
ping-Andersen 1985; Esping-Andersen 1990; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; 
for a more contemporary study, see Mares 2003). They postulate that 
“the struggle over welfare states is a struggle over distribution” (Huber 
and Stephens 2001, 17), and thus coalitions between or across societal 
groups and the existence of large, cohesive political parties such as Social 
Democratic, Christian Democratic, or market-liberal parties that hold 
power over substantive periods of time determine the form and gener-
osity of states’ social policy regimes (in addition to Esping-Andersen, 
see also, Korpi 1983). A central theme in this literature is that large la-
bour union movements, coupled with a hegemonic Social Democratic 
party, have led to the creation of generous, universal welfare states (e.g., 
Stephens 1980). Similarly, the dominance of Christian Democratic par-
ties has also generated rather generous welfare states, but of a different 
character. Christian Democratic, or Continental, welfare states rely more 
heavily on the family to provide certain social services, favour a male 
bread-winner model, and make access to generous benefits conditional 
on employment (Esping-Andersen 1985; Esping-Andersen 1990; Kersber-
gen 1995). Lastly, the Liberal welfare states typically lacked strong Social 
Democratic or Christian Democratic parties at critical junctures in time, 
and are characterised by fragmented societal interests and universal, but 
minimalist welfare states (for an excellent review of how racial prejudices 
undermined the development of a more comprehensive welfare state in 
the US, see Katznelson 2005).
 The second step in historical-institutionalist analyses is based on the 
argument that once welfare state structures and supplementary public 
policies are put into place, they leave policy legacies behind that condi-
tion subsequent governments’ room for manoeuvre, i.e., they make poli-
tics path dependent. Path dependency refers to the idea that the longer an 
institution remains in place, the more actors adjust their behaviour and 
expectations according to this particular institutional setting, and thus, 
the more resilient it will become to radical changes. In other words, ini-
tial steps down a particular path will encourage further steps down that 
same path, and over time, paths not chosen “may become increasingly dis-
tant, increasingly unreachable alternatives” (Pierson 2004, 64). While the 
investment in existing institutions may therefore make alternative paths 
more costly, the existence and reliance on particular institutions also gen-
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erate “winners”, who, in turn, will have a vested interest in preserving the 
institutional status quo. As a consequence, institutions become “sticky” 
and “locked-in”, as politicians, who aggregate and channel societal group 
preferences into their party manifestos, refrain from pursuing policies 
that damage their chances for re-election. This means that the underly-
ing mechanisms that trigger path dependency are positive feedback and 
increasing returns (Pierson 2000, 252). In light of these assumptions, Pier-
son argues that – in settings where path-dependent processes take place 
– political life is likely to be characterised by four features:
1.  Multiple equilibria. Under a set of initial conditions conducive to 
positive feedback, a range of outcomes is generally possible.
2.  Contingency. Relatively small events, if occurring at the right mo-
ment, can have large and enduring consequences.
3.  A critical role for timing and sequencing. In these path-dependent 
processes, when an event occurs may be crucial. Because early parts 
of a sequence matter much more than later parts, an event that hap-
pens ‘too late’ may have no eﬀ ect, although it might have been of 
great consequence if timing had been diﬀ erent.
4.  Inertia. Once such a process has been established, positive feedback 
will generally lead to a single equilibrium. Th is equilibrium will in 
turn be resistant to change (Pierson 2004, 44, emphasis in original).
However, this positive feedback process is not the only causal mechanism 
identified by historical institutionalists. Most prominently, Hall and Sos-
kice (2001) argue that specific institutional complementarities, or a set 
of institutions that strengthen and reinforce one another, also promote 
institutional continuity. Hall and Soskice herein distinguish two differ-
ent types of equilibrium production regimes, including Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs) and Co-ordinated Market Economies (CMEs), which 
can succinctly be summarised as follows:
In one, ﬁ rms coordinate with other actors primarily through competi-
tive markets, characterized by arms-length relations and formal con-
tracting. Here, equilibrium outcomes are dictated by relative prices, 
market signals, and familiar marginalist considerations. In the other 
modality, ﬁ rms coordinate with other actors through processes of stra-
tegic interaction of the kind typically modeled by game theory. Here, 
equilibrium outcomes depend on the institutional support available for 
the formation of credible commitments, including support for eﬀ ective 
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information-sharing, monitoring, sanctioning, and deliberation. ... At 
the one end of the spectrum stand liberal market economies (LMEs) 
where relations between ﬁ rms and other actors are coordinated pri-
marily by competitive markets. At the other end are coordinated mar-
ket economies (CMEs) where ﬁ rms typically engage in more strategic 
interaction with trade unions, suppliers of ﬁ nance, and other actors 
(Hall and Gingrich 2004, 7f).
Therefore, rather than locating the source of stability in political parties 
that lack the political power or will to push through (unpopular) reforms, 
it is firms that are reluctant to dismantle well-established institutional 
configurations. Removing or substantially altering even parts of such in-
stitutionally complementary production regimes would disrupt its insti-
tutional equilibrium and consequently undermine a country’s competi-
tive advantages.
 To summarise, based on the theoretical premises of institutional re-
production through complementarities or institutional inertia through 
positive feedback and increasing returns, most scholars in the histor-
ical-institutionalist tradition either assume that institutions develop 
only incrementally through adaptation, leaving the overall institutional 
structures intact, or they postulate that only a dramatic exogenous shock 
can cause institutional innovations due to radically altered external 
conditions. Accordingly, many historical-institutionalist scholars see 
an image of a “frozen welfare landscape” and perceive welfare states as 
“immovable objects” (Esping-Andersen 1996, 24; Pierson 1998, 539, re-
spectively).5
II.4 Historical Institutionalism: Beyond Continuity
In recent years, historical institutionalists have become increasingly dis-
satisfied with their paradigm’s lack of analytical flexibility. More and more 
scholars have begun to seek options other than stability, on the one hand, 
and radical change triggered by external shocks, on the other. The need 
for more analytical flexibility has further been emphasised by the work of 
numerous prominent scholars, including, for instance, Bleses and Seeleib-
Kaiser (2004), Clasen (2005), Lessenich (2003), Palier (2004), Palier and 
Martin (2007), and Scharpf and Schmidt (2000b), which has shown sig-
nificant institutional changes in European welfare state trajectories, way 
beyond what would be expected by Pierson’s work, and in directions that 
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do not necessarily fit the expectations outlined by Esping-Andersen (see 
section II.5 below). From this, a two-fold conclusion was drawn: first, 
“change is difficult, but it happens!” (Hemerijck 2007, 15); and, second, 
we need new tools to understand the conditions under which this change 
occurs (Streeck and Thelen 2005a).
 In response to these conclusions, Streeck and Thelen (2005a) and their 
collaborators attempted to broaden historical-institutionalist scholars’ 
analytical tool kit. Their recent work goes beyond the expected outcomes 
of institutional “lock in” and institutional breakdown as a result of ex-
ternal shocks by theorising about the possibility of incremental and yet 
transformative institutional change. How gradual and yet transformative 
institutional development becomes possible is captured by five causal 
mechanisms – where mechanisms are understood as “frequently recur-
ring ways in which things happen” (Elster 1989; Scharpf 1997, cited in 
Thelen 2003, 233): displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and exhaus-
tion (Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 19ff ). Displacement describes a process 
in which dominant institutions are gradually replaced by dormant or for-
eign institutions. These new institutions, in turn, generate institutional 
incoherence, which creates space for deviant behaviour and increasingly 
cultivates a new institutional logic. Layering refers to a process where 
new institutions are added onto existing institutions. These new institu-
tions gradually siphon off the support for the old institutions, and the 
initial compromise between old and new institutions slowly results in the 
defeat of the old ones. Differential growth is herein the main explana-
tory process. Drift has to do with deliberate neglect. Even though external 
conditions require institutional adaptation, actors purposely refrain from 
doing so, which gradually makes the existing institutional setting obsolete 
or minimises its value or functions. Conversion occurs when old institu-
tions are redeployed to serve new functions or purposes, or new purposes 
are attached to old structures and, lastly, exhaustion describes a process 
where institutions gradually wither away, as the normal workings of the 
institution depletes its own functions or resources, due to decreasing re-
turns or over-extension.
 We can conclude that rather than expecting institutional change only 
in response to external shocks (and institutional reproduction otherwise), 
change can and does occur, albeit under a “veil of continuity” (expres-
sion borrowed from Schedler 2000). The following figure summarises the 
above described results of institutional change.
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II.5 Causal Mechanisms to Explain Institutional Transformations: 
Ideas and Agency
While Streeck and Th elen’s new conceptualisation of processes of insti-
tutional change has vastly improved our understanding of institutional 
evolution, it remains somewhat underspeciﬁ ed with respect to the rel-
evant actors and how these actors trigger the processes-oriented causal 
mechanisms of displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and exhaustion. 
The authors, however, provide two focal points. On a general level, they 
argue that fundamental change “ensues when a multitude of actors switch 
from one logic of action to another” (Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 18). This 
switch may happen as institutions, which are assumed to be political com-
promises, are continuously challenged by purposive political and societal 
actors. These challengers include both the “losers” of the status quo who 
are eagerly waiting for an opportunity to alter or eliminate existing insti-
tutions, and the “winners”, if and when they become disappointed with 
particular institutional arrangements over time (cf., Thelen 2003). On 
a more specific level, Streeck and Thelen recommend shifting the at-
tention to more subtle influences by emphasising the role of political 
actors working on the sidelines, whose “active sponsorship of amend-
ments, additions or revisions” can make or break a government’s reform 
agenda (Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 24). In either case, Streeck and Thel-
en’s work suggests that paying particular attention to coalitions formed 
among powerful actors is the most promising way forward if we want to 
locate the sources for transformative institutional change (see also Hall 
and Thelen 2009, 25).
 A focus on “coalitional politics” and shifts in the “balance of power” also 
means, however, that institutional change is more often than not reduced 
to struggles over “scarce resources” in which political competition is lim-
ited to ideological choices (within particular institutional constraints). 
Table 1 Types of Institutional Evolution: Processes and Outcomes
Continuity Discontinuity
Incremental Reproduction by Adaptation Transformative Change
Disruptive Survival and Return Breakdown and Replacement
Source: Streeck and Thelen 2005b, 9
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While “power politics” is certainly a very important ingredient in explain-
ing institutional evolution, it does not capture the whole story. Deciding 
what to fight for includes, and is often preceded by, “collective puzzle-
ment” (Heclo 1974, 305), i.e., social processes in which actors’ cognitive 
and normative ideas – old and new – can become the pinnacle nexus for 
institutional continuity or change. The omission of an ideational vari-
able thus leads to incomplete explanations, or even worse, the detection 
of spurious relationships. Accordingly, in what follows, I will develop an 
analytical framework that builds on, but also redirects, Streeck and Thel-
en’s research agenda in three steps. First, I will elaborate on this book’s 
underlying ontology of agency, which is necessarily different from that of 
Streeck, Thelen and many other historical institutionalists; second, I will 
briefly review how historical-institutionalist scholarship has incorporat-
ed “ideational” explanatory factors in recent studies of the welfare state; 
and third, I will offer three actor-centred causal mechanisms with which 
we can analytically distinguish power politics “as usual” from collective 
puzzlement, and derive expectations on how the two processes interact.
II.5a Ontology of Action and Agency
As the previous sections in this chapter have shown, many historical in-
stitutionalists explicitly or implicitly borrow assumptions about political 
behaviour and institutional design from the rational choice literature. For 
instance, Pierson’s understanding of path dependency is based on positive, 
economic/electoral interests-based feedback loops, while Hall and Sos-
kice’s assumptions about equilibrium outcomes and institutional comple-
mentarities presume rational actors, whose decisions are based on a cost/
beneﬁ t calculus. Even Streeck and Th elen prioritise rational action when 
they stress that institutions “are the object of ongoing skirmishes as actors 
try to achieve advantage by interpreting or redirecting institutions in pur-
suit of their goals, or by subverting or circumventing rules that clash with 
their interests” (Streeck and Th elen 2005b, 19). Th is implies that the actors 
are assumed to strategically pursue their “interests”, which are based on a 
set of clearly speciﬁ ed and hierarchically ranked preferences. Th e ontol-
ogy in this book takes a diﬀ erent perspective as it explicitly challenges the 
assumption that political actors are always rational utility-maximisers. In-
stead, actors are seen as reﬂ exive agents in the sense that they continuously 
adapt to internal and external ideational stimuli, which can alter their be-
liefs about what is appropriate, eﬀ ective, eﬃ  cient, or modern. Th is kind 
of treatment, I believe, does justice to the historical-institutional premise 
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that actors are embedded in their historical contexts, which inform their 
“mental maps”, while also taking the role of normative and cognitive ideas 
seriously as Peter Hall did in his seminal works (1986; 1989; 1993). Th e crux 
of the argument about actors’ motivations is that in politics in general, and 
with respect to welfare politics in particular, policymakers face “problem 
situations” for which neither ends nor means are stable and preferences are 
not clearly delineable (cf., Whitford 2002, 342). Rather, the actors’ creativ-
ity and their situation at that particular time in history becomes a crucial 
element in the deﬁ nition of desirable outcomes and appropriate avenues. 
Th is implies that the conception of policymakers as rational individuals is 
problematic in at least three ways: (a) policymakers may not a priori know 
what their preference about a certain public policy or political structure 
is. More speciﬁ cally, there may be great uncertainty about the most ap-
propriate means to a desired end, while the end itself is also evolving over 
time and therefore never ﬁ xed (source of inspiration, Whitford 2002); this 
means (b) that actors cannot unambiguously identify the “winners” and 
“losers” of proposed institutional changes because the changes are com-
plex, costs and beneﬁ ts are widely diﬀ used, and many eﬀ ects are only vis-
ible in the long run; and (c) the assumption of a purely functional logic 
of institutions is not only problematic due to actors’ inability to perfectly 
predict the future or an institution’s implementation on the ground – as 
Streeck and Th elen argue – but also because it downplays the role of nor-
mative ideas, which underlie political action and set behavioural boundar-
ies for policymakers and other stakeholders.
 Ideas, in addition to benefit-maximising interests, are therefore the 
“medium by which people can imagine a state of affairs other than the 
status quo and such imaginations might plausibly spur them to act to try 
and make changes” (Lieberman 2002, 698). Ideas can thus offer institu-
tional alternatives that were previously unavailable, or rule out others on 
the basis of normative or cognitive predispositions. But rather than using 
ideas in a deterministic way, I also concur with Sheri Berman who writes 
that social “scientists must be able to explain the backstory, why some of 
the innumerable ideas in circulation achieve prominence in the political 
realm at particular moments and others not. Since no intellectual vacuum 
ever exists, what is really at issue here is ideational change, how individu-
als, groups, or societies exchange old ideas for new ones” (Berman 2001, 
233). Thus, what I suggest is that we analyse and pay close attention jointly 
to the effects of historical trajectories, actor constellations, and the role of 
normative and cognitive ideas, rather than treating each of them as com-
peting variables. With respect to ontological considerations, this means 
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that it is assumed that political actors constantly seek and actively solicit 
institutional design alternatives to existing formal structures and public 
policies, while new or re-emerging normative or cognitive ideas may oﬀ er 
new “scripts” about what is an eﬃ  cient, modern, or legitimate institutional 
design (e.g., Fligstein 1991). Institutional entrepreneurs are therefore seen 
as being able to take a “reﬂ ective stance towards established practices”, i.e., 
they can envision alternative processes and outcomes (Beckert 1999, 785). 
Accordingly, it is this focus on actors’ ideas that allows us to understand 
how “human agency can defy the constraints of political and social struc-
tures and create new political possibilities” (Lieberman 2002, 698).
II.5b The Role of Ideas in Historical-Institutionalist Writings
While there are few social scientists who would argue that “ideas” do not 
matter in “unsticking” institutions and “unﬁ xing” preferences and norms 
(Schmidt 2008), there remains great disagreement about when and how 
ideas matter, and why some ideas are inﬂ uential, while others fade without 
having any impact. At the risk of oversimpliﬁ cation, one can identify es-
sentially two groups of scholars who utilise ideas as explanatory variables. 
First, there are the “traditional” historical institutionalists who emphasise 
institutional continuity, which is occasionally ruptured by some external 
crisis. For them, ideas are essential during these “crisis moments” because 
actors are then, and only then, open up to new ideas (e.g., Blyth 2002; Hall 
1989; McNamara 1998). In this scholarship, ideas are solely used as a “resid-
ual” variable, whose explanatory power is established by revealing that all 
other interest and institution-based explanations have failed (e.g., Berman 
1998; Parsons 2003). Ideas are thus reduced to “road maps showing actors 
how to maximize their interests” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 11) or “stra-
tegic weapons” used in political battles (Blyth 2002). Th e consequence of 
this particular treatment entails that these scholars retain an ontology of 
rational – as opposed to reﬂ exive – action and agency, while analytically 
prioritising ruptured rather than incremental institutional change.
 However, there is also a second group of historical institutionalists who 
use ideas as causal variables in explaining incremental but transformative 
change (Heclo 1974; Hemerijck and Visser 2003; Béland and Hacker, 2004; 
Béland 2005; Hemerijck 2007; 2008). Th ese scholars consider political ac-
tors not only as “vote maximisers” but also as “problem solvers”, who con-
stantly seek new information about institutional alternatives. When poli-
cymakers and institutional entrepreneurs “collectively wonder what to do”, 
access to new cognitive and normative ideas can lead to a re-evaluation of 
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existing policies, programmes or even paradigms, which can then trigger 
institutional changes (even in the absence of a crisis and ahead of policy 
failures). For these scholars, political actors and institutional entrepre-
neurs “not only ‘power’ (or whatever the verb form of that approach might 
be); they also puzzle” (Heclo 1974, 306). Accordingly, these scholars base 
their research in the literature on transnational policy diﬀ usion and social 
learning with which they seek to “open the ‘black box’ of the cognitive and 
normative orientations of policy actors” (Hemerijck and Visser 2003, 2).
 To summarise, we can identify four types of historical-institutionalist 
approaches that deal with the causes of institutional change (see table 
2 below). First, “traditional” historical institutionalists argue that insti-
tutions are “sticky” and will – in the absence of a major external shock 
– adapt to challenges, thus reproducing themselves over time (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Pierson 2004). Second, we have those scholars who ar-
gue that institutions incrementally change as actors’ interests adapt to 
changing environments. While external shocks are not a necessary condi-
tion for incremental but potentially transformative changes, these schol-
ars rely primarily on the interplay of rational actors, the distribution of 
power among these actors, and the institutions in which they are embed-
ded to explain change (Hall and Thelen 2009; Streeck and Thelen 2005b). 
The third group of scholars also utilises ideas as explanatory variables, 
but only if and when an external crisis forces political and social actors 
to reassess their normative and causal preconceptions (Blyth 2002; Hall 
1989; McNamara 1998). Finally, there is a group of scholars that argues 
that much institutional change can be explained by the gradual chang-
es in policymakers’ normative and cognitive beliefs (Heclo 1974; Visser 
and Hemerijck 2003; Béland and Hacker, 2004; Béland 2005; Hemerijck 
2007). The following table shows these competing schools of thought.
Table 2 Competing Causal Mechanisms and Necessary Conditions for 
Transformative Institutional Change
Interests (powering) Ideas (puzzling)
External shock
(crisis, abrupt and 
revolutionary change)
Paul Pierson
Gøsta Esping-Andersen
Peter Hall (1989)
Mark Blyth
Kate McNamara
Endogenous evolution 
(no crisis, incremental yet 
transformative change)
Peter Hall (2001)
Kathy Thelen
Wolfgang Streeck
Hugh Heclo
Anton Hemerijck
Jelle Visser
Source of inspiration: Hemerijck 2007
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In what follows, I seek to synthesise the “powering” and “puzzling” expla-
nations of endogenous, evolutionary change by analytically distinguish-
ing three actor-based mechanisms.
II.5c  Three Actor-Centred Causal Mechanisms to Explain 
Transformative Institutional Change: Reshuffl  ing, 
Realignment, and Reassessment
Fritz Scharpf (1997, 29) reminds us that “in a world that is exceedingly 
complex and in which we will often be studying unique cases, we must 
have a good idea of what to look for if we wish to discover anything worth-
while”. This section seeks to do precisely that. In an attempt to simplify 
a complex reality, I first establish the political contexts in which actors 
operate (i.e., the political structures) and subsequently propose three ac-
tor-oriented causal mechanisms, which identify under which conditions 
institutional entrepreneurs are able to identify and possibly agree on an 
institutional path that departs from the status quo and thus may lead to 
institutional transformation. These latter three causal mechanisms ana-
lytically differentiate between actor constellations, actor coalitions, and 
actors’ ideas. Empirically, however, these processes are not mutually ex-
clusive. Rather, the mechanisms are likely to occur simultaneously to the 
effect that, if they pull in the same direction, the mechanisms reinforce 
one another, or, if they pull in opposite directions, they may weaken one 
another.
 Political Structures and Institutional Change
The development of economic institutions and welfare states is embed-
ded in a political process, which is highly conditional on existing political 
structures. The most important political structures include electoral and 
legislative institutions. Electoral institutions are important because they 
condition the effective number of political parties and the way in which 
these parties compete.6 The two main electoral institutions typically iden-
tified in the literature include single-member plurality districts (hence-
forth SMD) and systems of proportional representation (PR). There are 
typically four characteristics associated with SMD electoral rules, in-
cluding first, the dominance of two political parties, which alternate in 
heading the government. Second, the electoral competition between the 
two major contenders leads to clearly delineated partisan manifestos that 
allow “voters to identify and choose among competing government op-
tions available to them” (Shugart and Carey 1992, 7), which, third, leads 
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to moderately ideological contests as the main political parties in these 
systems need to “compete for the swing voters in the centre of the political 
spectrum” (Downs 1965; Lijphart 1999, 63). And fourth, as SMD systems 
typically produce single-party cabinets, their governments “promote uni-
fied, decisive leadership and hence coherent policies and fast decision-
making” (Lijphart 1999, 259).
 PR systems, in turn, are typically more inclusive, as governments in 
these systems include “broad interests and multiple parties” (Shugart and 
Carey 1992, 11). Inclusiveness is the intended consequence of a system 
that promotes the viability of small parties and the inevitability of forming 
coalition governments in most cases (Powell 2000, 16). Electoral compe-
tition may therefore be characterised by many competing, often strongly 
ideological, visions and pre-election alliances between parties within the 
same ideological spectrum. The likelihood of swift policy changes may 
be reduced in such systems as compromises among two or more coali-
tion partners are necessary. Thus, the weakness of PR systems is the pres-
ence of many veto players, who may create inertia and deadlocks (Pierson 
2001b; Swank 2002; Tsebelis 2002).
 Irrespective of a country’s electoral rules that condition the number 
and strength of political parties, the level of “fragmentation” in a political 
system may be further amplified by its legislative institutions. Legisla-
tive institutions include those institutions that may present “veto points”, 
such as bicameralism, federalism, or judicial review. Generally speak-
ing, the expectation is that the more veto players and veto points there 
are in a political system, the less responsive it will be to institutional 
change. These political structures, however, only condition the situations 
in which actors find themselves. This is to say, political structures do not 
determine outcomes as politics is ultimately shaped by actors and agency. 
Let us now turn to the actual actor-based mechanisms, including two 
that are derived from political interests (powering) – including actor re-
shuffling and actor realignment – and one that is derived from normative 
and cognitive ideas (puzzling), i.e., the actors’ reassessment of current 
institutional designs.
 Political Interests and Institutional Change
Reshuffling. The first causal mechanism for actor-induced change is one 
that focuses on changes in the composition of the main political actors. 
Most importantly, it is national elections that may result in a reshuffling 
of actor constellations in the executive and/or legislative branches of gov-
ernment, which can subsequently trigger new public policies and changes 
 THEORETICAL APPROACH
to formal structures. The more actors in key positions are reshuffled, and 
the more these new actors’ ideology differs from that of the old actors, 
the greater the potential for change. In other words, a complete change 
in government, say from a centre-left (coalition) government to a centre-
right coalition, increases the likelihood of institutional change (e.g., Boix 
1998; Garrett 1998; Swank 2002). Smaller reshuffles, however, such as the 
replacement of an individual minister or changes in coalition partners, 
also offer an opportunity for new voices to be heard thus triggering fur-
ther institutional contestation and deliberate alterations. What “kind” of 
change a (partially) reshuffled government introduces, however, is dif-
ficult to predict for any specific political party (in any country, at any 
point in time) because the preferences of the actors are highly conditional 
on the overall distribution of power, institutional contexts, as well as the 
interpretation of “problem situations” at that time. Nevertheless, one may 
be able to capture various political parties’ Weltanschauungen during two 
post-war phases of welfare state development, namely the “golden years” 
(1950s to 1970s) and the “age of austerity” (since about 1980) (the latter 
term is borrowed from Pierson 2001b). More specifically, based on the 
seminal work of Esping-Andersen (1990), one can expect that market-
liberal parties during the golden years sought to establish universal, but 
minimalist welfare states that limit market interference, strengthen the 
self-reliance of citizens, and provide means-tested support to those, and 
only those, in actual need. Social Democratic political parties, in turn, 
wanted (a) to “de-commodify” individuals by reducing their dependence 
for socio-economic well-being on market mechanisms, and (b) to coun-
teract unequal social stratification through redistribution. Hence, Social 
Democrats believed in a strong state and sought to generate generous, 
universal welfare policies. Finally, Christian Democratic parties embraced 
a “subsidiarity” principle, which shifted responsibility for welfare admin-
istration and provision to non-state actors including the social partners 
(social insurance schemes), church groups and social NGOs (e.g., services 
for the elderly, disability care and poverty relief ), and the family (child and 
elderly care). Christian Democrats preferred a degree of de-commodifi-
cation somewhere between market-liberal and Social Democratic parties 
and accepted, if not perpetuated, social inequalities due to the fact that 
benefits are employment-related and status preserving, leading to a seg-
mented welfare state.
 Whether, however, partisanship remains a powerful explanatory vari-
able in the age of permanent austerity is debatable (e.g., Huber and Ste-
phens 2001; Korpi and Palme 2003; Allan and Sruggs 2004; Rueda 2006; 
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2007). This controversy is due to competing factors that encourage not 
only welfare cut-backs, but also welfare recalibrations and the defence 
of the status quo. This is to say, even though market-liberal political par-
ties have continued to be key advocates for cost “containment and [the] 
retrenchment of expenditures and institutional revisions”, the extent to 
which they can act on their advocacy depends on the degree of popu-
lar support for existing welfare provisions and the credibility of the ma-
jor opposition party as a defender of the welfare state (Kitschelt 2001, 
274). Likewise, Social Democratic parties may maintain their ambition 
to “modify market outcomes and redistribute wealth to favour the least 
advantaged sectors and advance equality in general” (Boix 1998, 4). But 
these goals have become increasingly difficult to sustain as the interna-
tional division of capital and labour forces Social Democrats to be cost 
conscientious, both with respect to public deficits and taxation (Pierson 
2001a, 424). Finally, the portfolio of the Christian Democrats is also com-
promised in at least in two ways: first, fiscal austerity also limits Christian 
Democrats’ room for manoeuvre, which, in turn, may affect their abil-
ity to pursue “consensual” politics (cf., Kersbergen 1995). Second, socio-
economic changes associated with secularisation, emancipation and de-
industrialisation require Christian Democrats to adapt their ideological 
positioning as their “core” electorate shrinks (Korthouwer 2008, 9).
 We can thus conclude that even though partisan actors still compete on 
various political platforms, politics in times of austerity is very different 
from politics during more expansionary times. Hence, the question is not 
only under what conditions political partisanship matters (for the evolu-
tion of welfare institutions), but also “how much” and “to what effect”. This 
also means, however, that even though political choice remains “impor-
tant though much more constrained by the new more internationalized 
economic environment” (Huber and Stephens 2001, 1), every description 
of welfare state evolution will remain incomplete without considering the 
effects of political reshuffles and partisan competition.
Realignment. The second dimension of actor-induced institutional change 
focuses on how (competing) interests are mediated, coalitions are formed, 
and pacts are negotiated. Hence, it not only matters who is “in power”, but 
also what resources these actors have and what allegiances are possible. 
In other words, for an explanation of institutional continuity and change, 
it is important to be sensitive to how actors (re-)align themselves in the 
face of political struggles over power and ideas. Politics is, after all, a game 
in which actors, whose positions are less loudly heard or represented, are 
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constantly waiting for an opportunity to shift the dominant discourses 
and agendas (cf., Schmidt 2008). These “marginal” or “marginalised” ac-
tors may become empowered through changes in the political environ-
ment, or empower themselves through a realignment of political forces, 
which allows for the articulation of institutional alternatives, which, in 
turn, shifts the power balances away from some actors in favour of others. 
Realignments of actors can therefore cause or prevent the formation of 
powerful cross-party coalitions, strengthen or weaken intra-party cohe-
sion, and/or contribute to the construction of coalitions between political 
parties and societal actors, all of which constitute possible elements in 
explaining institutional continuity and change.
 The most important actors outside of parliament are the “social part-
ners”, namely employers’ representatives and associations, on the one 
hand, and organised labour, on the other. The social partners play a cru-
cial role in both organising and reorganising welfare states and socio-eco-
nomic outcomes. With respect to the former, traditional forms of social 
partnership are centred on wage negotiations, but also include the co- or 
self-administration of most welfare states’ social insurance and labour 
market programmes. With respect to the latter, the social partners are 
consulted before major welfare state change is enacted in most countries 
and can thus influence committee opinions, parliamentary debates, and 
government decisions. The social partners can also play a facilitating role 
in co-ordinating policy initiatives and implementing welfare reforms, or 
obstruct changes to the status quo by defending their clienteles’ interests 
(Ebbinghaus 2001, 103). Hence, (failure to build an) alignment with the 
social partners, or any one part(y) of the social partners, may be another 
critical element in the explanation of welfare state change. The traditional 
“power resources” literature, for instance, stresses that the alignment of 
Social Democrats with an encompassing labour movement was critical 
in establishing the Swedish welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1985; Korpi 
1983). Likewise, more recent literatures explain welfare change in Ireland, 
Italy or Portugal with reference to the emergence of encompassing “new 
social pacts” that include, but are not limited to, negotiated agreements 
with the traditional social partners (Rhodes 2003).
 Ultimately, actor-centred explanations of institutional evolution need 
to look “at” and “into” political parties, which remain the main vehicles for 
change, but also “beyond” them, because alignments with other societal 
actors may be critical for the occurrence, direction, and scope of change. 
In other words, whether or not old and new social partners are aligned 
with or “powering against” the government (or the opposition) can have 
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important effects on institutional development. This is the case because 
co-operation, “concertation” or “pacting” not only creates political legiti-
macy for (unpopular) changes, but also creates more balanced results and 
reduces the likelihood of the subsequent defection of the involved actors 
(Culpepper 2002, 779).
 Ideas and Institutional Change
Reassessment. While the mechanisms of reshuﬄ  ing and realignment an-
swers Hall and Th elen’s plea for the study of institutional change as a “pro-
cess built on coalitional politics” (2009, 20), the third mechanism, reassess-
ment, goes beyond interest-based accounts by focusing on the underlying 
ideas and collective puzzling that motivate politics. Th is type of broadened 
analytical framework is both an empirical necessity and an analytical ad-
vancement because it is “ideas [that] explain the form of change that is 
enacted” (Heﬀ ernan 2002, 749). Only by incorporating ideas into the an-
alytical repertoire we can explain why and how partisan ideologies and 
positions change, why inter- and intra-party divisions emerge, and under 
what conditions actors (re-)align in old or new ways. Because ideas are a 
fuzzy concept, I analytically distinguish between two types of ideas that are 
frequently used in social science research: normative and cognitive ideas 
(e.g., Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 9). Normative ideas specify criteria for 
distinguishing just from unjust or appropriate from inappropriate public 
policy and political structures. Th is is to say, the analytical focus on norma-
tive ideas concerns itself with identifying the values that policymakers (and 
other stakeholders) uphold. Accordingly, normative ideas set “ideational 
boundaries” for institutional designers, thus ruling out some options a pri-
ori. Likewise, normative ideas can serve as an “ideational compass”, direct-
ing policymakers in a speciﬁ c direction of institutional change they per-
ceive as an appropriate means to reaching a desirable goal. Cognitive ideas, 
in turn, include ideas about cause-and-eﬀ ect relationships on which poli-
cymakers’ strategies, policy evaluations, and their very goals may be based 
(e.g., Weir 1992). Changes in policymakers’ cognitive ideas may thus di-
rectly aﬀ ect actors’ strategies, preferences, and understandings of “problem 
situations”, and intellectually challenge taken-for-granted institutions or 
processes. Cognitive ideas can therefore either alter the direction of change 
(i.e., the forms and functions of public policies and structures), or aﬀ ect the 
speed of change, serving either as “accelerators” in political processes of 
evidence-based policymaking, where actors’ ambitions are corroborated by 
new information, or as “brakes”, or even “stop signs”, when political reform 
proposals are contradicted by empirical ﬁ ndings or theoretical models.
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 Demonstrating the independent explanatory power of ideas thus neces-
sitates two analytical steps. First, it needs to be shown that a reassessment 
of normative or cognitive ideas does “not simply reﬂ ect group interests or 
material conditions” and second, that these ideas have “made possible new 
courses of action that changed the material world itself ” (Hall 1989, 369). 
While the ﬁ rst step requires a careful evaluation of the processes that lead 
to institutional changes and a “weighing” of the explanatory force of ideas 
against other idiosyncratic factors, the second step can only be substanti-
ated if it can be shown that policymakers were aware of new ideas and that 
these ideas were reﬂ ected in the political discourse (Bennett 1997, 215). 
Th e main theoretical argument is that, through the introduction of new 
normative and/or cognitive ideas, the institutional status quo may become 
increasingly less attractive and policymakers will begin to seek institu-
tional alternatives. Questions about the appropriateness and functionality 
of status-quo institutions may arise if they do not perform as expected, 
that is, when current institutions do not operate eﬃ  ciently especially com-
pared to other – perhaps foreign – institutions. Th is account of relative 
performance, however, does not necessarily presuppose a crisis moment. 
Instead, it may be based on the availability of new evidence or revised in-
terpretations of problem situations by reﬂ exive actors, which therefore 
triggers institutional changes “ahead of failure” (e.g., Hemerijck 2007, 37).
 The introduction of new ideas and interpretations – normative and 
cognitive – can occur through domestic “trial-and-error” learning pro-
cesses or cross-border policy diffusion. If we want to take the latter se-
riously, “we must overcome ‘methodological nationalism’ and combine 
comparative analysis of domestic policies and the study of international 
(European) social policy and its effects in national politics” (Visser and 
Hemerijck 2003, 3). International or transnational policy diffusion can 
thus be analytically seperated from domestic trial-and-error processes, 
and labeled “learning from others”, i.e., the detection, observation and 
examination of politically attractive institutional alternatives in another 
country, or “learning with others”, which entails a social, interactive and 
reiterative process of ideational exchange and deliberation among policy-
makers (cf., Visser and Hemerijck 2003). 
 In sum words, sources for cognitive and normative reassessments can 
come from “above” through international organisations, from the “left 
and right”, i.e., foreign governments, ministries, agencies, or epistemic 
communities, and from “below” through (sub)national experts, the social 
partners, national pressure groups, or NGOs. The following graph visu-
alises the “points of entry” for new ideas, interpretations, and reflections.
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To summarise, the actor-centred, historical-institutionalist approach 
(ACHI) presented in this book is built around three focal points: situ-
ational contexts, power relations, and reflexive agency. In other words, 
ACHI includes carefully tracing the interactions between the various 
powerful political actors over time, who are interested in and capable of 
implementing (or resisting) institutional developments, while remaining 
sensitive to their institutional boundaries and the underlying ideas that 
shape their actions. Therefore, the main theoretical argument is that, in 
the absence of exogenous shocks, transformative institutional develop-
ments become possible when enough powerful actors endorse alternative 
ideas about institutional design. In other words, the presence of political 
actors in disagreement with prevailing institutions is a necessary condi-
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tion for institutional evolution. Political disagreement is not a sufficient 
condition, however, because disagreement needs to be coupled with the 
articulation of a feasible institutional alternative, and the existence of a 
political coalition powerful enough to endorse and translate this institu-
tional alternative into action.
 The ACHI research agenda thus attempts to answer the questions of 
who, when, where, how, and why institutional developments take place. 
To answer the who-question, it is necessary to identify the “core” actors, 
that is to say, the main actors involved in the policymaking process. The 
when- and where-questions are part and parcel of any historical-institu-
tionalist study with a focus on critical junctures, political legacies, in-
stitutional complementarities, timing and sequencing. The how-question 
requires being sensitive to coalitional arrangements and prevailing ideas, 
conducive to inducing institutional development. And finally, when as-
sessing the why-question, it is necessary to pay close attention to the core 
actors’ preferences, their pay-offs, and their ideational underpinnings, 
which “filter” their realities and construct their preferences. It is of cru-
cial importance, however, that ideas in this context are not merely re-
duced to “focal points” around which actors’ preferences converge during 
times of crisis (e.g., Blyth 2002). Actors’ ideas may instead actually change 
independently of external crises because actors may reassess the status 
quo due to processes of critical self reflection and/or the availability of 
new ideas, challenging the appropriateness or functionality of existing 
institutions. The following table presents a synthetic view of the causal 
mechanisms that explain the institutional evolution outlined by historical 
institutionalists.
II.6 Three Institutional Trajectories
Explaining welfare regime change is a complex and challenging task. While 
the academic literature outlined above has generated important insights 
about the impact of political legacies that make institutional changes con-
tingent on past events and has proposed a set of mechanisms that obstruct 
or facilitate institutional changes, it is necessary to also delineate a set of 
potentially observable trajectories in order to understand institutional de-
velopments in relative and comparative terms. At the risk of oversimpli-
fication, and being well aware that welfare state development is a process 
and not a final destination, one can identify three potential, analytical sce-
narios that the academic literature alludes to: (1) continued institutional 
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Table 3 Explaining Institutional Evolution: Summary Table
Mechanisms 
Explaining
Radical Change
Mechanisms 
Explaining 
Reproduction
Mechanisms 
Explaining 
Transformative 
Change
(process-oriented)
Mechanisms 
Explaining 
Transformative 
Change
(actor-oriented)
External Shock
(existing logic no 
longer applies; 
radically alters cost/
benefi t calculations 
of key actors and/
or normative 
& cognitive 
foundation)
Increasing Returns
(sunk costs and 
positive feedback 
loops reinforce pre-
existing institutions; 
alternatives 
increasingly costly) 
Displacement
(defection leads 
to rising salience 
of subordinate 
relative to dominant 
institutions) 
Reshuffl  ing
(introduction/
replacement of 
political actors)
Institutional 
Complementarities
(mutually 
reinforcing sets of 
institutions generate 
comparative 
advantages; 
dismantling of one 
element undermines 
equilibrium of entire 
regime)
Layering
(diff erential growth 
as new elements 
attached to existing 
institutions gradually 
change their status 
and structure)
Realignment
(changes in actor 
coalitions and 
alliances)
Drift
(deliberate neglect 
leads to slippage 
in institutional 
practices)
Reassessment
(shift in political 
actors’ normative/ 
cognitive ideas)
Conversion
(old institutions 
are redeployed to 
new purposes or 
new purposes are 
attached to old 
structures)
Exhaustion
(depletion leads to 
gradual breakdown 
of institutions over 
time)
Sources: Steinmo and Thelen 1992; Pierson 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005b
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diversity across countries; (2) uni-modal or multi-modal convergence on 
commonly identifiable model(s) of pre-existing ideal-typical clusters; and 
(3) hybridisation, i.e., the process of “mixing and matching” of institu-
tions across and within regime types, potentially leading to either partial 
convergence (convergence on some elements, while retaining others), neo-
convergence (the establishment of an entirely new, but common combina-
tion of various institutions) or neo-divergence (the establishment of an 
entirely new, but different combination of institutions).7 The following 
section illustrates these potential trajectories by reference to the litera-
ture on labour market policy regimes. 
 Based on the logic of path dependency, the first possible institutional 
trajectory is – once a particular path has been taken – sustained insti-
tutional reproduction, leading to continued institutional diversity. The 
argument for this development comes in essentially two varieties (cf., 
Hemerijck 2007, 11). The first version – as outlined above – is based on 
the logic of increasing returns that “lock in” pre-existing sets of insti-
tutions and make path-altering changes unlikely (Pierson 1994; 1996a; 
2001b; 2004). Once established, compromising or cutting existing rights 
and privileges becomes electorally unattractive and, as such, institutional 
inertia and minor adaptations are likely, which effectively perpetuates 
existing regime trajectories and typologies. Similarly, Esping-Andersen 
(2002) argues that welfare regimes share a particular historic trajecto-
ry and have developed in path-dependent ways. Accordingly, precisely 
because welfare states come in clusters, sharing similar problems and 
advantages, regime-specific rather than “one-size-fits-all” institutional 
changes can be expected (see also Iversen and Wren 1998; Iversen 2005). 
In the contemporary contexts, this means that the Nordic welfare states’ 
generous and universal welfare policies and their heavy reliance on public 
sector jobs have been accompanied by high monetary costs. Consequent-
ly, sustaining popular support for the necessarily high levels of taxation 
and public expenditures constitute the Nordic welfare states’ main chal-
lenge. The Liberal welfare states, in turn, rely on relatively low levels of 
taxation, low payroll costs, and a deregulated labour market, which has 
created a large number of private sector jobs. The flipside to this institu-
tional choice, however, is widespread poverty, income inequality, and so-
cial exclusion. And finally, Continental welfare states face a vicious cycle 
of spiralling costs and shrinking income bases. Not only have Continental 
welfare states followed a strategy of deliberate “surplus labour shedding”, 
but the subsequently necessitated rises in non-wage payroll costs encour-
aged firms to improve their productivity rather than to invest in new jobs, 
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which has led to a further decline in overall employment rates, threat-
ening the sustainability of the welfare state in general. Based on these 
different sets of institutional problems and advantages, Esping-Andersen 
predicts that welfare states will adapt in different ways and, accordingly, 
their institutional diversity will be  retained.
 Similar conclusions have also been drawn by the more recent schol-
arship on activation policy. Most prominently, Jean-Claude Barbier ar-
gues – as does Serrano Pascual (2007) – that while activation regimes 
have evolved in a similar direction, the relative distance between regime 
clusters has remained stable. In his interpretation, “hugely differing pro-
grammes and policies have been implemented. ... All of them appear as 
embedded in their societal coherence, in terms of the systems of social 
protection, the values and norms upon which these are based, as well 
as the industrial relations systems they are linked to” (Barbier 2001, 3). 
Within this context, Barbier identifies two diametrically opposed ideal-
type conceptions, one liberal and the other universalistic. In the liberal 
activation camp, he places both the UK and the US, where “ALMPs as 
well as social policies ... take a limited role, restricted to inciting individu-
als to seek work, providing quick information and matching services, as 
well as investing in short-term vocational training” (Barbier and Ludwig-
Mayerhofer 2004, 427). Conversely, in the universalistic world, which in-
cludes countries like Denmark or Norway, the state “not only cares for the 
provision of complex and extended services to all citizens, but simultane-
ously guarantees relatively high standards of living for the assisted, and, 
for the lower paid sections of the labour force, benefit levels close to ac-
tual minimum wages” (Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004, 427). While 
an unambiguous third pole has not (yet) emerged, the Continental Euro-
pean regimes – including France and Germany – represent intermediate 
cases, which “have emerged, dependent on their historical and societal 
traditions, [combining] elements from both ideal-types” (Barbier 2001, 
11; see also Barbier 2007, 152; Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004, 428). 
He concludes that despite, or maybe because of the use of a “common 
language” and the “homogeneity of words” used to describe activation 
in various contexts, there are no signs of convergence with regard to val-
ues, the substance of the activation programmes, rights, or entitlements. 
It is therefore this plurality, in contrast to a commonality within activa-
tion policy, which remains “a challenge for further research” (Barbier and 
Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004, 434).8
 The second prediction is one of convergence on pre-existing regime 
types. In its extreme version, there are authors who predict uni-modal 
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convergence. In this case, welfare state institutions in any developed in-
dustrial nation will, sooner or later, reach a common institutional, neo-
liberal destination. Most prominently, it is argued that the internation-
al forces of economic globalisation and capital mobility have severely 
constrained the room in which national governments can manoeuvre 
(Scharpf 2000a), which in turn forces governments to reduce welfare 
expenditures, deregulate labour markets, and embrace “work-oriented 
policies, privatization of social welfare, increased targeting of benefits, 
and the shift from an emphasis on social rights of citizenships to the 
civic duties of community members” (Gilbert 2002, 5; see also Goldberg 
and Rosenthal 2002). Accordingly, Gilbert concludes that even though 
the reform processes and speeds in various countries may vary, all of 
“these nations are sailing toward the same shores” (2002, 47). Similarly, 
Handler, who focuses on the most disadvantaged jobseekers, argues that 
European welfare states increasingly question, if not abandon, the “old” 
ideals of social citizenship and welfare entitlements and rely more on 
“new”, ideologically driven ideals of workfare and conditional benefits. 
He argues that there is a common trend toward a “jobs first” strategy, that 
is to say, a new focus on work as the best way to assure social inclusion, 
which ironically leads to more rather than less social exclusion (Handler 
2003, 230). While Handler acknowledges significant differences between 
Europe (not including the UK) and the US, he concludes that the over-
all character of European welfare states has changed, particularly with 
regard to the most marginalised jobseekers. In other words, he predicts 
trends toward a uni-model convergence with regard to the treatment of 
the long-term unemployed and socially excluded, who are increasing-
ly being subjected to policies that resemble US-style workfare policies 
(Handler 2004, 209).9
 Other authors, most prominently those associated with the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) school of thought, argue that two ideal-typical econo-
mies currently exist upon which most countries will converge. The way 
in which production regimes relate to welfare regimes is through their 
labour market policies, meaning that liberal production regimes promote 
liberal welfare regimes, while co-ordinated production regimes promote 
more generous welfare regimes. As Peter Hall (2003b, 41) explains:
By forcing people into the workforce, the low beneﬁ t levels and strict 
eligibility criteria of a liberal welfare state, for instance, help sustain the 
highly ﬂ uid labour markets on which ﬁ rms in liberal market economy 
[sic] tend to depend. Th ey complement the low-wage, cost-conscious 
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strategies characteristic of many ﬁ rms in such economies by depress-
ing the reservation wage. In contrast, by assuring workers of generous 
beneﬁ ts should they become unemployed, the high beneﬁ t levels and 
prolonged beneﬁ t periods available to skilled workers in [coordinated] 
welfare states encourage individuals to develop the industry-speciﬁ c 
skills central to the production strategies of many ﬁ rms in coordinated 
market economies; and they encourage ﬁ rms to make use of such skills 
by assuring them that skilled labour will remain available through a 
recession.
 In other words, these authors predict a  bi-modal institutional outcome, 
as LMEs and CMEs continue to reproduce their production regime types 
and their corresponding welfare regime types, while those countries lo-
cated between the ideal types, i.e., “mixed” production and welfare re-
gimes, are expected to converge on the LME model. This latter trend will 
be the case as it is substantially easier to “liberalise” a regime than to “co-
ordinate” it.
 The last group of scholars offers a third possible scenario. In addition 
to predicting the persistence of empirically and analytically distinct re-
gime clusters or the convergence on one or more, pre-existing regime 
types, a third interpretation is put forward, namely that of institutional 
hybridisation. Institutional hybridisation depicts an institutional evo-
lution in which political actors (deliberately or accidentally) “mix and 
match” policy features from within and across regime clusters, thus 
breaking certain pathways and diluting regime-specific characteristics. 
Hybridisation can lead to any one of three institutional outcomes: First, 
when policies are (re-)assembled in similar ways across regime types, 
institutional convergence on one new, hybrid model follows (neo-con-
vergence). However, when institutions are mixed and matched different-
ly in various cases, continued diversity will result, potentially leading to 
neo-divergence (source of inspiration, Zeitlin 2003). The possibility of 
partial convergence lies somewhere in the middle because countries will 
retain some of their original institutional characteristics, while adopt-
ing a mix of similar instruments in other areas. While this interpreta-
tion remains a minority view, there are a number of authors whose work 
could be described as observing trends of hybridisation.10 For instance, 
Lindsay and Mailand (2004, 196) argue that there has been a “real and 
lasting shift” in the labour market policies of both the UK and Den-
mark. While there are still important differences between the two coun-
tries, both countries have taken a step toward the other and adopted a 
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broadly similar approach in areas such as the re-balancing of rights and 
obligations, client-centrism, a real work focus, and the delivery through 
local partnerships (see also, Campbell and Pedersen 2007; Lindsay and 
Mailand 2004, 198). Similarly, Bruno Palier (2004, 2) isolates impor-
tant common trends in Europe’s social protection reforms, including a 
common focus on employment-oriented social protection policies, in-
stituting supply-side social policy instruments, an overall tightening of 
benefits regimes, and privatisation of services (Palier 2004, 9). In oth-
er words, rather than seeing an overall trend of making welfare states 
“meaner” and “leaner”, Lindsay, Mailand, Palier, Zeitlin and some other 
scholars argue that governments mix and match characteristics from 
various welfare traditions, and thus recalibrating their own systems, as 
opposed to retrenching, labour market policy regimes (see also Ferrera 
and Hemerijck 2003).
II.7 Analytical Grid: Four Dimensions of Labour Market Policy Regimes
As outlined in the introduction, this book is interested in welfare state re-
form in general but has a more modest ambition. The aim is to carefully 
compare and contrast labour market policy regimes, a key constituent in 
the welfare state make-up. For this purpose, I suggest distinguishing four 
analytical dimensions, which, when taken together, comprise the core el-
ements located at the work-welfare nexus of any modern labour market: 
ideational, organisational, financial and work incentives.
Ideational Dimension
The first, ideational dimension of labour market policy regimes concerns 
policymakers’ normative and cognitive underpinnings, hence their over-
arching principles guiding public policy, and the underlying cognitive 
assumptions about causes and remedies of labour market shortcomings. 
Therefore, the ideational dimension refers to the (declared) intentions 
about what economic results labour market policy is believed to be ca-
pable of delivering, and what social goals it aims to achieve. These goals 
typically involve a mix of labour market efficiency (i.e., the efficient sup-
ply of labour) and equality (i.e., the reduction and/or prevention of social 
exclusion and underachievement). The way in which these two (poten-
tially rival) goals are weighed against each other is expected to vary over 
time, across regime types, and along partisan lines. Moreover, the actual 
ANALYTICAL GRID: FOUR DIMENSIONS OF LABOUR MARKET POLICY REGIMES
choice of institutional solutions also includes an assessment of the most 
adequate form of delivery for these policies, which in turn is based on an 
interpretation of the problems at hand, and their root causes and rem-
edies. As such, the cognitive element includes an assessment of whether 
the main causes of an unemployment crisis are mainly cyclical or struc-
tural in nature, and accordingly, also whether unemployment is the result 
of individual idleness or (systemic) market failures. While this cognitive 
judgment points to particular policy responses, policymakers’ normative 
predispositions further affect the decisions about what kind of state in-
tervention is appropriate, how much resources are necessary to imple-
ment the preferred institutional solutions, and which actors need to be 
organised.
Organisational Dimension
The second, organisational dimension includes all of the aspects that deal 
with the governance and delivery of labour market services. Governance 
in this context is defined as the institutional structures of authority trans-
posing public law into action. The organisation of employment services 
can thus be analytically differentiated by looking at which actors, public 
or non-public, are responsible for the administration and delivery of pub-
lic laws. Public employment services (PESs), governments’ most impor-
tant delivery arms of labour market policy, vary by the degree of their 
organisational centralisation and their loci of decision-making powers. At 
one extreme are those PESs with headquarters institutionally inseparable 
from a respective ministry for employment affairs, where the decision-
making powers are entirely in the hands of public appointees and civil 
servants. In this state-operated model, the minister in charge has direct 
authority over, and responsibility for, the governance of the PES. The gov-
ernment thus steers, monitors, and funds the operations on the ground, 
including both regional and local offices. This version can be described 
as a “top-down” or vertical approach to labour market governance and is 
most clearly represented by the Japanese PES.
 At the other extreme is the locally operated model, which is not directly 
steered by national PES headquarters and is not directly responsible to 
a governmental department on the national level. In a locally operated 
model, regional and/or local public authorities are in charge of “their” la-
bour markets and have total control over their choice of policy measures 
and the partners they decide to work with. Local/regional authorities are, 
however, bound by public law and may receive government funding or 
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subsidies. Contemporary empirical examples include Italy, Switzerland, 
and the United States.
 In the third type, public officials share authority with the social part-
ners, such as employer and employee representatives, or delegate respon-
sibility to specifically appointed civil servants. In this semi-autonomous 
model, the PES is neither entirely incorporated into a governmental de-
partment nor entirely run by third parties, like the social partners or lo-
cal authorities. Instead, a multi-partite body comprised of a variety of 
representatives from the responsible governmental department, local 
authorities, and/or the social partners share legal authority and political 
responsibility. Public law, however, binds the operations of a semi-public 
PES and the funding for its operations may include a multitude of sources, 
including general taxes, local taxes, and payroll contributions. Most con-
temporary European PESs fit this model, albeit with different “agents” 
and varying degrees of autonomy.
 There are also “non-public” employment services that come in a vari-
ety of forms, including for-profit, not-for-profit and membership-based 
versions. For-profit employment services are typically operated by private 
employment agencies (PREAs). While PREAs in many countries work 
alongside PESs, there are a few countries in which public services have 
been fully outsourced to private, for-profit agencies. Australia and New 
Zealand are typically at the forefront of this development. There are also 
not-for-profit organisations that assist the unemployed in their job search 
and offer counselling services in just about every country. These services 
are offered alongside PES and PREA services and often include church-
affiliated groups and social NGOs. Finally, there are also employment 
services offered by the social partners that are either unilateral (solely 
employer or union run) or bilateral, i.e. jointly run by the social partners. 
Historically, labour unions or employer associations have operated many 
of Europe’s employment services as part of the class struggle that occurred 
at the end of the 19th century. Even today, however, the political legacies 
of union-run employment services are still visible, most strikingly in the 
Nordic countries and Belgium, where unemployment insurance systems 
are still administered by labour unions (Zeitlin 2008a, 20).
 To summarise, institutional structures of employment services vary 
greatly along the locus of authority (public vs. non-public) and the distri-
bution of power (concentrated or shared). The following graph visualizes 
these dimensions.
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While the institutional structures of authority (i.e., their forms) vary greatly 
across employment services, variations within “public” models with respect 
to their operational principles and methods (i.e., their functions) are also 
very relevant. When we assess the operational principles and methods we 
arrive at an important insight into the logic that drives Public Employment 
Services’ daily operations. Two dimensions with potential trade-oﬀ s have 
been identiﬁ ed as particularly relevant: one that focuses on economic vs. 
social concerns, and one that compares administrative vs. managerial con-
cerns. Two questions arise in relation to this subject: (1) What are the em-
ployment services’ guiding principles? Th is question addresses the impor-
tance of economic goals, which are typically associated with the eﬃ  ciency 
and eﬀ ectiveness of labour market measures, and the importance of social 
goals that are usually associated with equity concerns; (2) What is the rela-
tionship between the employment oﬃ  ce and the individual jobseeker? Im-
portant insights can be gathered about the ways in which the organisations’ 
principles are transposed into action by addressing the relationship between 
the employment oﬃ  ce and jobseekers. PESs may see themselves as public 
bureaucracies, administrating unemployment. If so, they will consider their 
compliance with regulations as their core responsibility. In this scenario, the 
unemployed persons’ legal status determines their “entitlement” to beneﬁ ts 
and services, individual discretion is limited, the relationship is demarcated 
and hierarchical, and the administration of labour market measures remains 
largely separate from politics. In turn, employment services may also see 
themselves as “managers”, delivering labour market services to their “cus-
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tomers” and thus maximising service quality and customer satisfaction are 
considered their core functions. In this scenario, the legal status of being 
unemployed may determine the range of services available to those who 
qualify, which, however, should not necessarily be considered an “entitle-
ment” but a function of the employment oﬃ  cers’ evaluation of the situation. 
As such, individual discretion is high, the relationship is quasi-contractual, 
and the administration reﬂ ects predominant political views.
Financial Dimension
Th e third, ﬁ nancial dimension is mainly concerned with two elements: the 
sources of revenue and the type and level of expenditure. Th e source of 
revenue is crucial as it (a) distributes costs and (b) legitimates the institu-
tional structures of authority as the following section will demonstrate. Th e 
revenue for labour market programmes typically comes from one (or both) 
of two sources: payroll contributions from employees and/or employers, 
and contributions based on general taxation. If the main source of revenue 
is based on payroll contributions, the costs are narrowly distributed among 
the employed, which, in turn, is more likely to introduce a sense of “ex-
clusiveness” and “entitlement” regarding the services by those who have 
contributed to them. It also legitimates the role of the social partners in la-
bour market policy administration, as they represent the interests of those 
workers and employers who provide for the funding of these measures. But, 
if the main source of funding is based on general taxation, the costs are 
distributed more widely, which, in turn, is more likely to establish a sense 
of “inclusiveness” and “universalism”. Moreover, since the former source is 
a direct tax on labour, it raises the price of labour, which may have a nega-
tive eﬀ ect on job creation as well as net wages, which aﬀ ects the motivation 
to seek (low-wage) gainful employment. Th e latter, conversely, is seen as a 
more indirect tax that aﬀ ects society as a whole with less immediate eﬀ ects 
on the price of labour, but may result in higher taxes in other areas.
 Th e main expenditures for labour market policies include, on the one 
hand, transfer payments and, since the mid-1970s, expenditures on “exit op-
tions” such as early retirement or disability pensions. Th ese types of expen-
ditures have been labelled “passive” labour market policies (PLMPs) since 
the late 1980s. On the other hand, there are also “active” labour market poli-
cies (ALMPs), which include a variety of measures, all intended to promote 
some sort of “action” by beneﬁ t recipients such as support with job-search 
activities, occupational and social skills training, participation in employ-
ment projects and the like. While “passive” measures are intended to allevi-
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ate economic hardship during periods of unemployment, active measures 
aim to remove obstacles to employment, motivate jobseekers to actively 
seek and accept employment, and/or to retain or improve jobseekers’ em-
ployability. Th e following ﬁ ve ALMP categories are typically identiﬁ ed by 
the OECD: public employment services, (re-)training courses, direct job 
creation, wage or employment subsidies, and business start-up subsidies.11
Box 1 Five Instruments of Active Labour Market Policy
A. Organisation
1. Public Employment Services – PESs refers to job-search assistance agencies that provide 
information and off er matching and placement services. The overarching aim is to 
increase labour market fl uidity and effi  ciency. PESs monitor, organise, and implement 
most, if not all, active and passive labour market measures. PESs sometimes also provide 
additional social services such as counselling or aid with care responsibilities, or off er 
support with regional mobility.
B. Policy Substance
2. (Re-)Training Courses – These supply-side measures, off ered with the aim of 
enhancing the ability of jobseekers to re-enter the workforce and to consequently 
retain employment. Training courses vary greatly regarding their quality, intensity, and 
duration. Some training courses include short (and inexpensive) “soft skill” courses that 
teach participants social skills such as teamwork or appropriate work behaviour, how to 
write an application or conduct a job interview. They often also include a motivational 
component. “Hard skill” training courses, in turn, include longer (and more expensive) 
technical skills training courses that equip and update participants’ occupational skills. 
Both job-placement services and soft and hard-skills training courses are considered 
supply-side measures.
3. Direct Job Creation – The state (or its local agents) acts as an “employer of last resort” 
and creates public service employment programmes. The main clientele in such 
programmes are often socially excluded, long-term unemployed workers who face 
severe hurdles upon re-entering the workforce.
4. Wage or Employment Subsidies – Wage subsidies are intended to increase incentives 
for the unemployed to accept low-wage work, while employment subsidies are paid 
to employers in order to match the losses in productivity that fi rms incur when hiring 
“atypical” workers. Both direct job-creation schemes and wage or employment subsidies 
are considered demand-side measures.
5. Start-Up Subsidies are paid to the unemployed who want to start their own business. 
These measures are intended to create new jobs and improve the productive and 
innovative capacity of an economy. Start-up subsidies are mostly limited to qualifi ed 
unemployment benefi t recipients.
Source: Dar and Tzannatos 1999
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The fourth, work-incentives dimension analytically combines most of 
the aspects that comprise formal active and passive labour market 
policies. Herein, positive and negative incentive measures are identi-
fied and differentiated, which include the primary characteristics of 
any labour market policy regime, regardless of its respective welfare 
regime type. Each incentives category is further subdivided into finan-
cial incentives, or those incentives that are directly related to transfer 
payments, and non-financial incentives, i.e., incentives that condition 
the access to transfer payments or gainful employment. Consequently, 
negative financial incentives include unemployment benefits paid for 
short periods of time, low and means-tested social wages,12 and the 
unavailability (or phasing out) of “early exit” options. Negative non-
financial incentives, in turn, describe the conditions jobseekers need 
to fulfil in order to access benefits and assistance payments. These 
conditions include active job-search requirements, broad definitions 
of “suitable” job offers, and strict, i.e., restrictive, eligibility criteria. 
Taken together, negative incentives reduce, or even eliminate, the fi-
nancial reasons that encourage some people to remain inactive for 
extended periods of time or to voluntarily continue living a “life on 
benefits”.
 On the positive side, financial incentives to find, retain, or resume 
work can include wage or employment subsidies, tax credits for low-
wage work, benefit “top-ups” for participation in public work schemes, 
or start-up assistance for self-employment. Taken together, these fi-
nancial incentives are intended to make work pay, or, to significantly 
increase one’s income through employment. In turn, the provision of 
non-financial services includes the provision of high-quality job-coun-
selling services that improve job placement and matching, access to mo-
tivational, social, and technical skills training courses, child and elderly 
care support programmes, or the existence of social services, including 
transportation and/or assistance with mental health, debt, or substance 
abuse problems. These non-financial services can help remove obstacles 
to finding work and increase jobseekers’ chances to retain gainful em-
ployment. The following box summarises these four sets of positive and 
negative work incentive structures.
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Table 4 Negative and Positive Incentive Structures of Labour Market Policy Regimes
 
Negative Incentives 
(fi nancial)
Negative Incentives
(non-fi nancial)
Positive Incentives
(fi nancial)
Positive Incentives 
(non-fi nancial)
•  Short duration of 
unemployment 
benefi t payments
•  Low, means-tested 
social wages
•  Unavailability (or 
phasing-out) of 
“early exit” options 
(early retirement or 
disability pensions)
•  Job-search 
requirements
•  Broad defi nition 
of a “suitable” job 
off er
•  Strict eligibility 
criteria
•  Benefi t sanctioning 
when in breach 
with benefi t 
conditions
• In-work subsidies
•  Tax credits
•  Benefi t top-up 
for participation 
in public work 
schemes
•  Self-employment 
start-up subsidies
•  Job counselling
•  Training courses 
(soft and 
occupational skills)
•  Childcare 
support13
•  Other services 
(mobility, mental 
health, debt, 
substance abuse)

Part I
Origin and Crisis of European 
Labour Market Policy Regimes
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III Origin of European Labour Market Policy Regimes 
 and the Manpower Revolution
Even though most of the legal framework for active labour market policy 
was not formally introduced until the early 1950s, it is important to pro-
vide information about the path-creating efforts launched by European 
governments during the pre-WWII era. Accordingly, chapter III first offers 
a brief overview of emergence of the very concept of unemployment and 
the origins of labour market policy regimes. Subsequently, I elaborate on 
the genesis of the Swedish concept of ALMPs, initially known as active 
manpower policies, followed by a succinct introduction to the OECD, 
which successfully diffused this concept. This chapter then precedes with 
a synopsis of subsequent policy changes in five European countries: Den-
mark, Germany, Austria, the UK, and Ireland, in that order. Chapter IV 
discusses the international, i.e., OECD, and national responses to the two 
oil crises during the 1970s, which triggered significant economic chal-
lenges across Western Europe, including a significant increase in unem-
ployment, spiralling inflation, and economic stagnation. The consequences 
and reactions to the two oil crises are covered sequentially, starting with 
the international dimension and followed by domestic policy responses. 
Both of these chapters are designed as – at times quite detailed and yet, 
necessarily incomplete – reconstructions that rely primarily, but not exclu-
sively, on the existing secondary literature and officially published policy 
documents. The main purpose of these chapters is to provide both a his-
torical backdrop and a benchmark for the assessment of contemporary 
institutional evolution.
III.1 Locating the Origins of Unemployment and Labour Market Policy
Throughout human history, there have always been people without sta-
ble sources of income, who would nowadays be considered unemployed. 
However, the very term “unemployment” as we know it today only arose 
as a meaningful concept with the rise of manufacturing and industrialisa-
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tion, i.e., during the birth of capitalism in the 19th century (cf., e.g., Salais 
et al. 1986; Whiteside and Salais 1998). Prior to industrialisation, most 
people worked in agriculture, and for the majority of those who did not, 
work was often neither “stable” nor “institutionalised”. Poor people with-
out work were often employed on a temporary or seasonal basis as work 
became available (cf., Zimmermann 2006), and “unemployment” was nei-
ther a publicly acknowledged problem nor discussed in any systematic 
way by economists (Harris 1996, 52). Likewise, at the beginning of the 19th 
century, less than five percent of the population lived in cities of more 
than 20,000 inhabitants, and, in about 1850, urban dwellers only exceeded 
ten percent of total populations in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and 
Belgium (Alber 1982, 29).
 While public authorities had adopted various poor laws since the end 
of the 16th century – largely as a consequence of the Protestant Reforma-
tion and the “birth” of nation-states – these laws were characterised as 
“negative social policy” (Zöllner 1959). They were considered “negative” 
because assistance for the poor was mainly designed – up until the 19th 
century – as a “repressive measure to discipline the poor” and typically in-
cluded forced labour (Alber 1982, 25). Popular perceptions of, and official 
attitudes to, people without work were sceptical, and “private philanthro-
pists no less than public officials dreaded the hazards of disincentives to 
mobility, interference with wages, ... and artificial creation of work” (Har-
ris 1996, 53). Accordingly, local communities that delivered “poor relief ” 
were mainly interested in keeping the poor in check and maintaining pub-
lic order rather than providing any real assistance to those in need (Alber 
1982, 26). More comprehensive protection, in turn, was only available for 
members of guilds or crafts, or when provided by churches and charity 
organisations or other friendly societies (cf., Zeitlin 2008a, 19).
 It was only in the second half of the 19th century that a gradual reas-
sessment took place and “modern poor relief ” became less repressive and 
more needs-oriented (Alber 1982, 26). The reassessment of traditional 
poor laws coincided also with the emergence of modern “social securi-
ty” systems. With industrialisation, urbanisation, and population growth 
during the mid- to late 1800s – and thus the rapid expansion of the pro-
letariat and mass poverty – the bourgeoisie had increasingly been pres-
sured to introduce public intervention to alleviate mass suffering. While 
these interventions where mostly aimed at preserving the ruling classes’ 
privileges, they nevertheless constituted a “breakthrough” for the working 
class. Most important was German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s intro-
duction of three “path-creating” programmes, including health insurance 
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in 1883, accident insurance in 1884, and old age and invalidity insurance in 
1889 (Pilz 2004, 25). Governments across Europe subsequently followed 
his example, which constituted the beginning of the modern welfare state. 
Of great importance was also, however, the shift in official attitudes and 
public sentiment toward unemployment at the turn of the century. Unem-
ployment had then become part of the “social question” and intellectuals 
and economists acknowledged it as a significant problem (cf., Harris 1996; 
Niess 1982; Price 2000, 8).
 Following these reassessments and legislative changes, policymakers 
introduced two foundational pillars of modern labour market policy re-
gimes, including the establishment of public employment services, match-
ing available jobs with jobseekers, and the introduction of unemployment 
insurance (UI) schemes, that would protect workers and their families 
from the consequences of job loss. The first “meaningful” – as opposed to 
purely repressive – public works projects, organised by national govern-
ments, followed in the post-WWI era, establishing the idea of an “active” 
labour market policy.
Establishment of National Unemployment Insurance Systems: 
From Bismarck to Ghent
While national unemployment insurance was not part of the original “so-
cial security” legislation in Bismarck’s Germany – and did not become na-
tional law until 1927 – it was some of the small Swiss Cantons that organ-
ised the first public unemployment insurance programmes. These local 
programmes were, however, inspired by Bismarck’s “experiments” with 
a public provision of welfare policy. Even though the Swiss programmes 
had some financial difficulties from the start, they nevertheless motivated 
other European policymakers – who increasingly acknowledged the ex-
istence of cyclical unemployment – to develop their own ideas of how 
publicly sponsored UI schemes could be designed. As a consequence, 
during the late 1890s “municipal unemployment insurance schemes be-
gan sprouting throughout Western Europe” (Heclo 1974, 69), which rep-
resented an alternative to the union-run unemployment insurance pro-
grammes that had surfaced across Europe during the mid-1800s.1
 In Belgium, where the union movement was already well established, 
a new “mixed” form of these two programmes was first advanced in 1901. 
The public authorities in the Belgian city of Ghent decided to financially 
support – rather than run – the unions’ voluntary UI schemes (Vandaele 
2006, 649). It was at this time that the “Ghent system” of workers’ protec-
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tion – i.e., a voluntary insurance system, administered by labour unions 
and subsidised by the state – was established. Ghent’s novel approach 
quickly spread across Europe, first to cities like Milan, Amsterdam and 
Strasbourg over a period of a few years (Heclo 1974, 70). France was the 
first country to establish a nationwide, Ghent-like system in 1905, while 
Norway (1906), Denmark (1907), the Netherlands (1916), Finland (1917), 
Belgium (1920), Luxembourg (1921), Switzerland (1924), and Sweden2 
(1934) followed suit (Alber 1982, 28, table 1). A voluntary, union-admin-
istered fund was not only less expensive for local and national authori-
ties, but it was also attractive because “workers themselves were to carry 
the main burden; if their own contributions were to fund the insurance 
it would be in their own best interest to closely scrutinise all applicants 
[and thus prevent welfare abuse]” (Edling 2006, 105). Yet, in order to insti-
tutionalise a Ghent system, two necessary conditions had to be fulfilled. 
First, because a Ghent system would also automatically encourage work-
ers to apply for union membership, the government had to have the po-
litical will to empower unions. And second, the unions had to have the 
organisational capacity to deliver such systems. In particular the lack of 
political will is a crucial factor for any explanation of the variation in the 
timing of the introduction of Ghent systems across Europe.
 During the time when the Ghent system rapidly spread throughout 
Europe, some policymakers pursued other, alternative strategies. Most 
prominently, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and William Be-
veridge, a socially progressive Liberal, introduced the world’s first man-
datory, fully public unemployment insurance scheme in Great Britain in 
1911 – and therefore also in Ireland, which did not gain independence 
until 1922 (Harris 1996, 53; Price 2000). While coverage was initially only 
about 17 percent – this was due to the relatively high minimum income 
requirement – by 1920 it had been extended to cover nearly all of Britain’s 
workers (Phan-Thuy et al. 2001, 3). The public option was designed to be 
the basic “safety net” for all workers, while unions were allowed to orga-
nise additional insurance schemes to supplement benefits during periods 
of unemployment. Austria and Germany – and Italy in 1919 – followed the 
British example and introduced mandatory, nationwide schemes in 1920 
and 1927, respectively (cf., Alber 1982, 28; Wilk 1991; Pilz 2004). However, 
in contrast to the British system, where UI was organised by the central 
government and delivered by local labour exchanges established in 1909 
(see next section), the Austrian and German systems were administered 
and implemented by public labour exchanges that were semi-independent 
and governed in equal parts by public authorities as well as labour union 
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and employers’ representatives. As such, three different ways to organise 
UI emerged in the early years of the 20th century: a “Bismarckian”, manda-
tory system financed by specific payroll contributions and governed by 
semi-public, tripartite labour exchanges; a mandatory, largely tax-based 
and centrally organised Anglophone system; and finally, a voluntary, pub-
licly subsidised but union-run alternative, which was predominant in 
Scandinavia, but could also be found in large parts of Continental Europe.
The Birth of a National Public Employment Service: 
Trend-Setter Germany
Just as labour unions and municipalities began developing UI schemes 
in the mid- to late 1800s, they also began offering job-placement assis-
tance. Among the first places where public “labour exchanges” (Arbe-
itsnachweise) emerged were the German cities of Dresden and Leipzig 
in 1840 and 1844 respectively (Schmid et al. 2005, 269). In the 1860s, a 
small number of communist unions began to create their own labour ex-
changes as they began to recognise their importance in the class struggle 
(Schmuhl et al. 2003, 24). In the 1880s, a “wave” of union-run labour ex-
changes followed, with the sculptors, blacksmiths, and cigarette-sorter 
unions leading the way (Rottenecker and Schneider 1996, 44). In order 
to counter the unions’ influence, employers’ associations followed suit 
in the 1890s, establishing their own, unilateral exchanges (Schmuhl et 
al. 2003, 26), which heightened mutual distrust and fed into the ongoing 
class struggles. Unions increasingly feared that employers would use their 
exchanges as a “strike-breaking” organisation, while employers were un-
easy about having a union-based system that could lead to a “closed shop” 
(Phan-Thuy et al. 2001, 2).
 Despite growing tensions in some parts of Germany, additional public 
labour exchanges were introduced in other parts, mainly in southern Ger-
many, the Rhineland and in Berlin in the 1890s. Remarkably, the boards of 
these new public labour exchanges were organised in a “corporatist” fash-
ion, i.e., they included representatives from employer associations and 
labour unions (Schmuhl et al. 2003, 35). In 1898, the German Association 
of Labour Exchanges (Verband Deutscher Arbeitsnachweise, VDA) was 
founded and began receiving public subsidies in 1904. In 1908, the first 
legislative proposal followed with the aim of introducing similar tripar-
tite labour exchanges across Germany (Schmuhl et al. 2003, 35). However, 
due to significant and prevailing disagreements between labour unions 
and employers in many parts of Germany, the government was unable to 
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introduce this corporatist governance structure nation wide (cf., Tram-
pusch 2000a). Nevertheless, municipal public labour exchanges contin-
ued to spread as both employers and unions increasingly realised the “ad-
vantages in separating employment services from the social struggle by 
planting them on neutral ground” (Phan-Thuy et al. 2001, 2).
 Th e rapid expansion of Germany’s public labour exchanges quickly 
served as a model for many other European countries. For instance, when 
William Beveridge visited Germany in 1907, he found 400 public labour 
exchanges, which had become “the most important” placement service, 
ﬁ lling nearly half of all job vacancies (Phan-Th uy et al. 2001, 3). Beveridge’s 
visit corroborated his ideas about the adequacy of public – thus “inde-
pendent” – labour exchanges at which the unemployed were required to 
register and show a willingness to work. Based on his ﬁ rst-hand “evidence”, 
which provided an institutional alternative to the dysfunctional poor laws 
associated with “workhouses” and the “disgrace of pauperism”, Beveridge 
was able to convince fellow Liberals to issue concrete policy proposals for a 
similar scheme (Heclo 1974, 81f; Hennock 1982). Subsequently, Parliament 
passed the Labour Exchanges Act in 1909 and public labour exchanges 
were set up in Britain and Ireland, without, however, any institutionalised 
involvement from either the unions or the employers (cf., Price 2000, 19).
 Other European countries also followed suit during the late turn of 
the century and began creating public and/or social partnership-based 
labour exchanges. In Austria, social partnership-based associations for 
job placement and apprenticeship accommodation (Vereine für Arbeits-
vermittlung und Lehrlingsunterbringung) were first established in 1885 in 
Vienna. In 1898, the city government of Vienna organised the first Austri-
an public labour exchange, while various other cities followed suit in the 
period from 1902 until the outbreak of WWI in 1914 (Schmidt 1990, 170). 
In 1905, the public labour exchanges founded an association (the Reich-
verband der allgemeinen Arbeitsvermittlungsanstalten), that harmonised 
organisational practices and staff training (Schmidt 1990, 171).3
 In Sweden, socially progressive Liberals established public labour ex-
changes run by municipalities in 1902 (Rothstein 1985, 156; Delander 1991, 
8ff; King and Rothstein 1993, 153; Wadensjö 2009). From the beginning, 
many of the Swedish exchanges were governed by corporatist boards, 
and from 1907 onwards, only corporatist-governed exchanges received 
national funding (Blom-Hansen 2000, 160), which led to a rapid increase 
in public employment offices during the 1910s (interview, SOFI2). Den-
mark, in turn, introduced its first public employment service run by local 
authorities in 1913 (Madsen 2005, 283). The newly established municipal 
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PESs were governed in a tripartite fashion, headed by a neutral chairman, 
and state funding subsidised up to a third of their operating costs. The 
director of the Copenhagen exchange, who was appointed by the gov-
ernment, became the quasi-supervisor of the Danish public exchanges, 
receiving advice from a social partnership-based Supervisory Council 
(Tilsynsråd) (Nørgaard1997, 204).4
 While (various types of ) public employment services began to emerge 
during the first years of the 20th century, which were still characterised by 
intense class struggles, the socio-political environment changed radically 
during WWI and the immediate post-war period. The war forced national 
governments to organise labour resources more effectively, whereas the 
aftermath of the war created massive numbers of returning soldiers look-
ing for employment. At the same time, unemployment among unionised 
workers grew significantly, which further strengthened the union move-
ment and increased pressures on public officials to accommodate the 
workers’ demands. In Germany, the final days of WWI were characterised 
by a “truce” (Burgfriede) between employers and unions, which included 
a commitment not to expand their unilateral labour exchanges and to 
work towards the creation of more corporatist exchanges. Besides fac-
ing overwhelming post-war challenges, the social partners feared that the 
government would give local authorities a monopoly on labour exchanges 
– as the British government had done – and thus lobbied together for the 
creation of nation-wide, bipartite labour exchanges in the Stinnes-Legien 
Agreement of 15 November 1918 (Trampusch 2000a, 94). The German 
government was, however, not willing to concede full authority to the 
social partners and it was only after years of political struggle that Ger-
many finally introduced the first national Public Employment Service – 
the Reichsanstalt für Arbeitslosenvermittlung – in 1927. The Reichsanstalt 
was governed in a tripartite fashion, and included public officials as well 
as representatives from both workers and employers in equal parts. A 
national, tripartite structure thus represented a political compromise 
between unions and employers on the one side and the government on 
the other (Pilz 2004, 28). This also meant that local authorities lost their 
placement authority, and unemployment benefits were subsequently pro-
cessed in local, tripartite employment offices. However, local authorities 
retained their responsibility for providing income support payments (So-
zialfürsorge) for uninsured jobseekers and others in need. This division of 
responsibility between locally organised, needs-based, and tax-funded in-
come support, on the one hand, and nationally organised, contributions-
based unemployment insurance, on the other hand, would emerge as the 
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core structure of public assistance in Germany and became a core aspect 
of the conflicts surrounding the recent Hartz reforms (see chapter VII).
 In Austria, the war and its aftermath also brought about the emer-
gence of a centralised and social partnership-based PES. Already during 
the war, the newly founded Ministry for Social Support (Ministerium für 
soziale Fürsorge) was charged with the authority to oversee local employ-
ment offices, and some regions, or Länder, received their own regional 
headquarters (Landesstellen für Arbeitsvermittlung) (Schmidt 1990, 171). 
Once WWI had ended, the Social Democratic minister for social affairs 
appointed an “industrial county commission” (Industrielle Bezirkskom-
missionen, IBK) that would be in charge of both issuing financial support 
to the unemployed and assisting them in finding employment throughout 
Austria. These IBKs had equal numbers of representatives from both the 
labour unions and the business sector (Lechner et al. 1993, 210f ). When 
Austria introduced its UI system in 1920, the ministry – upon the initia-
tive of the Social Democratic Secretary of State (Sozial-Staatssekretär) 
Ferdinand Hanusch – transformed the labour exchanges (Arbeitsnach-
weise) into “unemployment offices” (Arbeitslosenämter) that handled 
job placement and unemployment benefit payments. Public offices rap-
idly expanded throughout the 1920s until each district had its own of-
fice (Schmidt 1990, 171). The new unemployment offices were governed 
by a bipartite committee, which institutionalised social partner influence 
in labour market policy. However, the main “headquarters” remained 
with the ministry in Vienna. This upward trajectory of social partner-
ship in labour market governance was abruptly disrupted when the US 
stock market crashed in February 1929. Austria experienced massive un-
employment in the early 1930s, which resulted in an explosion of social 
expenditures, the collapse of Austria’s democracy, and a brief civil war in 
1934. In 1935, the new authoritarian, Christian-Social leadership replaced 
the IBK and unemployment office management across the board, ended 
the social partnership-based approach, and renamed the offices “regional 
employment offices” (Landesarbeitsämter) and “employment offices” (Ar-
beitsämter) respectively (Schmidt 1990, 170ff ).
 1935 was a critical year also for Sweden. Th e Social Democratic govern-
ment pushed through its demands for a nationwide, heavily state-subsi-
dised UI system, which, in turn, accelerated the growth in corporatist la-
bour exchanges. Th e Social Democrats supported the spread of corporatist 
exchanges because it gave the government the ability “to check [beneﬁ t 
recipients’] willingness to accept work” (Wadensjö 2009). Th is was thus a 
ﬁ rst indication of the labour market approach that would later be known as 
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the Swedish “work line”, or the expectation that everyone capable of work-
ing should be in employment. Central PES headquarters – largely mod-
elled on the German PES of 1927 – were then established during WWII.
 The institutional changes in Denmark and Great Britain were less 
dramatic. Danish Social Democratic and socially liberal policymakers 
refrained from introducing a centralised PES or expanding local public 
offices. The Danes preferred a system of self-governance that was pri-
marily organised by the labour unions. When unemployment quickly and 
significantly rose in the 1930s, policymakers massively expanded public 
“work camps” and large construction projects rather than reforming the 
unemployment system (Jørgensen 2002, 172). Meanwhile, the British gov-
ernment continued to consolidate its unilateral, centralilised system. As 
a result, the “exchanges … ceased to be ‘on trial’ and were instead an ac-
cepted part of the state apparatus” (Price 2000, 85).
 To summarise, while the late 1800s were characterised by the establish-
ment of UI systems and the creation of locally organised public and mem-
bership-based labour exchanges, the post WWI-era saw the emergence of 
nationally organised PESs and the consolidation of corporatist labour mar-
ket governance systems in many European countries. Great variations in UI 
and PES design however emerged, reﬂ ecting both ideological preferences 
and labour union strength. Despite, or perhaps because of, these organisa-
tional diﬀ erences, common developments are also observable. On the one 
hand, most national governments fully acknowledged unemployment as a 
national issue, occurring in cyclical patterns. Th is constituted a signiﬁ cant 
reassessment by policymakers, who until then had maintained the belief 
that markets were immaculate and unemployment solely the fault of “idle” 
jobseekers. On the other hand, governments were increasingly interested 
in inﬂ uencing, if not controlling, both job-placement processes and the is-
suance of UI payments, either directly through political representation on 
national, regional or local governing boards, or indirectly, through ﬁ nan-
cial support and legislative oversight. Th e ambitions of most governments 
to expand their responsibility in the handling of work and unemployment-
related issues was further expressed in the International Labour Organisa-
tion’s (ILO) second Convention conclusions of 1919, where Member States 
committed to establish “a system of free public employment agencies un-
der the control of a central authority. Committees, which shall include rep-
resentatives of employers and of workers, shall be appointed to advise on 
matters concerning the carrying on of these agencies” (ILO 1919, Article 
2). Th e convention was ratiﬁ ed by Denmark, Sweden and the UK in 1921, 
Austria in 1924, and Germany and Ireland in 1925.
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The Roots of “Active” Labour Market Policy
Along with the emergence of UI schemes and public- and membership-
based labour exchanges, the first “active” labour market interventions 
were mainly initiated in the post-WWI period, which was a period of se-
vere economic crisis. When unemployment skyrocketed in the 1920s and 
1930s, European governments introduced a variety of public works proj-
ects, during which the unemployed would receive financial assistance in 
exchange for labour. “Public works” programmes had a long history but 
were mostly associated with the poor laws and “workhouses”. However, 
these new programmes were qualitatively and quantitatively different for 
at least three reasons: First, these – often massive – programmes were 
organised by national governments rather than local authorities. Some 
of the most well-known examples of public work projects include the 
infamous Nazi programmes launched to build the Autobahn, or Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s New Deal projects in the US, which included the cre-
ation of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA), which employed millions of people. Second, the 
underlying logic of these public works project was fundamentally differ-
ent. While the main aim of earlier work projects was to “discipline” the 
jobless and prevent welfare abuse, the goal of these new programmes 
was to provide “relief ” to the unemployed during periods of massive un-
employment. And third, workers who participated in most of these new 
public works projects actually received close to market wages, which was 
certainly not the case in the “workhouses” or other 19th-century public 
works projects.
 It needs to be reiterated, however, that these public works pro-
grammes were only designed to provide work and wages for the un-
employed. They were not designed to improve, or maintain, the “em-
ployability” of workers, which is the goal of contemporary ALMPs. The 
exception to this rule may have been Germany and Sweden, where ac-
tive “measures for encouraging increased mobility in the labour force 
through vocational training, and travel and moving allowances” were 
already discussed during the 1920s and 1930s respectively (King and 
Rothstein 1993, 162; for Germany, see Faust 1987, 276). However, the 
extent to which these measures were actually used prior to WWII was 
quite limited, and it would not be until the 1950s that this ALMP con-
cept was actually enacted.
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III.2 Locating the Origin of Active Manpower Policy
[T]he worker should not be the slave of the manpower policy,
but rather the policy should be the tool of the workers.
Hermann Beermann, DGB (1964, 157)
After the devastation of WWII, most of Europe experienced a period of 
rapid economic growth and technological innovation throughout the 
1950s, an era, that is often dubbed the “golden age” of the welfare state 
(e.g., Huber and Stephens 2001). During this time, welfare state poli-
cies and unemployment insurance were expanded in both coverage and 
in levels of compensation. Moreover, full employment, as envisioned in 
ILO Convention 88 of 1948 – and reaffirmed in Convention 122 of 1964 
– became not only a rhetorical goal but also an immediately attainable 
goal (except in Ireland and Italy, where unemployment remained over 
four percent). In most European countries the emerging challenge was 
one of labour shortages rather than unemployment. Accordingly, labour 
market interventions were typically limited to job-search assistance and 
voluntary participation in employment projects. “Active” labour market 
policies, as we understand them today, were used, if at all, only for a small 
group of people with specific and pressing needs in particular circum-
stances. In other words, during the 1950s, there was no “over-all, unified 
manpower programme ... concerned with the entire range of occupations 
and industries and with the long-range interests of workers, employers 
and the public” (Bakke 1964, 53).
 A true “manpower revolution” – i.e., the comprehensive use of ALMPs 
– would only occur in the 1960s, when the OECD spread the idea of ac-
tive “manpower policies” throughout Western Europe. The concept of 
manpower policy is credited to two Swedish trade union economists, 
Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner5 (Martin 1975, 432, fn. 5), who outlined 
the expansion of active manpower policy as a supplementary instrument 
to macro-economic policy in various documents, but most importantly 
in the Trade Unions and Full Employment publication of 1951 (Land-
sorganisationen i Sverige 1953). Their discussion of manpower policy 
was placed in the context of economic growth and full employment, 
and was mostly seen as a means for sustaining non-inflationary growth, 
which could be achieved via two mutually supportive strategies: wage 
increases needed to be settled at the national level in a “solidaristic” 
way, i.e., equal pay for equal work, which, in turn, anticipated increased 
wage equity (Wadensjö 2009). These wages were to be set at the highest 
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rate possible without compromising Swedish international competitive-
ness, while special increases for low-wage employees would lead to an 
equalization of incomes. This meant that firms that could only survive 
by paying low wages needed to rationalise, while inefficient firms would 
be forced to shut down. Both of these trends would then lead to an in-
crease in overall productivity in the Swedish economy and, of course, 
unemployment. Therefore, the second, complementary strategy ensured 
that workers laid off by these firms would be “retrained and redeployed 
through specially designed labour market programmes into the com-
petitive firms and industries where their services were needed” (Mil-
ner 1989, 107; see also, Esping-Andersen 1990, 168). This labour market 
intervention aimed to fulfil three interrelated desirable political goals: 
(a) enhancing the economy’s productive capacity; (b) keeping inflation 
in check through the effective flow of labour, both across regions and 
occupations; and (c) improving social upward mobility and individual 
competences.
 However, Rehn and Meidner’s ideas would not become law until the 
early 1950s as both the government – especially the Social Democrats’ co-
alition partner from 1951 to 1957, the Peasants League (later renamed the 
Centre Party) – and Swedish business remained sceptical about the need 
for such large-scale and costly economic interventions (personal conver-
sation, SOFI2). This situation eventually changed due to three events: 
First, the 1957 elections gave the Social Democrats a clear mandate, thus 
effectively eliminating the need to align with the Peasants League in a 
coalition government. Second, the governmental reshuffle brought in a 
new Prime Minister and a new Finance Minister, both of which were pro-
ponents of the Rehn-Meidner model. And third, the Korean War and the 
Suez Canal Crisis induced high levels of inflation in mid-1950s, which led 
even leading employers to reassess their positions (Milner 1989, 110). In 
1957, the government officially adopted the Rehn-Meidner model, which 
meant – inter alia – the development of new active manpower policies, 
the strengthening of existing programmes, and doubling expenditures 
on labour market measures (Milner 1989, 109). It was during this period 
that labour market training for adult employees and mobility grants be-
came the foundation of Sweden’s “active” labour market policy regime 
(Thoursie and Wadensjö 1997).6
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III.3 The OECD and the Diff usion of Active Manpower Policy
The OECD, which grew out of the Organisation for European Economic 
Co-operation (OEEC) that was established to manage the Marshall Plan 
after WWII, was founded in Paris on 14 December 1960 (Barbezat 1997; 
Schäfer 2005, 58-61). The OECD’s primary objective was to aid advanced 
industrial nations to reach their economic growth potentials, while keep-
ing inflation in check. The best way to pursue this goal was through the 
construction, dissemination, and propagation of novel and convincing 
economic ideas. The OECD created the following two structures toward 
this end, which are still in place today: 7 (1) the Council and the Commit-
tees, and (2) the Secretariat linked to the Secretary-General, who is also 
Chairman of the Council (cf., Marcussen 2004, 21ff ). The Council is com-
prised of ambassadors from all of the Member States and is responsible for 
establishing the overall strategy of the OECD. The Council meets annu-
ally at the ministerial level to set jointly agreed-upon priorities to support 
common policymaking needs and to call attention to certain economic 
issues and ideas. Expert Committees comprised mainly of national civil 
servants are set up in specific policy fields, including, for instance educa-
tion, the labour market, and investment. Representatives from all Mem-
ber States participate in all of the Committees, supporting the Council’s 
operations. The national representatives also solicit the input and advice 
from employers (through the Business and Industry Advisory Commit-
tee), worker representatives (through the Trade Union Advisory Commit-
tee), and other specialised NGOs. The Council and national governments 
seek and draw on the expertise and conclusions generated – usually by 
consensus – in these committees. Accordingly, this “first level” of internal 
OECD organisation is described as being “political, deliberative and con-
sultative” (Marcussen 2004, 21).
 Th e second level, the Secretariat, is divided into specialised policy Direc-
torates and comprises professionals and administrative staﬀ  who support 
the workings of the respective Committees. Most of the involved profes-
sionals are economists, statisticians, or lawyers, and the modus operandi 
in the Secretariat is “administrative, analytical and data-processing” (Mar-
cussen 2004, 21). Th e Secretary General oversees the workings of the Sec-
retariat and chairs the Council, which makes him the key “link” between 
the experts and national governments. Th e “heart” of the OECD’s Secre-
tariat structure is the Economics Department, which “constitutes the very 
essence of the OECD staﬀ ’s self-deﬁ nition” (Marcussen 2004, 24). As we 
will see in greater detail in chapter V, the Economics Department produces 
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the annual Economic Outlook as well as the country reviews, outlining key 
reform suggestions for individual members. To summarise, the OECD of-
fers a forum in which policymakers and policy experts come together to 
exchange ideas, which are then systematically reviewed, analytically and 
theoretically tested, and supported with empirical and statistical data. In 
the ﬁ eld of employment and labour market policy, the OECD was – at that 
time – the “only player” in town, and for “new ideas to spread worldwide, 
they had to ﬁ rst pass the OECD ﬁ lter” (Noaksson and Jacobsson 2003, 34).
 In 1962, Gösta Rehn, a “very active and ambitious man” (personal con-
versation, SOFI2) was appointed Director of the OECD’s Manpower and 
Social Affairs Directorate, a position he would hold until 1974 (Rehn and 
Svenska institutet för kulturellt utbyte med utlandet, 1984). One of the 
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Directorate’s “main tasks [was] the 
promotion of an active manpower policy” (OECD 1964a, 3), and it was 
through him that the “active manpower policy” ideas that the Swedish 
model was based on were quickly disseminated throughout the industri-
alised world (cf., Lenert 1964, 65; Rothstein 1985, 153). The main mecha-
nism of policy diffusion was the application of the “country review proce-
dure [which was applied] also to the study of manpower and allied social 
policies, which had proved so successful in other sectors of the Organisa-
tion” (OECD 1963, 7).8 In 1963, the OECD produced its first country re-
port on manpower policy, choosing Sweden as its first case study (OECD 
1963).9 In addition to disseminating information about labour market 
structures and policies in OECD member countries, the OECD was also 
engaged in organising a series of expert conferences. For instance, the 
OECD organised a labour union seminar on active manpower policy in 
Vienna, in September 1963. Prior to the conference, the OECD members 
circulated various reports on active manpower policy, country case stud-
ies, and other supplementary material. The seminar’s explicit goal was to 
provide an “ideational compass” that would guide governments in their 
reform efforts and promote an exchange of current experiences, as well 
as offering a forum for the presentation of management and trade union 
views (cf., OECD 1964b). An additional seminar was held in April 1964 
for management and business representatives. The results of these semi-
nars were communicated to the Manpower and Social Affairs Director-
ate. The Directorate then produced – and the Council endorsed – a set 
of key recommendations about active manpower policy in 1964 (OECD 
1964c). These recommendations were subsequently circulated alongside 
a request to produce ministerial reports that would outline how govern-
ments enacted these measures into national law, which was due on 30 June 
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1965. It was these 1964 OECD Recommendations that would subsequently 
serve as the frequently cited reference point for national reform efforts 
(see the following country studies). The OECD’s recommendations can be 
summarised along three categories: goals, governance and instruments.10
Box 2 Summary of 1964 OECD Recommendations
Goals of Active Manpower Policies (AMPs)
1.  AMPs shall promote economic growth by contributing to the increase of an 
economy’s productive capacity and its utilisation
2.  AMPs shall supplement macro-economic policy, alongside “fi scal and monetary 
policies designed to maintain high levels of employment and business activity”
3.  AMPs shall have an expansionist eff ect on employment and production but an anti-
infl ationary eff ect with regard to costs and prices, i.e., AMPs shall be used pro-actively 
and counter-cyclically
4.  AMPs shall be used as (fi nancial) means to assist fi rms’ economic restructuring eff orts
5. AMPs shall enhance individual occupational and geographic mobility
Governance of National Labour Markets
1. If necessary, create one central labour market authority (PES)
2. Establish local/regional PES offi  ces that aid in the eff ective fl ow of labour
3.  Endow PESs with “suffi  cient resources” so they can provide access to vocational 
guidance and occupational counselling to all “categories of workers, whether 
employed, under-employed, or unemployed”
4.  Employers’ and workers’ organisations shall play a positive role in promoting 
economic growth and the improvement in the standards of all people
5.  A public body shall gather and disseminate information/labour market data (i.e., 
forecast trends and needs)
National Labour Market Measures
1.  AMPs shall be designed as supply-side measures, improving the skills of the 
workforce and jobseekers
2.  While training opportunities should be provided by employers, “public authorities 
must see to it that total training capacity is adequate for the economy as a 
whole... Everybody needing and wishing to acquire new skills should be given the 
opportunity to qualify for the new and better jobs”
3  AMPs shall include the promotion of geographic mobility through the dissemination 
of information about job openings outside the home area and the collaboration of 
employment services with local housing authorities
4.  Provide special measures for “marginal groups” to promote their participation in 
“useful employment,” particularly when “shortages of labour exist or are impending”
5.  Provide adequate unemployment benefi ts and compensation in cases of redundancy 
as well as allowances for those “undertaking resettlement, retraining, rehabilitation, 
and other readjustments”
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As Box 2 shows, the immediate focus of the OECD Recommendations was 
threefold: (1) establish a set of clear labour market policy goals; (2) out-
line key recommendations regarding the introduction or recalibration of 
public employment services to adequately organise and implement public 
labour market policy; and (3) provide key recommendations for the de-
sign and content of public labour market policy measures.
 In March 1965, the OECD organised a seminar on the Public Employ-
ment Service to support the Recommendations. All of the OECD Mem-
ber States’ PESs were assessed during this seminar. The OECD pointed 
out that the old concept which considered a PES “a passive institution 
designed primarily to enrol the unemployed and to determine their eli-
gibility for benefits” had become obsolete (OECD 1966, 11, emphasis 
added). The OECD pointed out that Sweden had an “outstanding” sys-
tem that could serve as a benchmark for other members. At that time, 
Sweden was not only spearheading the manpower revolution, but had 
also established a modern PES. In 1947, the Swedish Social Democratic 
government nationalised all regional PESs and introduced a tripartite, 
national-level Labour Market Board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, AMS) 
instead. The AMS co-ordinated the activities of 25 tripartite County 
Labour Boards that, in turn, oversaw some 233 local employment of-
fices (OECD 1963, 25). The new Swedish PES – effectively modelled on 
the German PES established in 1927 – remained a relatively indepen-
dent organisation, but was bound by parliament’s legislative framework 
and by the Ministry of Labour, which had authority over the AMS’s 
budget.
 In 1967, a Working Party that included representatives of all OECD 
members was convened. The Working Party was charged with evaluating 
materials that had been specifically commissioned by the OECD Man-
power Division. This exercise led to the publication of a comprehensive 
review of public employment services in 1969. While the exchange of 
national viewpoints clearly revealed disagreement on many key issues, 
“[there] was agreement, without exception, that an active manpower 
policy was not only accepted, but was becoming an integral part of the 
economic life of each of the countries. [Moreover,] labour market and 
professional experts and practitioners [were] favourably disposed to the 
acceptance of a new and enlarged responsibility for the Employment Ser-
vice” (Levine 1969, 49).
 The 1960s can thus be seen as a decade when ideas about active man-
power polices, delivered by empowered and modernised public employ-
ment services, came to the forefront. As the OECD “exported” these ideas 
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throughout Europe (Rothstein 1985, 153), the organisation effectively es-
tablished itself as a major “ideational agent” in the realm of economic 
policy discourse in general and with respect to labour market policy in 
particular (Marcussen 2001). In other words, the OECD had become a 
key actor in preparing, disseminating, and popularising the use of active 
manpower policies and the modernisation and expansion of PESs. The 
following country overviews will provide some empirical evidence for this 
claim and outline key labour market policy developments.
III.4 Five Country Cases: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, 
and the UK
Denmark
The organisation of the Danish labour market remained largely in the 
hands of the social partners – mainly the labour unions – during the 
1950s and most of the 1960s. As a consequence, the Danish system was 
rather complex and fragmented. The central government, in turn, played 
only a minor role, which was most evident in three important areas: 
First, even though the government had formally placed the municipal 
PESs under the control of the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1942 – which 
led to an increase in the number of offices – the government contin-
ued to lack the ability to significantly influence their operations (Nør-
gaard 1997, 315). These offices also continued to play only a marginal 
role throughout the 1950 and 1960s. This was in part due to the fact that 
only uninsured workers could access their services. Moreover, the of-
fices were usually located on “dingy premises in back streets”, and were 
seen as unattractive by jobseekers and employers (OECD 1974, 35). The 
majority of job placements still took place in the labour unions’ labour 
exchanges, which were mostly organised along craft and occupational 
lines. The flipside of having union-run offices was that labour market 
mobility across occupations was limited and comprehensive informa-
tion about the labour market remained scarce. In 1958, an attempt was 
made to improve the operations of the labour market through the intro-
duction of a corporatist Labour Market Council (Arbejdsmarkedsråd) at 
the national level. However, the council was not a real decision-making 
body akin to the AMS in Sweden. It’s main function was to serve as a 
forum for debate and “to make sure that nobody in the labour market 
establishment took any initiatives without the other parties knowing it” 
(Nørgaard 1997, 356, fn. 27).
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 Second, a large number of about 60 union-run unemployment funds, 
which had emerged out of an extensive network of unionised self-help as-
sociations, established in the 1870s (Rothstein 1985), continued to admin-
ister unemployment insurance payments. Even though the central state 
tried to assume some oversight over the unemployment associations by 
establishing Local Occupational Committees, the effect these institutions 
had also remained limited (Nørgaard 1997, 317). The main disadvantage of 
a largely uncontrolled, union-run UI system was the lack of information 
and coverage. More specifically, access to UI funds was mainly limited 
to the “typical” male worker, while the central authorities also lacked in-
sights into who the unemployed were and what skills were needed in the 
labour market, and thus they lacked the ability to effectively manage the 
supply and demand of labour and skills.
 Third, while a nationwide system of technical schools had already been 
established in the 1870s (Kristensen and Petersen 1996, 9), there was, 
other than the standard company-based training, very little comprehen-
sive adult training and retraining during the 1950s. The main innovation 
during the 1950s was the Apprenticeship Law of 1958, which reorganised 
and somewhat streamlined the demands on apprentices and harmonised 
the content of training curricula. However, the systems remained mainly 
organised and financed by the social partners, which effectively limited 
the steering capacity of the Ministry of Education (OECD 1974, 37). The 
Ministry of Labour, in turn, financed and oversaw the training of both 
skilled and unskilled workers, while the social partners essentially con-
trolled the curricula. In the 1960s, two further improvements were made. 
First, unskilled labour, i.e., those who had never received any formal vo-
cational training, were offered training opportunities (Specialarbejderud-
dannelser) in Specialized Workers Schools (later called AMU-Centres) 
in 1960. These courses were, however, relatively short – typically one to 
three weeks – and were primarily focused on the construction, metal, 
and road and rail sectors (OECD 1974, 40f ). Second, in 1966, courses for 
skilled workers (Efteruddannelse) were offered. Skilled labour included 
all those who had already completed an apprenticeship training course 
and needed additional training (Kristensen and Petersen 1996, 11; Larsen 
2005, 120; OECD 1974, 41). These courses were also mainly in the con-
struction and metal sectors and normally lasted from two to four weeks, 
which was in stark contrast to the courses offered in Sweden, which aver-
aged six months (Brehmer and Bradford 1974, 113). Workers already em-
ployed could ask their employers for permission to participate, and vari-
ous courses could be taken throughout the year, so that employees could 
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upgrade their skills continuously (interview, CARMA). Even though the 
government successively introduced and modernised its training and re-
training courses in 1958, 1960, and 1966, there was still no overarching 
structure that co-ordinated the various efforts. The field remained split 
between the ministries of education and labour, while training and re-
training efforts were mainly limited to the employed with lower skills sets 
in a few specific sectors, over whose curricula the government could exert 
little control.
 In summary, job-placement services, unemployment insurance, voca-
tional guidance and (re-)training for the employed were not systematical-
ly and centrally organised. Moreover, there was literally no training avail-
able for the unemployed who were seeking jobs. Not surprisingly then, by 
the mid-1960s, “everyone in Denmark realise[d] that there [had to] be a 
transition to a uniform and more rational system of labour exchange ser-
vices under public administration in the near future” (OECD 1967a, 19). 
Inspired by the Swedish experiences with active labour market policies 
(Kvist et al. 2008, 223; interview, CARMA), and after years of deliberating 
and negotiating within two commissions that had been specifically estab-
lished to reform the labour market, the Danish government was finally 
able to enact some groundbreaking institutional changes in the period 
1967-1970.
 In 1967, the Social Democratic government passed a law, which shifted 
the marginal risk of unemployment insurance from the UI funds to the 
state. Th is meant that when unemployment levels and insurance expendi-
tures exceeded a certain level, the state – i.e., the taxpayer – would reim-
burse the unemployment associations. While employers were not required 
to contribute to UI funds, workers continued to contribute their share (in-
terview, CARMA). As such, the state took over the responsibility of the 
ﬁ nancial risks associated with unemployment, while the administrative 
role of the labour unions was consolidated. Only those who had exhaust-
ed their UI rights and the uninsured were required to seek means-tested 
social assistance payments, which were administered by municipalities.11 
Th e Social Democrats also expanded the beneﬁ t system to cover part-time 
employees and the selfemployed, ﬁ xed UI contributions levels, and made 
unemployment beneﬁ t payments more generous by linking beneﬁ ts to 
workers’ previous salaries, thereby introducing an earnings-related beneﬁ t 
system similar to the one in Sweden.12 Th ese reforms eﬀ ectively increased 
the replacement rate from an average of about 40 percent of previous wag-
es to an average of almost 75 percent (PLS Consult and Jensen 1997, 51). 
For low-income workers, the replacement rate was as high as 90 percent of 
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previous wages. While these changes were mainly advocated by the labour 
unions, there were also concessions for employers. On the one hand, they 
were no longer ﬁ nancially liable for labour market policies, while, on the 
other hand, they were oﬀ ered an expansion of “extensive freedom[s] over 
dismissals” (OECD 1996c, 18). Moreover, when a bipartite Review Board 
for Unemployment Insurance was created both labour and business jointly 
oversaw the unemployment insurance funds.
 During the late 1960s, the Danish government also issued a variety of 
laws that further revamped the labour exchanges system. These changes 
were introduced by the newly elected bourgeois coalition government, 
but were actually the product of “many years of preparations in commis-
sions” (Jørgensen 2002, 172, see also Toft 2001). The changes were three-
fold: First, the unions lost their right to place workers into jobs, while state 
control over the PES offices became centralised through the creation of a 
central public employment service, the Arbejdsformidlingen (AF), which 
worked as a semi-autonomous agency under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Labour. Second, 29 regional PESs were created and charged with the 
authority to issue regional policies and to oversee the attached local of-
fices. And third, the social partners were not only represented at the na-
tional level, where a newly established Labour Market Board (Landsarbe-
jdsnævnet) replaced the Labour Market Council, first established in 1958, 
but also in Regional Labour Market Boards (Regionale Arbejdsmarked-
snævn) that advised the regional PES offices.
 In summary, the historic compromises leading to the labour market re-
forms in the period 1967-1970 institutionalised many of the 1964 OECD 
Recommendations, including the establishment of a national, corporatist 
PES and the introduction of more “adequate” beneﬁ t levels with a much 
broader coverage. Th rough these reforms, two pillars of the famous ﬂ exi-
curity model, namely ﬂ exible labour markets and comprehensive and gen-
erous beneﬁ ts, were also established during this period. However, shying 
away from addressing the issue of (re)training for the unemployed, the 
Danish reformers remained much less ambitious than their Swedish (and 
German) neighbours. Th e Danish lack of interest in expanding training 
programmes to include the unemployed can be explained when we look at 
Denmark’s economy, which was still dominated by the agriculture, textile, 
and clothing sectors during the “golden years” (Benner and Bundgaard Vad 
2000, 408). Th e larger, industrial ﬁ rms as found in Sweden and Germany, 
by contrast, were better able to make use of ALMPs. Not only did they have 
experienced human resource departments that were aware of governmen-
tal programmes available to workers, but also the skills of these industrial 
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workers stood to beneﬁ t most from training courses. Perhaps more im-
portantly, however, Danish “politicians thought that economic growth and 
full employment were permanent and that concepts like crisis and mass 
unemployment were ready for the museum” (Jørgensen 2002, 172). For 
these reasons, Danish policymakers prioritised improved job-placement 
and counselling services, ﬂ exible labour markets, and ﬁ nancial security 
through generous beneﬁ ts during (short) spells of unemployment.
Germany
When the OECD published its recommendations in 1964, Germany al-
ready had many of the proposed labour market institutions in place. Ger-
many had not only a well-funded, state-guided educational system and an 
elaborate system of vocational training, 13 but also a national, corporatist 
PES. The German PES, first established in 1927 and reinstituted after the 
end of WWII, was organised as a semi-autonomous, tripartite federal of-
fice, bound by public law. The federal office directed the activities of 11 
regional offices, which, in turn, were responsible for their local branches. 
All regional and local PES offices were governed in a tripartite fashion, 
ensuring the co-ordination of employers, workers, and local authorities’ 
interests. The German PES – inter alia – administered unemployment 
benefits, provided vocational guidance (Berufsberatung), and organised 
preparatory vocational training and re-training courses (berufliche Vorbe-
reitungs-, Fortbildungs- und Umschulungsmaßnahmen). These courses, in 
turn, were provided by external, mostly union- or employer-run providers 
(Träger) rather than the PES itself.
 However, despite this advanced institutional framework, the actual 
scope of active manpower policies utilised by the PES remained marginal. 
This is to say, while some interventionist measures had already been in-
stituted in the early 1950s – especially for young jobseekers – the ini-
tially high levels of unemployment quickly became labour shortages in 
the later half of the 1950s. Accordingly, “active” manpower measures were 
largely phased out, while the new labour shortages were alleviated by the 
introduction of large numbers of guest workers from outside Germany. 
German labour market policy was thus reactive in the sense that com-
pensation was paid to workers during spells of joblessness and “active” 
manpower policy was essentially limited to assistance with job searches.
 In the mid-1960s, however, German policymakers redirected and ex-
panded Germany’s labour market policy toward a more proactive orien-
tation by prioritising the prevention of unemployment in the first place, 
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reducing its duration in unavoidable situations, and generally improving 
occupational mobility in the working population. According to Günther 
Schmid, Germany’s leading labour market expert, this “turnaround” in the 
orientation of Germany labour market policy was “primarily triggered by 
the OECD” (Schmid and Oschmiansky 2005b, 336, my translation), while 
the brief economic downturn in 1967 made the Swedish concept of active 
manpower policies an attractive reference point for German policymak-
ers (interview, HBS). After policymakers reassessed the aim of Germany’s 
labour market policy, the Work Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, 
AFG) was issued in 1969 by the Grand Coalition, which was comprised of 
the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD). The 
core elements of the AFG included the use of proactive measures to cir-
cumvent hurdles to finding work, improve occupational structures, se-
cure high levels of employment, and promote economic growth (Schmuhl 
et al. 2003, 464). Much like the creation of the PES in Denmark in 1969, 
the AFG represented a major legislative breakthrough – realised after 
years of tough negotiations – that would become the “formative pillar 
for Germany’s entire labour market policy trajectory” (interviews, HBS, 
BMAS3). As such, supply-side measures such as occupational training 
for the unemployed became a centrepiece, which was based on the idea 
that everyone should be able to find and maintain suitable employment 
(Rottenecker and Schneider 1996, 163). While the AFG primarily targeted 
the unemployed, the government also adopted the Vocational Training 
Act (Berufsbildungsgesetz) on 16 August 1969 and the Vocational Training 
Promotion Act (Ausbildungsförderungsgesetz) on 19 September 1969, to 
improve the vocational training prospects of workers in employment.14 In 
order to be able to adequately deliver a significantly larger set of labour 
market measures, the PES was modernised, renamed the Federal Em-
ployment Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, BA), and relocated to its new 
headquarters in Nuremberg. As planning and foresight became part and 
parcel of a proactive labour market policy regime, the BA also received 
support from the Institute for Labour Market and Occupational Studies 
(Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung), created in 1967.
Austria
Austria also underwent major institutional changes in 1969. As in Ger-
many, active manpower policy had not been widely institutionalised dur-
ing the immediate post-war era. In contrast to Germany, where unem-
ployment remained an issue until the mid-1950s, Austria reached full 
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employment almost immediately after the war. In 1947, with under three 
percent unemployment, Austria even faced its first shortages of skilled 
labour (Wilk 1991, 156). Thus, active manpower measures were not nec-
essary, while labour shortages were quickly addressed by inviting guest 
workers, mainly from Turkey and Yugoslavia. When unemployment be-
gan to rise in the early 1950s to 7.5 percent during a mild economic re-
cession (Butschek 1981, 9), Austria offered some – albeit, very modest – 
vocational training programmes for unemployed jobseekers (Wilk 1991, 
161). By 1955, unemployment had declined again and the perceived need 
for reform subsided.
 With the emergence of the Rehn-Meidner model in Sweden, the Aus-
trian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) began to demand the institution of 
active manpower policies along Swedish lines in as early as 1959. Their 
demands were quickly taken up by national experts (Aichholzer 1982, 70; 
Fischer and Potmesil 1984, 273; Wilk 1991, 162), and the first legislative 
proposal was presented in 1963. This first proposal did not, however, find 
a broad enough coalition to actually introduce legislative changes. The 
next impetus for change – and external legitimisation of union demands – 
came not only in the form of the 1964 OECD Recommendations, but also 
from an 1964/65 OECD inspection report that outlined recommenda-
tions for the adoption of active manpower policies (Tálos 1981, 339; Wilk 
1991, 162). As in Denmark and Germany, political struggles prevented the 
swift passage of legislation, and it would not be until 12 December 1968 
that the Labour Market Promotion Act (Arbeitsmarktförderungsgesetz, 
AMFG) was approved by Parliament to become law in 1969. As in Ger-
many, the AMFG redirected the overall aim of Austrian labour market 
policy “based on the logic of an active labour market policy to reach and 
sustain full employment and prevent unemployment” (Government of 
Austria 1968, my translation). Much like in Germany, the AMFG was ac-
companied by additional legislation that approved the institution of the 
Vocational Training Act (Berufsausbildungsgesetz) of 1969. As such, the 
AMFG, like the AFG in Germany and the various aforementioned Danish 
labour laws, served as the foundation of contemporary Austrian ALMPs 
(interview, BMWA1).
 With the AMFG, the Christian Democratic single-party government 
not only established a legal foundation for the use of active labour mar-
ket policy, but also addressed the governance structures of Austria’s PES, 
which became necessary for two reasons: First, the Austrian PES had been 
nationalised and placed under direct authority of the Ministry for Social 
Administration by the Nazis in 1938. In contrast to Germany, this sys-
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tem had been retained after the end of WWII in 1945, much to the dis-
satisfaction of the social partners (Wilk 1991, 158).15 The social partners 
and various policymakers had been waiting for an opportunity since the 
end of the war to challenge this “unresolved” institutional organisation 
question. The second factor concerned the actual role that the Austrian 
PES might play in the labour market. As in Germany, local employment 
offices not only offered job-placement services and paid benefits, but 
were also involved in vocational counselling and apprentice placements. 
In contrast to Germany, however, the Austrian local employment of-
fices covered only “a very limited part of the Austrian labour market”, 
which made an overhaul of the PES even more desirable, if not necessary 
(OECD 1967b, 42).
 Accordingly, the AMFG provided the context in which this “open” is-
sue was to be settled with a compromise. On the one hand, the Christian 
Democrats, who had gained an absolute Parliamentary majority in 1966, 
codified in the AMFG that the PES would be retained within the ministry 
(Wilk 1991, 163). One the other hand, however, the PES was completely 
overhauled, which was partially a concession to the social partners. First, 
the social partners were guaranteed an advisory function at all levels of 
PES governance. Furthermore, local employment offices were established 
nationwide, with additional branch offices in the larger districts. Finally, 
the organisation of services was revamped through the establishment of 
three service areas with separate functions, including a “counselling and 
placement” division that was responsible for providing information, ad-
vice, placement, occupational rehabilitation, and individual support ser-
vices, a “benefits” division responsible for the financial and accounting 
aspects of unemployment insurance, and an “employment policy” divi-
sion that dealt with the remaining tasks (Wilk 1991, 171).
 In summary, the OECD Recommendations and the subsequent inspec-
tion report stimulated Austrian labour market reforms, which led to an 
overhaul of the Austrian PES and the introduction and codification of ac-
tive manpower policies. However, in contrast to Denmark, Sweden, and 
Germany, which had established semi-autonomous PESs, the Austrian 
PES remained under direct ministerial jurisdiction. Despite its primarily 
state-led character, however, the Austrian government solicited and insti-
tutionalised the collaboration with the social partners at all levels of PES 
governance.
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United Kingdom
With the end of WWII, the Labour government, inspired by the seminal 
Beveridge Report, introduced four legislative acts, constructing a “social 
security network, which protected everyone against destitution or want” 
(Fraser 2009, 275). This new, universal system covered the entire popula-
tion against a variety of risks, including sickness, unemployment, retire-
ment, and injuries through the National Insurance and Industrial Injuries 
Act of 1946. Thousands of qualified employees had to be recruited as some 
“25 million people had to be classified, recorded and issued with national 
insurance numbers” during this period (Fraser 2009, 276). In line with 
these reforms, the local Labour Exchanges – which had been renamed 
Employment Exchanges during WWI (Lord Young 1990, 153) – were con-
verted into Unemployment Benefit Offices (UBOs) where unemployed 
jobseekers had to regularly “sign in” in order to receive their benefits.16 
Moreover, a separate Youth Employment Service was created to assist 
younger jobseekers. The system was funded by employer and employee 
contributions and was additionally subsidised by general taxation. The 
system was, in contrast to most Continental and Nordic European cas-
es, fully administered by the government rather than the social partners 
(Finn et al. 2005, 4). The British system of adult education and vocational 
training was also organised differently. Britain’s immediate post-war his-
tory was characterised by a “voluntarist” training system. This meant that 
the provision of training by the state was residual and limited to the prob-
lem of unemployed youth and special groups. Social partnership was un-
coordinated and workers, individual employers, and various unions made 
their own arrangements. While this system “effectively excluded those 
workers – the vast majority – not directly placed in vocational schemes or 
coveted apprenticeships (King 1997, 385f ), the underlying belief was that 
a laissez-faire approach could meet the demands of a modern economy 
(Wikeley 1990, 355; King 1997, 387).
 During the 1960s, a major reassessment about the adequacy of the 
British system took place. On the one hand, Conservative and Labour 
policymakers alike realised that the system of voluntarism had signif-
icant shortcomings as British productivity had shown rapid declines. 
On the other hand, it was recognised that the UBOs had incurred a 
“dole image” in the public eye, while employers became increasingly 
dissatisfied with their placement services (OECD 1966, 75). Accord-
ingly, politicians across party lines became increasingly interested in 
moving toward a more co-ordinated labour market system and major 
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legislative proposals were initiated by Prime Ministers Harold Macmil-
lan (Conservatives, 1957-1963), Harold Wilson (Labour, 1964-1970) and 
Edward Heath (Conservatives, 1970-1974). This era, which was charac-
terised by a “corporatist temptation”,17 culminated in major institution-
al changes: (1) the establishment of the tripartite National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC) in 1962, designed as a national “plan-
ning institution” with a remit to advise the government on economic 
policy (Hall 1986, 87); (2) the formation of Industrial Training Boards 
(ITBs) in 1965; and, most importantly, (3) the creation of a new PES, 
the tripartite Manpower Services Commission (MSC) in 1973 that was 
responsible for both job placement and adult vocational training (cf., 
Heyes 2000, 4).
 Th e Industrial Training Act of 1964 was envisioned to revolutionise the 
British system of poor training (Finegold and Soskice 1988). However, the 
act was characterised not only by innovations but also by major shortcom-
ings. Most importantly, while the act empowered the Minister of Labour 
to establish ITBs with the “prime function being to oversee the training 
provided by employers in each sector” (Wikeley 1990, 355), it left the “vol-
untary” aspects of the British vocational training system intact – largely 
due to the insistence of some employers (King 1997, 388). Accordingly, the 
ITBs were usually headed by a chairman from the industrial or commercial 
sectors, whereas employer, labour union, and education sector represen-
tatives served on the ITB boards. Th is meant that even though vocational 
training had found legislative recognition, the state was not able to directly 
aﬀ ect the quality or content of training, and did not play an active role in 
encouraging employers to provide more training. Moreover, even though 
the act allowed the ITBs to raise a “training levy on ﬁ rms within their in-
dustry” (Tamkin et al. 2006, 137), the state refrained from providing any 
new resources. As such, training remained fragmented, poorly funded and 
without an overarching framework. Last, because the unemployment rate 
remained low throughout the 1960s, the main focus of the ITBs was to im-
prove the skills of those with jobs. Th is, in turn, left low-skilled jobseekers 
with little state support (King 1997, 388). 
 Important changes in the British adult education system therefore 
predate the OECD Recommendations of 1964. The OECD, did howev-
er, have a major impact on the creation of a tripartite employment and 
training authority, and the introduction of a broad array of active man-
power policies designed to address the needs of unemployed workers. 
When the UK’s Department of Labour was “examined” by OECD repre-
sentatives from Austria, Germany, the United States as well as by Gösta 
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Rehn in 1968 (OECD 1970, 11), a “window of opportunity” opened for 
a radical reform of the PES and British labour market policies as the 
OECD’s views coincided with those held by department officials (Price 
2000, 136). Three responses are most noteworthy. First, new Job Centres 
were opened at attractive locations to provide improved job-placement 
services, in addition to, but separate from, UBOs, which oversaw benefit 
payments. At that time, the Conservative government believed that it 
was only the separation of employment from benefit services that could 
adequately address the negative image of the exchanges (Beale 2005, 68), 
a view that the OECD also advocated during their visit (OECD 1970, 24). 
Second, the multipartite MSC was established in 1973, not long after a 
team of British civil servants visited Sweden and West Germany to learn 
more about their corporatist models in 1971. The MSC was established 
to manage employment and training policies through the Employment 
Service Agency (ESA), which was in charge of the Job Centres and the 
Training Services Agency (TSA), which oversaw the ITBs. The MSC was 
headed by a chairman who was appointed by the Secretary of State, three 
CBI and three TUC representatives, two local authority representatives 
and one official representing the education sector (Wikeley 1990, 356). 
Thus the establishment of the MSC was a clear signal of the govern-
ment’s (renewed) commitment to “consensus management of the econ-
omy”, while Labour and the TUC envisioned that the MSC could play a 
“strategic role” similar to that of the Labour Market Board in Sweden 
(Ainley and Corney 1990, 22). And third, the state took a more active 
role in the provision of training for the unemployed through the Train-
ing Opportunities Scheme (TOPS), which was launched in 1972. TOPS 
offered training (and a small allowance) to adults of at least 19 years of 
age who had not been in full-time education for at least two years and 
showed “a clear intention of taking up employment in the training occu-
pation” (Beale 2005, 68).
 In summary, the late 1960s and early 1970s were a time when Britain 
moved toward a more “co-ordinated” labour market regime by soliciting 
the support of the social partners, established a national authority that 
co-ordinated employment and training activities, and introduced and 
expanded active manpower policies. The OECD’s recommendations, in 
turn, served as an important focal point and resource, “accelerating” and 
“legitimising” major labour market reforms (cf., also, Lewis 1978).
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Ireland
Ireland is similar to its British neighbour in that it had utilised a small set 
of Labour Exchanges established in 1909 as a means for jobseekers and 
employers to meet. The main functions of the Irish Labour Exchanges 
were similar to those in Britain, which included the issuance of benefit 
payments, while placement was only considered a “minor ancillary activ-
ity” and was limited to filling a small number of unskilled jobs, many of 
them in the public sector (NESC 1985, 206). The Irish UI system, like that 
of its British neighbour, was based on a flat-rate benefit at modest levels, 
and was very centralised, with the state being responsible for the adminis-
tration and management of a separate “unemployment fund” (MacCashin 
2004, 195). In 1952, a new legislative act fully integrated this unemploy-
ment fund into the national social security system and made it more gen-
erous. The benefit period was extended from six months – for those with 
a contribution history of six months – and the waiting period reduced 
from six to three days (MacCashin 2004, 199). Training, in turn, was also 
mainly “voluntarist” in nature, with little state involvement. During the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, however, radical institutional changes were 
implemented, including the introduction and expansion of active man-
power policies, the creation of the Industrial Training Authority (AnCO), 
which co-ordinated vocational training in 1967, and the establishment of 
the National Manpower Service (NMS) in 1971, which was responsible for 
the delivery of labour market services.
 Generally speaking, Ireland was very receptive to the introduction of 
active manpower policies during the 1960s. Already in the late 1950s, the 
Fianna Fáil led government had decided to engage in a new economic 
course, which was subsequently initiated by Taoiseach, or Prime Minis-
ter, Sean Lemass (1959-1966) and pursued further by his successor Jack 
Lynch (1966-1973). More specifically, Ireland abandoned its strategy of 
“protectionism and import substitution industrialisation” in the early 
1960s (Cousins 1995, 36), which, in turn, exposed older and more tra-
ditional industries to fierce international competition (cf., O’Donnell 
2004, 50). Accordingly, the government was very interested in the OECD 
Recommendations (NESC 1985, 48) and requested its own report on the 
use of active manpower policies from the National Industrial Economic 
Council (NIEC) in 1964.18 Based on this report, the government issued 
a White Paper on Manpower Policy in 1965, which triggered a number 
of substantial institutional changes: First, the government created the 
Department of Labour (DfL) in 1966, which temporarily (until 1971) 
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“took over the employment exchanges” that had previously been under 
the authority of the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) (OECD 1998, 
25f ). Second, the government issued the Industrial Training Act in 1967, 
which created AnCO, a semi-independent body with its own council. 
This legislation signalled the “beginning of a more comprehensive ap-
proach to training”, which expanded significantly over time (NESC 1985, 
50). These changes in industrial policy were coupled with educational 
reforms, including the introduction of free and open access to secondary 
education and access to free school transportation, the development of 
Regional Technical Colleges (RTCs), and the expansion of a scholarship 
scheme for tertiary education in the late 1960s. Third, the responsibil-
ity for benefits payments was moved back to the DSW in 1971, while a 
PES, the “National Manpower Service (NMS) was set up as a separate 
functional entity within the Department of Labour” (OECD 1998, 26) to 
oversee the delivery of labour market policy, including job-placement 
and training services for the unemployed. Eight regional offices were in-
troduced and a network of local offices was established and expanded 
in the years thereafter. Apprenticeship schemes were also expanded and 
active manpower policy was “primarily concerned with the supply side 
of the labour market” (NESC 1985, 51). Besides significantly revamping 
its active labour market policy framework, the Irish government also 
lengthened the duration of UB from six to 12 months in 1967 – and to 15 
months in 1976 (McCashin 2004, 199).
 To summarise, during the 1960s and 1970s, Ireland’s “welfare pro-
visions [not only] converged on those in the United Kingdom” 
(O’Donnell 2004, 51), but its labour market provisions actually “out-
paced” developments in Britain. While Ireland fell short of introducing 
a Continental or Nordic vocational training system, the “developments 
in Ireland in the 1960s reflected the concept of active manpower policy 
as envisioned in the 1964 OECD Recommendations” (NESC 1985, 51) 
and policymakers took a significant step toward the co-ordination of 
its labour market through the creation of AnCO and a national place-
ment agency.
III.5 Conclusions
Active labour market interventions were certainly not an entirely new 
phenomenon in the post-war era. The industrialised nations discussed 
here had already begun using some active measures prior to the “man-
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power revolution” of the 1960s. However, the use of manpower policies 
across Europe had been sporadic and policymakers typically confined 
their use to youth and other “special” groups. In the context of virtually 
full employment, various types of employment exchanges were primar-
ily concerned with assisting jobseekers and employers in filling job va-
cancies and/or paying out unemployment benefits, rather than deliver-
ing active manpower policies. However, during the 1960s, the economic 
beliefs of two Swedish labour union economists regarding the use of ac-
tive manpower policy became an attractive reference point for reform-
minded policymakers. As this brief overview has shown, the OECD Rec-
ommendations of 1964 and their dissemination by the Manpower and 
Social Affairs Directorate served as a motivation for many governments 
to initiate institutional changes. Meanwhile, a series of OECD follow-up 
reports, country studies and conferences helped to disseminate best prac-
tices, country-specific experiences, and new insights into how to apply 
these new measures. Unemployment remained fairly low in most Euro-
pean countries during the post-war period, which meant that the main 
focus of these new instruments were supply-side oriented, i.e., focused 
on placement and the improvement of the technical skills of the jobseek-
ers. Demand-side programmes such as public works projects were of a 
smaller scale and used as “social” programmes to provide employment to 
disadvantaged groups rather than as an instrument to artificially reduce 
the demand for labour.
 In addition to advancing the use of active manpower policy in the five 
case studies, the OECD promoted the creation of national, tripartite PESs 
in Denmark, Ireland, and the UK. In the other countries, it encouraged the 
transformation of PESs into “modern” service providers that offered im-
proved vocational counselling and guidance to jobseekers (OECD 1978b, 
46).19 Accordingly, many social scientists have attributed this “manpower 
revolution” to the OECD Recommendations, which “appear to have had 
considerable weight as major reorganisations of the structure of admin-
istrations were carried out by France in 1967, Germany in 1969, and Eng-
land in 1973, modelled to a very large extent on Sweden’s experience in the 
1960s” (Krautkrämer 1978, xii; Lewis 1978, xii; OECD 1978b, 44; Butschek 
1981, 34; Rothstein 1985, 153).
 In analytical terms, this can be interpreted as a partial convergence 
of labour market policy regimes on a common ideal that included a cen-
trally steered PES (addressing frictional unemployment), supply-side ac-
tive manpower measures (promoting non-inflationary economic growth, 
while addressing structural unemployment through investments in hu-
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man capital), demand-side measures that created employment opportu-
nities for the most disadvantaged, especially during cyclical downturns, 
the provision of “adequate” unemployment benefits, and social partner 
involvement in policy development and implementation (providing ex-
pertise, legitimacy, and resources).


IV Labour Market Policy Regimes in Crisis: 
 Divergence into Three Distinct Clusters
IV.1 Labour Market Policy Regimes Under Stress: 1973-1979
After a period of “institution-building” that included the creation and/
or modernisation of public employment services, the introduction and 
expansion of active manpower policies, and the general enthusiasm for 
economic planning, foresight, and management during the mid-1960s to 
the early 1970s, many European policymakers were rudely awakened by 
the first oil crisis of 1973. As a consequence of quadrupling oil prices and 
skyrocketing commodity prices, unemployment soared in most OECD 
countries. Two decades of (near) full employment came to an end and a 
“cosy world” had abruptly disappeared (British Prime Minister James Cal-
laghan, cited in Hall 1986). Table 5 below shows the changes in unemploy-
ment levels for most of Western Europe.
Practically all of the advanced industrial countries initially reacted to 
this crisis with a typical Keynesian response: they resorted to large-scale 
deficit spending. However, when unemployment remained stubbornly 
high throughout the latter half of the 1970s, policymakers and promi-
nent economists increasingly began publicly casting doubts about core 
Keynesian premises, including the assumptions about the inverse rela-
tionship between unemployment and inflation as captured in the Phil-
lips Curve.1 Most prominently, it was two US economists – and later 
Nobel Prize winners – who produced new insights, independently of 
each other, that challenged policymakers’ cognitive ideas about the use 
of macroeconomic demand management. Edmund Phelps, who was 
awarded a Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2006, introduced the 
concept of the expectations-augmented Phillips Curve in the late 1960s, 
which emphasised that high current levels of inflation lead to high fu-
ture inflation. His analysis thus suggested that it becomes more difficult 
to achieve price stability in the long run and that “the long-term rate of 
unemployment cannot be influenced by monetary or fiscal policy affect-
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ing aggregate demand” (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2006, 2). 
Meanwhile, a group of economists at the University of Chicago, includ-
ing Milton Friedman (Taylor 1990, 36), presented the idea of a “natural 
rate” of unemployment. Friedman argued that inflation was caused only 
by the excessive expansion of the money supply, while excessive unem-
ployment was the result of frictions in the labour market. Friedman, who 
was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1976, did not believe that 
unemployment could be reduced through expansionary demand policy, 
and that a “natural” level of unemployment was an unavoidable, if not 
necessary, aspect of every economy. The level of unemployment was 
mostly a reflection of labour market institutions that were too rigid and 
wages that were set at levels that exceeded workers’ productivity. As a 
result, Friedman advocated free markets, laissez-faire capitalism, price 
stability targets and balanced budgets as the most appropriate way to en-
hance employment. The works of these two economists thus formed the 
scientific foundation for the economic concept of NAIRU, which would 
become the guiding principle of the 1994 OECD Jobs Study (see chapter 
VI.) However, throughout most of the 1970s, the representatives of pure 
Table 5 Increase in Unemployment as a Percentage of Civilian Labour Force, 
 1960-1979
Average
Country
1960-
1973
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1974-
1979
Chan-
ge
Austria (AT) 1.7 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.8 0.1
Belgium (BE) 2.2 2.5 4.6 6.0 6.8 7.4 7.7 5.8 3.6
Denmark (DK) 1.4 3.6 4.9 6.4 7.4 8.4 6.1 6.1 4.8
Finland (FI) 2.0 1.7 2.3 3.9 5.9 7.3 6.0 4.5 2.5
France (FR) 1.8 2.6 3.7 4.1 4.6 4.8 5.4 4.2 2.4
Germany (DE) 0.8 2.2 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.5 2.7
Greece (GR) 4.6 2.1 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 -2.6
Ireland (IE) 5.5 5.4 9.3 9.1 8.8 8.3 6.8 8.0 2.4
Italy (IT) 5.4 5.4 5.9 6.8 7.2 7.3 7.8 6.7 1.3
Netherlands (NL) 1.1 2.8 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.5 5.0 3.9
Portugal (PT) 2.6 1.8 4.6 6.4 7.6 8.1 8.2 6.1 3.6
Spain (ES) 1.8 3.3 4.7 4.6 5.2 7.0 8.7 5.6 3.8
Sweden (SE) 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.3 2.0 0.1
United Kingdom (UK) 1.9 2.1 3.3 4.9 5.3 5.2 4.7 4.2 2.3
Source: OECD.stat, extracted on 30 June 2009
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“supply-side economics” or “monetarism” would remain in the minority 
among the political elites. This is to say, while some governments saw 
themselves as “pragmatists reluctantly taking nasty medicine” (Ruggles 
and O’Higgins 1987, 160), they had not fundamentally reassessed their 
causal and normative beliefs and thus had not yet shifted entirely from a 
Keynesian to a monetarist view.
 In search for alternative solutions to address Europe’s high levels of 
unemployment, a ministerial-level meeting was arranged by the OECD 
Committee for Manpower and Social Affairs, for the first time in OECD 
history. In this meeting, the Ministers exchanged their ideas regarding 
measures to address unemployment. But instead of endorsing Fried-
man’s prescriptions, an increase in active manpower policies was seen as 
the appropriate tool to ameliorate the effects of the economic downturn. 
At that time, policymakers still believed that increases in unemployment 
were cyclical by nature – rather than structural as Friedman had pro-
posed – and that an imminent economic recovery would bring unem-
ployment levels back down to, or at least close to, pre-oil crisis levels 
(OECD 1976, 8). However, as the economic environment had changed 
from one of labour shortages to one of oversupply, policymakers shifted 
the focus of active manpower policies. While active manpower policies 
were seen as predominantly economic instruments to improve the gen-
eral supply of labour in the 1960s, policymakers began to utilise them in 
the 1970s as socially oriented, “offensive” and explicitly counter-cyclical 
instruments that supported employment during times of a gradual eco-
nomic recovery. Put differently, active manpower measures were recali-
brated and new instruments introduced, including occupational training 
courses for a large number of the unemployed; public support for the 
creation of jobs in the context of regional and industrial development; 
employment subsidies to sustain and increase levels of employment; and 
the creation of jobs in the secondary labour market, particularly in ar-
eas where public services were needed (OECD 1976, 24). These “new” 
measures were thus intended to stabilise, if not increase, the demand for 
labour. As such, more state interventionism – in contrast to its retreat as 
Friedman had envisioned – emerged as the predominant policy strategy 
of the mid-1970s.2 A brief review of country-specific policy responses 
follows below. [Please note that an appendix to this chapter provides 
tables with comparative data on the developments described in this 
 section.]
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IV.2 National Policies after the First Oil Crisis: Moderate Optimism and 
the Expansion of Active Manpower Policies
Sweden
In contrast to most European economies, Sweden survived the challeng-
es of the first oil crisis relatively well and unemployment remained under 
three percent throughout the 1970s. The Social Democratic government’s 
strategy was based on the continuation of interventionist labour market 
policies, including massive industrial subsidy programmes, stimulating 
employment growth in the private sector, and the expansion of active 
manpower policies, which included generous supply-side measures, in-
tended to equip workers with new skills in a changing labour market. 
Demand-side measures were also vastly expanded, providing work op-
portunities for laid-off workers (Anxo and Niklasson 2004, 6). These 
measures included a system of grants for the recruiting of young people 
in the early 1970s, which were subsequently expanded in several stages. 
The Swedish government also expanded the use of temporary job op-
portunities in public employment projects throughout the 1970s. These 
were arranged by national and local authorities in both public and private 
firms (Ahlqvist 1979, 49). Moreover, financial incentives were provided 
to companies “to increase their training programmes during recessions 
so that they can avoid having to lay off employees” (Larsson 1979, 14). 
During the early 1970s, demand-reducing measures were also introduced 
and/or expanded, including a “right” for employees to take an educa-
tional leave of absence. These periods of absence fulfilled a dual purpose: 
while firm employees improved their occupational skills, the temporarily 
vacant position was filled with an unemployed who could gather some 
in-firm work experience. Early exit options were also fostered through 
a relaxation of the access to pensions for older workers in poor health 
in 1970; the introduction of a disability pension for older unemployed 
workers, who had exhausted their UB entitlements in 1972; and the is-
suance of a new support scheme in 1974, with more lenient job-search 
requirements for older workers (Wadensjö 1991, 303ff ). In addition to 
these labour market policy measures, the Social Democratic government 
also issued the Job Security Law in 1974, effectively regulating dismissals 
by new legislation rather than social partnership agreements. The new 
law institutionalised the so-called “seniority principle”, meaning that the 
longer one was employed with a particular employer, the more difficult it 
became to get laid off, which is also known as the “first-in-last-out rule” 
(cf., Wadensjö 2009).
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 Interestingly, these interventionist policies were all subsequently ex-
tended by the bourgeois coalition government that took office in 1976, 
ending a 44-year era of Social Democratic rule (Anxo and Niklasson 
2004, 6). The new centre-right government (comprised of the agrarian 
Centre Party, the conservative Moderates, and the liberal People’s Party), 
did not endorse a monetarist paradigm, because they believed that the 
downturn was temporary, and because they wanted to prove that the “So-
cial Democratic propaganda against them” was incorrect (Huber and Ste-
phens 2001, 241). Mjøset (1987, 429) goes even further in his assessment 
of the politico-economic orientation of the bourgeois parties and argues 
that “these parties were heavily Keynesian”. An additional factor that con-
tributed to the extension of Sweden’s policies – which Mjøset (1987, 421, 
table 4) called “fumbling” – included the strong intra-party conflicts that 
plagued the three-party coalition government. In other words, the bour-
geois government not only refrained from adopting a new set of economic 
ideas, which could have redirected the traditional “Swedish Model”, but 
the coalition government was also unable to align its own forces on a new 
course, which, in turn, caused great internal instability. More specifically, 
during the period 1976-1982, Sweden’s centre-right coalition government 
underwent numerous reshuffles with “no less than five different cabinets” 
(Benner and Vad 2000, 416).3 Not being able to consolidate their politi-
cal forces, lacking a coherent vision, and rejecting a monetarist reform 
agenda, the centre-right government – in an attempt to maintain Swe-
den’s international competitiveness and to stimulate employment growth 
– merely relied on the strategic devaluation of the krona – “twice in 1976 
(after 25 years of constant exchange rates) and again in 1977 and 1981” 
(Anxo and Niklasson 2004, 6).
 The 1970s were, however, characterised not only by “fumbling” and 
“more-of-the-same-policies”, they became a critical era also for the devel-
opment of what we today refer to as the “Nordic Model”: a service-heavy 
welfare state, high female employment rates, and extremely high tax bur-
dens (cf., Sapir 2006). This is to say, during the first two post-WWII de-
cades, the Nordic welfare states were “not distinctive in terms of the size 
of public social service employment or, other than in Finland, in the level 
of women’s labour force participation” (Huber and Stephens 2001, 125). 
However, during the 1960s, and in particular during the 1970s, a distinct 
set of Nordic labour market characteristics was established. Because the 
Social Democrats, and to some extent the labour unions, had been re-
luctant to welcome “guest workers” to compensate for labour shortages, 
the expansion of the public sector in the areas of childcare, elderly care, 
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health care, and education provided additional job opportunities for many 
women during the 1970s. More specifically, the public sector doubled its 
size from 700,000 to 1,400,000 employees in the period 1965-1980 (Ben-
ner and Vad 2000, 406).
 This drastic expansion of the public sector must – at least in part – be 
understood as a reaction to a rapidly growing women’s movement and the 
Social Democrats’ alignment with their cause. The women’s movement 
emerged as a loud advocacy group “for equal access to the labour market 
for women, a higher value to be put on caring work, and a more equal 
division of labour in the household” (Huber and Stephens 2001, 126). 
The Social Democrats, in turn, quickly incorporated gender equality into 
their ideology and, together with the Swedish Trade Union Confedera-
tion (Landsorganisationen i Svergie, LO), launched the Increased Equality 
programme in 1969. The government subsequently endorsed the estab-
lishment of a “dual-earner household model”, which it promoted with its 
transition to separate taxation in 1971, the appointment of a Delegation 
for Equal Opportunities to improve women’s opportunities in the labour 
force in 1972,4 and the expansion and introduction of transfer payments, 
including increased compensation for maternity leave, a new paternal 
leave scheme, and more generous sick pay for parents with ill children in 
1974 (cf., Thoursie and Wadensjö 1997, 66; Huber and Stephens 2001, 126). 
The combined effects of the normative reassessment regarding “women 
and work”, the rapid expansion of the public sector, and the introduction 
of innovative gender-oriented transfer payments, eventually led to dra-
matic increases in the female employment rate during the 1970s. While 
women’s labour force participation generally improved from 53.8 percent 
in 1965 to 65.2 percent in 1974, the participation rate for married women 
rose even more drastically, from 42.2 percent to 63.6 percent during the 
same time period (Schmid 1975, 60).
Denmark
In contrast to Sweden, Denmark experienced a strong economic recession 
after the first oil crisis and saw rapidly accelerating levels of unemploy-
ment. Moreover, the 1970s were characterised by great political volatility 
and instability. The Liberal Party was in power from 1973 to 1975, followed 
by two short-lived Social Democratic-Liberal coalition governments from 
1975 to 1978, and 1978-1979, which, in turn, were followed by two minority 
Social Democratic governments, from 1979-1981 and 1981-1982. In other 
words, even though the period from 1975-1982 was under Social Demo-
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cratic leadership, the government was weak politically and had to rely 
either directly or indirectly on the support of other parties.
 In 1975, the newly elected Social Democratic coalition government at-
tempted to alleviate skyrocketing unemployment by employing counter-
cyclical Keynesian demand management. However, “increasing public-
sector and balance-of-payment deficits forced [them] to abandon this 
policy” already in 1977 (Torfing 1999, 10). In contrast to the Swedish 
strategy of currency devaluations, state subsidies, and massive manpower 
measures, Denmark hesitantly and half-heartedly embraced a monetar-
ist orientation,5 and the commitment to full employment was gradually 
replaced by concerns about the “competitiveness” of Danish firms. In this 
regard, the government began to interfere in the social partners’ wage 
settlements – much to the resentment of the unions – and since 1976 
“disposable real wages ... diminished for all categories of employees” (Lind 
1988, 10).
 The government reacted to rising unemployment also by gradually ex-
panding labour market measures, but saw no immediate need to dramati-
cally alter their policies as long as the prolonged and generous benefits – 
that had become as generous as those in Sweden – were able to guarantee 
a decent standard of living for the unemployed (cf., Torfing 1999; Benner 
and Vad 2000; Knuth et al. 2004). On the supply side, the Danish PES be-
gan organising short (seven to ten week) introductory vocational courses 
(erhvervsforberendende kurser) “for young people in the 16-25 age group 
and for unemployed women” (Köditz 1990, 34). In contrast to Sweden, 
however, these courses were very basic and not designed to offer com-
prehensive vocational training. On the demand side, the government in-
troduced the Job Offer Scheme (Arbejdstilbudsordningen) in 1978, which 
was the most important and largest employment measure to date (Jør-
gensen 2002, 173). Through this scheme, jobseekers earned the “right” to 
employment in a subsidised, public sector job for at least seven months.6 
That same year, the national government’s Extraordinary Local Authority 
Employment Measures Act also required local authorities to invest a fixed 
portion of their budgets in the reduction of unemployment and in the de-
velopment of public works projects (Knuth et al. 2004, 56). Through this 
act, access to active manpower measures was effectively extended to also 
include “uninsured” workers and social assistance recipients.
 Overall, while the effect of the supply-side and demand-side measures 
on unemployment reduction was rather limited, it was a new early re-
tirement scheme, introduced in 1978/79 that made “a real dent” in the 
unemployment statistics (Benner and Vad 2000, 437). The newly intro-
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duced, demand-reducing Post-Employment Wage Scheme (efterløn) al-
lowed workers and unemployed jobseekers who had been UI fund mem-
bers for at least 20 years to receive a post-employment wage from the 
age of 60 until retirement. Since the income earned through the efterløn 
was considerably higher than UB entitlements, older unemployed work-
ers were “incentivised” to enter the scheme, thus withdrawing from the 
labour market. The following table illustrates the various unemployment 
measure priorities in Denmark and Sweden.
Despite these significantly different macro-economic and labour mar-
ket policy approaches in Denmark and Sweden, both countries shared 
a commitment to women-friendly labour and social policies and the 
expansion of welfare services delivered by local authorities. The Dan-
ish Child and Youth Care Law of 1964 set the stage for the “very rapid 
increase in public day care provision” (Huber and Stephens 2001, 144), 
which led to an increase in female labour force participation. In 1965, the 
Social Democratic prime minister appointed a commission on the status 
of women, and in 1975, after the Social Democrats had returned to power, 
the Equal Status Council was established. These developments further 
institutionalised childcare and elder care arrangements at the munici-
pal level, which expanded “rapidly in the 1960s and early 1970s” (Benner 
and Bundgaard Vad 2000, 411). Finally, by the mid-1970s, Denmark had 
also caught up to Sweden in the area of maternity leave benefits, and 
subsequently also introduced a parental leave scheme (Huber and Ste-
phens 2001, 144). In summary, the 1970s in Denmark were characterised 
by the institutionalisation of a service-heavy, women-friendly welfare 
state, which led to both increased levels of female labour market par-
Table 6 Distribution of Government Spending on Labour Market Policy Measures in 
Denmark and Sweden, 1979
Denmark Sweden
Cash assistance to the unemployed 84% 10%
Employment policy measures targeted to the individual 10% 45%
Employment policy measures targeted to fi rms 1% 13%
Labour market training 4% 31%
Increased geographical mobility 0% 1%
Source: Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987, 65, table 5
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ticipation and the expansion of the public sector, which “grew steadily 
over the 1970s and 1980s, driven by an expansion of services and transfer 
 payments” (OECD 2000, 24).
Germany
On 28 September 1969, Willy Brandt (SPD) was elected the first non-
Christian Democratic Chancellor in Germany’s 20-year young post-war 
history. While the Chancellor was now a Social Democrat, there was only 
a partial cabinet reshuffle because the SPD – now in a coalition with the 
smaller Free Democrats (FDP) – had previously been in the Grand Coali-
tion with the Christian Democrats (1966-1969). This meant that the Social 
Democrats had played an instrumental part in issuing both the Stability 
and Growth Act of 1967 and the Work Promotion Act (AFG) of 1969, the 
two most important pieces of legislation with respect to macro-economic 
and labour market policy. However, rather than being able to coast along 
on the same policy trajectory, the SPD-FDP coalition faced significant 
challenges in the early years. On the one hand, Germany began to experi-
ence extraordinarily high rates of inflation in early 1973, which was caused 
by two factors. First, the unions successfully negotiated significant wage 
increases, which exceeded real increases in productivity. And second, the 
government had successively increased its public spending in line with 
the general euphoria regarding economic steering during the early 1970s. 
After the first oil crisis, inflation continued to increase and reached seven 
percent in 1974 (Hetzel 2003, 38). On the other hand, the oil crisis trig-
gered an economic recession, which led to a rapid increase in the unem-
ployment rate, which quadrupled from 273,000 in 1973 to over 1,000,000 
in 1975. Germany, like many other oil-importing countries in Europe at 
that time, thus experienced a new economic challenge known as stagfla-
tion, or simultaneous economic stagnation and high levels of inflation. In 
the midst of this economic turmoil, Chancellor Willy Brandt resigned in 
1974 and Helmut Schmidt, an economist and an ex-economic and finance 
Minister, became Germany’s new chancellor.
 This important reshuffle in the Chancellor’s Office brought about a 
substantive course correction in Germany’s economic policies. In con-
trast to Sweden (and Denmark until 1977), Germany abandoned its short-
lived commitment to Keynesianism and thereafter pursued a more “se-
lective” monetarist strategy, combining price stability measures (rather 
than full employment) with an expansion of interventionist labour market 
measures and increases in benefits. This allowed the German economy 
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to survive the ﬁ rst oil crisis relatively unscathed with an economic growth 
rate of ﬁ ve percent in 1976 and four percent thereafter until 1979. Inﬂ ation 
also declined rapidly to under three percent and seemed to be largely un-
der control (Hetzel 2003, 41, ﬁ gure 6), which was in stark contrast to other 
European countries, most notably Denmark and Sweden (see table 10 in 
the appendix). Th e price of “sound” economics, however, was sustained 
levels of unemployment, which the government tried to address through 
improved access to training for the unemployed and the expansion of a va-
riety of employment promoting projects (Arbeitsbeschaﬀ ungsmaßnahmen, 
ABMs). Rottenecker and Schneider (1996, 171) and Schmuhl (2003, 506f ) 
count a total of 18 such programmes launched between 1974 and 1983, 
many of which were delivered by the national PES (Bundesamt für Arbe-
it, BA). Moreover, unemployment beneﬁ ts and unemployment assistance 
payments were increased, partially because the Social Democrats contin-
ued to adhere to the Keynesian idea that the sustained purchasing power of 
the unemployed would maintain domestic demand for goods and services. 
Th e Social Democrats were also unwilling to abandon the state’s reactive 
“caretaker” function, which illustrated that the German Social Democrats 
(like the Danish Social Democrats) had not fully internalised the principles 
of the still young AFG, which would have emphasised active over passive 
measures. Th e SPD’s smaller coalition partner, however, became increas-
ingly concerned with the costs of the welfare state and favoured a “cleaner” 
monetarist strategy. Striking an intra-governmental compromise, the FDP 
was able to push through its restrictions on access to training for those al-
ready employed, new regulations that would allow employment oﬃ  cers to 
regularly check on the unemployed, and a tightening of the criteria of what 
constitutes a “suitable” job oﬀ er (Schmuhl et al. 2003, 520).
Austria
In 1971, Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ), a staunch Keynesian who had spent the pe-
riod of the Nazi occupation in Sweden (where he was in close contact with 
Willy Brandt), became the first Social Democratic Chancellor in Austria 
with an absolute majority in parliament. The Kreisky era (1970-1983) was 
characterised by a period of welfare state expansion and – in contrast to 
Germany – a sincere commitment to full employment. Even though the 
economy grew significantly less in the second half of the 1970s, the gov-
ernment was able to keep unemployment consistently at around two per-
cent throughout the 1970s, thus outperforming even Sweden, the “model” 
welfare state.
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 This exceptional employment record was due to a number of factors. 
First, like Sweden, Austria applied Keynesian, counter-cyclical economic 
policies, leading to a significant expansion of the public deficit, from 1.3 
percent in 1973 to 4.5 percent in 1975 (Ostleitner 1997, 102). These mea-
sures were further coupled with moderate wage settlements by the social 
partners (Wilk 1991, 166). Second, Austria pegged its schilling in 1976 to 
the (low-inflation) German mark, which allowed Austria to “free-ride” 
on German stability policies because Germany was Austria’s main export 
market (Butschek 1981, 21). 7 Third, Austria’s tertiary sector had remained 
underdeveloped during the post-war years, but expanded rapidly during 
the late 1970s, thus creating new employment opportunities (Tálos 1987, 
94). Fourth, in 1969, the majority of Austrians voted for the introduction 
of a 40-hour workweek in a national referendum initiated by the SPÖ. The 
gradual reduction in the workweek eased over-supply pressures and by 1 
January 1975 Austria had achieved the 40-hour week. And last, Austria 
had been suffering from labour market shortages since the mid-1960s, a 
situation which had been compensated with the influx of guest workers. 
In the midst of the economic downturn, these guest workers were then 
disproportionately affected by job cuts, and so unemployment was simply 
“exported” after the oil shock in 1973 (cf., Tálos 1987, 94).
 While all of these factors significantly contributed to stable employ-
ment rates in Austria, active manpower policy was also used, albeit mod-
erately. In particular, support to facilitate regional mobility was expanded, 
while measures for disabled workers were introduced in 1974 and continu-
ously expanded throughout the 1970s. Spending on apprenticeships for 
the unemployed and public employment projects also increased, although 
more modestly in international comparison. Total expenditures on active 
measures increased from 168 million schillings in 1970 to 1.017 million 
schillings in 1979 (Wilk 1991, 179, table 2).
 Finally, with respect to women and work, Austria did not follow the 
Danish or Swedish model of expanding welfare services such as child and 
elderly care. Austria did, however – in stark contrast to Germany – in-
troduce individual taxation in 1972, which is usually considered to be one 
of the main ingredients in Denmark and Sweden’s success in attracting 
women into the labour force (e.g., Dingeldey 2001). Kreisky also promot-
ed an end to the discrimination of women in the workplace, expanded 
maternal leave schemes in 1976, equalised financial transfers to all fami-
lies with children (reaching several hundred thousand families that had 
previously been excluded from tax breaks due to their low incomes), and 
pushed through legislation that codified wage equality in 1979 (cf., Cerny 
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1997, 111). Despite these efforts, women’s employment rates remained 
very low in Austria and the male breadwinner norm was never seriously 
questioned by society as a whole or by employers.
United Kingdom
In 1974, Harold Wilson’s Labour party replaced Edward Heath’s Con-
servatives who had been in power since 1970. The Wilson government, 
inspired by the lessons of Continental and Scandinavian corporatism, 
quickly promised the labour unions a new Social Contract that included 
various welfare state expansions in exchange for wage stability and in-
dustrial peace. However, when Britain entered a full-scale recession in 
1974/75, unemployment rose rapidly, and the expensive new measures 
(see next paragraph) required tax increases and “cuts and cash limits on 
all spending programs” (Rhodes 2000b, 35). 8 Amidst inflation and a lin-
gering currency crisis, the Labour government was forced to abandon its 
commitment to full employment and reluctantly shifted from a Keynesian 
strategy to a more conservative fiscal and monetary policy (Hall 1986, 94; 
Rhodes 2000b, 39). However, when an IMF loan restored market confi-
dence in 1976, unemployment began to stabilise in 1977, while inflation 
was somewhat reigned in and fell below ten percent in 1978.
 During these turbulent but seemingly stabilising times, the Labour 
government decided to redirect the MSC’s mission and create an array 
of demand-side active manpower measures. Originally, the creators of 
the MSC had envisioned that the MSC would deliver a “comprehensive 
manpower strategy”, overhauling the entire British voluntarist and inef-
fective vocational training and education system. In the midst of the 
crisis, however, the new MSC became an “instrument for the speedy 
delivery of a series of work experience and training programmes which 
[the government had] offered to the trade union leaders in exchange 
for the wage restraint they attempted to impose upon their members 
in the social contract” (Ainley and Corney 1990, 45). Among the largest 
programmes were the Job Creation Programme (JCP, renamed the Spe-
cial Temporary Employment Programme in 1978), the Work Experience 
Programme (WEP), and the Youth Opportunity Programme (YOP). In 
addition to these mostly demand-side labour market measures, the La-
bour government also introduced a new demand-reducing measure, the 
Job Release Scheme (JRS) in 1977 – albeit at a much smaller scale than 
the Danish efterløn – which provided British men aged 60-64 with a pre-
retirement pension (Ebbinghaus 2006, 148).
NATIONAL POLICIES AFTER THE FIRST OIL CRISIS
 By 1978, the continuous rise in unemployment rates seemed to be 
stemmed and 1979 saw a gradual decline in unemployment. However, 
when the government attempted to keep wage increases under five per-
cent, the labour unions rejected this proposal and industrial strife ensued. 
The TUC was unable to restore stability and, in the winter of 1978/79, 
“[m]ilitant public sector workers and private sector workers joined forces 
and launched the ‘Winter of Discontent’ – the first to fight falling real 
incomes, the second to defend wage differentials” (Rhodes 2000b, 35). 
The result of the unions’ militancy sent the Labour Party into disarray, 
increased public scepticism regarding neo-corporatism, and, ultimately, 
led to 18 years of Conservative rule.
Ireland
As an increasingly export-oriented economy, Ireland “suffered dispropor-
tionately when the European and world economies went into recession 
and demand for Irish exports declined” (House and McGrath 2004, 43). 
Like most other countries in the Western world, Ireland initially reacted 
with an application of Keynesian demand-management policies and the 
expansion of the public sector in an attempt to spend their way out of 
the recession. During the 1970s, this strategy was coupled with a series 
of nine “corporatist” National Wage Agreements and two National Un-
derstandings intended to keep inflation in check (Sexton and O’Connell 
1996, 89; O’Donnell and Thomas 1998, 117). This strategy bore some fruit 
early on and Ireland underwent a significant recovery (O’Donnell 2004, 
52). Thus, during the mid-1970s, Irish policymakers remained optimistic 
and believed that short-term correctives, mainly designed to operate on 
the demand side, could alleviate the “temporary” labour market imbal-
ance. Meanwhile, a plethora of labour market instruments were intro-
duced to alleviate unemployment among various groups. For instance, 
AnCO launched the Community Youth Training Scheme in 1975 and the 
Community Training Workshops for disadvantaged young people in 1977. 
While the former was designed to provide basic training and work expe-
rience to young unskilled jobseekers, the latter was intended to provide 
basic literacy and numeracy skills. In 1978, AnCO also introduced the 
Work Experience Programme, a temporary, public employment scheme. 
The Department of Labour, in turn, introduced a wage subsidy scheme 
called the Premium Employment Programme in 1975 (which evolved into 
the Employment Incentive Scheme in 1977). The Department of Environ-
ment operated two Environmental Improvement Schemes, while the De-
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partment of Education directed the Temporary Grant Scheme for Youth 
Employment in 1976 (later called Teamwork). These rapid developments 
reveal that the Irish government was increasingly placing manpower poli-
cies centre stage in the state’s strategy to counteract a period of mass 
unemployment during the 1970s (NESC 1985, 255ff; O’Connell and Mc-
Ginnity 1997, 25; DETE 1998, chap. 4). There was, however, no overall 
coherent strategy and a large number of actors were responsible for the 
implementation of these programmes. Even though a tripartite Manpow-
er Consultative Committee was set up in 1978 to assist the DfL in super-
vising and monitoring labour market policy, its actual impact was “very 
limited” (NESC 1985, 54). Nevertheless, counter-cyclical deficit spending, 
social concertation, and the application of a variety of active manpow-
er policy seemed to keep unemployment somewhat in check, especially 
when considering the substantive “growth in [Ireland’s] labour force” dur-
ing 1973 and 1980, which was triggered by both net migration inflows and 
a “natural increase in population” (Kennedy 1993, 5ff ).
IV.3 Conclusions
The 1973 oil crisis marked the beginning of a new era of unemployment in 
most of Europe and, as inflation spiralled upwards, Keynesian economic 
policies came under increasing scrutiny, especially in Germany, the UK, 
and, to a lesser extent, in Denmark. Nevertheless, virtually all of Europe 
turned to more active manpower policies – especially on the demand 
side – to address high levels of allegedly “temporary” unemployment. The 
manpower policies outlined in the Swedish Model during periods of rapid 
economic growth, full employment and technological innovation, were 
now recalibrated into instruments used to combat cyclical unemployment 
in times of economic turmoil. Their main goal was no longer to assist 
firms (and workers) in adjusting to economic restructuring, but to pre-
vent economic hardship and ease the transition back into employment. As 
such, the goals switched from affecting primarily economic to primarily 
social outcomes, and the focus of these measures shifted from the supply 
to the demand side. In addition to the consolidation of active manpow-
er policies as an appropriate instrument to address cyclical fluctuations 
in the labour market, the early 1970s also highlighted the beginning of a 
uniquely Nordic strategy that built on a rapid expansion of the public sec-
tor and the promotion of a gender neutral, women-friendly welfare state.
AFTER THE SECOND OIL CRISIS
IV.4 After the Second Oil Crisis: Shattered Illusions and Diverging 
Pathways
In the early 1980s, it was generally accepted that the welfare state was 
“in crisis” (OECD 1981) and unemployment had become an increasingly 
salient issue. Unemployment continued to rise not only because a second 
oil crisis in 1979 triggered another global economic downturn, but also 
because many economies had to accommodate the influx of a new genera-
tion of workers as the baby boom generation’s children reached working 
age. Moreover, European manufacturing began to face fierce economic 
competition from various emerging economies, particularly the Asian 
Tigers. The table below illustrates the impact of the second oil crisis on 
unemployment statistics, followed by a brief overview of the OECD’s re-
actions and illustrations of country-specific responses to the crisis.
As unemployment continued to rise, long-term unemployment estab-
lished itself as a common phenomenon and the OECD began publish-
ing its Employment Outlook in 1983, which offered a synopsis of current 
Table 7 Unemployment as Percentage of Civilian Labour Force, 1980-1990
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average
1980s
AT 1.9 2.5 3.5 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.1 .. .. .. .. 3.2
BE 8.1 10.4 12.2 13.5 13.5 11.4 11.3 11.3 10.2 8.3 7.3 10.7
DK 6.9 10.4 11.1 11.6 8.6 8.0 6.1 6.2 6.6 8.3 8.5 8.4
FI 4.7 4.9 5.4 5.5 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.2 4.6 3.2 3.1 4.8
FR 5.8 6.8 7.4 7.7 9.0 10.3 10.2 10.7 10.2 9.6 9.2 8.8
DE 3.2 4.6 6.5 8.1 7.2 7.2 6.5 6.3 6.2 5.6 4.9 6.0
GR 2.8 4.1 5.8 7.9 8.1 7.8 7.4 7.4 7.7 7.5 7.0 6.7
IE 7.4 10.5 11.6 14.0 15.6 17.1 17.7 17.4 16.8 15.6 13.3 14.3
IT 7.7 8.0 8.7 9.5 10.1 10.4 11.2 12.1 12.1 12.1 11.5 10.3
NL 6.2 8.7 11.6 12.0 12.2 13.2 12.2 9.5 9.1 8.3 7.4 10.0
PT 7.8 7.6 7.5 7.9 8.6 8.9 8.8 7.4 6.0 5.3 4.9 7.3
ES 11.5 14.2 16.0 17.5 20.2 21.6 21.1 20.3 19.3 17.3 16.3 17.8
SE 2.2 2.8 3.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.9 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.8 2.7
UK 5.7 9.1 10.5 11.4 11.9 11.3 11.3 10.8 8.9 7.2 6.9 9.5
Source: OECD.stat, extracted on 30 June 2009
 ORIGIN OF EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKET POLICY REGIMES 
labour market trends in its Member States and investigated the causes of 
unemployment. In the early to mid-1980s, however, no single explana-
tion prevailed, with at least three theories gaining prominence, including 
one that stressed the weakness of effective demand, one that highlighted 
rising labour costs, and one that emphasised the role of rigidities in the 
labour, capital, and product markets (OECD 1986, 5). In addition to the 
introduction of greater ﬂ exibility, which – at that time – included even 
more reliance on active manpower measures to make workers more adapt-
able, the OECD Employment Outlook discussed the restructuring of work-
ing time, non-wage labour costs, the positive role the social partners could 
play in minimising inﬂ ation, special measures for youth and the long-term 
unemployed, and a new “innovative approach of oﬀ ering long-term unem-
ployed older workers the possibility of opting for early retirement” (OECD 
1983, 71; see also, OECD 1984; OECD 1985; OECD 1986). Th is latter ap-
proach was based on the belief that “owing to the depressed state of labour 
markets in Europe, and the reluctance of many employers to hire older 
workers, there are often very severe obstacles to the re-insertion of the 
older long-term unemployed in regular employment” (OECD 1984, 10).
 As there were “no magic remedies for lowering unemployment” (OECD 
1986, 11), governments picked and chose their preferred prescription or 
a mix thereof. Consequently, while Keynesianism was largely abandoned, 
or being phased out – with the exception of a brief attempted revival in 
France in the early 1980s (see, e.g., Hall 1986) – divergent responses to 
labour market policy regimes were institutionalised, which were histori-
cally contingent and reflected governments’ ideological predispositions, 
their political strength, i.e., their capacity to (re-)align political coalitions 
powerful enough to enact transformative changes, and, perhaps most 
importantly, their underlying assessment of the root causes of, and rem-
edies for, the crisis. While the Nordic countries, especially Sweden, con-
tinued to expand their service-heavy and women-friendly welfare states, 
the Continental welfare states opted for a strategy of demand reduction 
by adhering to the male breadwinner model and the expansion of labour 
market exit options. Th e Anglophone countries, especially the UK under 
Th atcher, embraced Milton Friedman’s monetarist prescriptions and fol-
lowed a strategy of deregulation, privatisation, and welfare retrenchment 
since the mid-1980s. By the end of the 1980s, three distinct crisis response 
patterns had solidiﬁ ed, which were identiﬁ ed as three diﬀ erent “worlds of 
welfare capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1990). In what follows, I brieﬂ y sup-
port this argument with a more detailed look at the national responses.
NATIONAL POLICY RESPONSES
IV.5 National Policy Responses: Social-Investment, Labour-Shedding, 
and Marketisation Strategies
Sweden
When the second oil crisis struck, the Swedish bourgeois government 
struggled with its economic policies. While active manpower policy con-
tinued to play an important role, the devaluations of the krona interfered 
with the increases in real wages, while record levels of inflation reached 
almost 14 percent in 1980 and remained in double digits throughout 
1981. Similarly, the increasingly open economy and the continuous crisis 
of Swedish industries, especially in manufacturing, strained industrial 
relations and made the employers association (SAF) – which increasing-
ly adopted an “aggressive neoliberal posture” – less willing to compro-
mise (Huber and Stephens 2001, 241).9 When, in the spring of 1980, the 
government decided to opt for a policy of “full austerity” that included 
(modest) cuts in public transfers, a reduction in labour market expen-
ditures, and a general acceptance of rising unemployment, the already 
tenuous situation exploded into the “Great Conflict” between the social 
partners and between the government and the labour movement (Mjøset 
1987, 448).10
 The ongoing struggles regarding the course of the Swedish economy 
subsequently returned the Social Democrats back to power in 1982. In the 
face of a new economic reality, the Social Democrats pursued a strategy 
of partial privatisation, deregulation of the financial sector, and the intro-
duction of market principles to the public sector, including the  Swedish 
PES, which was intended to prevent cuts in welfare state provisions (Hu-
ber and Stephens 2001, 242). The government devalued the krona yet 
again, which “actually created an undervalued Swedish currency” (Anxo 
and Niklasson 2004, 6). When the labour movement realigned itself with 
the new government by becoming more accommodating and actually ac-
cepted “real wage reductions” (Mjøset 1987, 449), the exposed tradable 
sector experienced a major boost. Within a short period of time, the gov-
ernment overcame the crisis (Anxo and Niklasson 2004, 7), and Swe-
den’s “Third Way” – positioned between the neo-Keynesian approach 
of the French government during the early 1980s and the Thatcherite 
approach of marketisation – was termed a success. Huber and Stephens 
(2001, 243) summarise Sweden’s success story as follows: by the end of 
the 1980s, “[t]he budget deficit, which had been 8 percent of GDP when 
the Social Democrats had come into office, had been eliminated; unem-
ployment was under 2 percent; the balance of trade was in surplus; and 
 ORIGIN OF EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKET POLICY REGIMES 
social policy reforms had been passed”. As a result of these improving 
economic conditions, the Social Democratic government could afford 
to further expand the public sector and welfare services, including the 
introduction of a legal “right” to municipal day care (Lehto et al. 1999, 
122),11 the extension of parental leave, and paid leaves of absence “to take 
care for ill children [were] expanded from twelve to sixty days” (Huber 
and Stephens 2001, 243).
 Not only were the public sector and women-friendly policies expanded, 
the use of labour market training and the scope of public relief works were 
also vastly extended during the 1980s. This was done to “catch” the unem-
ployed early, thus preventing them from drifting into long-term unem-
ployment. Moreover, since the late 1980s, jobseekers who participated in 
public relief work and other direct job-creation programmes, (re-)quali-
fied for new periods of unemployment benefit payments upon completion 
of these programmes. As a result, benefit coverage was de facto extended 
to uninsured workers, who first participated in a municipal programme 
and afterwards were eligible for regular benefits. Moreover, there was “no 
limit on the amount of time a jobless person [could] spend outside the 
regular labour market by switching between training and unemployment 
compensation” (Forslund and Krueger 1994, 7). Local authorities had also 
an incentive to place social assistance recipients into ALMP programmes 
because participants would subsequently qualify for UB and thus be 
transferred from local welfare offices to the nationally run employment 
offices. Although some, if not most, economists believed that Sweden’s 
active manpower measures had gone “over the top” during this period, the 
virtue of the Swedish Model was its resilience – “the Swedish unemploy-
ment rate never lingered over 3 per cent [and] long-term unemployment 
was never allowed to emerge” (Layard et al. 2005, 63).
 In summary, the 1980s were characterised by the reinforcement of a 
“modified” Swedish Model, in which the government increasingly built 
on a strategy of currency devaluations, while counter-cyclical spending 
became less pronounced.12 The Nordic welfare trajectory, however was 
reinforced by further improving women-friendly policies and expanding 
the public sector, albeit on a smaller scale than in the 1970s (Benner and 
Vad 2000, 418). The expansion of welfare services was further coupled 
with public sector modernisation (to make it more efficient), the contin-
ued issuance of generous subsidies that kept struggling industries alive, 
and the expansion of the scope of demand-side ALMPs, effectively mak-
ing the Swedish welfare state the “employer of last resort”. In other words, 
it was during the 1970s and 1980s that a “truly distinct Nordic – and es-
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pecially Swedish – model came into being with the shift towards active 
labour market policies, social service expansion, and gender equalisation” 
(Esping-Andersen 1996, 11).
Denmark
The development of economic and social policies in Denmark during the 
1980s included trends that were similar to those in Sweden (including the 
expansion of women-friendly family policies and the continued growth of 
the public sector), and trends that were particular to Denmark (including 
the endorsement of a hard currency policy and early steps taken towards 
a compulsory “activation paradigm”). These differences can – at least in 
part – be attributed to political make-up of Denmark at the time. In con-
trast to Sweden, where the 1980s were mostly a “Social Democratic” de-
cade, Denmark saw a Conservative-Liberal coalition government replace 
the Social Democrats in 1982, who had left office voluntarily as they were 
not able to align a parliamentary coalition large enough to get their poli-
cies passed (Mjøset 1987, 451). The new centre-right government (1982-
1993), under the leadership of conservative Prime Minister Poul Schlüter, 
quickly made the consolidation of public deficits their major political goal 
(Lind 1988, 9). The bourgeois government was more convincing than the 
Social Democrats in its implementation of a hard currency policy, which 
included forceful interventions in collective wage agreements to keep in-
flation in check. These government interventions, however, forced the 
social partners to pull out of wage negotiations at an earlier stage, which 
then shifted the locus of wage agreements “away from the central level of 
federations to the lower level of each trade organisation” (PLS Consult 
and Jensen 1997, 88).13
 While these developments certainly weakened Denmark’s social part-
nership, the centre-right government did not pursue a path of “disman-
tling” the unions and a decentralisation of wage bargaining, which was 
the strategy of the Conservative government in Britain during this same 
period (see below). Instead, the government continued to solicit the sup-
port of the social partners in political decisionmaking processes, and, 
in 1987, the Conservative-Liberal government was even able to issue a 
joint “Declaration of Intent” in which the social partners agreed to the 
“goal of keeping Danish wage increases below those of countries in which 
Danish companies usually compete” (PLS Consult and Jensen 1997, 89). 
Nevertheless, the relationship was lopsided in favour of the employers, 
who the government granted a “long-cherished wish for the removal of 
 ORIGIN OF EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKET POLICY REGIMES 
the automatic cost-of-living adjustment (from wages and unemployment 
benefits)” (Lind 1988, 12, emphasis added). This adjustment effectively 
reduced the level of unemployment benefits over time “by stealth”, from “a 
peak of 72 percent in 1979 to 58 percent in 1987”, while, however, shielding 
low-wage workers (Huber and Stephens 2001, 262).
 The government’s strategy seemed to bear fruit and Denmark expe-
rienced rapid economic growth soon after the second oil crisis. Infla-
tion dropped from some twelve percent in 1981 to four percent in 1984 
and 1985 (Boje and Madsen 1994, 103, figure 5.1), while unemployment 
levels also began to decline (see table 7). The rapid growth of the ter-
tiary services and the information technology sectors even led to some 
“bottlenecks in the labour market, particularly in the demand for skilled 
workers” (OECD 1996c, 13). In reaction to these changing labour market 
conditions, the unemployed were given the “right” to a second Job Offer 
in 1983, which was supplemented in 1984 with educational as well as self-
employment subsidies (Knuth et al. 2004, 59). In 1985, the Conservative-
Liberal government also began placing increased emphasis on improving 
the qualifications of the unemployed, which resulted in an expansion of 
training measures now also available for the unemployed in a systematic 
and comprehensive way (interview, CARMA).
 However, when unemployment began to rapidly rise again in 1987, al-
most all of the political actors reassessed their beliefs about the causes 
of Denmark’s employment malaise. As policymakers increasingly per-
ceived unemployment as a structural, rather than a cyclical, phenomenon 
(Knuth et al. 2004, 51), the typical “Danish” use of demand-side measures, 
which provided alternatives to unemployment such as Job Offers, came 
under fire, and supply-side concerns became increasingly significant. In 
the late 1980s, the provision of skills became a key issue and a new job 
rotation scheme (Jobrotation) was introduced. This scheme was similar to 
Sweden’s 1970s schemes, which allowed employed workers to leave their 
jobs to pursue continuing education courses, if there was an unemployed 
person who could temporarily fill his or her position. The introduction of 
these schemes was achieved with the collaboration of the labour unions, 
employers and training programme providers, and received general polit-
ical support. In 1989, the government also restructured its PES “through 
the merger of the previous Directorate of Labour and the Directorate for 
Adult Vocational Training” and renamed it the national Labour Market 
Authority, Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsens (AMS) (OECD 1996c, 39). However, 
the new AMS retained two subdivisions, including the AF (Arbeidsformi-
dlingen), which was responsible for “typical” PES services, and the AMU 
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(Arbeidsmarkedsuddannelse), which managed 24 state-owned training 
centres. The AMU’s training centres offered courses to both employed 
and unemployed semi-skilled workers. Additional training courses were 
provided for skilled and unskilled workers through technical and voca-
tional schools, supervised by the Ministry of Education (OECD 1996c, 
39).14 Like Sweden, the Danes also began to develop their first “new pub-
lic management” reforms, including (a) the introduction of elements of a 
management-by-objectives system, (b) improved PES collaboration with 
the business sector, (c) decentralisation by delegation of numerous tasks 
to the local level, and (d) the introduction of a clearly structured “pack-
age of products” (Willemer 2003, 173). Moreover, Denmark opened new 
placement offices in attractive locations, such as pedestrian zones, to 
increase access and visibility. Finally, in an attempt to incentivise look-
ing for regular employment, participants in public employment projects 
received lower wages than those negotiated in public sector wage agree-
ments (Rosdahl and Weise 2001, 170).
 In this context of labour market recalibration, PES modernisation, and 
the expansion of supply-side measures, Danish policymakers also dis-
cussed compulsory participation in ALMPs for the first time in Danish 
history. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, participation in ALMPs was 
seen as a “right” and thus, a privilege rather than an obligation (cf., Ros-
dahl and Weise 2001). By the late 1980s, however, Danish policymakers 
realised – a fact that OECD analyses also repeatedly pointed out – that 
the Danish conceptualisation of “active” labour market policy, which of-
ten started only after someone was unemployed for four years, could not 
prevent long-term unemployment (Knuth et al. 2004, 55). The first com-
pulsory measure was introduced in 1990 – with the support of the Social 
Democrats – when 18 and 19 year-old social assistance claimants were 
required to participate in the Youth Allowance Scheme in order to receive 
benefits. The introduction of this scheme was a critical normative and 
cognitive break in, and reassessment of how Danish policymakers con-
ceived of unemployment. The Danish, especially the Social Democrats, 
had previously considered unemployment as “an event outside the con-
trol of the individual” and benefits were thus guaranteed for an unlimited 
period of time (Andersen and Pedersen 2007, 4). The Minister of Social 
Affairs Aase Olesen was the first to publicly challenge the Nordic prin-
ciple of a social “right” to state support. By referencing the Swedish “work 
line” – but also paralleling the development in Britain triggered by Lord 
Young in the late 1980s (see below in this chapter) – Olesen successfully 
reframed the issue in terms of “something for something” (Abrahamson 
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2006, 359). This principle would later be an important precursor of many 
institutional changes first associated with the “active line” in Denmark,15 
and subsequently with the concept of “activation” across Europe (see 
chapters V and VI).
 In summary, despite the neo-liberal rhetoric of the centre-right govern-
ment throughout the 1980s, the Danish welfare state remained intact and 
no major cuts in the benefits regime occurred.16 Generous and prolonged 
benefits continued to be a “right” for jobseekers – albeit with some signs 
of conditionality – and supply-side measures were improved and expand-
ed for both insured and uninsured workers. Similarly, while the corporat-
ist arrangements of wage-bargaining underwent a process of decentralisa-
tion, the social partners’ role in influencing and delivering labour market 
policy was never questioned and the social partners’ found themselves 
represented on all levels of the newly reorganised AMS. Despite these 
seemingly “adaptive” rather than “transformative” institutional changes, 
a major ideational shift across party lines had occurred. As unemploy-
ment was increasingly seen as structural rather then cyclical, policymak-
ers started to reassess their normative and cognitive beliefs about the ap-
propriateness of Denmark’s entire labour market policy regime, including 
the very definition of jobseekers’ rights and duties. As we will see below, it 
was this reassessment which subsequently triggered transformative insti-
tutional changes associated with “activation” policy and the “PES service 
model” during the 1990s and 2000s, not only in Denmark but in the EU in 
general (see chapter V).
Germany
With the eruption of the second oil crisis in 1979, Germany slipped back 
into a recession. By 1980, inflation rates rose above five percent and un-
employment was rising at a record pace. At the same time, economic 
growth rates stagnated in 1980 and even reached negative growth levels 
of some two percent in 1981 and 1982. Facing growing budget deficits, 
the Social Democratic-Liberal coalition government reduced spending on 
employment promotion measures, further tightened job-search criteria, 
and made access to training more restrictive. These retrenchment efforts 
were mainly promoted by the FDP, while the SPD accepted these cuts be-
cause they feared confrontations with their coalition partner, faced CDU 
accusations of fiscal irresponsibility, and – when push came to shove – 
preferred cuts in labour market measures over cuts in transfer payments 
(Schmuhl et al. 2003, 520). However, when Economic Minister Otto Graf 
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Lambsdorff (FDP) issued a strongly neo-liberal strategy paper on 9 Sep-
tember 1982 – outlining major economic reforms, including an overhaul 
of labour market policy – the SPD could no longer avoid an open con-
frontation with the FDP. One week later, Chancellor Schmidt announced 
that he would call for a vote of confidence in Parliament. Most of the FDP 
MPs voted against the Chancellor, thus realigning with the CDU/CSU. 
The Social-Liberal government fell and Helmut Kohl (CDU) became the 
new Chancellor on 4 October 1982, as part of a centre-right coalition with 
the FDP.
 Chancellor Helmut Kohl almost immediately announced an “intel-
lectual and moral turning point” in German economic and social policy, 
while proclaiming the vision that the country was to be transformed from 
a “welfare society to a productive community” (Wohlfahrtsgesellschaft zur 
Leistungsgemeinschaft) (Kohl 1983). However, while the rhetoric implied a 
sweeping deregulation of the labour market, the Kohl government avoid-
ed radical changes. Instead, the government continued the “recruitment 
prohibition” of foreign workers initiated by the Social Democrats in the 
1970s, while facilitating a ﬂ exibilisation of the labour market at the mar-
gins through an expansion of ﬁ xed-term contracts and part-time employ-
ment. Th e modesty of these institutional changes, however, were not the 
result of legislative “veto points” (Zohlnhöfer 2003, 139), but a reﬂ ection of 
intra-governmental disagreements on many issues. Failing to ﬁ nd a com-
mon position, the centre-right coalition was unable to align a coalition 
strong enough to successfully advocate (unpopular) reforms. In particular, 
the more socially oriented wing of the CDU under the leadership of Labour 
Minister – and member of the powerful metal workers union IG Metall 
– Norbert Blüm blocked any substantial retrenchment eﬀ orts, while Ger-
many’s well organised labour unions also stood up for their interests.
 This is not to say, however, that little institutional change occurred 
in the 1980s. The 1980s saw the introduction or expansion of a series of 
“labour-shedding” policy measures. Because policymakers believed that 
there “was only so much work to go around”, the government, the opposi-
tion, employer associations, and the labour movement alike compromised 
on a series of demand-reducing measures. This compromise included the 
following: a moderate reduction in the workweek, an extension of early 
exit options, perpetuation of the male breadwinner model, and the expan-
sion of (demand-side) “active” labour market policy. Taken together, these 
measures would eventually lead to the Continental path of “welfare with-
out work” (Esping-Andersen 1996), and the emergence of a “high equality, 
low employment regime” (Streeck 2001, 2).
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 More specifically, while France became the vanguard in reducing the 
workweek to 35 hours, German policymakers and employers feared that a 
similar reduction, as demanded by the IG Metall, would undermine Ger-
man competitiveness in global markets. Consequently, Chancellor Kohl 
and Labour Minister Blüm agreed to smaller reductions in working hours, 
from 40 hours to 38.5 in 1984 and down to 37 in 1987. Blüm, in turn, pro-
moted “early exit” as an alternative to a 35-hour workweek, which brought 
some stability to these turbulent years (interview, DGB1). The early exit 
policy included three pathways: (1) measures that allowed the older, long-
term unemployed to receive unemployment benefit payments first, and 
then “transfer” into early retirement; (2) “regular” early retirement of-
fered to older workers in employment, who had long employment histo-
ries; and (3) a disability option for workers in ill health.
 Blüm approached the ﬁ rst, “long-term unemployment” pathway by 
building on a provision originally introduced during the Weimar period 
whereby white-collar workers who had been unemployed for at least one 
year were allowed to retire at the age of 60. Th is measure was extended 
by the ﬁ rst post-WWII German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer (CDU), 
to blue-collar workers and became known as the “59er rule” (Trampusch 
2005, 205). When the Kohl government extended unemployment beneﬁ ts 
from 12 to 32 months in 1986, the “59er rule” eﬀ ectively became the “57er 
rule” (Köhler-Rama 2003, 144). Th e second, “early retirement” option was 
based on the pension reforms of 1972, which were introduced as a “ﬂ exible 
retirement” provision during periods of considerable economic growth 
and full employment. Th is original reform allowed workers who had made 
old age insurance contributions for at least 35 years to retire at the age of 
63 “without an actuarial reduction in beneﬁ ts” (Manow and Seils 2000, 
141). Th e Kohl government replaced this scheme with the Pre-Retirement 
Act of 1984 (in eﬀ ect until 1988 and subsequently replaced by a part-time 
scheme), which allowed these workers to already retire by the age of 58 
(Ebbinghaus 2006, 151, table 5.5). Th ese workers would receive up to 65 per-
cent of their previous gross wages in beneﬁ ts (additional top-ups possible 
through collective agreements), while companies would receive ﬁ nancial 
rewards from the BA if they hired a young replacement. Th e third pathway, 
the “disability” option, in turn, was extended via the 1984 pension reforms. 
Workers who were only able to work part-time, but for whom no such em-
ployment was available, were now allowed to draw a disability pension.
 While the pre-retirement scheme was rather short-lived and the dis-
ability option was not as extensively utilised as similar schemes available 
in other European countries, the “57er rule” became the most important 
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instrument for larger companies to “shed” an excessive labour force in a 
“socially responsible” way. While none of these provisions were originally 
intended as instruments to reduce the labour supply, the Kohl govern-
ment – with the support of the opposition, employers’ associations, and 
labour unions – purposely recalibrated the functions of these policies. 
This is to say, through a process of deliberate conversion, the German old 
age social security pillar became a de facto labour market policy intended 
to artificially reduce the labour supply.17
 Moreover, while an early exit option was the “instrument of choice”, the 
low activity regime also included the perpetuation of the male breadwin-
ner model and the extension of demand-side labour market policy mea-
sures. Female employment rates, while they showed slight increases dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s, albeit almost exclusively of a part-time nature, 
remained low in international comparison. The main hurdle for women 
joining the workforce as full-time employees was the poor availability of 
childcare facilities (Hagemann 2006, 225),18 as well as unfavourable school 
and store hours.19 Moreover, the tax code introduced in 1958 did not (and 
still does not) promote women’s labour market participation. Accord-
ing to the German tax code, incomes of dual-earner households are first 
added together, the sum is then divided by two, and then taxes are as-
sessed. This means that single-earner households headed predominantly 
by males have the highest tax savings, while married couples with dual 
incomes have no such tax advantages. Finally, the continued support of 
societal norms certainly played a role as well. A “good” mother stayed at 
home with her children, while a woman with small children working full 
time was considered a bad, “raven mother”.20
 Labour market measures, in turn, saw a further expansion of demand-
side instruments. The expansion of public work programmes (ABMs), 
in particular during the period 1982-1986, was considered an appropri-
ate and necessary response to increased long-term unemployment rates. 
From 1982 to 1988, the percentage of long-term unemployed grew from 
18 percent to 32.6 percent, while the percentage of very long-term unem-
ployed, i.e., those who had not had a job in over two years, rose from 4.4 
percent to 16.5 percent (Schmid and Oschmiansky 2005a, 261).
 In summary, German policymakers – in an alignment with all of the 
major stakeholders – addressed unemployment via a strategy of demand 
reduction, in particular, “early exit strategies” that were also popular in 
other Continental welfare states such as Austria (see next section) and the 
Netherlands (see e.g., Esping-Andersen 1996, 19ff; Visser and Hemerijck 
1997).
 ORIGIN OF EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKET POLICY REGIMES 
Austria
Austria’s government also reassessed their commitment to Keynesianism 
during the 1980s. While the OECD in 1978 still described Austria as a 
“remarkable” economy that was able to simultaneously achieve a “pro-
gressive reduction of inflation and continued economic growth” (OECD 
1978a; see also, Scharpf 1987, 95f ), by the early 1980s, the Social Demo-
cratic government was confronted by new challenges. The SPÖ’s counter-
cyclical policies applied during the Kreisky era had not only been used to 
suppress unemployment, but they also had a detrimental effect on the na-
tional debt, which, in turn, hampered economic growth (Walterskirchen 
1991, 13). After Franz Vranitzky (SPÖ), who was Chancellor from 1983-
1997, formed a coalition government with the Liberals in the fall of 1983, 
and subsequently with the Christian Democrats in 1986, Kreisky’s Austro-
Keynesian policies were gradually phased out. Large portions of Austria’s 
nationalised industries were privatised, and annual budget targets were 
agreed upon. Importantly, and in contrast to both Denmark and Sweden 
– which had encountered increasing tensions between the social partners 
and the government in the early 1980s – the Austrian labour unions con-
tinued to support the government’s course correction and accepted the 
stagnation of real incomes in order to make Austrian companies more 
competitive globally. Throughout the 1980s, Austria experienced almost 
no labour strife or strikes (Walterskirchen 1991, 50).
 However, the government’s gradual move toward a hard currency 
policy triggered a steady rise in unemployment. Unemployment almost 
doubled from 2.4 percent in 1981 to 4.5 percent in 1983, and continued to 
grow until the late 1980s, reaching a peak of 5.6 percent in 1987 (Biffl 1989, 
139, table 3).21 At the same time, the percentage of long-term unemploy-
ment also grew from just under 20 percent in 1981 to just over 30 percent 
by 1987 (Biffl 1989, 140, table 4), while the unemployment numbers among 
youth grew rapidly from 9,900 in 1980 to 47,026 in 1987 (Biffl 1989, 141, 
table 5), which was especially alarming for policymakers (Walterskirchen 
1991, 33). Ultimately, it became painfully apparent that this rising trend 
in unemployment was not a temporary, i.e. cyclical, challenge, but rather 
a structural one that needed extra attention (Wilk 1991, 131). According-
ly, one of the last legislative acts of the Kreisky government was passing 
an amendment to the AMFG on 9 February 1983, which introduced an 
“experimental clause” that would broaden (and simplify) the toolbox of 
labour market policy instruments, while also specifically targeting “prob-
lem” groups, such as youth and the long-term unemployed (Wroblewski 
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2004, 63). Perhaps the most significant development that arose from the 
“experimental clause” was the introduction of the Aktion 8000 in March 
1985. The Aktion 8000 was designed to create 8,000 new jobs, mainly for 
youth and the long-term unemployed, in the “second labour market”, i.e., 
additional, publicly subsidised jobs that would benefit the community and 
serve as a “bridge” to the open labour market (interview, IHS1). The Ak-
tion 8000 created more than 10,000 jobs in the next four years and was 
quite successful as “[m]ore than half of [the participants] found regular 
jobs afterwards” (Walterskirchen 1991, 34).
 Other 1980s recalibration efforts included the introduction of subsi-
dies paid to firms that offered additional apprenticeships, a rebalancing 
of public training efforts in favour of the unemployed,22 and the extension 
of unemployment benefits paid to older workers for up to four years in re-
gions experiencing particular hardships (Walterskirchen 1991, 98). How-
ever, despite these expansions, labour market policy measures continued 
to play only a modest role in the Austrian context, and many of these 
programmes, especially the Aktion 8000, were exposed to the constant 
criticism of employers and other market-oriented actors.
 In addition to the government’s attempts to tackle problems of unem-
ployment, private industry initiatives also had long-term effects on the 
Austrian labour market. When the steel company VoestAlpine was forced 
to lay off a large number of its employees, the management board and the 
workers council (Betriebsrat) were confronted with the social responsibil-
ity of finding new opportunities for “their” workers. Inspired by experi-
ences gathered from an excursion to the German steel company Dillinger 
Hütte in the Saarland, VoestAlpine established Austria’s first outplacement 
foundation in late 1987. Instead of offering only a severance payment, the 
foundation would assist laid-off workers in their job-search activities and 
re-training efforts. In the summer of 1988, the foundation received its 
“legal footing” through legislation that amended Austria’s employment 
promotion act. While it was initially only steel mills that relied on these 
foundations to “smoothen” their restructuring (and privatisation) efforts, 
additional employment foundations were established – and financially 
supported by national and regional governments as well as the Austrian 
PES – also in other sectors.
 More important than the still rather modest use of ALMPs was the 
continued reliance on the male breadwinner model and the expansion of 
early exit options, which included early retirement and disability pensions 
during the 1980s. In the period 1973 to 1988, the number of people who 
took advantage of early exit schemes almost doubled to some 100,000, or 
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three to four percent of the total workforce (Walterskirchen 1991, 112). 
In other words, just as in Germany, Austria preferred a strategy that re-
lied heavily on the extensive use of “exit options” and the perpetuation of 
the male breadwinner model to keep female employment rates low rather 
than extensive active labour market measures (Biffl 1996, 71f ). As such, 
even though Sweden had remained a role model for the Ministry of La-
bour and Social Affairs throughout the 1980s, the policies actually pur-
sued were much closer to the Continental, particularly German, labour-
shedding strategy (interview, BMWA1).
United Kingdom
After the Conservatives returned to office in 1979, British labour market, 
training, and social policies would first be gradually, then later more radi-
cally, redirected. The incoming Thatcher administration fully endorsed 
the monetarist paradigm outlined by Milton Friedman, and shared a “fun-
damental belief in the need to shift the boundaries of private and public 
activity” (Ruggles and O’Higgins 1987, 161) with US President Ronald Rea-
gan. Upon taking office, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s main con-
cern was to curb rising inflation, reduce the overall tax burden, and limit 
government interventions and public borrowing.
 With respect to labour market policy, this meant that the “state” – and 
the labour movement – was detrimental to economic growth and creativ-
ity. Thatcher preached less public intervention, which would then make 
way for tax cuts as public expenditures were reduced. While the govern-
ment succeeded in quickly abolishing 16 of the 23 ITBs “in an attempt to 
return the full cost of training to employers”, while also cutting the MSC’s 
budget for adult training in real terms during the early 1980s (Wikeley 
1990, 355f ), it was less successful in dismantling labour market measures 
for the unemployed. Unemployment rates exploded from 5.7 percent in 
1979 to 13 percent in 1982, which made the labour market a salient elec-
toral issue. Moreover, the Conservatives still faced a powerful MSC that 
openly opposed many of the new strategies (cf., Finn 1987, 134). Initially, 
the MSCs prevented drastic cuts in employment benefits, while it even 
reversed some Thatcher policies of retrenchment in the area of employee 
training. This was the case with the Youth Opportunities Programme (lat-
er replaced by the Youth Training Scheme, YTS), and the Community En-
terprise Programme (CEP, later replaced by the Community Programme, 
CP).23 The CP scheme, which offered employment opportunities to the 
long-term unemployed, became so popular – reaching a peak of near-
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ly 250,000 participants in the spring of 1987 – that the government had 
to “reign in its expansions” (Price 2000, 266). The first half of the 1980s 
thus saw a surprising combination of market-embracing measures, e.g., 
the curtailment of the ITBs and anti-inflationary macro-economic policy, 
and market-eschewing measures, including the rapid expansion of “special 
measures” such as the CP.
 By the mid-1980s, however, the Thatcher administration would em-
bark on a more radical course. When the Conservatives were re-elected 
in 1983 – in part due to the internal disarray within the Labour Party 
and the formation of the Social Democratic Party by Labour defectors 
in 1981 (Hall 1986, 99) – the government confronted the unions more ag-
gressively and the MSC was gradually abolished. In contrast to the Con-
tinental and Nordic strategies regarding working with the labour unions 
to tackle the challenges of rising unemployment and inflation, the Brit-
ish Conservatives confronted the fragmented labour union movement, 
whose preference for real-wage increases were considered one of the 
causes of the unemployment crisis. In addition to openly confronting, 
and eventually defeating, the labour unions in 1984 – which led to daily 
clashes between picketing miners and police brigades (Hall 1986, 109) 
– the government also passed the Employment Act of 1984 (expanded 
in 1990), which substantially weakened the labour unions’ strike capac-
ity through the introduction of mandatory pre-strike ballots (Manning 
1993, 422).
 The MSC’s demise, in turn, occurred very gradually and was stalled 
until after the Conservatives won a third consecutive term in 1987. During 
the Conservatives’ second term, the MSC remained an important, albeit 
less autonomous, player. A major new actor in the field was David Young, 
former MSC chairman, who Thatcher appointed in September 1984 as 
the “Minister without Portfolio” to advise the government on unemploy-
ment issues. In September 1985, he then became Secretary of Employ-
ment. Young, like the Danes, found inspiration in both the Swedish “work 
principle” and the Beveridge Report, which stated that “[y]oung people 
should not get unconditional unemployment benefits” (Beveridge Report 
cited in Johnson 1991, 242). Rather, unemployment should be seen as an 
opportunity to provide further education and training to the (young) un-
employed (Lord Young 1990, 153ff ). While Young faced resistance to the 
introduction of expensive, high-quality training for young adults from the 
Treasury, he was successful in introducing his Restart Interviews, which 
foreshadowed both the Danish “active line” and New Labour’s “New Deal 
for Young People”, which were launched in 1993 and 1997 respectively. 
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During Restart Interviews, which went national in March 1986, individu-
als were first asked for the reasons why they were unemployed. Subse-
quently, the unemployment officer would choose one of the following 
(low-cost) interventions, including (Price 2000, 242):
–  Submission to a job; which might have been assisted by a Job Start 
payment of 20 per week for six months to anyone taking a job pay-
ing less than 80 per week;
–  Submission to a job in the Community Programme, which Young 
wanted to expand further;
–  Assistance with setting up a business, through an expanded Enter-
prise Allowance Scheme;
– Attendance at a Jobclub; 24
– Or, attendance at a 1-week Restart Course.
In October 1986, Young also announced the piloting of a new Job Train-
ing Scheme, which offered “full-time training and work experience 
for an average of 6 months to people who had been unemployed for 6 
months or more. Priority went to 18-25 year olds” (Beale 2005, 73). The 
participants were paid a small training allowance of 25, the equiva-
lent of their current benefits. The TUC vociferously resisted this pro-
gramme, which they perceived as a means to force the unemployed to 
simply work “for dole money” and as a PR move for the upcoming elec-
tions (The Guardian, 27 December 1986). Because of the TUC’s resis-
tance, the scheme, which was launched in 1987 as a new element in the 
Restart menu, remained voluntary for young jobseekers, which was dif-
ferent from the Danish Youth Allowance Scheme as well as American 
“workfare schemes”. Because of ongoing quarrels between the govern-
ment and (parts of ) the MSC, Young became increasingly interested in 
circumventing the MSC’s powers. But rather than dismantling the MSC, 
which would have been the preferred course for many Conservatives, 
Young proposed other ways to keep the MSC in check. He suggested 
moving the Job Centres out of the MSC and to the Department of Em-
ployment, and he wanted to increase the representation and influence of 
employers on the Commission, who would then be more concerned with 
training than employment. This proposal was presented in the Tories’ 
Manifesto of 1987.
 After winning a third term and with a booming economy, the Conserva-
tives felt conﬁ dent enough to endorse further reforms to the employment 
system. Th e government limited the MSC’s remit to training, while respon-
NATIONAL POLICY RESPONSES
sibility for the Job Centres and labour market policies was returned to the 
Department of Employment. Th e MSC was renamed the Training Com-
mission with consensual policy decisionmaking further compromised with 
the introduction of six more employer representatives (without consulting 
the CBI) (Wikeley 1990, 357). Th e restructured Department of Employ-
ment, in turn, was further strengthened by the launch of a Stricter Beneﬁ ts 
Regime (SBR), which was designed to “police” dubious beneﬁ t recipients. 
More speciﬁ cally, with the introduction of the 1989 Social Security Act, the 
unemployed were required to actively seek work, which would be checked 
at the Restart Interviews and elsewhere, and could result in sanctions if of-
ﬁ cials thought their job-search activities were inadequate. It further abol-
ished the concept of “suitable work” and introduced a 13-week period dur-
ing which the unemployed could refuse job oﬀ ers below the normal wages 
for their occupations. Th ereafter, claimants were expected to broaden their 
search and the refusal of job oﬀ ers could result in sanctions.
 The new Secretary of State, Norman Fowler, also combined a range of 
training and employment programmes (37 in total), including the Com-
munity Programme and the Job Training Scheme, into a new framework, 
called Employment Training (ET). The ET, which involved no new re-
sources, was initially intended to accept 300,000 participants (that figure 
was later reduced to 200,000), offering (low-cost) training for about six 
months, work experience to the long-term unemployed, and assistance 
with job-search activities (Fowler 1991, 298). The participants were of-
ten referred to the ET through the Restart Interviews and would get paid 
10 plus benefits, which left most participants worse off than they would 
have been under the Community Programme (Wikeley 1990, 365). While 
Fowler was willing to retain the voluntary nature of the programme, he 
threatened to reduce or withdraw benefits from those unemployed who 
“did absolutely nothing to find work” (Fowler 1991, 298).
 The TUC once again opposed the government’s policies and narrowly 
voted to withdraw its support from the ET, even though Labour Party 
leader Neil Kinnock had called upon its leaders not to boycott the scheme, 
but rather to continue “resist[ing] the slide to workfare [... and] to expose 
the falsehood of the scheme” from within (Financial Times, 7 Septem-
ber 1988). Only eight days later, Fowler dissolved the Training Commis-
sion, created a successor entity, the Training Agency, and recommenced 
with the programme. The dissolution of the Training Commission was 
the “final break” with British corporatism that had governed labour mar-
ket policies throughout the 1970s (Wikeley 1990, 357). Within less than a 
year, the TUC and the CBI were no longer formally or automatically em-
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bedded in employment policy formation or implementation. Instead, the 
newly empowered Department of Employment relied on local, private-
sector employers as their partners and market mechanisms, as opposed 
to public institutions, to provide training (Financial Times, 16 September 
1988). The unions’ last formal role in government training programmes 
was subsequently abolished with the gradual replacement of the Training 
Agency by some 80 employer-led, self-governing Training and Enterprise 
Councils (TECs). Central funding for training, in turn, was cut the fol-
lowing year – and was not restored even during the early 1990s economic 
recession – “effectively placing the privatisation of training in the hands 
of local employers” (Whiteside 2003, 107).
 To summarise, the Conservative years were characterised by a “move 
away from training and work programmes towards initiatives run by the 
Employment Service”, in particular job-search assistance (Robinson 1997, 
vii). The variety of programmes introduced under the “training” label 
were “inextricably entangled with the instillation of work discipline, and 
with alleviating public irritation at the prospect of the unemployed claim-
ing benefits indefinitely” (Whiteside 2003, 106). Only the very young, 
unemployed school-leavers, aged 16-17, still maintained their “right to 
training” (Lindsay and Mailand 2004, 136). In addition to gradually re-
ducing the scope of both supply-side and demand-side ALMPs during the 
1980s, the British demand-reducing pre-retirement scheme (the Job Re-
lease Scheme) was also closed down entirely in 1989, while its part-time 
variant had already been closed down in 1986 (Ebbinghaus 2006, 219, fn. 
8). The Tories were clearly influenced by a monetarist paradigm, which 
entailed a focus on containing costs, minimising benefit fraud, and coun-
teracting individual “welfare dependency”. In turn, the Restart Interviews 
and the Stricter Benefit Regime were launched as important precursors 
of New Labour’s “activation” paradigm. Finally, but possibly most impor-
tantly, the social partners were gradually excluded from the policymaking 
process, while the department was empowered and local, employer-led 
Training and Employment Councils created, reinstituting British “vol-
untarism” in the provision of vocational training. Taken together, these 
1980s developments gave rise to a unique – at least in the European con-
text – combination of economic and labour market institutions, which 
constituted a liberal welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1996, 15ff; see also, 
Ferrera and Hemerijck 2003, 101ff ) and a liberal market economy (Hall 
and Soskice 2001).
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Ireland
When the second oil crisis shook the global economy in 1979, its aftermath 
severely undermined Ireland’s Keynesian strategy. National debt skyrock-
eted while the associated costs of counter-cyclical deficit spending re-
sulted in income tax hikes, which had to be pursued in order to service 
the rising debt. A profound economic, social and political crisis followed, 
which O’Donnell (2004, 52) describes as follows: “The period 1980-87 was 
one of recession, falling living standards and a dramatic increase in unem-
ployment. Total employment declined by almost 6 per cent and employ-
ment in manufacturing by 25 per cent”. Making things worse, the indus-
trial decline, high levels of unemployment, and outward migration meant 
even less government revenues, which necessitated even higher income 
tax hikes, and a further deflation of the economy. The crisis was so severe 
that “there was talk of the International Monetary Fund stepping in, and 
there were even questions about whether or not the Republic could last 
as an independent country” (House and McGrath 2004, 43). Industrial 
relations during this period rapidly deteriorated, as they did in Britain, 
and so national wage agreements were suspended in 1980. However, the 
devolution of wage negotiations from the national to the firm level did not 
bring any real benefits to the vast majority of businesses. It did, however, 
increase unemployment and inequality. During these times of deep de-
spair, expectations for economic recovery on all sides were extremely pes-
simistic, which, in turn, had “encouraged rent-seeking and profit-taking 
behaviour” (O’Donnell 2004, 52).
 In an attempt to address spiralling levels of national debt and unem-
ployment, the centre-left Fine Gael (FG) and Labour coalition govern-
ments (1981-1982 and 1982-1987) cut social services and health care bene-
fits (which the FG favoured) and expanded active labour market measures 
(which Labour favoured). Labour Minister Ruairi Quinn (Labour Party) 
set up a separate Youth Employment Agency (YEA) for those under 25 
years of age in 1982, and launched the Alternance and the Social Employ-
ment Scheme (SES) in 1984 and 1985 respectively. While the former of-
fered training to the older, long-term unemployed, the latter provided 
“temporary, part-time work experience in the not-for-profit sector for 
those aged over 25 years who had been on the Live Register [Ireland’s 
social assistance scheme] for more than twelve months” (Duggan 1999, 
3). In response to the plethora of ALMPs used in the Irish context, the 
multipartite National Economic and Social Council (NESC) published a 
report in 1985 that strongly advocated a more coherent and streamlined 
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approach to the governance of the labour market. These recommenda-
tions were subsequently included in the White Paper on Manpower Policy 
issued by the FG-Labour government in 1986. It outlined the creation of a 
tripartite National Training and Employment Authority called Foras Áise-
anna Saothair (FÁS), which was then codified in the Labour Services Act 
of 1987.
 In the 1987 general elections, Labour lost four seats in the Dáil, receiv-
ing the brunt of the blame for unpopular cutbacks, while voter dissat-
isfaction also led to an increase in votes for the far more radical Work-
ers Party and the newly established, centre-right Progressive Democrats 
(PD). As a result, Fianna Fáil (FF) emerged with the most votes and was 
able to form a minority government. Fianna Fáil built on their predeces-
sor’s work and introduced FÁS on 1 January 1988 as a “one-stop” service 
centre, where employed and unemployed workers could get job-search 
assistance and training. FÁS streamlined the functions of AnCO, the Na-
tional Manpower Service, and the Youth Employment Agency, and took 
over the Social Employment Scheme. In other words, in the period dur-
ing which Britain fully endorsed marketisation, union confrontation, and 
the dismantlement of the MSC, Ireland launched the tripartite FÁS and 
made state-supported, in contrast to voluntarist, training a key priority. 
The creation of FÁS, however, was only one of the two major differences 
between Ireland and Britain. The second, perhaps more dramatic change 
began when the NESC “hammered out” a report in 1986, entitled Strat-
egy for Development (O’Donnell 2004, 54). While the FG-Labour govern-
ment had been sceptical about the report’s recommendation in favour of 
“competitive corporatism” (cf., Rhodes 2003), in which the labour move-
ment was to agree to moderate wage increases in exchange for tax cuts, 
the NESC recommendations were utilised by the new Taoiseach (Ireland’s 
prime minister) Charles Haughey (FF). Accordingly, the new FF govern-
ment abandoned the system of decentralised wage setting and successfully 
passed the first national social partnership agreement, the Programme for 
National Recovery (PNR), which outlined an agreement among the gov-
ernment, the social partners, and other key civil society actors on wage 
restraint, fiscal austerity and welfare state recalibration.
 Fianna Fáil’s new strategy would not have been possible, however, with-
out a reshuffle in the FG leadership and a realignment of Ireland’s political 
forces after the elections. More specifically, as the FF minority govern-
ment was dependent on the support of the opposition to pass their un-
popular fiscal restraint bills, it was critical that the new FG party leader, 
Alan Dukes, had decided not to oppose the measures outlined in the PNR. 
CONCLUSIONS
Rather, in a selfless move that would become known as the Tallaght Strat-
egy, Alan Dukes sacrificed a political opportunity, which he could have 
exploited to weaken the government, in an attempt to assist overcoming 
the national crisis (House and McGrath 2004, 44).
 The other critical player that needed to be aligned with the government 
was the labour movement (cf., Baccaro 2003). The labour unions, while 
initially sceptical about a programme that outlined wage moderation, de-
spite spiralling inflation, eventually accepted the terms outlined in the 
partnership agreement. One the one hand, the unions’ support was solic-
ited by assuring that “the value of social welfare payments would be main-
tained, and income tax would be reformed to reduce the burden on work-
ers” (O’Donnell 2004, 54). Perhaps more importantly, however, decreases 
in union membership and the harsh experiences the British unions faced 
during Thatcher’s reign had also increased union fears of further margin-
alisation. Moreover, the emergence of a new political party, the “avowedly 
neo-liberal” Progressive Democrats, alerted the labour “union movement 
to the possibility of ideologically informed party politics in Ireland, and 
such a prospect cannot be underestimated as a likely factor in prompting 
their early enthusiasm for co-operating with a national wage agreement in 
1987” (Sexton and O’Connell 1996, 75).25
 In summary, the 1987 elections represent a crucial moment in Irish 
history, because they reflect a reassessment of economic thought, i.e., the 
acceptance of fiscal conservatism, albeit with a consensual, rather than 
conflict-oriented, outlook. They also produced new leadership, not only 
at the governmental level, but the election results also forced a reshuffle 
of the leadership in the main opposition party, brought a new voice on the 
political right, the Progressive Democrats, and realigned the voices within 
the social partners in support of a national partnership agreement.
IV.6 Conclusions
Part I was divided into three historical phases, each with a particular argu-
ment about institutional evolution. In chapter III, I argued that European 
welfare states, while having unique historical trajectories and diverse sets 
of labour market and social policy prerogatives and instruments, partially 
converged on particular elements of the Swedish Model. More specifically, 
after the OECD began disseminating certain ideas associated with active 
manpower policy and a national, tripartite PES, many European welfare 
states incorporated these elements into national policies. Important ex-
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amples included the German Work Promotion Act and the Austrian La-
bour Market Promotion Act, both of which were enacted in 1969. Other 
examples include the creation of a modern, tripartite PES in Denmark, 
Ireland, and the UK in 1969, 1971, and 1973 respectively, and the gradual 
introduction and expansion of active manpower policies in these three 
countries.
 In chapter IV, I argued that European policymakers’ reactions covaried 
in response to the first oil crisis of 1973. Virtually all of the cases dis-
cussed here endorsed active manpower policies, now of the demand-side 
type, to cushion the effects of what was considered a cyclical economic 
downturn. It was only after 1979 that governments started to take per-
sistent unemployment more seriously as a structural phenomenon. Price 
stability became the primary political objective for most governments, 
while the commitment to full employment was largely abandoned. By the 
mid-1980s, diverging labour market strategies had become apparent and 
the OECD lacked a clear-cut solution to the dual challenge of persistent 
unemployment and high inflation that would be acceptable to all of the 
involved governments. By the end of the 1980s, three diverging strategies 
had been put forward, including a Nordic (mainly Swedish), a Continental 
(mainly German), and an Anglophone (mainly British) version.26
 In the Nordic cluster, the 1970s and 1980s were characterised by im-
portant developments, including the expansion of the public sector, ex-
tending welfare services and enabling female employment, the consolida-
tion of a dual breadwinner norm, and continued reliance on (not always 
entirely consensual) social partnership. One of the most critical develop-
ments in the Nordic cases was the provision of child and elderly care, 
which enabled a reconciliation of work and family life, while providing 
(flexible) employment opportunities for women. These developments 
were further supplemented by an accommodating tax regime, expanding 
maternity and paternity leave schemes, and school hours that allowed 
mothers to engage in full-time employment. As a consequence, female 
employment grew significantly during those decades. Even though wage 
negotiations in both Sweden and Denmark became more tenuous, social 
partnership remained a staple ingredient in the Nordic welfare states. 
The governments continued to seek the social partners’ collaboration, 
not only because of the social partners’ resources and expertise, but 
also to legitimise policy choices and programmes. Both welfare states 
also maintained high levels of general taxation to finance their welfare 
states with the goal of achieving high levels of equality and social ho-
mogeneity (adherence to the equity principle).27 Sweden and Denmark 
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continued to differ, however, in the importance they placed on various 
labour market measures. While Sweden favoured “active” over “passive” 
measures, Denmark “tolerated” unemployment more than Sweden and, 
accordingly, emphasised passive measures in order to prevent economic 
hardship during periods of joblessness. Nevertheless, the role of active 
measures in Denmark, accessible to both insured and uninsured work-
ers, became gradually more significant and expenditures continued to 
increase throughout the 1980s.
 In the Continental cluster, the method of choice for addressing un-
employment was through demand-reducing measures such as early exit, 
protracted education opportunities, and a reduction in working hours. 
Similarly, the consolidation of the male breadwinner principle kept fe-
male employment rates low. Active labour market policies, in turn, were 
recalibrated throughout the 1970s and 1980s to address problems associ-
ated with long-term unemployment. However, the relative weight of ac-
tive measures, typically only available to insured workers, was moderate 
in comparison to passive expenditures (i.e., cash transfer payments). As 
the Continental countries relied more on payroll contributions (insurance 
principle) than on general taxation to finance their labour market pro-
grammes, governments had to gradually increase these payments dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s when unemployment increased. As such, labour 
market measures were often used in pro-cyclical ways: when unemploy-
ment decreases, more funds become available and programmes are ex-
panded. Because much of the Continental economies’ success in keeping 
unemployment low relied on prioritising the employment of prime-aged 
male workers at the expense of other groups, the Continental welfare 
states became known as a system that suffered from “welfare without 
work” (Esping-Andersen 1996). This strategy was largely agreeable to all 
stakeholders, including the social partners, as long as the beneficiaries 
were insured workers and their families. Accordingly, in the 1980s, the 
Continental welfare states seemed to successfully keep inequality low, 
while also preserving the social status of the unemployment (equivalence 
principle).
 In the Anglophone cluster, especially Margaret Thatcher’s Britain, 
a strategy of deregulation, privatisation, and marketisation based on 
Friedman’s monetarist paradigm was chosen. This path included the dis-
mantling of unions and the removal of labour market “rigidities” such as 
employment protection legislation and administrative “red tape” inhib-
iting job creation. The social partners were thus expelled from welfare 
state governance in general and the labour market in particular, while 
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benefits became more residual and flat rate. The guiding principle was 
not equivalence like in the Continental cases or equity as we saw in the 
Nordic cases, but ending the “culture of dependency” by advancing mar-
ket principles and reducing the role of the state. Ireland shared many 
characteristics with the UK, including the provision of limited social 
services, a flexible labour market, and a tradition of poor relief to those 
in need. Moreover, during the economic crises of the 1980s, Ireland’s 
policymakers also followed the British example of decentralised wage 
setting. However, by the end of the 1980s, Ireland had begun to diverge 
from Britain’s more radical path and began to rebuild social partnership 
features by creating a tripartite Training and Employment Authority 
(FÁS) and arranging national wage-setting agreements, embedded in a 
larger “planning” context. As such, the Irish case is not a “pure” example 
of the Anglophone welfare state, even though it shares many features 
with its British counterpart.
 Table 8 summarises the key principles that are shared in the respec-
tive welfare state clusters, which is followed by supplementary tables in 
the appendix, which summarise the economic, employment, and labour 
market policy characteristics of the three welfare clusters for the period 
1974-1989.
Table 8 Core Principles, Common Outcomes, and Tradeoff s in Three Welfare Clusters 
in the 1980s
Welfare 
Cluster
Principles Outcomes/Eff ects Equity-Employment-Tax 
Trade-off 
Nordic
(Sweden, 
Denmark)
Dual breadwinner 
principle
Universality principle 
(general taxation)
Equity principle (social 
homogeneity)
Consensus-style 
policymaking
Large public sector 
(increasing in size)
Service-heavy & 
women-friendly welfare 
state (delivered mainly 
through public actors)
Generous active and 
passive labour market 
measures for all citizens
Social partners involved 
in labour market 
institutions (based on 
tradition)
Female employment 
rate: high
General level of activity: 
high
Inequality: low
Taxation: high
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Table 8 Core Principles, Common Outcomes, and Tradeoff s in Three Welfare Clusters 
in the 1980s
Welfare 
Cluster
Principles Outcomes/Eff ects Equity-Employment-Tax 
Trade-off 
Continental
(Germany, 
Austria)
Male breadwinner 
principle
Insurance principle 
(payroll contributions)
Equivalence principle 
(status preservation)
Consensus-style 
policymaking
Medium public sector 
(increasing in size)
Transfer-heavy welfare 
state; weak child/elder 
care institutions
Generous transfers to 
insured workers
Social partners 
involved in labour 
market institutions 
(legitimised by payroll 
contributions)
Not-for-profi t actors 
and social partners 
involved in social policy 
delivery
Female employment 
rate: low
General level of activity: 
medium
Inequality: low
Taxation: medium; 
(but high payroll 
contributions)
Anglophone
(UK and to 
some extent 
Ireland)
Male breadwinner 
principle (very strong in 
Ireland)
Weak universality 
principle (general 
taxation)
Market principle 
(welfare seen 
as individual 
responsibility)
Weak social partnership 
(improving in Ireland in 
late 1980s)
Medium public sector 
(stagnant/declining)
Transfer-biased welfare 
state; weak child/elder 
care institutions
Residual, fl at-rate 
benefi ts
Not-for-profi t actors 
involved in social policy 
delivery
Female employment 
rate: medium (low in 
Ireland)
General level of activity: 
medium/high in UK, 
low in Ireland
Inequality: high
Taxation: low
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 Appendix to Part I, Chapter IV: Comparative Data
Table 9 Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP); Percentage Change from Previous 
Period, 1974-1989
Average
1974-1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Denmark 2.1 4.3 3.6 0.3 1.2 0.2
Sweden 1.6 2.2 2.7 3.3 2.6 2.7
Austria 2.1 2.4 2.1 1.6 3.4 4.2
Germany 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.5 3.7 3.6
Ireland 3.8 3.1 -0.4 4.7 5.2 5.8
UK 1.5 3.8 4.2 4.2 5.2 2.2
Source: OECD 2002, 207, table 1
Table 10 Infl ation Rate (Consumer Price Index); Percentage Change from Previous 
Period, 1974-1989
Average 
1974-1984
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Denmark 9.7 4.7 3.7 4.0 4.5 4.8
Sweden 10.0 7.4 4.2 4.2 5.8 6.4
Austria 5.5 6.7 9.1 8.5 7.3 7.5
Germany 4.3 2.1 -0.1 0.2 1.3 2.8
Ireland 14.7 5.5 3.8 3.1 2.2 4.0
UK .. 5.2 3.6 3.7 4.6 5.9
Source: OECD 2002, 225, table 19
Table 11 General Government Gross Financial Liabilities as Percentage of Nominal 
GDP, 1985-1989
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Denmark 74.9 71.8 68.6 66.7 65.0
Sweden 64.7 64.1 57.0 51.2 46.5
Austria 49.1 53.6 57.5 58.9 58.1
Germany 40.6 40.6 41.6 42.1 40.8
Ireland 99.5 110.6 111.8 108.2 98.9
UK 59.2 58.4 56.1 49.7 43.0
Source: OECD 2002, 239, table 33
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Table 12 Overall Marginal Tax Wedge, 1978-1989
1978 1981 1985 1989
Denmark 69.7 72.1 75.1 72.5
Sweden 75.4 75.3 71.2 70.5
Austria .. .. .. ..
Germany 66.0 64.3 67.5 66.3
Ireland .. .. .. ..
UK 44.3 50.4 48.1 38.2
Source: OECD 1994, 241, table 9.1
Table 13 Labour Force Participation Rate, Total, 1973-198928
1973 1979 1983 1987 1989
Denmark 75.9 79.8 80.9 84.0 84.3
Sweden 75.5 80.5 81.3 81.7 83.3
Austria 65.1 64.9 65.6 67.0 67.2
Germany 68.8 66.8 65.1 68.6 68.2
Ireland 63.5 62.4 62.7 61.6 60.3
UK 73.0 74.3 72.4 74.9 76.0
Source: OECD 1990a, 200, table G
Table 14 Labour Force Participation Rate, Female, 1973-1989
1973 1979 1983 1987 1989
Denmark 61.9 69.9 74.2 78.6 78.3 a
Sweden 62.6 72.8 76.6 79.4 81.0
Austria 48.5 49.1 49.7 53.0 54.3
Germany 49.6 49.6 49.7 54.4 54.4a
Ireland 34.1 35.2 37.8 38.5 37.6 a
UK 53.2 58.0 57.2 62.4 65.2
a  = 1988
Source: OECD 1990a, 200, table H
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Table 17 Expenditures on Specifi c Labour Market Measures as Percentage of GDP, 
1987
Denmark Sweden Austria Germany Ireland UK
PES 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.23 0.17 0.16
Training 0.52 0.49 0.13 0.29 0.56 0.11
Youth 
Measures
0.21 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.40 0.27
Direct Job 
Creation/
Employment 
Subsidies
0.03 0.26 0.12 0.20 0.32 0.31
Disabled 0.25 0.75 0.03 0.21 .. 0.04
Cash Transfers 2.64 0.70 0.91 1.33 3.66 1.66
Early 
Retirement29
1.25 0.10 0.16 0.02 .. 0.02
Sum (total 
expenditures)
5.03 3.77 1.48 2.34 5.12 2.57
Active: Passive 
Ratio (w/o 
spending on 
the disabled)
0.23 1.39 0.36 0.58 0.40 0.51
Source: OECD 1988, 86, table 3.1

Part II
The Emergence of the 
Activation Paradigm


V The OECD’s Repeated Reassessments and the EU as a 
 Proliferator of New Ideas
Chapter III examined the emergence of active manpower policy – in-
spired by the Swedish Model and diffused by the OECD – across most 
of the industrialised world. Chapter IV outlined the expansion, reca-
libration, and – in most cases – gradual expansion in the use of active 
manpower policy in response to the employment challenges that arose 
after the two oil crises in the 1970s. In this chapter, I will trace how 
the OECD has reacted to – and repeatedly adjusted its position on – 
the causes of, and remedies for, unemployment since the late 1980s. I 
will juxtapose the OECD’s recommendations to those of the EU, which 
emerged in the mid-1990s as an additional “ideas proliferator” and lo-
cus for new policy agendas. I argue that while the authors of the OECD 
and EU statements initially offered competing sets of recommendations 
– based on different normative and cognitive underpinnings – a gradu-
al phase of normative and cognitive recalibrations has subsequently led 
to programmatic convergence on a common paradigm based on activa-
tion policies.
V.1 The New Aspiration for an “Active Society” and the Road to the 
OECD Jobs Study
Possibly one of the most striking developments in OECD countries dur-
ing the 1980s was the diversity in both the level and structure of un-
employment. While unemployment began to decline in some European 
countries as part of a general economic upswing in the mid-1980s, in 
many others, unemployment remained a salient issue. Moreover, many 
countries shared – even those with a better record such as Austria – 
the phenomenon of persistent and long-term unemployment, which was 
concentrated in particular groups, especially youth. At the same time, 
employers in many countries began to report skills shortages, which 
highlighted the increasing mismatch of jobseekers’ skills and employers’ 
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demands (for an excellent review, see Blanchard 2006). These economic, 
political, and social challenges were further amplified by demographic 
developments that suggested that economic old-age dependency ratios 
would significantly rise (as birth rates declined and people grew older), 
which, in turn, increased concern about the sustainability of old age so-
cial security systems.
 When a cyclical economic upswing contributed to continuously fall-
ing average levels of unemployment from 1984 to 1990,1 the OECD seized 
this opportunity to propose a New Framework, endorsing an “active so-
ciety” (OECD 1990b) that was welcomed by the Ministerial Council. The 
New Framework articulated a major reassessment of many previously held 
recommendations. The diversity in unemployment levels, the growth in 
youth unemployment, and the emergence of long-term unemployment 
– despite sustained economic growth – led the OECD to consider unem-
ployment as a predominantly structural phenomenon. Thus, the OECD 
concluded, in stark contrast to previous assessments, that there remained 
“little scope for addressing unemployment by aggregate demand mea-
sures” (OECD 1990a, vii). It also outlined a new political agenda. At the 
heart of the OECD’s reorientation toward an “active society” was a cog-
nitive shift in the cause-and-effect relationship between levels of unem-
ployment and employment. It was argued that the mobilisation of passive 
reserves would improve the productive capacity of an economy, raise in-
come levels (while easing pressures on the public budget), enhance so-
cial progress, and thus contribute to the creation of new jobs. In other 
words, this New Framework welcomed, rather than rejected, the expan-
sion of general employment levels through the mobilisation of women, 
lone parents, disabled workers, and other economically inactive, but not 
necessarily unemployed, people. To achieve this goal, the expansion of 
“non-standard” forms of employment, such as part-time, weekend and 
homework, and self-employment, and the associated segmentation of the 
labour market was tolerated, if not embraced. In this context, “adequate 
training and other mobility-enhancing” measures were considered nec-
essary to turn these non-standard jobs into “stepping stones” to regular 
employment (OECD 1989, 10). Th e associated policy recommendations 
included: (1) a “swing from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ labour market policies”;2 (2) 
a renewed focus on guaranteeing a “solid background of basic education” 
and improving workers’ adaptability through “lifelong learning”; and (3) a 
reorientation of PESs’ functions away “from bureaucratic control” toward 
a “view to the active facilitation of labour market processes” (OECD 1990a, 
ix). Th e latter promoted a spirit of active job searching by improving place-
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ment and counselling services, more frequent contact with the PES, and 
potentially beneﬁ t conditionality. Targeted and selective training measures 
and employment subsidies should be considered if, and only if, all other 
measures failed. Coupled with an increase in the pressure on jobseekers to 
ﬁ nd and accept jobs, the OECD foresaw tax and beneﬁ ts reforms early on. 
Tax and beneﬁ ts reforms should make employment ﬁ nancially more at-
tractive than “a life on beneﬁ ts”. Additional hurdles to gainful employment, 
especially the lack of childcare, also needed to be addressed.
 While the OECD’s recommendations and rhetoric thus foreshadowed 
much of the contemporary European discourse, little substantive policy 
change occurred in the early 1990s. In fact, when the economic reces-
sion of the early 1990s affected European labour markets, most govern-
ments were more interested in “managing” rising levels of unemploy-
ment than pushing more people into atypical employment. In response, 
the OECD symbolically entitled their 1991 Employment Outlook “La-
bour Market Reform: Staying the Course” and in 1992, the OECD articu-
lated the fear that the additional layer of cyclical unemployment might 
turn into structural unemployment if governments failed to pursue the 
recommendations outlined in the New Framework. To overcome many 
Member States’ reform apathy, the OECD Labour Ministers agreed in 
May 1992 to launch a comprehensive research effort “on the reasons 
for and the remedies to the disappointing progress in reducing unem-
ployment” (OECD 1992, ix). That same year, the Manpower and Social 
Affairs Committee was renamed the Employment, Labour and Social 
Affairs Committee, capturing the OECD’s far-reaching normative and 
cognitive reassessments. The term “manpower policy” was also gradu-
ally replaced with “active labour market policy”. Two years later, the 1994 
Jobs Study (JS) was published, which would become the focal point for 
all subsequent OECD labour market reform proposals. The JS articu-
lated nine (later ten) broad policy guidelines and more than 70 detailed 
policy recommendations specific to its Member States (Martin 2006, 1).
Box 3 1994 OECD Jobs Study Recommendations
1. Macro-economic policy, in conjunction with good structural policies, should 
encourage sustainable (i.e., non-infl ationary) growth
2. Improve frameworks to enhance the creation and diff usion of technological know-
how
3. Increase fl exibility of working time
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Source: OECD 1999, 9
While the language in the recommendations is fairly neutral and not 
explicitly “anti-welfare”, the Jobs Study has typically been interpreted 
as an “American” or “neo-liberal” prescription in which social policy is 
viewed as a “brake” to economic development and a “burden” to employ-
ers, individuals, and the public purse (Casey 2004, 330). This particu-
lar interpretation has typically been explained by (a) the specific policy 
recommendations that were developed in the subsequent country as-
sessment processes, and (b) the relative weight given to the ten policy 
areas with a clear bias against five labour market institutions, including 
minimum wages, employment protection legislation (EPL), unemploy-
ment and other benefits, the tax wedge, and wage-setting arrangements 
(Watt 2006, 2). In other words, the OECD recommendations were heav-
ily focused on improving labour market flexibility, which was regarded 
as the key ingredient of economic growth and job creation.3 The very 
definition of flexibility, however, had taken on an entirely new mean-
ing. While up until the early 1980s, achieving flexible labour markets 
was predicated on the use of ALMPs – which were assumed to make 
the labour market flexible by improving the occupational and regional 
mobility of workers – the JS’s interpretation of flexibility was based on 
removing “rigidities” caused by labour unions and governmental regula-
tions. Accordingly, the scope for “active” labour market policy became 
more limited and was envisioned as a mixture of positive, non-financial 
incentive measures, mainly efficient and effective job-matching and 
placement services, and their negative counterpart, i.e., the enforce-
ment of work and job search requirements.4 While the targeted use of 
4. Eliminate impediments to the creation and expansion of enterprise
5. Make wages and labour costs more fl exible to refl ect local conditions and individual 
skill levels, in particular of younger workers
6. Reform employment security provisions that inhibit the expansion of employment 
in the private sectors
7. Strengthen the emphasis on active labour market policies and reinforce their 
eff ectiveness
8. Improve workforce skills and competences through wide-ranging changes in 
education and training systems
9. Reform unemployment and related benefi t and tax systems so that equity is not 
pursued at the expense of effi  cient labour markets
10. Enhance product market competition to reduce monopolistic tendencies and 
weaken insider-outsider mechanisms.
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supply-side measures was still seen as a desirable component of labour 
market policy, demand-side measures were seen as mostly inappropri-
ate instruments that should only be used for the most disadvantaged 
jobseekers and only for limited periods of time.
 Finally, the JS also built on the older notion of an “active society” – even 
though this term was no longer used – by encouraging, rather than sup-
pressing, labour market participation of all groups in society. This pre-
scription still included the expansion of “atypical” employment, which 
continued to be seen as an appropriate instrument for addressing unem-
ployment and social exclusion. This preference is articulated well in the 
statement by the OECD Secretary General Jean-Claude Paye: “It is much 
better to have people on a salary, perhaps not a very high one, than to have 
people unemployed” (citation in, Riding 1994).
 In summary, while the wording of the JS remained neutral – after 
all, it had to be endorsed by all Member States – its message was that 
(Continental) Europe needed to adjust its labour markets along US lines 
to sustain competitiveness and improve its employment performance. 
This reorientation must therefore be understood in part as a reassess-
ment and, in other cases, as a confirmation of market-oriented politi-
cal actors’ beliefs about the adequacy of the deregulatory approach to 
the unemployment malaise. The large “over-regulated” economies in-
cluding France, Germany, and Italy in particular suffered from large-
scale, often long-term unemployment, which strongly contrasted with a 
well-performing, “unregulated” US with its steady job increases. While 
this problem assessment was not fully shared by left-leaning actors, it 
was nevertheless internalised in the OECD recommendations as the 
Jobs Study was conducted, evaluated and published during a politically 
“conservative moment”. In other words, not only was the OECD agenda 
mainly driven by the US’s superior economic performance and the UK’s 
endorsement of deregulatory labour market policies, but also by centre-
right governments in most European countries. While Germany was 
governed by a Christian-Liberal coalition government under Helmut 
Kohl, Denmark and Sweden were headed by Poul Schlüter (Conserva-
tive People’s Party) and Carl Bildt (centre-right Moderates) respectively, 
and Socialist François Mitterrand faced a Gaullist majority in parlia-
ment and was thus forced to appoint Édourd Balladur as prime minister 
in March 1993.
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V.2 The European Union as a Proliferator of New Ideas: From Delors’ 
1993 White Paper to the European Employment Strategy
During the first four post-WWII decades, the OECD enjoyed an almost 
“monopoly-like situation” with regard to the exchange, deliberation, and 
diffusion of ideas and recommendations in the fields of social and labour 
market policy in Europe (Noaksson and Jacobsson 2003, 34). The EU, in 
turn, had little influence in this field and the impact of European integra-
tion was typically described as “negative integration”, or the retrenchment 
of national regulatory capacity, rather than “positive integration” associ-
ated with European-level capacity building (Leibfried and Pierson 1995; 
Scharpf 2000b). Accordingly, the EU’s achievements in European social 
policy making were considered “at best – weak” (Pochet 2005, 37), and “EU 
social policy remained limited and secondary” (Geyer 2000, xiii). How-
ever, throughout the 1990s, the EU would gradually emerge as an impor-
tant new actor in the dissemination of new ideas related to employment 
and social policy. Th e ﬁ rst step toward “positive integration” in the realm 
of labour market policy was the conclusion of the Treaty on the European 
Union (henceforth Maastricht Treaty), signed in Maastricht on 7 February 
1992. Th e Maastricht Treaty not only codiﬁ ed Europe’s hard currency path, 
i.e., “a harmonious and balanced development of economic activity, [and] 
sustainable and non-inﬂ ationary growth”, but also set out “a high level of 
employment and social protection, the raising of the standard of living and 
quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among 
Member States” as core EU principles and priorities (cf., Art. 2).
 Unemployment, in turn, was first discussed as a European rather than 
a national problem after the currency crisis of September 1992, which 
forced Britain, Italy, and Sweden (a soon-to-be EU member) out of the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The EU Member States 
realised that the Union did not have the tools to adequately deal with 
macro-economic shocks, which in turn, could potentially endanger the 
prospects of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduc-
tion of a common currency as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, 
on 1 June 1993 the Commission presented a Community-wide Framework 
for Employment in which a high level of employment across all Member 
States was prescribed as “a fundamental objective of the Community”. 
The Commission also underlined the need for Member States’ policy co-
ordination and common action at the Community level, while identifying 
Scandinavia as a good example for the achievement of high employment 
rates (Commission of the European Communities 1993a). Later that same 
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month, the chiefs of government (CoGs) conceded at the Copenhagen 
Council that a comprehensive European strategy was needed to “restore 
sustainable growth, reinforce the competitiveness of European industry 
and reduce unemployment” (Council of the European Union 1993, 3). For 
this purpose, the Copenhagen Council invited the Commission to present 
a White Paper on a medium-term strategy for growth, competitiveness 
and employment. This White Paper would become Social Democratic 
Commission President Jacques Delors’ window of opportunity to outline 
his vision of a Europe that would include an explicit social dimension as 
a counterweight to the EU’s fundamentally “neo-liberal thrust” (Pollack 
1999, 268). While the White Paper agreed with many of the OECD’s find-
ings published in the 1994 Jobs Study, including the diagnosis that most 
of Europe’s unemployment was caused by structural impediments, it pro-
posed significantly different remedies. More specifically, Delors placed 
less emphasis on enforcing market mechanisms and the removal of “ri-
gidities” through labour market deregulation, welfare state retrenchment, 
and decentralisation of wage negotiations, and more emphasis on capac-
ity-building state interventions, social partnership, and the proliferation 
of a “sustainable developmental model” (cf., Commission of the European 
Communities 1993b).
 The White Paper did, however, share the OECD’s vision of an “active 
employment policy” that reflected the cognitive and normative shifts that 
had also reached the European Commission. Accordingly, the Commis-
sion began to “persuade” national governments about the merits of an 
active labour market policy regime that entailed mutual obligations to 
jobseekers and the state alike. Accordingly, the White Paper called for a 
“complete reversal of attitudes” with the aim of preventing rather than 
managing long-term unemployment (Commission of the European Com-
munities 1993b, 18). For this purpose, the unemployed should, based on 
the duration of their unemployment spell, first be offered “training lead-
ing to meaningful qualifications, then the possibility of working, possibly 
in the public sector for a number of months” (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities 1993b, 18f, emphasis added). The more difficult cases, 
in particular the long-term unemployed, should be monitored personally 
by the same employment adviser, while young jobseekers, especially early 
school leavers, should be guaranteed a “Youthstart”, leading to a meaning-
ful vocational certification. Jobseekers were thus offered “real assistance”, 
which would also carry, however, an obligation to make a “personal in-
vestment in this training and employment” (Commission of the European 
Communities 1993b, 18f ).
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 Inspired by Delors’ White Paper, the CoGs’ meeting in Essen in Decem-
ber of 1994 – the last European Council attended by Delors as President of 
the Commission – introduced a new focus on the labour market, echoing 
many of the recommendations of both the Jobs Study and the White Pa-
per. The Essen Council took place at a time of economic recovery, which 
had the potential to “set free” new financial means in the fight against un-
employment. However, Essen also took place while further steps toward 
the consolidation of the EMU were occurring, which required the tighten-
ing of national budgets and the creation of more efficient public sectors. 
As such, a strategy was needed that could tackle the unemployment prob-
lem without turning to inflationary growth and growing budget deficits. 
The Council then agreed on the following five guidelines, consolidating, 
broadening, and further specifying previously outlined measures:
Box 4 Five Guidelines Proposed at the 1994 Essen Council
Source: Council of the European Union 1994, 2f.
When we compare the Essen guidelines to the JS recommendations, the 
difference between their orientations and their conclusions are quite 
striking. Not only are the Essen guidelines clearly oriented toward en-
1. Improving employment opportunities for the labour force by promoting 
investment in vocational training. […] 
2. Increasing the employment-intensiveness of growth, in particular by:
 •  more fl exible organization of work […]
 •  a wage policy which encourages job-creating investments and in the present 
situation requires moderate agreements below increases in productivity, and
 •  fi nally, the promotion of initiatives, particularly at the regional and local level that 
create jobs […]
3. Reducing non-wage labour costs […]
4. Improving the eff ectiveness of labour-market policy […] by moving from a passive 
to an active labour market policy. […]
5. Improving measures to help groups which are particularly hard hit by 
unemployment:
 •  Particular eff orts are necessary to help young people, especially school leavers who 
have virtually no qualifi cations, by off ering them either employment or training.
 •  The fi ght against long-term unemployment must be a major aspect of labour-
market policy. […] 
 •  Special attention should be paid to the diffi  cult situation of unemployment 
women and older workers.
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hancing the employability of workers through a strong focus on voca-
tional training, while assisting the weakest groups in the labour market, 
including older workers, early school leavers, women and the long-term 
unemployed, but they also do not address EPL standards or benefit lev-
els. Likewise, instead of calling for the devolution of wage setting to the 
firm level, the Essen guidelines called for “moderate agreements below 
increases in productivity”, which were best achieved by concerted actions 
at the national or sectoral level. As such, addressing “structural” prob-
lems and moving from “passive” to “active” labour market policy meant 
something very different in the Essen guidelines compared to the OECD 
recommendations.
 In order to institutionalise a peer-review process, all of the Essen 
guidelines were to be translated by the Member States into multi-an-
nual programmes, while having regard “to the specific features of their 
economic and social situation” (Council of the European Union 1994, 3). 
Starting in December 1995, the Labour and Social Affairs Council, the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council, and the Commission would 
monitor the Member States’ policies and report back to the European 
Council. While the newly launched Essen Process therefore represented 
a first step in creating a common European framework for the exchange 
of economic ideas and good practices, mutual surveillance, and bench-
marking, it was rather unclear whether any permanent structure would 
emerge at the European level (cf., Commission of the European Com-
munities 2004). This institutional uncertainty was mainly due to the 
scepticism to these developments by the centre-right parties. At this 
point in time, the British, French and German governments as well 
as the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe 
(UNICE)5 all opposed any transfer of real policymaking competences to 
the EU level.
 However, the year 1995 would see new players emerge, advancing the 
agenda for the European co-ordination of employment policies. On the 
one hand, the EU welcomed three new members on 1 January 1995: Aus-
tria, Finland, and Sweden. All three countries had strong corporatist tra-
ditions and generally favoured labour market interventions over “free” 
markets. Accordingly, the inclusion of these governments in the Union 
significantly strengthened the alignment of players in favour of the Es-
sen Process. Especially the Swedish government quickly turned out to be 
a major advocate for European-level employment co-ordination, mainly 
because of domestic pressures. Shortly before its accession to the EU, the 
Swedish right-of-centre Moderates lost the national elections and the 
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Social Democrats were returned to office. Newly elected Premier Ingvar 
Carlsson, who had already been actively involved in pushing the agenda 
for the inclusion of an employment title in subsequent European trea-
ties prior to Sweden’s accession (Financial Times 1993), faced a scepti-
cal Swedish electorate, in particular among Social Democratic voters. His 
worst fears were realised when the Swedes elected their first set of MPs 
to the European Parliament on 17 September 1995. While the parties that 
campaigned on a broadly anti-EU platform, including the Greens and the 
Left Party, won 17.2 percent and 12.9 percent of the vote, respectively, up 
from five percent and 6.2 percent in the 1994 general elections, the Social 
Democrats plummeted from 45.4 percent to 28.1 percent support (Ferrara 
and Weishaupt 2004, 284). Nine months after Sweden had joined the EU, 
these outcomes strikingly confirmed what polls had warned: “Sweden is 
thoroughly disillusioned with membership, and last November’s referen-
dum would be lost if it was held again now” (The Times, 1995). As such, by 
the end of 1995, it became increasingly essential for the Swedish govern-
ment to find ways to ease voters’ concerns over EU membership and its 
impact on the Swedish welfare state.
 Moreover, as a consequence of a reshuffle within the Commission 
in 1995, Allan Larsson became the new Director General for Employ-
ment and Social Affairs. Larsson, who had served as Director Gener-
al of the Swedish Labour Market Board (1983-1989), Swedish Finance 
Minister (1990-1991) and Chairman of the European Employment Ini-
tiative (EEI),6 was a “very influential” man whose opinions “carried a 
lot of weight” (interview, DGEmpl2). Although Larsson needed to be 
an independent candidate, his political beliefs reflected Swedish policy 
priorities, especially Swedish notions of active labour market policy (cf., 
Pochet and Jenson 2006). Carlsson quickly invited Larsson to write a 
paper entitled “A Vision for IGC 1996: A European Employment Union 
– to Make EMU Possible” and submitted a first, detailed proposal for 
an “employment title” to be included in a new EU treaty to the Westen-
dorp Reflection Group, which prepared the contents for the upcoming 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1996 (cf., van Riel and van der 
Meer 2002).7 Subsequently, during an informal meeting in Cordoba at 
the end of October, EU Employment Ministers under Swedish leader-
ship, worked hard to lay the groundwork for a European employment 
strategy, which would be put before the Council for ratification in Ma-
drid on 15-16 December 1995. The proposal for institutionalising a Eu-
ropean employment policy, however, failed at the Madrid Council as the 
“big three” Member States were still opposed to it (Johansson 1999, 9). 
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Nevertheless, even though the Madrid European Council did not ratify 
the proposed European employment policy, it reaffirmed that the fight 
against unemployment should remain a priority of the Community and 
the Member States. Moreover, the Madrid Council approved a Single 
Report on Employment, which was prepared jointly by the Economic 
and Financial Affairs Council (EcoFin), the Social Affairs Council, and 
the Commission. This 1996 report gave the Member States and the Com-
mission a detailed agenda for action. The Council furthermore encour-
aged the Commission to work with the Member States to develop proper 
indicators to evaluate the successes of various measures and policies 
and to intensify the exchange of information and experience (Council of 
the European Union 1996). These developments were thus considered 
major successes for the proponents of a European employment agenda 
because the Maastricht Treaty had not foreseen that employment would 
be on the agenda for the 1996 IGC.
 While the IGC negotiations of 1996 did not lead to a breakthrough, 
the strength of the “anti-employment co-ordination coalition” declined 
substantially in 1997. First, the French resistance to an employment title 
dissipated after the election of Socialist Premier Lionel Jospin. The new 
French government not only became an outspoken supporter of a Euro-
pean employment strategy, but actually demanded that the EU addresses 
employment policy, threatening not to sign the Stability and Growth Pact 
if nothing was done (interview, DGEmpl3). Second, German Chancel-
lor Kohl faced increasing domestic pressure to deal with the issue of un-
employment, which had surpassed (based on national figures) the four 
million threshold in 1996, the highest level in the history of the Federal 
Republic. The labour unions in particular put intense pressure on Kohl 
to abandon his opposition to a European employment policy. Third, the 
“pivotal event was the change of government in Great Britain on 1 May 
1997” (van Riel and van der Meer 2002). Newly elected Prime Minister 
Tony Blair (Labour Party) was eager to show that everything in Britain 
had changed. Accordingly, Blair wanted to present himself as a “good Eu-
ropean” by showing that Britain would no longer be a stumbling block 
regarding an employment policy amendment to the treaty (personal com-
munication, DGEmpl1; interview, DGEmpl3).
 In short, the reshuffling of governments in Britain and France, and 
increasing domestic pressures in Germany to soften its categorical op-
position to a European response to unemployment, allowed for the forg-
ing of a “careful political compromise” between those Member States 
in favour of delegating powers to the EU and those who were more re-
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luctant to transfer those policymaking powers to the EU (Mosher and 
Trubek 2003, 67). This compromise formally created the European Em-
ployment Strategy (EES) at the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997, which 
institutionalised a multilateral surveillance process and established a 
permanent, treaty-based Employment Committee (EMCO), promoting 
policy co-ordination among Member States’ employment and labour 
market policies. The precise institutional design of the EES, in turn, was 
to be decided later that year. At first, the proposals of the Commission 
were unacceptable to the Council,8 while the Economic, Finance, and 
Labour ministers were also unable to agree on a common formula during 
their October meetings. Eventually, however, it was the then President 
of the Council, Jean-Claude Juncker, who offered a “realistic” proposal 
that became the blueprint for the EES (interview, EMCO1). Jean-Claude 
Juncker, a highly respected Christian Democrat, successfully persuaded 
the sceptics, including Helmut Kohl, about the adequacy, necessity, and 
prospects of an employment title to be included in the new Treaty of 
Amsterdam (Pochet 2005, 49). At an extraordinary European Council 
meeting held on 26-27 November 1997, prior to the ratification of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, a compromise was ultimately reached and the so-
called Luxembourg Process was passed. This new process rested on four 
policy pillars, each with a set of commonly agreed upon guidelines, out-
lining the direction of national institutional reforms, and a set of institu-
tionalised mutual monitoring, reporting, and feedback mechanisms.
Box 5 Institutional Components of the EES (Luxembourg Process)
Source: European Parliament 2007
•  Employment Guidelines (EGL): following a Commission proposal, the Council shall 
agree annually to a series of guidelines that establish common priorities for Member 
States’ employment policies; 
•  National Action Plans (NAPs): every Member State shall draw up an annual National 
Action Plan that describes how these guidelines are put into practice on a national 
level; 
•  Joint Employment Report (JER): The Commission and the Council shall jointly examine 
each National Action Plan and present a Joint Employment Report. The Commission 
shall present a new proposal to revise the Employment Guidelines accordingly for the 
following year; 
•  Recommendations: The Council may decide, by qualifi ed majority, to issue country-
specifi c recommendations upon a proposal by the Commission.
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Box 6 Four Pillars of the European Employment Strategy (1997-2002)
Source: Council of the European Union 1997, annex
Employability Pillar
Guidelines 1 and 2: Implementing preventative and employability-oriented 
strategies, building on the early identification of individual 
needs and ensuring that young/long-term unemployed persons 
are offered a new start in the form of training, retraining, work 
practice, a job or other employability measure after six/12 
months respectively.
Guideline 3: Shifting people from welfare dependency to work and training by 
increasing the number of unemployed people in ALMP measures, 
gradually achieving the average of the three most successful 
Member States, and at least 20 percent.
Guidelines 4 and 5: Developing partnerships as a framework for the provision of 
training and lifelong learning.
Guidelines 6 and 7: Facilitating the transition from school to work.
Entrepreneurship Pillar
Guidelines 8-10: Reducing overhead costs and removing the administrative burden 
to promote business activities, especially for small and medium-
sized enterprises, exploiting all of the available opportunities for 
job creation, including the social economy; encouraging self-start-
ups.
Guideline 11 and 12: Making the tax system more employment friendly by reducing 
labour and non-wage labour costs, in particular for unskilled and 
low-paid work.
Adaptability Pillar
Guidelines 13 and 14: Inviting the social partners to negotiate fl exible working 
arrangements and to examine the possibility of more adaptable 
types of work contracts.
Guideline 15: Re-examining the obstacles to investment in human resources and 
possibly provide for tax or other incentives for the development of 
in-house training.
Equal Opportunities Pillar
Guideline 16: Reducing the gap in unemployment rates between men and 
women and actively supporting the employment of women.
Guideline 17: Improving access to care services.
Guideline 18: Facilitating the return to work after child bearing. 
Guideline 19: Giving special attention to people with disabilities.
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While in principle all four pillars were of equal importance, the focal 
point of the EES was clearly the Employability Pillar, which was seen 
as a “real watershed at the time” (interview, DGEmpl2). Not only was it 
the only one of the four pillars with hard targets, including a “new start” 
within six and twelve months for the young and adult unemployed re-
spectively and the participation of at least 20 percent of the unemployed 
in training or equivalent programmes, but it identified early and individ-
ualised interventions, skills and training as key issues. As such, the EES 
had a real effect on Member States’ domestic policy making (interview, 
EMCO2), while the idea of “activation” – especially for young jobseekers 
– through offers of positive, non-financial incentives and the introduc-
tion of individual actions plans were “at the core of the EES” right from 
its inception (interview, DGEmpl3).
 To summarise, the 1997 realignment of actors in favour of European-
level concerted action on unemployment – including Allan Larsson, 
advocating a Swedish model and new Prime Minister Tony Blair, who 
had just launched his New Deal in the UK (see box 7, below) – made 
the institutionalisation of the EES possible. Successfully delivering the 
EES was not only a significant breakthrough for the European Union to 
influence national labour market and social policy for which previous 
treaties had little room, but it encapsulated the formalisation of a ma-
jor normative reassessment that had been initiated by Jacques Delors in 
1993. In other words, the EES embodied the normative view that “good” 
social policy is an activating policy that prevents long-term unemploy-
ment through early, individualised interventions and investments in 
people, while consolidating the cognitive assumption that supply-side 
labour market policy interventions lead to structural improvements. 
The EES also placed a much higher priority on raising employment lev-
els as the key to economic performance, while the OECD in its Jobs 
Study applied the concept of NAIRU as the main benchmark (Eichhorst 
and Hemerijck 2008). As such, the EES emerged as a real alternative 
to the prescription of the OECD Jobs Study and offered a new perspec-
tive on the causes of, and remedies for, Europe’s unemployment prob-
lems. Finally, the EES was also a symbolic victory for its proponents, 
because it received its own title in the Amsterdam Treaty, rather than 
just a chapter, which indicated that employment policy objectives were 
equally as important as macro-economic objectives.
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Box 7 The New Deal Measures in the UK
V.3 The Consolidation of Activation and the Emergence of the PES 
Service Model
The OECD from 1995 to 1999: A Period of Refl ection
Parallel to the launch of the EES and the emergence of activation as the 
guiding policy principle, the OECD continuously assessed and evaluated 
Member States’ labour market programmes and their application of the 
JS. Numerous studies conducted between 1995 and 1999 provided fur-
ther evidence for the need to recalibrate existing measures. In particular 
the need for activation was repeatedly stressed also by the OECD, while 
traditional ALMPs, including supply-side and demand-side oriented 
measures, were scrutinised and their use questioned both in terms of 
efficiency (i.e., costs) and effectiveness (i.e., achieving the desired out-
come, which would be in most cases employment). More specifically, 
the OECD published the following results, which concentrated on three 
areas.
When Tony Blair and Gordon Brown came to offi  ce in Britain in 1997, they almost 
immediately launched their fl agship programme, the New Deal for Young People 
(NDYP), for young adults aged 18 to 24. The NDYP’s core element included the activation 
of jobseekers after a period of six months, when jobseekers fi rst entered a four-month 
period of intensive counselling and job-search support (the Gateway period), and 
subsequently moved on to the New Deal phase. The NDYP included four options, 
ranging from subsidised employment in the private sector, subsidised and temporary 
work in the voluntary or environmental sectors, to full-time education or training. In 
line with the normative foundation of “no rights without responsibilities”, there was 
no “fi fth option” to continue a (passive) life on welfare. Within months, the NDYP was 
extended to the “New Deal for Long-Term Unemployed” (ND25+) with similar options, 
and subsequently, other types of New Deals were off ered to single parents (April 1998), 
their partners (April 1999), chronically disabled persons (April 1999), older workers (April 
2000), partners of childless NDYP participants (2001) and partners of childless ND25+ 
participants (2002). With the exception of the NDYP and the ND25+, participation was 
voluntary apart from an interview with a personal advisor. In 1999, the government 
then initiated a series of other policies that supplemented the New Deals in an attempt 
to prevent particular hardships by “making work pay”. Most importantly, a national 
minimum wage was introduced in April 1999 and was subsequently raised a number 
of times. In October 1999, the Conservatives’ Family Credit, an in-work benefi t, was 
replaced by a more generous Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) (Glyn and Wood 
2001, 205). The new system resulted in an almost ten-fold increase in tax credits, which 
skyrocketed from £1.4 billion in 1999 to £11.5 in 2004 (Nachtwey and Heise 2006, 6).
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 First, job-placement and matching services are generally considered 
efficient and effective measures. Best results are achieved when benefit 
claimants are kept “active” through frequent contacts with the PES (OECD 
1996b; OECD 1996e, 8). Within this context, good examples for maximis-
ing the PESs’ effectiveness include “profiling” for new benefit claimants to 
identify those at risk of becoming long-term unemployed (e.g., Denmark), 
the use of “availability for work” tests (e.g., UK), and the “conditionality” 
of transfer payments on participation in ALMP measures after six to eight 
months of unemployment (e.g., UK). The introduction of individual ac-
tion plans (individual handlingsplan) which were part of Denmark’s 1994 
labour market reform (see box 8 at the end of this section) were herein 
identified as a “virtuous” reform (OECD 1995a, 111; OECD 1995b, 29).
 Second, supply-side measures such as training showed mixed results. 
Broad-based training seemed ineffective in helping participants find and 
retain employment, while targeted training courses, offered to specific 
groups and sensitive to employers’ needs, tended to yield better results. 
Similarly, with respect to demand-side measures, targeted employment 
subsidies tended to yield more positive, long-term effects because the un-
employed retain their motivation and skills. Direct job creation, however, 
did not yield the same positive effects because most of these jobs were not 
in the private sector and the associated acquired skills did not correspond 
to employers’ needs (OECD 1995a; OECD 1995b).
 Third, benefit/tax regimes must be restructured to provide proper 
incentives for those seeking and accepting (low-wage) employment. As 
such, the OECD encouraged its Member States to address inactivity traps 
(when benefits are high relative to expected net earnings) and poverty 
traps (when increases in time and work effort yield little prospect of high-
er earnings). In this context of “making work pay”, non-wage labour costs 
such as payroll contributions were also identified as potential disincen-
tives for employers to invest in new jobs (OECD 1996a).
 In 1999, the OECD published a second, comprehensive progress evalu-
ation and review of the JS. In this study, the OECD stressed the synergetic 
effects of combining a variety of structural reforms, while confirming 
that “countries with a good record on unemployment tend to have rising 
employment, relatively high participation, a relatively better position of 
marginal groups, a higher share of those working part-time doing so vol-
untarily and less of a long-term unemployment problem” (OECD 1999b, 
10).9 Accordingly, the OECD explicitly encouraged its members not to use 
early retirement schemes and low female participation rates as a way of 
tackling youth unemployment, while shifting special attention to people 
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on the margins of the labour market, including single mothers and non or 
low-skilled workers. In this context, the OECD recommended boosting 
these workers’ incomes through in-work benefits and/or employment/
wage subsidies without however increasing costs to employers. More gen-
erally, the OECD’s broadened scope of interest in the 1999 study, which 
explicitly included issues related to gender equality, the special needs of 
marginalised groups, and social equity concerns more generally, was con-
sidered a significant course correction and a step toward the European 
mainstream (Noaksson and Jacobsson 2003, 54).
The OECD and the Modernisation of Public Employment Services
In line with the findings published in the JS Implementation Reviews and 
various Employment Outlooks, the OECD began to also increasingly focus 
on reforming national PESs. PES reform had become necessary in order 
to adequately address “further ways and means of achieving the efficien-
cy objectives of active labour market policies, while continuing to meet 
their equity objectives” (OECD 1997a, 6). To this end, the OECD not only 
produced a series of (descriptive rather than prescriptive) PES country 
reports (e.g., OECD 1993c; 1996c; 1996d; 1997c; 1998), but also advocated 
“testing” or “pioneering” a new PES model (OECD 1997a, 26). At a meet-
ing of the Employment Labour and Social Affairs (ELSA) Committee in 
October 1997, four “promising avenues” were discussed, and subsequently 
published as an Occasional Paper.10 They included: first, PES core func-
tions, including job brokerage, unemployment benefit administration, 
and referral of the unemployed to ALMP programmes should be inte-
grated – ideally but not necessarily – by setting up “one-shop offices”. 
The integration of these services was seen as desirable because (a) close 
co-operation between placement and benefit work allows for an effective 
application of work tests; (b) the co-ordination of job brokerage and the 
ALMPs can assure that jobseekers acquire the skills needed to fill avail-
able job vacancies; and (c) the co-operation between benefits administra-
tion and the ALMPs is needed to avoid long-term dependency on cash 
transfers (OECD 1997a, 6f ).
 Second, since the 1996 study showed that job brokering at an early 
stage of joblessness and targeted and individualised supply-side ALMPs 
are effective in preventing long-term unemployment, their use was rec-
ommended to all members. However, as such instruments are costly and 
the availability of staff is limited, not all jobseekers can (and should) have 
access to these public services. Accordingly, reliable profiling techniques 
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could help to properly select qualified clients by grouping jobseekers into 
three categories: (i) those who are job-ready and not at risk of becoming 
long-term unemployed; (ii) those at risk but judged to be job-ready; and 
(iii) those at risk and judged to be not job-ready. The first group might be 
“left to fend for themselves except for normal placement services. Group 
(ii) should be assisted immediately with job-search assistance measures 
such as résumé writing, provision of telephone and fax facilities, jobs 
clubs etc. ... Only group (iii) might be considered for immediate referral to 
training and employment programmes” (OECD 1997a, 13). At what stage 
this intervention should begin, i.e., immediately, or after three, six, or 12 
months, largely depended on the availability of staff and resources, but a 
first contact with the PES should not occur any later than three months 
after someone becomes unemployed. After six months, individualised ac-
tion plans (IAPs), more intensive interviews, and stricter “suitable work” 
criteria should be applied. Participation in public work programmes (and 
wage subsidies) should only be considered an option after twelve months, 
when all the groups are combined.
 Third, the use of performance targets and “management-by-objective” 
techniques were considered “good practices” because PES offices are then 
“no longer bound by rigid budget lines, staffing regulations and other for-
mal constraints” (OECD 1997a, 16). MBO techniques further allow PESs 
to become more decentralised – thus giving more leeway to front-line 
officers, who could respond better to local labour market and individual 
jobseeker needs – while ensuring that “broad national policy orientations 
are followed” and government budgets managed in a transparent way 
(OECD 1997a, 16). Performance targets should “generally [be] applied on 
the basis of negotiations, mutual agreements, regular follow-up meetings, 
etc. rather than in the form of rigid administrative procedures to avoid 
undesirable – and potentially counterproductive – results” (OECD 1997a, 
17).
 Fourth, the OECD argued that the introduction of market signals to 
PES operations could possibly further enhance their efficiency, while 
creating a real “benchmark” against which performance targets could be 
assessed. Market-type mechanisms could include “contracting out”, i.e., 
awarding delivery service contracts to private actors through competitive 
bidding processes, and organisational reforms that separate buyers from 
providers of public goods. Another way to increase market competition 
was the liberalising of rules and regulations that governed private em-
ployment agencies (PREAs). While the experience with the introduction 
of market mechanisms in some countries, including Sweden, had pro-
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duced decreases in unit costs for training by about 20 percent (and a loss 
of market share by almost 50 percent for the public labour market training 
centres in Sweden), the OECD urged its Member States to be cautious 
about contracting their services out because cost savings were not re-
alised in numerous other cases. Furthermore, there had been no system-
atic evaluations to test whether contracting out had negative effects on 
the quality of the services (OECD 1997a, 18f ).
 Since the OECD Member States had requested a follow-up conference 
on the PES in 1997, a large-scale meeting was organised in Prague in July 
2000. At this conference titled “Labour Market Policies and the Public Em-
ployment Service”, labour market experts not only identiﬁ ed a “sea change 
in PES working methods” but also recognised a set of good practices. In 
addition to repeatedly stressing activation as the most appropriate way 
forward, the PESs also needed to adopt “private sector practices and de-
velop modern management methods”, while retaining however, a “public 
service ethos”. Th e most frequent themes included (OECD 2001, 61):
–  Customer service. Like the customers of private business, jobseekers 
and employers seek rapid, easily accessible services, without queues, 
misdirection or red tape. Th is focus has been typiﬁ ed by the use of 
customer satisfaction surveys, one-stop shops and the expansion of 
telephone services and information technology.
–  Information technology. Internet vacancy banks are only the most 
obvious among a number of IT-related developments, which include 
CV data banks, on-line training, improved electronic exchange of 
information between diﬀ erent organisations and providers, and fast 
entry of, and access to, register information by PES staﬀ .
–  PES performance indicators and jobseeker classiﬁ cation instru-
ments. Th e use of placement rates and a variety of other indicators 
for assessing performance at local, regional and national level of the 
PES has become relatively commonplace. …
–  Contestability and ﬁ nancing mechanisms. Th e purchase of some 
proportion of intensive job-search assistance services and labour 
market training from private sector providers has become relatively 
commonplace.
In summary, the reform ideas first proposed in the 1994, which were 
strengthened and streamlined by the ELSA Committee meeting in 1997, 
and subsequently reaffirmed in 2000 at the Prague Conference, focused 
on “modernising” PES governance structures by embracing a service and 
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market orientation akin to the private sector. The OECD’s “ideational 
turn” thus incorporated important aspects of the philosophy of New Pub-
lic Management, which had generally become popular in public sector 
reform. In fact, the OECD played a crucial role in spreading NPM ideas, 
most importantly by setting up its Public Management Service (PUMA) 
in 1989 (Mathiasen 2005, 651), which subsequently produced key docu-
ments in favour of public sector reform along NPM lines (e.g., OECD 
1993b; OECD 1993ff; OECD 1997b).11 While there are countless definitions 
of NPM, they all share some common ideas and principles, centred on 
the goal of transforming state bureaucracies – rightly or wrongly associ-
ated with inefficiency, red tape, and ineffective use of public programmes 
– into modern management agencies, emulating private business best 
practices. As such, the key message of NPM – then taken over into PES 
reform – was to “reinvent government” and to recalibrate “public gov-
ernance” through (partial) privatisation,12 deregulation, and decentrali-
sation, while increasing competition, promoting new partnerships and 
introducing new incentive structures to both public employees and cus-
tomers (cf., Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Pollitt and Bouckaert 1995; 2000; 
2004; Weishaupt 2010a).
Box 8 The Danish “Active Line”
Based on the fi ndings of the multi-partite Zeuthen Commission, assembled in 1991, and 
the positive experiences made with the Youth Allowance Scheme introduced in 1990 
(see Chapter IV), the Danish Social Democrats gradually and sequentially introduced 
comprehensive changes to the Danish labour market under the heading of an “Active 
Line”. The two main elements of structural changes included (a) the modernisation of 
the Danish PES (see chapter VI), and (b) a shift away from traditional ALMPs toward 
activation. The shift toward activation in Denmark was based on the “revival” of the 
constitutionally anchored “right and duty to work” (Greve 2000, 329), echoing Delors’ 
“mutual obligations” and foreshadowing New Labour’s “rights and responsibilities” 
rhetoric. The labour market reforms, successively introduced in between 1994 and 1999, 
substantially recalibrated almost the entire set-up of negative and positive incentive 
structures in Denmark. While access to unemployment benefi ts was gradually reduced 
from nine to four years – leaving the generosity of benefi ts intact – “compulsory” 
activation was gradually introduced, timetables were tightened, and participation in 
ALMPs no longer (re-)qualifi ed for UB. The “threshold” for activation was decreased to 
two years in 1996 and to 12 months in 1999. The young unemployed could be activated 
earlier during periods of joblessness, typically after six months (Lindsay and Mailand 
2004, 133). There was also an option for “early activation” at three months for clients 
at risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Compulsory activation typically went 
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The EU and the Modernisation of Public Employment Services
With an operational shift of labour market policy toward early interven-
tions, preventative strategies, and the individualisation of services, the EU 
recognised the need for the modernisation of the national Public Employ-
ment Services along NPM lines13. During the launch of the EES, PES re-
form was considered a key goal, even though it was not explicitly formu-
lated in the Guidelines as such (interview, especially DGEmpl3, but also 
BMAS6). 14 Put diﬀ erently, achieving the quantiﬁ ed targets with respect to 
early, customised interventions and ALMP participation rates required a 
modernised, and more eﬃ  cient, PES capable of delivering such services ad-
equately and without requiring additional funding. Moreover, in the spring 
of 1997, shortly before the launch of the EES, the DG for Employment, So-
cial Aﬀ airs and Equal Opportunities (henceforth DG Employment) also set 
up a Network of the Heads of Public Employment Services (HoPES), within 
which the heads of national PESs would meet bi-annually to promote ide-
ational exchange and co-operation (cf., Weishaupt 2010a).15 HoPES was de-
signed to provide an eﬀ ective forum for mutual learning and to serve as 
a supporting structure to initiate, foster, and enhance national PES mod-
ernisation eﬀ orts (interview, DGEmpl3).16 Th e Commission, in turn, placed 
itself in a “driving seat” in the PES network, where it early on identiﬁ ed four 
common priority areas for institutional advancement in support of the EES:
PES should (a) obtain substantial access to vacancies, (b) develop ar-
rangements for the systematic case management of all registered un-
employed jobseekers, (c) contribute to the co-ordinated delivery of all 
public services to jobseekers, focused on their reintegration, and (d) de-
velop strong partnerships with other relevant actors on the market. In 
addition, there is a need for a more active approach to the promotion 
of occupational as well as regional mobility in Europe as a means of in-
creasing job opportunities and improving job matching (Commission 
of the European Communities 1998, 14, emphasis added).
hand in hand with the drawing of individual action plans that were primarily seen as 
“moral contracts”, codifying the rights and duties of jobseekers and the state. With 
regard to positive incentives, the Danish government mainly focused on a wide range 
of non-fi nancial incentives, including high-quality training, which remained a “public” 
responsibility, and a plethora of other supply-side and demand-side programmes 
(e.g., Jobtraining, Jobrotation, Pool Jobs, Flexjobs and a variety of “leave” programmes, 
including a Childcare Leave, Sabbatical Leave, and an Educational Leave scheme).
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Subsequently, the European Commission issued a series of more specific 
recommendations, including: (1) the development of service enterprise 
features, (2) the use of modern information and communication technol-
ogy to improve client services, (3) case management and early interven-
tions, (4) continuous monitoring and in-depth analysis of labour market 
conditions and trends, (5) the co-ordination of various PES functions, 
and (6) the building of partnerships with other stakeholders in the labour 
market (Commission of the European Communities 1999a, 26f ).
 In other words, like the OECD, the European Commission fully incor-
porated – without using the name (interview, DGEmpl3) – the NPM phi-
losophy. The Commission hoped that when Member States would trans-
late these new priorities and recommendations into action, PESs would be 
transformed into outward-looking, efficient and effective, modern “ser-
vice providers”, capable of delivering “individualised service packages” in 
the form of “individual action plans” to jobless clients. By turning PESs 
into “one-stop shops at the local level”, these public agencies would thus 
become more attractive to both jobseekers and employers, while generat-
ing new synergies through the active engagement with all relevant stake-
holders, including the social partners, vocational training centres, private 
placement services, and institutions that assist other inactive people who 
are not registered as unemployed (Commission of the European Commu-
nities 1998, 16ff ).
 In addition to key concepts such as case management, individual action 
plans, early interventions, and local partnerships, the concept of “quality” 
became part of the European PESs jargon in 1999 (Commission of the 
European Communities 1999b, 1). While some EU Member States, includ-
ing Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, 
had already undergone reforms to improve the quality of their service 
delivery in the early 1990s, other EU Member States now recognised the 
need to follow suit. Accordingly, “customer satisfaction”, “minimum qual-
ity standards” and “higher staff productivity” became new buzzwords. In 
a follow-up study conducted by the Commission and published in June 
2000, the success of the “service model” was praised and the use of in-
dividual case management, including the use of activation, preventative 
measures and, in particular, the individual action plans as instituted by 
Austria, Denmark and France, were singled out as particularly virtuous 
practices (Commission of the European Communities 2000, 5). In ad-
dition to the new focus on developing customer orientation and quality 
control, the Commission subsequently also endorsed “performance man-
agement” through the introduction of management-by-objective (MBO) 
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systems. While Allan Larsson had been an early advocate for moving from 
“management by regulation to management by objectives” (e.g., Larsson 
1999a; 1999b), a comprehensive study of EU Member States’ PES gover-
nance systems published in December 2000 now formally recommended 
the “introduction of MBO in the PES of countries without performance 
management systems” (Mosley et al. 2000, viii).17 This conclusion was 
reached because MBO systems:
– help to clarify priorities in labour market policies
–  set clear standards in terms of which PES performance can be fairly 
assessed
–  shift emphasis from the inputs of ALMP to policy outputs and im-
pacts, providing an instrument for improving both the eﬃ  ciency 
and eﬀ ectiveness of policies
–  are an appropriate tool to support the implementation of the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy (Mosley et al. 2000, viii).
In short, by the turn of the millennium, the heads of PES and most West-
ern policymakers had agreed upon and committed to the modernisation 
of labour market services and offices in line with a new “service model” 
that was built on key features such as (a) activation, i.e., a more rigorous 
and earlier application of job search requirements; (b) case management, 
i.e., individualised, tailor-made services for PES customers; (c) perfor-
mance management, i.e., the introduction and/or strengthening of MBO 
governance techniques to advance the centres’ steering capacity, ensure 
programme cohesion, and improve transparency; and (d) decentralisa-
tion, i.e., the promotion of local level flexibility and the expansion of local 
partnerships. In other words, the Commission and HoPES promoted in-
stitutional reforms that were largely based on the NPM philosophy and al-
most identical to the recommendations put forward by the OECD in 1997.
V.4 Further Ideational Convergence: The Reassessed OECD Jobs Study 
and the Revised Lisbon Agenda
Lisbon and Beyond
The Lisbon Strategy launched in March 2000 during a rather unique align-
ment of almost exclusively Social Democratic governments – 11 of the 15 
Member States were governed by centre-left parties, including the big 
three, Britain, France and Germany – marked a “double departure for the 
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EU” (Zeitlin 2008b, 436). On the one hand, the EU committed itself to be-
coming “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion” (Council of the European Union 2000). 
At the heart of the so-called Lisbon Agenda lay a modernised European 
Social Model with three elements, including “making more investments 
in people, activating social policies and strengthening action against old 
and new forms of social exclusion” (Rodrigues 2003, 17). As such, the 
“Lisbon Summit in 2000 marked a ‘true watershed’ in employment and 
social policy by bringing together economic and social policy in a long-
term perspective” (Larsson 2001, 51). On the other hand, the EES was 
strengthened and the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) formalised 
as a framework within which national governments could improve their 
economic and social performance. The EU outlined that the OMC would 
be used in a variety of social policy areas, including social inclusion, pen-
sions, and health care, this is to say, in domestically sensitive areas where 
mutual learning promised to be an appropriate tool to overcoming uncer-
tainties (Zeitlin 2005b). Lisbon also substantially strengthened the EES by 
arming it with additional “hard targets” – to be reached by 2010 – such as 
an overall European employment rate of 70 percent and an employment 
rate for women of more than 60 percent (Council of the European Union 
2000, 10). Subsequently, the Stockholm European Council in March 2001 
introduced a 50 percent employment target for older workers aged 55-64 
(Council of the European Union 2002, 12).
 While the Commission praised the success of the EES in its Five-Year 
Review in July 2002 – especially because EU members had increasingly 
moved from “managing unemployment to managing employment growth” 
– there was also a perceived need to revise the EES (Commission of the 
European Communities 2002, 8). As a result, in April 2003, the Com-
mission proposed, and the Council endorsed, a simplification of the EES 
by consolidating the four pillars and corresponding guidelines into three 
overarching objectives, including (1) full employment, (2) quality and 
quantity of work, and (3) social inclusion and an inclusive labour market. 
The overarching objectives were then supported by “ten commandments” 
that were coupled, at least in some areas, with associated quantifiable 
targets. Finally, with respect to policy implementation and governance, 
the revised EES stressed the need for more effective public employment 
services, more involvement of the social partners, and the allocation of 
suitable financial resources (OPTEM 2007, 111). The following two boxes 
summarise the “ten commandments” and their targets.
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Box 9 The “Ten Commandments” of the EES (2003)
Source: Watt 2004, 126, table 1
Box 10 Quantifi ed Targets in the 2003 Guidelines
Source: Watt 2004, 128, table 2
Parallel to the revision of the EES, during the March 2003 Spring Council 
meeting, an eight-person strong taskforce was set up to prepare addi-
tional recommendations before the following year’s Spring Council meet-
ing. This taskforce, which was led by former Dutch Prime Minister Wim 
Kok,18 presented its conclusions in November 2003 in a report entitled 
1. Active and preventative measures for the unemployed and inactive
2. Job creation and entrepreneurship
3. Address change and promote adaptability and mobility in the labour market
4. Promote development of human capital and lifelong learning
5. Increase labour supply and promote active ageing
6. Gender equality
7. Promote the integration of and combat discrimination against people at a 
disadvantage in the labour market 
8. Make work pay through incentives to enhance work attractiveness
9. Transform undeclared work into regular employment
10. Address regional employment disparities
1. Every unemployed person to be off ered a new start (job or other employability 
measure) within 6 months of unemployment in the case of young people and 12 
months in the case of adults
2. By 2010, 25 percent of the long-term unemployed to participate in an active 
measure, with the aim of achieving the average of the three most advanced 
member states
3. By 2010, at least 85 percent of 22 year olds in the European Union should have 
completed upper secondary education
4. The European Union average level of participation in lifelong learning should be at 
least 12.5 percent of the adult working-age population (25-64 age group)
5. By 2010, achieve an increase, at EU level, of the eff ective exit age from the labour 
market from 60 to 65 
6. Provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90 percent of children between 3 years and the 
mandatory school age and at least 33 percent of children under 3 years of age
7. Achieve by 2010 an EU average rate of no more than 10 percent early school leavers
8. All job vacancies advertised by national employment services should be accessible 
and be able to be consulted by anyone in the EU by 2005
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“Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: Creating More Employment in Europe”. The results 
presented in this report were generally seen as a warning: the Lisbon 
objectives will not be met unless Europe reforms its labour markets (Eu-
ropean Report 2004a). The group further concluded that the EES should 
focus on three reform priorities, including (1) improving the supply of 
labour (i.e., increasing the active population and modernising social pro-
tection systems); (2) enhancing the adaptability and flexibility of labour 
markets, and (3) making more investments in human resources (OPTEM 
2007, 110).
 The 2004 Spring Council then requested an additional, follow-up re-
port by a High Level Group, chaired again by Wim Kok, to “instil new life 
into the failing Lisbon Strategy” (European Report 2004b). This second 
report concluded that the Member States’ progress was too slow and/
or limited to meet the 2010 objectives. For that reason, the EES needed 
to refocus on “growth and jobs, supported by intensified peer pressure 
on Member States through a process of ‘naming, shaming, and faming’” 
(Zeitlin 2008b, 436). This focus on “growth and jobs” was warmly wel-
comed in 2005 by the newly appointed Commission President José Man-
uel Durão Barroso, who quickly changed the “mood and direction” of the 
Lisbon Process (interview, EMCO2). While Barroso rejected the revi-
sion of the Lisbon Strategy through a process of naming, shaming, and 
faming, his Commission introduced a new institutional design that com-
bined the European Employment Guidelines and the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines into a single set of 24 Integrated Guidelines for Growth 
and Jobs. The EES was thus integrated into the revised Lisbon Strategy, 
in which employment received its own chapter, based on eight guide-
lines. This integration, however, effectively ended the “equilateral tri-
angle” envisioned by the original Lisbon Agenda, namely equally weigh-
ing economic, labour market, and social policy, which were then seen 
as mutually reinforcing. By reducing employment policy to a chapter, 
the policy domain also lost some of its status, both symbolically and in 
terms of visibility. The comprehensive National Action Plans were now 
not only subsumed into the less detailed – with respect to labour mar-
ket policy – National Reform Programmes, but the Joint Employment 
Reports became part of the single Annual Progress Report, addressing 
the entire area of reforms. Inserting employment into the greater BEPG 
was an indication that economic goals were going to be the number one 
priority of the newly relaunched Lisbon Strategy, while the social am-
bitions disappeared entirely for the time being (cf., also Zeitlin 2008b, 
438-41). However, “following an effective EU-level campaign led by social 
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NGOs with support from key Member States and the European Parlia-
ment, social cohesion objectives, including the commitment to a decisive 
reduction of poverty and social inclusion, were formally reinstated in 
the Lisbon Strategy by the 2005 Spring European Council, a decision 
reaffirmed by successive Spring European Councils in 2006 and 2007” 
(Zeitlin 2008b, 437).
 Despite – or maybe because of – its “neo-liberal turn”, most, if not all, 
European policymakers continued to adhere to the idea of a European So-
cial Model.19 Searching for new ways to promote economic and employ-
ment growth without abandoning long-standing norms and structures 
of social protection, the concept of “flexicurity” emerged as a possible 
avenue. While flexicurity was first only debated in elite and expert circles 
such as EMCO in the early 2000s,20 it rose to the top of the European 
agenda at the Summit Meeting in Hampton Court in October 2005.21 
The Commission, and the subsequent Austrian and Finnish presidencies 
(spring and fall of 2006 respectively), have continued to advance the con-
cept. Many EU Member State governments, the European Parliament, the 
main European trade union associations (more hesitantly) and employ-
ers’ organisations (more enthusiastically) also showed great interest in 
it (Keune and Jepsen 2007, 8). Moreover, an EMCO working group on 
flexicurity was set up under the Austrian presidency, which produced a 
report intended to develop a consensus on a set of common principles of 
flexicurity (EMCO 2006).22
 While flexicurity is rooted in the Dutch Flexibility and Security Act of 
1999, coupling a relaxation of dismissal laws and the rules for setting up 
temporary work agencies with higher levels of security in atypical work 
(Visser 2005), the current debate mainly centres on the Danish variant, 
typically encapsulated by the “Golden Triangle” of lax employment pro-
tection standards coupled with generous unemployment benefits and 
extensive ALMPs (e.g., Madsen 2005; Wilthagen 2005). The core idea 
is that employers can “hire and fire” employees with relative ease, while 
workers are not only protected by generous unemployment benefits 
(which allow them to sustain their economic well-being), but also have 
access to ALMPs, which enable them to more easily transfer into new ar-
eas of employment. As a result, Danish job mobility is among the highest 
in Europe, while economic productivity is also high and relative poverty 
low.
 It was quite apparent, however, to the EMCO members in charge of 
producing common principles of flexicurity – and interviewees reiterated 
this repeatedly – that the Danish version of flexicurity not only required 
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substantial financial resources to provide both active and passive LMPs, 
but it also built on a long tradition of social partnership (see chapter III 
and IV). But because either – or perhaps even both – of these factors may 
not be readily available in other Member States, a wide variety of different 
mixes of employment security and labour market flexibility had to be in-
cluded that could serve as functional equivalents. In June 2007, the Com-
mission circulated a Communication suggesting eight common principles 
– subsequently adopted by the Council in December 2007 – reflecting the 
results of the EMCO working group.
Box 11 Common Principles of Flexicurity
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/fl ex_ingredients_
en.htm, last accessed on 3 August 2008
The language used to describe flexicurity – and thus the normative and 
cognitive underpinnings – has explicit “third way” characteristics. Just 
like activation and the “PES service model”, it seeks to combine “free 
market” elements – in particular the reduction of EPL standards – 
with state-induced “capacity-building” and “social cohesion” elements, 
by stressing “comprehensive lifelong learning”, “effective ALMPs” and 
1. Flexicurity is a means to reinforce the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, create 
more and better jobs, modernise labour markets, and promote good work through 
new forms of fl exibility and security to increase adaptability, employment and 
social cohesion.
2. Flexicurity involves the deliberate combination of fl exible and reliable contractual 
arrangements. 
3. Flexicurity approaches are not about one single labour market or working life 
model, nor about a single policy strategy: they should be tailored to the specifi c 
circumstances of each Member State.
4. Flexicurity should promote more open, responsive and inclusive labour markets 
overcoming segmentation. It concerns both those in work and those out of work.
5. Internal (within the enterprise) as well as external fl exicurity are equally important 
and should be promoted. Suffi  cient contractual fl exibility must be accompanied by 
secure transitions from job to job.
6. Flexicurity should support gender equality.
7. Flexicurity requires a climate of trust and broadly-based dialogue among all 
stakeholders, where all are prepared to take the responsibility for change with a 
view to socially balanced policies.
8. Flexicurity requires a cost eff ective allocation of resources and should remain fully 
compatible with sound and fi nancially sustainable public budgets.
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“modern social security systems” (Commission of the European Com-
munities 2007, 5).23
 In summary, while labour market policy has lost “visibility” and eco-
nomic issues seem to outweigh equity concerns due to the reshuffle 
of the European Commission, the effective alignment of socially ori-
ented actors has led to the continuation of a lively debate about, and 
programmatic focus on, social and labour market policies. However, 
a risk remains that the new governance architecture may lead to less, 
not more, policy co-ordination (as the range of objectives has nar-
rowed); more unilateralist, in contrast to co-ordinated, reform endea-
vours (because “process ownership” has been lost); and the emergence 
of dual-track, parallel “jobs and growth” and “greater social cohesion” 
processes, replacing the mutually reinforcing triangle of economic, 
employment, and social policies (for a similar assessment, see Zeitlin 
2008a, 438f ).
Toward the OECD Jobs Study Reassessment
The OECD has also gone through a long period of reflection, evalu-
ation, and reorientation. By 2003, the OECD was echoing the Lisbon 
Strategy’s ambitions by calling for “more and better jobs” and for the 
mobilisation of all under-represented groups. The OECD, similar to the 
Lisbon employment targets, also began advocating reductions in non-
employment and a focus on “policies that help people move up career 
ladders”, while recalibrating benefits and tax regimes so that they “make 
work pay”. The OECD specifically reiterated that “activation” policies, 
including benefit conditionality, individualised services, and the main-
tenance of effective contact with the PES, were a necessary component 
in moving beneficiaries of unemployment and other non-employment 
benefits into jobs (OECD 2003, 14). In light of the efforts to moder-
nise PESs and the explicitly expressed shift toward creating more and 
better jobs, the OECD Employment and Labour Ministers concluded 
in September 2003 that the almost decade-old Jobs Study needed to be 
reassessed. Three years later, the OECD published its reassessment in 
the 2006 Employment Outlook, which included substantial revisions to 
its previous recommendations, based on “new insights and policy les-
sons” (OECD 2006a, 13). The following table summarises these seven 
new insights, in the same order they were presented in the Employment 
Outlook.
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Box 12 Seven Policy Lessons in the OECD Reassessed Jobs Study (RJS)
Source: OECD 2006a, 13f.
Th e revised JS shows that the OECD has fundamentally reassessed many of 
its core cognitive beliefs. To some extent, the RJS even spelled out a gradual 
move toward – or at least positive acknowledgement of – something akin 
to a European Social Model. Th e Anglo-American deregulation of labour 
market institutions and decentralisation of wage-setting arrangements is 
no longer the (only) best-practice model and dominant message. Instead, 
partnership-based wage co-ordination, activation, (state-sponsored) life-
long learning and family policy, and making-work-pay measures are seen 
as potential remedies for high unemployment and appropriate measures 
for increasing employment. Th e shift in prescriptions from market forces 
to innovative public policy mixes is also evident in the listing of prod-
uct market competition and stability-oriented macro-economic policy as 
the fourth and sixth policy lessons respectively, while new state-of-the-
art concepts such as “activation” and “ﬂ exicurity” are introduced ﬁ rst and 
1. Activation or mutual obligations approaches can co-exist with relatively generous 
unemployment benefi ts when providing strong incentives for the unemployed to 
seek and accept work;
2. It is vital to remove existing barriers to labour force participation among women 
(e.g., through the introduction/expansion of fl exible working patterns, appropriate 
tax incentives, adequate, but not overly long, paid parental leave, access to good 
quality and aff ordable childcare, and more sharing responsibilities between 
men and women), older workers (e.g., by phasing out remaining disincentives to 
continued work and various pathways into early retirement) and under-represented 
groups more generally;
3. A better alternative to merely easing the conditions of temporary jobs while leaving 
those governing permanent jobs unchanged – which results in a growing duality in 
labour markets and hinders investment in growth – is fl exicurity;
4. Expand labour demand by pricing back into employment the lower-skilled who 
are excluded by tax, social contribution or institutional arrangements. Moreover, 
policies that stimulate product market competition will create new jobs, especially 
in the service sector;
5. Eff ective lifelong learning has great potential to help workers adjust to changing 
skills demands; 
6. Stability-oriented macro-economic policy reduces cyclical output fl uctuations and 
positively interacts with structural reforms;
7.  There is no golden road to better labour market performance, but both the English-
speaking and Scandinavian countries, especially Denmark, score high in this area.
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third. In other words, the new OECD prescriptions contain “more carrots 
and fewer sticks” (Watt 2006, 11), and the tone of the prescriptions –com-
pared to the original JS of 1994 – is signiﬁ cantly less “neo-liberal”.
 This endorsement of some state-led capacity building, in contrast to 
“negative” market making, has also been supported by a series of thematic 
reviews, including important Country Notes on early childhood education 
and care, conducted from 1998 to 2004,24 an ongoing series of country 
studies on the reconciliation of work and family life, entitled Babies and 
Bosses, which was launched in 2002, and a new project on ageing and em-
ployment policy, covering 21 OECD countries, which has led to a series 
of publications entitled Live Longer, Work Longer. These studies comple-
ment the EU’s calls for innovative state interventions, in particular the 
state-led expansion of childcare facilities and lifelong learning measures, 
which are designed to achieve higher participation rates among women 
and older workers, less discrimination based on age or gender, and the 
provision of work and learning opportunities throughout the life-cycle.
 To summarise, the OECD and the EU have arguably moved closer to-
gether with respect to their prescriptions: the EU has become more market-
oriented and more concerned with growth, while the OECD has become 
more equity and partnership oriented and less concerned with labour mar-
ket “rigidities”. Th e reorientation of the OECD is probably more noticeable. 
Th e OECD now not only criticises the expansion of “precarious” jobs, lead-
ing to insecurity, poverty and under-achievement, but also admits “there is 
no robust evidence for a signiﬁ cant direct eﬀ ect of EPL on unemployment” 
(OECD 2006a, 96).25 Likewise, the OECD “core” prescription of a general 
move toward a decentralisation of wages has been replaced by the (some-
what reluctant) suggestion that “high corporatism bargaining systems tend 
to achieve lower unemployment than do other institutional set-ups” (OECD 
2006a, 86). In other words, the RJS accepts the virtues of Nordic labour 
market models and has become more sceptical about the merits of entirely 
“free” labour markets. Th e EES, in turn, more fully embraces labour market 
ﬂ exibility (previously only referred to as adaptability) and has relegated em-
ployment to a chapter within the new NRPs. While this reorganisation was 
intended to “streamline” the parallel processes of the EES and the BEPG, it 
certainly favours eﬃ  ciency over equity goals.
 Th is process of convergence seems to have become possible due to (a) 
the frequent and institutionalised exchange of ideas and practices between 
the EU and the OECD since 1996 (Noaksson and Jacobsson 2003, 52); (b) 
the conduction and publication of empirical studies that provided hard evi-
dence for the vibrancy of the Nordic models, especially Denmark’s, and the 
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lack of evidence to substantiate some of the key recommendations in the 
1994 JS, especially with respect to the eﬀ ects of EPL and wage bargaining on 
unemployment levels; and (c) the emergence of “bridging” concepts such 
as activation, the “PES service model”, and more recently ﬂ exicurity that all 
combine rights with obligations, public services with private market mech-
anisms, and individual (employment rather than job) security with labour 
market ﬂ exibility in virtuous circles. Th e table below summarises the key 
developments of the last decade and a half in both the EU and the OECD.
The EES and the OECD Peer-Review Processes: Birds of a Feather?
Before concluding this chapter, I would like to raise the following ques-
tions: Are the EU and OECD peer-review and policy diﬀ usion processes 
similar creatures, and if not, do we have reason to believe that one pro-
cess may be superior to the other? Quite certainly, the OECD processes of 
peer review, i.e., the exchanging of ideas and best practices, promoted and 
monitored by an executive body, while leaving policy implementation to 
the members, was a great source of inspiration for the EES (Noaksson and 
Jacobsson 2003; Visser 2005, 181). Accordingly, both the OECD peer-re-
view process and the Luxembourg Process are based on a method of “soft” 
co-ordination and not on “hard”, justiciable laws (e.g., Zeitlin and Trubek 
2003; Trubek and Trubek 2005; Zeitlin et al. 2005). Despite these appar-
ent similarities, the actual peer-review processes associated with the EES 
are much more frequent, more rigorous, and more institutionalised than 
those of the OECD. More speciﬁ cally, the EU Member States are examined 
annually through Joint Employment Reports, (now Annual Progress Report, 
APR) in contrast to every one-and-a-half to two years by the OECD.26 More-
over, EU members are required to draft National Action Plans for Employ-
ment (now National Reform Programmes), for which there is no functional 
equivalent in the OECD peer-review process.27 Th ird, and perhaps most 
importantly, in the context of EU peer review exercises, a wide variety of 
actors, including the social partners and government representatives from 
labour and social aﬀ airs departments are involved in the process, which is 
in contrast to the primarily technocratic actors involved in the OECD pro-
cess, whose contacts are mostly limited to national representatives in the 
ﬁ nance and economics ministries. Fourth, the newly established Employ-
ment Committee (EMCO), replacing the Employment and Labour Policy 
Committee of 1996, is constitutionally anchored in the Amsterdam Treaty 
(Art. 130) and represents the key forum for ongoing, regular, and system-
atic deliberations on labour market and social policy developments in the 
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EU. Moreover, EMCO hosts the debates and negotiations regarding Em-
ployment Guidelines and EMCO’s conclusions are almost always accepted 
without any substantive changes by the Council, making EMCO a very 
powerful forum (Interview, BMAS2). And ﬁ nally, in addition to the regular 
peer-review exercises, the Commission also introduced a new peer-review 
mechanism, the Mutual Learning Programme (MLP) in 2005. Th e MLP 
replaces the Peer Review Programme, ﬁ rst launched in 1999, and brings 
together national experts and a variety of stakeholders with the aim to en-
courage mutual learning and to assist in transferring good practices. Th e 
core goal of the review process recalibration is to “achieve a higher level 
of dissemination and coherence” (MLP 2005). MLP participants now con-
duct “thematic” research in biannual cycles in areas of key policy priority, 
arrange meetings with the Member States to review the reports and ﬁ nd-
ings, and disseminate the information to a wide range of actors. EMCO is 
closely involved in this process. In summary, the EES’s methodology goes 
beyond what the OECD can produce, and the possibility of “mutual learn-
ing” is greater. Th e EES process has thus been described by many observ-
ers as “contextualised”, allowing consultation and ongoing feedback, in 
contrast to the OECD’s process, which is seen as “decontextualised” and a 
“one-size-ﬁ ts-all” approach (Hemerijck 2002; Zeitlin 2003, 15; Visser 2005, 
181). As such, the OECD is often perceived as a “teacher” – typically an 
economist or lawyer – telling member countries how they ought to be-
have. Th e EES, in turn, is perceived as a “joint endeavour” of a large variety 
of actors (Eichhorst and Hemerijck 2008, 31). Th e EES’s real advantages 
therefore lie in the fact that participants may claim “ownership” over its 
processes, it may mobilise a wide(r) variety of participants and stakehold-
ers, it has the potential to “persuade” actors about the appropriateness of 
reforms, and, last but not least, it may even provide some ﬁ nancial incen-
tives because the implementation of reform proposals may be subsidised 
through the European Social Fund (ESF) (e.g. Weishaupt 2009).
 Despite, the EES’s superior “learning” context, I argue that it is precise-
ly the OECD’s “decontextualised” and “eﬃ  ciency-oriented” approach that 
sometimes makes its recommendations more attractive to policymakers. 
Th is is the case because OECD recommendations are seen – or can be pre-
sented to electorates – as “hard facts” rather then (watered down) political 
compromises. Th e highly politicised 1994 JS, however, may be the excep-
tion. Th is means that the OECD is less useful as a “learning tool” and more 
practical as an instrument to convince other, perhaps more hesitant, actors 
or society in general about institutional changes that are deemed necessary 
to policymakers. In other words, in these contexts OECD recommenda-
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tions become an element of “powering” rather than “puzzling”. Hence, if 
and when the conclusions of the EES and the OECD are consistent, they can 
become powerful, mutually reinforcing instruments for policymakers, of-
fering a context for reﬂ exive learning and the gathering of “hard evidence” 
with which analytical solutions can be turned into real policy outputs.
 Finally, it is also important to mention that there is a substantial amount 
of overlap in the memberships of the two organisations, and experts are 
engaged in regular and institutionalised meetings, joint work in common 
projects, and ad hoc discussions. As such, learning across institutional 
boundaries is certainly also possible, or even probable, because the EU 
and the OECD have a relationship, which is characterised by both “emula-
tion and competition” (interview, DGEmpl3).
 The following graph illustrates the process of policy diffusion and mu-
tual learning, while differentiating the various focuses and processes in 
the OECD and the EU.
Figure 3 The Processes of Peer Review in the EU and the OECD
Process EU OECD
Defi nition of Problem 
(Cause and Eff ect)
Structural unemployment; 
low employment
Structural unemployment; 
low employment
Defi nition of Common 
Goals
Full Employment (70% - 60% 
- 50% Employment Targets)
“Active Society” and “more 
and better jobs”
Monitoring and 
Reporting of national 
Implementations
Commission drafts APR/EGL; 
Committees review; Council 
approves; Member States 
write NRPs
Country Desk prepares 
Country Report and visits 
Country; Drafting of Country 
Report
Multilateral 
Deliberation
Cross-examination of 
NRPs; Discussion in 
EMCO; Consultation with 
Social Partners; Bilateral 
discussions between MS and 
Commission
Discussion in Economic 
Development and Review 
Committee (EDRC)
Recommendations and 
Publication
Publication of Annual 
Progress Report (annually)
Publication of Economic 
Survey (every 1½ to 2 years)
Sources: Noaksson and Jacobsson 2003; Casey 2004; Dostal 2004; Schäfer 2006; Zeitlin 2008b; 
Interview, BMAS2
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 V.5 Conclusions
In contrast to the 1960s, there was no single point of reference (i.e., Swe-
den) and no single “voice” for the dissemination of good practices with 
respect to labour market measures in the 1990s. Instead, various coun-
tries such as Denmark and the Netherlands emerged as “good examples” 
in the mid-1990s (e.g., Auer 2000),28 and the UK toward the second half of 
the 1990s. These “good practice exemplars”, however, had their own par-
ticular sets of strengths and weaknesses.29 Likewise, while the US seemed 
effective in achieving high levels of economic and employment growth 
during times when most of Europe was struggling – and thus served as 
a focal point in the 1994 OECD Jobs Study – the US’s model of “free” 
labour markets remained, with few exceptions, the antithesis to the Eu-
ropean Social Model, which was promoted by the EU. The agreement on 
neo-liberal prescriptions remained thus incomplete, many actors did not 
follow the OECD’s recommendations, and no single country seemed to 
embody an institutional mix entirely desirable or transferable. Moreover, 
when the EU emerged as an “ideational agent” in addition to the OECD 
in the mid- to late 1990s, two partially overlapping and partially compet-
ing sets of recommendations were issued. While the OECD Jobs Study 
prioritised reducing unemployment through deregulatory structural re-
forms, with a focus on labour market “rigidities” such as organised wage-
settlements, strict employment protection, and generous unemployment 
benefit regimes, the European Employment Strategy focused mainly on 
“positive” supply-side measures, such as individual case management and 
vocational training, while stressing the improvement of employment rates 
as the main focal point. As such, throughout the 1990s, there was no one 
clear country model to emulate and the EU and OECD presented two sets 
of – at times competing – recommendations.
 However, in the second half of the 1990s, the OECD gradually reas-
sessed many of its core beliefs, while the EU further developed its influ-
ence in the social sphere with the launch of the Lisbon Agenda in 2000 and 
the quantification of various performance indicators and targets. In the 
early 2000s, an increasingly coherent set of recommendations emerged 
and a common normative and cognitive framework became gradually 
identifiable. This new labour market policy paradigm was based on (a) 
“activation” (i.e., early and systematic interventions, case management, 
and benefit conditionality); (b) a PES “service model” informed by NPM 
philosophy (i.e., customer orientation, sensitivity to efficiency and effec-
tiveness of public programmes, and a governance architecture emulating 
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private management structures); and (c) the promotion of employment 
through the use of “positive” capacity-building public policies, support-
ing a more inclusive labour market, especially with respect to women and 
older workers. More recently, the concept of flexicurity was added as a 
new supplementary element. This concept is still in its infancy, however, 
and it is thus too early to identify how precisely it will be translated into 
public policy recommendations.
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
VI The Emergence of the Activation Paradigm: 
 Analysing Institutional Hybridisation
The previous three empirical chapters have illustrated three phases of 
cognitive and normative shifts, leading to new policy agendas and insti-
tutional changes. The first, institutional consolidation phase, lasting from 
the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, was characterised by an ideational con-
vergence on the conceptual and normative merits of the Swedish concept 
of active labour market policies, which were seen as an adequate instru-
ment to simultaneously improve the adaptability of national economies 
and the mobility of individual workers. These ideas were spearheaded 
by the OECD, especially Director of Manpower and Social Affairs Gösta 
Rehn, and resulted in a “manpower revolution”, associated with substan-
tive national legislative changes, introducing or strengthening national 
public employment services and active manpower measures. The second 
“crisis” phase, lasting from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, was charac-
terised by a major reorientation by national governments and the OECD 
alike. Keynesianism and other attempts to manage demand were grad-
ually phased out and, in parallel, monetarist theory emerged, focusing 
on supply-side economics and inflation. With respect to labour market 
policy, there was no longer a clear point of reference for emulation and 
the OECD issued a variety of “theories” about the causes of, and remedies 
for, unemployment. This lack of a focal point reflected the dissent within 
the OECD about the most appropriate way to move forward as well as the 
existence of competing ideas about the role of labour market policies and 
institutions. It was during the 1980s that country trajectories increasingly 
showed divergence along three reform strategies: Anglophone marketisa-
tion, Continental labour shedding, and Nordic social investment. Chap-
ter V, in turn, outlined the emergence of an “activation paradigm” with a 
uniquely Anglo-Nordic focal point.
 The remainder of this book seeks to delve deeper into two sets of ques-
tions: First, this chapter asks what caused certain countries to become 
trendsetters in activation policy, and to what extent these changes have 
led to a convergence of national models. For this purpose, an analytical 
 THE EMERGENCE OF THE ACTIVATION PARADIGM
overview of recent developments is presented, which includes an assess-
ment of the four dimensions of labour market policy regimes as outlined 
in chapter II. The primary focus is placed on the same six cases analysed 
in chapters III and IV. Descriptive statistics, however, are presented and 
occasional references are made to other European cases throughout this 
chapter. Chapter VI concludes with a comparison of contemporary labour 
market policy regimes with those present in the mid-1980s. Subsequently, 
chapter VII asks how these institutional changes have come about in the 
context of national politics. For this purpose, the evolution of labour mar-
ket policy from the mid-1990s to today is carefully traced in Germany and 
Ireland as two illustrative cases.
VI.1 Normative/Cognitive Dimension
In chapter V, I argued that both the EU and the OECD embraced new 
outlooks on unemployment and the most appropriate institutional mix of 
policies located at the work-welfare nexus. The associated changes in the 
recommendations for their members in both international organisations 
are far-reaching, especially as both institutions have gradually converged 
on the “activation paradigm” and the associated focal points of a “PES 
service model” and a more inclusive labour market. These converging rec-
ommendations need to be interpreted as a reflection and consolidation of 
the members’ new collective outlook – or at least an agreeable compro-
mise – on the key notions regarding labour market institutions and in-
struments. The emergence of, and developments in, the EES in particular 
represent a real watershed. In contrast to the more technocratic and often 
prescriptive recommendations of the OECD, the EES Guidelines are pro-
duced after deep deliberations and negotiations in EMCO, the approval 
of the Council and the Commission, and the input of a wide variety of 
non-governmental organisations, the social partners, and a multiplicity of 
governmental departments and ministries. Accordingly, because reaching 
a compromise with such a large number of actors is a very “cumbersome” 
process, the results carry “great weight, because one can say that they 
represent the consensus of all EU Member States and the Commission” 
(interview, BMAS2, my translation).
 Reaching such “cumbersome compromises” means that the formulation 
of EES Guidelines is a highly political process that entails elements of both 
“powering” and “puzzling”. One the one hand, Member States bring their 
own, home-grown political agendas to the EU table. Th is means that they 
NORMATIVE/COGNITIVE DIMENSION
seek to advocate “their” models for domestic political gain, and they worry 
about the eﬀ ects of EU Guidelines on national policies, e.g., reputational 
harm and ﬁ nancial costs. Quite clearly, however, Members States cannot 
simply “upload” their exact national models to the European levels and 
concessions must be made. On the other hand, the EES provides a forum 
through which policymakers are exposed to thought-provoking new ideas 
about common problems, which they can utilise in their respective national 
reform eﬀ orts. Th e same interviewee, who is also a member of EMCO, used 
the apt analogy of a “ping-pong game” to describe how ideas travel from 
national capitals to Brussels, bounce back to the national capital, and then 
back again to Brussels and so on (for a similar assessment, see Zippel 2004). 
Over time, Member States and the Commission take on just a little bit of 
the others’ ideas, and eventually “one can trace ideational changes in party 
manifestos, as grounds for justiﬁ cation for new legislation, in cabinet reso-
lutions and the like” (interview, BMAS2, my translation). As such, captur-
ing the main common features in the EES (and OECD recommendations) 
can serve as a good approximation with respect to the ways in which poli-
cymakers think about problems and solutions in their labour markets. Th e 
cognitive and normative changes that run like a “golden thread” through 
the EES as well as the JS are best encapsulated in two dimensions, including 
a renewed focus on (1) the supply side of the labour market through obliga-
tory activation measures, and (2) raising overall employment levels rather 
then merely reducing unemployment rates.
Supply-side Orientation and Activation
As we saw in chapter III, during the 1960s and 1970s, the birth years of 
active labour market interventions, policymakers assumed that the labour 
market was – within the hierarchy of markets – subordinated to ﬁ nan-
cial and product markets. Accordingly, the ALMPs were seen as a supple-
ment to macro-economic demand management and as an economic tool to 
boost productivity and enhance individual mobility. At that time, macro-
economic rather labour market policy did the “heavy lifting” in address-
ing questions pertaining to unemployment. However, as unemployment, 
especially its long-term version, established itself as a continuous chal-
lenge throughout the 1980s – often despite rapid economic growth – Eu-
ropean policymakers began to increasingly move away from locating the 
root causes of unemployment in insuﬃ  cient demand (i.e., cyclical causes 
of unemployment) and moved toward seeking solutions on the macro and 
micro level (i.e., structural and indiviual causes of unemployment). Th is 
 THE EMERGENCE OF THE ACTIVATION PARADIGM
new focus on the structural causes of unemployment included both labour 
market and welfare institutions that “hindered” the free workings of the 
market and shortcomings in workers’ skills and education. Th e political 
shift away from economic demand-management strategies was further ac-
centuated across Europe by the rapid steps taken toward establishing a 
common European market in the early 1990s and introducing a single Eu-
ropean currency at the turn of the millennium. Th e institutionalisation of 
the Economic and Monetary Union not only forcefully placed a “hard cur-
rency” paradigm at the centre of economic policy making through strict 
targets on national debt and inﬂ ation, but also meant that the European 
Central Bank (ECB) would determine the interest rates for the entire Eu-
rozone, and by extension, also aﬀ ect the non-EMU members’ room for 
manoeuvre. As such, policymakers lost an important means to manage 
national economic growth, and labour market policy became the main tool 
left to national governments to address unemployment besides adjusting 
levels of personal and corporate taxation to stimulate investment and 
growth. Hence, while the labour market was still seen as being dependent 
on the developments in the ﬁ nancial and product markets, it was now “of 
equal ranking” (interview, BMAS1), and had matured to a market with its 
own laws and regulations (interview, HBS).1
 Th is pragmatic shift toward a focus on the supply side was also a re-
ﬂ ection of growing concerns over welfare abuse, thus locating the root 
causes of unemployment in individual idleness. Intellectually, the US was 
on the forefront of these normative reassessments during the 1980s. On 
the one hand, academic writings suggested the dismantling of the entire 
US welfare state as the best way to ﬁ ght poverty (e.g., Charles Murray’s 
Losing Ground), or explained the existence of an “underclass” by refer-
ring to welfare programmes that allowed recipients to remain passive (e.g., 
Lawrence Mead’s Beyond Entitlement). Meanwhile, political and media at-
tacks were launched on supposed African-American “welfare queens” who 
were driving Cadillacs while collecting welfare (cf., Daguerre 2007). Simi-
lar assessments about the inactivity-enabling role of welfare institutions 
and the associated abuse of taxpayers’ money were also very evident in 
the UK during the late Th atcher era, where conservative think tanks mas-
sively attacked existing welfare structures. Popularising concerns about 
the welfare state was not, however, limited to the Anglo-Saxon world, but 
emerged as a salient, albeit not as hostile, topic in Denmark (see chapter 
IV for more details), Austria – mainly through the daily tabloid newspaper 
Die Krone (cf., Atzmüller 2009) – Germany and Sweden (for Sweden, per-
sonal conversation with VÄXJÖ). Ireland, in turn, was somewhat diﬀ erent 
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because the 1980s and early 1990s was a period of such massive unem-
ployment that almost everybody had some personal connection to being 
unemployed. Due to this direct or indirect, yet almost always personal, 
exposure to unemployment, reducing alleged welfare abuse was not part 
of Ireland’s political agenda (interview, YOUTH).
 This Europe-wide new public discourse and political concern ulti-
mately altered many policymakers’ views on unemployment. While the 
unemployed during the 1960s and 1970s were seen as the “victims” of un-
favourable economic developments, unemployment during the late 1980s 
and 1990s was increasingly interpreted – at least in part – as “voluntary”. 
Earlier “rights” to participation in active measures gradually turned into 
“obligations”, i.e., measures to test whether jobseekers were actively seek-
ing and remaining available for work. Interestingly, it was not only fiscally 
conservative actors who adopted these views, but also Social Democrats 
who embraced the concept of “mutual obligations”, including Commission 
President Jacques Delors in the early 1990s at the EU level. Prominent na-
tional examples, in turn, include Denmark’s Social Democratic govern-
ment that introduced a “right and duty” to activation in the early 1990s; 
the UK, where left-leaning New Labour launched its famous New Deals in 
1997/98 that were predicated on the norm of “rights and responsibilities” 
for both the state and jobseekers; and Germany, where Social Democratic 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder embedded his 2001 JobAqtiv reforms in a 
context of “demanding and promoting” (fordern und fördern) while the 
2002 Hartz proposals were advanced with the slogan “promoting self-ini-
tiatives and redeeming new securities” (Eigeninitiative auslösen – Sicher-
heit einlösen). Even though an explicit rights and responsibilities rhetoric 
was less pronounced in Austria and Ireland, both Austrian and Irish poli-
cymakers referred to the principle that the state offered “something-for-
something” (interviews, IHS2; YOUTH; see also Weishaupt 2009).
 For many Social Democrats who relied on the rhetoric of mutual ob-
ligations to justify deep reforms of their welfare states, the newly emerg-
ing idea of “activation” was seen as a necessary instrument to reduce 
(long-term) unemployment and to address the legitimacy of the welfare 
state; appropriate because work alleviates poverty and social exclusion; 
and politically viable as it was seen as a compromise between centre-left 
actors, prioritising citizens’ rights to public assistance, and centre-right 
actors, demanding that jobseekers act responsibly, which should be en-
forced through supervision and sanctions. Thus, many European actors 
hoped that activation would prove to be a real alternative to the purely 
neo-liberal “workfare” strategy offered in the 1994 OECD JS that simply 
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“downgraded” expectations by cutting beneﬁ ts and lowering wage ﬂ oors. 
Th e main goal of these activation reform eﬀ orts was to sustain a Euro-
pean welfare model by cutting welfare costs without cutting services (in-
terviews, BMAS1, DGB1). Welfare conditionality, in turn, was acceptable 
as the unemployed had real options to choose from and were not simply 
pushed into available (but perhaps inappropriate) work (interview, TUC1).
 Even though this discourse seemed somewhat superfluous in Sweden 
– because the decades-old “work line” had always included both sticks 
and carrots (personal conversation, IFS) – similar trends were visible. On 
the one hand, the “rediscovery” of a rights and responsibility discourse 
was based on the popular view that the Swedish welfare state had become 
overly passive during the 1980s. This impression was based on the ex-
pansion of disability pensions, less stringent work requirements for old-
er workers, and persistent levels of youth unemployment. On the other 
hand, the rapid rise of unemployment in the early 1990s led to a massive 
increase in social assistance claimants, whose “only” problem was that 
they were unemployed (personal conversation, VÄXJÖ). In an attempt 
to tackle the growing numbers of welfare recipients, many municipali-
ties launched their own activation schemes in the mid 1990s, which, in 
turn, entailed obligations for SA recipients to participate in various pro-
grammes in exchange for their benefits. In reaction to this “bottom-up” 
development, the Social Democratic central government then instituted a 
legal base by revising the Social Service Act in 1998 (Sproß and Lang 2008, 
61; Thorén 2008, 47ff ). An even more explicit rights and duties discourse 
then emerged in the run-up to the 2006 election. The bourgeois alliance 
of four centre-right political parties capitalised on this issue by claiming 
that the Social Democrats had lost touch with the Swedish “work line” 
and that they represented the real Swedish model that had always entailed 
a right and duty to work (Magnusson 2007, 4).
Raising Employment Levels: Building More Inclusive Labour Markets
In conjunction with the cognitive shift regarding the main causes of, and 
remedies for, unemployment and the normative shift toward welfare con-
ditionality and mutual obligations, a new policy agenda emerged during 
the 1990s. While the NAIRU concept and the associated OECD recom-
mendations made unemployment reduction the central focus of reform, 
the new policy goal increasingly became the raising of overall employ-
ment levels, thus bringing more people into the workforce, regardless 
of their benefits status. The first steps toward focusing on employment 
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rather than unemployment were already being articulated in the mid-
1990s with the inception of the Essen Process. This new goal was then 
quantified through the Lisbon targets in 2000. As outlined in chapter V, 
national governments committed themselves to reach jointly agreed-up-
on targets, including an overall employment rate of 70 percent, a female 
employment rate of 60 percent, and an employment rate of 50 percent 
among older workers. Th is new political agenda strongly reﬂ ected the fact 
that policymakers no longer believed that raising employment levels and 
shrinking unemployment levels were mutually exclusive (e.g., Boeri et al. 
2000). Instead, it was now commonly accepted that if and when govern-
ments increase the supply of (skilled) labour, more people will earn money, 
incomes rise, productivity improves, and thus the demand for labour in-
creases as more money is spent and new services are needed. Th is also 
means that when more people are working, tax revenues increase as the 
tax base is broadened, while individual dependence on the state is reduced. 
Both of these trends then allow governments to either reduce corporate, 
income, and/or payroll taxes, which stimulates future job growth, or to 
make additional investments in the economy, the public sector, and/or 
human capital development. However, the raising of employment levels 
was not only desirable in socio-economic terms, it also presented itself as 
(the only) solution to the “dual” challenges of globalisation and societal 
changes. More speciﬁ cally, while economic globalisation pressures forced 
policymakers to reduce welfare costs in a race to stay competitive, internal 
challenges associated with ageing societies, demographic shifts, new fam-
ily structures, and long-term, often persistent un- and underemployment, 
increased the demands on the welfare state, while also shrinking its very 
revenue base. As such, because policymakers had to ﬁ nd ways to do “more 
with less”, higher levels of employment became not only desirable, but also 
a necessary condition for the sustainability of European welfare models.
 Th e new policy agenda to increase employment levels was translated into 
an empirically observable upward trend in employment levels in the EU-15 
Member States. Overall employment levels increased from 60.7 percent in 
1997 to 66.9 percent in 2007.2 Even more remarkable, the employment rate 
for women went up from 50.8 percent in 1997 to 59.7 percent in 2007 and 
the employment level for older workers rose from 36.4 percent in 1997 to 
46.6 percent in 2007, respectively (Eurostat 2008). EMCO Chair Maarten 
Camps saw these trends as “clear evidence” that European policymakers 
had “put their mind” to this issue (Camps 2006, 3).
 Perhaps more tellingly, many national governments have openly em-
braced the goal of raising employment levels in their domestic arenas. 
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Perhaps the clearest and most ambitious move toward rising employ-
ment rates was propagated by British Prime Minister Tony Blair on 11 
October 2004. In a speech to the Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR) and Demos, the Prime Minister declared that the government 
should not rest until everyone who wants a job has a job, while further 
aspiring to attain the highest employment rate in the world. While an 
official target was not set, achieving the highest employment rate in the 
world de facto meant an ambitious target of about 80 percent (cited in 
Bivand 2004, 20). Sweden also set an 80 percent employment rate tar-
get in their National Reform Programme in 2006, while Denmark, which 
already had the highest employment rate in Europe, launched a labour 
market reform programme entitled “More People at Work” in November 
2002 to maintain its high levels of employment. Other Member States 
such as Germany returned to their official goal of reaching full employ-
ment, a goal they had abandoned more than 20 years ago. Similarly, the 
focus on women and older workers also came to the forefront in both 
Austria and Ireland. Civil servants in these two countries explained that 
they were not only being pressured to increase employment levels by do-
mestic employers who complained about skills shortages, but also from 
Brussels. Accordingly, the focus of the labour mobilisation was on older 
workers, who had already acquired work-related skills, and women, who 
were often well educated, but failed to return to work after having chil-
dren due to an insufficient public infrastructure or counterproductive 
benefit and wage systems (consensus view among interviewees in Austria 
and Ireland).
 To summarise, the new agenda of raising employment levels, the belief 
in the capability to steer the level of (un-)employment through supply-
side instruments, in particular activation, and the normative foundation of 
mutual obligations, moved reform debates in a common direction across 
Europe. Work was increasingly seen as the best form of welfare for the in-
dividual and more work was also the best means to sustain the functioning 
of the European welfare states. As such, a common discourse on self-reli-
ance through activation became predominant, albeit in a context in which 
the state should continue to play a supportive or enabling role. Moreover, 
the change in the political agenda to achieve high levels of employment 
directly aﬀ ected the workings of many government ministries (interview, 
BMAS4). Once the goal to raise employment levels was declared – which 
cannot be reached solely by reducing unemployment – the state machiner-
ies began searching for “untapped” sources, which often included the ac-
tivation of previously passive groups such as older workers, lone parents, 
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the disabled, or immigrants (interview, CESI). Th is search for new labour 
pools, in turn, then provided feedback to the “activation paradigm” and its 
normative foundation of mutual obligations.3
VI.2 Organisational Dimension
As chapter VI outlined, both the EU and the OECD, beginning in the 
mid-1990s, placed the modernisation of European PESs at the centre of 
attention. For an assessment of the procedural changes anticipated by the 
development of a “service model” and to answer the question of whether 
European PESs have converged on a similar institutional framework, it is 
necessary to understand their organisational structures. For this purpose, 
I will first briefly review their institutional make-up and outline their or-
ganisational differences, including (a) their position vis-à-vis the govern-
ment, i.e., their legal status, (b) the role of social partnership within PES 
governance structures, and (c) their source of revenues.
VI.2.a  Organisational Structures: Legal Status, Corporatist 
Governance, and Sources of Revenue
Legal Status
As outlined in chapter II, there are various ways to organise PESs. The 
majority of European PESs could be described as “semi-autonomous”, or 
institutions created under public law which, however, are not run directly 
by a governmental ministry. Put differently, while PESs operate relatively 
independently from government control on a daily basis, they have to 
follow laws adopted by their respective parliaments and adhere to gov-
ernmental regulations; receive broad instructions about the direction of 
labour market policy from a respective ministry; rely – at least partially 
– on funding from the government; and have governmental appointees 
sitting on, or even chairing, their executive and/or supervisory boards. 
This model is therefore distinct from an entirely state-run model, where 
the PES is an integral part of a ministry for employment, as is the case in 
Japan (and Austria until 1994), the entirely privatised model, introduced 
in countries such as Australia and New Zealand, or a regionally or locally 
run PESs with no or very little direct steering by the national government 
and no national PES headquarters (e.g., Italy, Poland, and the US).
 Among the six cases reviewed here, the British PES comes closest to 
a PES with a state-led governance system because Job Centres Plus (JCP) 
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is located within the DWP and its entire board is directly appointed by 
the government. However, the JCP enjoys “agency status”, which gives it 
some degree of independence from the Ministry (OECD 1993c). Histori-
cally, Germany and Sweden are archetypical representatives of a public, yet 
tripartite-run employment service, established in 1927 and 1947 respective-
ly. As outlined in chapter III, most other European countries followed the 
German and Swedish models, thus moving away from membership-based, 
primarily locally operated or social partner-operated models. For instance, 
in 1969/70, Denmark established a modern, tripartite PES with a monopoly 
on job-placement and matching services and an enhanced remit to pro-
vide training and further education, ending the labour unions’ dominance 
in this area. Similarly, the government in Ireland also created a PES, the 
National Manpower Service (NMS), in 1971, streamlining the activities of 
locally run PES oﬃ  ces. In 1987, the NMS was replaced by FÁS, Ireland’s tri-
partite Employment and Training Authority, responsible for job-placement 
and matching services as well as training measures that were oﬀ ered to both 
the employed and unemployed. Finally, Austria removed its PES from the 
Ministry of Labour in 1994/95 and established a tripartite-run agency with 
signiﬁ cantly more autonomy, similar to the German or Swedish versions.
Corporatist Governance
Most European PESs can look back at long periods of social partnership 
during which the employer and employee representatives were closely 
involved in PES governance, including programme design, monitoring, 
and delivery. In 2009, however, among the six countries discussed here, 
only Austria and Ireland have been able to retain a strongly tripartite gov-
ernance structure. In both of these countries, social partnership is the 
norm “all the way down” and employee and employer representatives are 
present in the national executive boards as well as the regional and local 
levels. The social partners also take part in most, if not all, major policy 
committees to develop labour market policies (interviews, AMS1, FÁS3, 
FÁS4). PES officials in both Austria and Ireland, and the social partners 
themselves, have described social partnership as positive and valuable, 
particularly due to its ability to resolve conflicts internally, which allows 
for pragmatic rather than ideological solutions (consensus view in inter-
views with Austrian and Irish PES representatives).
 This positive assessment of the social partners’ involvement is not a 
uniform experience across Europe. The long tradition of full participa-
tion of the social partners at all levels of PES governance was ruptured in 
the late 1980s in the UK, in the early 1990s in Sweden, in the early 2000s 
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in Germany, and between 2005 and 2009 in Denmark. In the UK, the 
social partners lost their direct representation on both the national steer-
ing board and in the regional and local branches in 1987 when the MSC 
was dismantled. After years of political isolation during the Conservative 
years, the New Labour government began to consult the social partners 
on a variety of issues, while the DWP organised regular meetings with 
both the TUC and the CBI (interview, DWP1). DWP officials described 
the engagement with the social partners and other stakeholders as a “good 
practice” (interview, DWP2). However, even though the social partners 
were consulted by the DWP, their actual impact on both policy initiation 
and design remained minimal (interview, IES2). Nevertheless, providing 
their “tacit” or “permissive” support was an important element in success-
fully launching many of New Labour’s reform packages and the TUC was 
influential in introducing certain provisions that prevented the exploita-
tion of vulnerable jobseekers (interview, TUC1).
 In Sweden, social partnership on the executive level formally ended in 
1991, when the Swedish Employers Confederation (SAF) withdrew from 
the governing boards of almost all government agencies, including the 
PES. The government had to subsequently expel the labour unions be-
cause their participation was no longer considered legitimate (Lindvall 
and Sebring 2005, 1061). However, despite their absence from the PES Ex-
ecutive Board, the social partners are still represented in the Stakeholders 
Council, a national advisory body. Moreover, the social partners advise re-
gional PES offices, albeit as regional stakeholders and experts rather than 
representatives of a particular organisation (interview, PES-Sweden).
 Meanwhile, the social partners in the German PES were formally weak-
ened, but not entirely expelled, in 2002. While their presence on the ex-
ecutive board (Verwaltungsrat) at the national level was preserved, the 
social partners were effectively removed from the boards at the regional 
level (Regionaldirektionen) and play only an advisory role in the local em-
ployment agencies (Arbeitsagenturen). With the benefit reforms that came 
into force in 2005, the social partners also lost their institutionalised in-
put concerning the services for the long-term unemployed, who now fall 
under the auspices of ARGEn (Arbeitsgemeinschaften) and Opt-out Com-
munes (Optionskommunen) (see below in this chapter). Nevertheless, the 
daily workings of social partnership in the Executive Board was described 
as “lively, important, and largely consensual” (interview BA1; confirmed 
by BDA1, but seen more sceptically by DGB1).
 Social partnership in Denmark is typically described as a system that 
functions well (see Hendeliowitz and Woollhead 2007; Hendeliowitz and 
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Hertz 2008). However, recent developments are often interpreted as a 
disruptive break. While the Danish Social Democrats instituted a sys-
tem of PES governance that mainly concentrated on the regional level, 
where the social partners were key decisionmakers (Knuth et al. 2004), 
the recent changes to the governance structures of the Danish PES pushed 
decision-making responsibility “upwards” and “downwards”. Governance 
responsibility was pushed upwards when the government empowered 
the national ministry by increasing the use of more specific performance 
targets, which directly affect local priorities, strategies and the choice of 
instruments. Likewise, responsibility was pushed downwards when mu-
nicipal authorities were empowered with the full responsibility for pro-
gramme implementation. At both the national and local level, the social 
partner retained only an advisory function and, increasingly, they are be-
ing relegated to the role of being “contractors” recruited for the delivery 
of some, but not all, programmes. Accordingly, many analysts interpreted 
the centre-right government’s reform as “an outright attack on the labour 
market parties’ influence on policy” (Larsen 2005, 129), which led to the 
formal dismissal of corporatism in 2007 (Jørgensen 2009, 16).
Sources of Revenue
In addition to a PES’s legal status and the degree of the social partner’s 
involvement in programme design and implementation, PESs’ sources of 
revenue are yet another important element in determining their degree of 
autonomy from respective governmental departments. In the case of Ger-
many, the PES budget is traditionally allocated almost entirely through 
specific payroll contributions, i.e., obligatory unemployment insurance 
payments, with its own financial circuit. This pattern provides the Ger-
man PES with further autonomy from the state because its services are 
largely self-financed and its budgets is clearly distinguishable from other 
social security funds. While Austria relies on payroll contributions to fi-
nance its labour market policies, the generated revenues are collected by 
the Ministry of Finance and thus become part of the general budget. In 
Ireland, the budget of FÁS is also predominantly comprised of payments 
into the Pay-Related Social Insurance (PRSI) fund and an employers’ levy, 
which generates funds for the training of employed workers. The state, 
however, provides a small subsidy (OECD 1998, 77). The budgets in Den-
mark, Sweden, and the UK, in turn, are mainly tax-financed. There are 
also some general payroll contributions to the social security system in 
the cases of Sweden and the UK, but these are fairly nominal with respect 
to unemployment insurance and have no direct effect on their PESs’ bud-
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gets (OECD 1996d, 26). In both Denmark and Sweden, employees can 
also voluntarily sign up for unemployment insurance (UI) for a small fee. 
UI funds are administered by recognised funds, typically associated with 
labour unions. The UI funds approve the payments of benefits – paid out 
by the local employment office – as well as the sanctions recommended 
by case managers.
 In summary, the description of these six PESs shows there is a great 
deal of variety among national organisations with respect to their organi-
sational and legal structures, the degree of social partner involvement, 
and predominant funding patterns. Despite this heterogeneity, most Eu-
ropean PESs have gradually converged in how they govern and deliver 
their services (cf., also Weishaupt 2010a). In particular, explicit attempts 
have been undertaken to turn the PESs into modern “service providers”, 
governed by a business rather than a bureaucratic philosophy. In this con-
text, central ideas of NPM theories – as advanced by the OECD Secre-
tariat, the European Commission, and HoPES – have guided institutional 
reforms (e.g., interviews, DGB1, DWP5, DGEmpl3). Four reform trajecto-
ries are most evident, including (a) a strengthening of the state’s steering 
capacity through the introduction of management-by-objectives systems 
and comprehensive programme evaluations, conducted by independent 
third parties; (b) responsibility-sharing through the encouragement of lo-
cal flexibility, local partnerships, and closer co-operation, if not merger, 
of employment and welfare offices; (c) increased competition through the 
lifting of state monopolies for the delivery of job-search and matching 
services and the introduction of quasi-markets through contracting out 
specific tasks and programmes; and (d) the contractualisation of the rela-
tionship between the state and jobseekers through individual case man-
agement and individual action plans.
VI.2.b  Management-by-Objectives and Independent Review: 
Strengthening PES Steering Capacities
Management-by-Objectives
In the European context, the two countries that spearheaded PES reforms 
in line with NPM ideas were Sweden and the United Kingdom (Forssell 
2001, 269ff; McLaughlin and Osborne 2002, 1). Sweden’s PES had already 
formally introduced far-reaching organisational reforms in 1985, when 
Allan Larsson was its General Director (1983-1989), including a manage-
ment-by-objectives (MBO) and a more decentralised decisionmaking 
structure. A rigorous use of MBO techniques only became possible, how-
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ever, with the full computerisation of the management operation system 
in 1996/97 (Mosley et al. 2000, 73). This system enabled real-time per-
formance comparisons of individual PES offices with set targets and is 
accessible to all staff members. The government and parliament, however, 
guide the operations of the Swedish PES through budget bills, which in-
clude broad national objectives. The national PES headquarters then sets 
specific goals and targets for the 68 regional offices, which, in turn, pass 
them on to their local branches (cf., Visser and Kouw 2006, 9).
 Similarly, the UK significantly expanded and streamlined the use of 
MBO in the mid to late 1980s and complemented these changes with the 
introduction of new local agencies and a stronger customer orientation. 
More specifically, the government replaced local employment offices with 
Next Step Agencies (NSAs), and divorced policy design from delivery. By 
doing so, the government clearly defined what the role of the newly in-
troduced NSAs was and what the role of the department was (interview, 
DWP5).4 Moreover, Prime Minister John Major introduced the Citizen’s 
Charter in 1991, establishing what customers could expect from the Brit-
ish PES and other public services. In this context, MBO techniques were 
believed to improve transparency and to encourage benchmarking exer-
cises between Next Step Agencies, which, in turn, were expected to pro-
mote the delivery of better services. However, the originally rather strict 
“top-down” management-style in the British context led to some counter-
productive and unintended consequences. The most commonly named 
examples include the (too hasty) placement of jobseekers into inappro-
priate jobs in order to reach certain performance targets and high staff 
turnover caused by the pressure to reach targets that were just too ambi-
tious (Finn and Blackmore 2001, 298). Consequently, the incoming New 
Labour government amended British performance targets so that they 
also focused on “higher-quality job outcomes” and made staff retention 
as well as jobseekers and employers’ satisfaction key organisational goals 
(Finn and Blackmore 2001, 303). While about 90 percent of all surveyed 
jobseekers were very satisfied with the services provided by the PES in 
2008 (interviews, JCP1, 2; DWP5), there was still an ongoing debate about 
the appropriateness of the use of overly ambitious job-placement targets 
rather than – or perhaps in addition to – targets for job retention.5
 Subsequent to the British and Swedish organisational reforms, the en-
thusiasm for MBO techniques gradually expanded across Europe, reach-
ing France and the Netherlands in the early 1990s (OECD 1993a; Mosley 
et al. 2000). While both Austria and Denmark had also “experimented” 
with MBO systems in the late 1980s, they fully launched their version 
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as part of their major organisational reforms in 1994/1995. In Denmark, 
these reforms led to the empowerment of regional PES offices, while in 
Austria, the PES was formally separated from the ministry and a semi-
autonomous, tripartite PES was established. Ireland, in turn, began in-
troducing and gradually expanding the use of MBO techniques in 1996.6 
Eventually Germany, the largest continental welfare state, which typically 
resists most NPM-inspired reforms, also followed suit.7 While the Ger-
man PES implemented first reforms in the late 1990s, the major overhaul 
of the German PES occurred in 2002, as part of the Hartz reform process.8
 Th ese converging trends on NPM steering techniques must be un-
derstood not only as endogenous modernisation processes, but also as a 
consequence of the Commission’s Director General for Employment and 
Social Aﬀ airs Allan Larsson’s advocacy and the launch of the EES. More 
speciﬁ cally, Larsson, a highly respected and inﬂ uential man, who had al-
ready been instrumental in introducing MBO techniques in the Swedish 
PES during the late 1980s, continuously advocated for a shift from manage-
ment-by-regulation to management-by-objectives at the European level 
(e.g., Larsson 1998; 1999a; 1999b). Moreover, the very launch of the EES 
promoted, if not necessitated, the use of hard, quantiﬁ able output targets 
because of three interrelated factors (cf., Mosley et al. 2000, viii; Mosley et 
al. 2003, 20). First, the EES required EU members to write annual action 
plans, which summarise national reform eﬀ orts. Th is, in turn, led to the 
institutionalisation of regular benchmarking exercises, which necessitated 
the collection of comparative labour market data and the establishment of 
common indicators (through EMCO’s Indicators Group). Finally, the EES 
compelled members to reach a set of commonly agreed-upon guidelines, 
which include quantitative performance targets, such as oﬀ ering “a new 
start” before young (adult) jobseekers have been unemployed for six (12) 
months, and to increase the number of unemployed people who receive 
training or take part in similar programmes. As such, the EES ampliﬁ ed 
the perceived need for PES modernisation and encouraged the heads of 
PES to (re-)evaluate their “institutional setting and management methods” 
(Commission of the European Communities 1998, 4).
Independent Review
In addition to improving the steering capacity of governments and cen-
tral PESs through the introduction of MBO techniques, policymakers in-
creasingly sought to achieve higher levels of programme quality. In line 
with NPM theory and OECD/EU recommendations, a critical element in 
PES reforms included a continuous and comprehensive evaluation of la-
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bour market instruments, conducted by independent third parties. While 
the Anglophone countries, including Ireland and the UK, share a long 
tradition of independent reviews (interview, FÁS1), countries with Nordic 
or Continental regimes, followed suit only in recent years. For instance, 
Sweden created the Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) 
in 1997, as a relatively autonomous, national evaluation body (Visser and 
Kouw 2006, 9). Since then, all of its labour market policies have been 
“subjected to a large number of rigorous evaluation studies” (Calmfors 
2004, 4). Germany has in recent years also undergone a series of wide-
ranging evaluations, conducted for the most part by independent third 
parties. These developments have been described as a “major step for-
ward” and a truly path-breaking development (interview, INFAS). Simi-
larly, leading Austrian policy experts argue that – due to EU membership 
and the launch of the EES – Austria has developed an “evaluation culture” 
and labour market policy monitoring has been vastly improved as EU tar-
gets are taken “very seriously” (interviews, IHS1; IHS2 respectively). Den-
mark has, however, emerged as somewhat of an outlier. While the Social 
Research Centre in Copenhagen conducts labour market policy evalua-
tions on a contractual basis, its close ties to the ministry are seen as some-
what compromising its claim of “independence”. Other institutions are 
occasionally contracted. These contracts are, however, on a much smaller 
scale and on an ad hoc basis (personal conversation, CARMA).
VI.2.c  Centralised Decentralisation and Bridging Employment and 
Welfare Services: Strengthening Local Rowing Capacities
Centralised Decentralisation
As outlined above, most European governments reorganised their PES 
governance systems away from “management-by-regulations” and toward 
“management-by-objectives”. The rationale was, on the one hand, to em-
power PES headquarters by giving them the capacity to articulate, trans-
pose, monitor, and enforce clearly articulated and transparent objectives. 
On the other hand, it was argued that traditional regulatory approaches 
had become increasingly obsolete, especially in areas with particular eco-
nomic hardships or among “non-standard” groups who were more diffi-
cult to place into work. Accordingly, PES officials sought – and were often 
granted – a reduction in bureaucratic structures which would enhance 
local flexibility. The idea was that local offices could then deliver more 
customised responses, adequate for their clients and their local labour 
markets, within, however, a clear set of operational parameters.
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 The extent and form of decentralisation varies rather strongly across 
countries, and within countries, across clienteles (i.e., insured versus un-
insured workers or the short-term versus long-term unemployed, etc.). 
Generally speaking, local employment offices have been granted more 
flexibility since the introduction of MBO systems. However, this de jure 
flexibility does not necessarily translate into practice. This is mainly due 
to the pressure placed on local offices to reach ambitious quantitative per-
formance targets. As long as local employment offices are able to reach 
their targets, the centre allows them a great deal of ﬂ exibility. If they fail 
to reach their targets, however, the centre puts pressure on them to follow 
its suggestion of what represents “good practice”. Th erefore, the fear of 
failure by local oﬃ  ce managers may impede local ﬂ exibility as they choose 
to follow protocol in the ﬁ rst place. Th is issue has been raised especially in 
the UK (interviews, JCP1; 2), but has also been mentioned in the German 
context (interview, BA1). To overcome these shortcomings associated with 
a strictly “top-down” approach – applied to various degrees in Austria, 
Germany, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK – the centre negotiates the targets 
with both regional PESs, functioning as “transmission belts”, and the lo-
cal oﬃ  ces, delivering the results. By doing so, the PES headquarters try 
to formulate targets in ways that take local particularities into account, 
while continuous feedback and consultation on all governance levels is in-
tended to assess the appropriateness of targets throughout the business 
cycle (interviews, JCP1,2; FÁS1; BA2). Regional and/or local targets are 
often added, ﬁ ne-tuned to local speciﬁ cities and local labour markets. Th is 
consultative mechanism, however, appears to work somewhat better in 
smaller countries (Austria, Ireland and Sweden).9
 As indicated above, a more dramatic U-turn is observable in Denmark. 
After the labour market reforms in the mid-1990s, Denmark was charac-
terised by its strong focus on regional governance and the fact that real 
decisionmaking authority was handed over to the social partners. The 
multipartite regional bodies devised regionally specific programmes and 
enjoyed high levels of discretion in translating national targets and set-
ting additional ones for their local offices (Mosley et al. 2000; Hende-
liowitz 2005). The Danish centre-right government that came into office 
in 2001, however, showed its dissatisfaction with the mid-level steering 
model early on. Embedded in a larger reform of its regions, the regional 
PES offices were first reduced to four and gradually lost their steering 
power. The government believed that the regional authorities “lacked 
[the] adequate capacity to ensure optimal sector planning” (Hendeliowitz 
and Hertz 2008, 11). Over time, the regional PESs were reduced to mere 
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monitoring bodies (Jørgensen 2009), while municipal authorities were 
empowered instead. With the reforms of 2007, the steering emphasis was 
further shifted both downward to the local level through more emphasis 
on “management by results”, and upward by streamlining and standardis-
ing the system of performance indicators. As of the fall of 2009, municipal 
authorities are now solely responsible for all of the labour market ser-
vices. While it is too soon to properly judge the outcomes of this reform, 
I concur with Colin Lindsay (2007, 16), who writes:
[W]hile the government has characterised this reform as promoting 
de-centralisation, the clear ‘central line’ that has always deﬁ ned Dan-
ish employment policy is stronger than ever. By abolishing partnership 
bodies that had a genuine decision-making authority, the government 
has arguably strengthened its own ability to direct policy from the top 
down, while allowing some freedom in the local implementation pro-
grammes. Lødemel and Trickey (2001), considering the UK’s activation 
services, have described this approach as a form of ‘centralised local-
ism’ – promoting localised delivery arrangements, but retaining ulti-
mate and near total power over the aims, general content and direction 
of policy within central government.
In summary, while PES governance systems continue to differ with re-
spect to the degree of top-down management, there seems to be an overall 
trend toward a “centralised” decentralisation. In other words, while local 
PES offices tend to have more autonomy with respect to programme and 
partner choices, the respective ministries simultaneously seek to hold lo-
cal PES offices accountable through ambitious performance targets and 
continuous monitoring.
Bridging Employment and Welfare Services
Tight central or regional steering through output targets is most common 
for local employment oﬃ  ces, delivering services to “typical” jobseekers, 
i.e., the short-term unemployed who receive unemployment beneﬁ ts. Lo-
cal discretion is much higher, and therefore local diversity is more pro-
nounced, for clienteles further from the labour market, including long-term 
unemployed jobseekers, social assistance recipients, and other “atypical” 
groups, such as lone parents or immigrants. Th is is the case, because these 
types of clients often fall under the authority of local municipalities, in 
contrast to centrally organised oﬃ  ces of the PES, that, in most countries, 
enjoy some independence from the central employment ministries. How-
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ever, because most national governments are in line with the new political 
agenda to raise overall employment levels, local authorities have been en-
couraged to approach “their” clients in new ways. In many cases, localised 
activation of diﬃ  cult-to-reach clients included (a) the establishment of 
one-stop centres for all jobseekers, thus streamlining the ways in which all 
types of beneﬁ ts recipients are approached, (b) the creation of new agen-
cies, speciﬁ cally designed to address the needs of these clients, and/or (c) 
the tighter collaboration of employment and welfare oﬃ  ces.
 This is to say, while all governments increasingly seek to “activate” 
benefit recipients in a more coherent, unified way, the actual institution-
alisation of these attempts remains varied. For instance, the New Labour 
government, following a pilot phase that lasted from June 1999 to Octo-
ber 2001, created the one-stop JobCentres Plus (JCP) in 2002. With the 
creation of the JCP, the Benefits Agency, formerly responsible for the is-
suance of welfare benefits, and the Employment Service that assisted job-
seekers in their jobsearch and application efforts, ceased to exist as sepa-
rate institutions and all jobseekers, irrespective of their benefits status, 
are catered for by JCP officers (Davern 2008, 116). Training courses for the 
unemployed, in turn, are delivered – if at all – by contractors rather then 
the JCP. The rather centralised system of JCP – which is associated with 
a variety of governance shortcomings that were described above – has 
been supplemented by a network of 15 Employment Zones (EZ), which 
have been established in areas of high unemployment. The EZ are private-
public-voluntary sector collaboratives, charged with the remit to address 
local disparities and to assist the most disadvantaged and marginalised 
jobseekers in experimental, innovative ways. All EZs are characterised by 
high intensity, more individualised placement/coaching services and in-
tensive collaboration with local employers. The recently published Leitch 
Review (2006) stimulated the launch of a revised Jobseekers’ Allowance 
and Flexible New Deal programme, which was introduced in the fall of 
2009, in which jobseekers are referred from the JCP office to private ser-
vice providers after a 12-month unemployment period. It is expected that 
these specialised providers will have new, more innovative techniques to 
offer. Building on the experiences of the EZ, these providers enjoy greater 
autonomy to design individual support, “prime contractors” are given lon-
ger contracts, and their payments are based on outcomes (McNeil 2009, 
15). Since 2004, there has also been more collaboration between JCP and 
the Learning and Skills Council (LSC), responsible for adult education. 
Pilot projects were also launched in 2009 to test the merits of the two 
institutions’ efforts to collaborate. A newly Integrated Employment and 
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Skill system will then be introduced in 2010, in which benefit claimants 
will undergo an extensive skills health check (McNeil 2009, 15).
 Inspired by British JCP, the original Hartz proposals, which the Ger-
man Social Democratic government had requested to inform their labour 
market reform efforts (see chapter VII), also included the establishment 
of a “single gateway” job centre for all jobseekers (cf., Hartz Commis-
sion 2002; also interviews, BMAS2, DWP5). While a significant political 
gridlock prevented these plans from being fully implemented, the govern-
ment nevertheless revamped the delivery of labour market services at the 
local level. The traditional employment offices (Arbeitsämter) were re-
modelled into modern “customer centres” (Kundenzentren) and renamed 
employment agencies (Arbeitsagenturen). These new employment agen-
cies would provide all benefits, job-search and counselling services to all 
insured, short-term unemployed and refer qualified jobseekers to skills 
training, provided by external service providers. All of the other clients, 
i.e., the long-term unemployed and those previously receiving social as-
sistance payments, are serviced in one of two offices, either so-called Ar-
beitsgemeinschaften (ARGEn), job centres jointly run by federal PES staff 
and local authorities, or Opt-out Communes (Optionskommunen) that 
chose not to cooperate with the federal PES and are solely under the aegis 
of local authorities. While in some instances these offices are “under one 
roof ”, most of them are in separate buildings, or even different parts of the 
city. Each of the three institutional arrangements, however, is organised 
as a “one-stop shop” where jobseekers receive job-search assistance, ben-
efit payments, and referrals for training and other services.10 Performance 
targets for the ARGEn – but not for the Opt-out Communes – are set 
by the Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs (BMAS) in consulta-
tion with the national PES – albeit, in a more deliberate and less binding 
way than for the federal employment agencies. One PES representative 
described this process as “top-down-bottom-up-top-down” rather than 
strictly “top-down” (interview, BA2).
 When the centre-right Danish government launched a comprehensive 
reform package entitled “More People in Work” in 2003, Denmark also 
moved toward a “one-stop shop” model. This reform streamlined all of the 
rules and regulations for insured and uninsured jobseekers to the effect 
that both groups are now subjected to the same procedures and have ac-
cess to the same instruments (Dingeldey 2005, 20). Since 2007, newly es-
tablished “one-stop” job centres have been delivering job-placement and 
benefit services, as well as making referrals to training and other services 
under one roof (Lindsay and McQuaid 2008).11 Like in Germany, Den-
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mark relied on two types of job centres from 2007 to 2009: in one type, 
central PES staff and local authorities co-managed all jobseekers, and in 
the other, municipal authorities worked without the assistance of federal 
PES staff. Following a government decision, the joint centres ceased to 
exist, much against the protest of the social partners and the opposition 
parties. Since the fall of 2009, only local municipalities have been respon-
sible for all services, incorporating and hiring previous PES staff members 
(personal conversation, CARMA).
 While Denmark, the UK, and Germany have introduced a variety of 
one-stop shops for all jobseekers, the other three countries in this study 
continue to have institutionally separate offices for employment and wel-
fare services. The Swedish government has made very little effort to in-
stitutionally merge municipal activation with the PES. There is, however, 
close co-operation between welfare and employment offices since SA 
recipients are not only expected to sign up with the local employment 
office to prove that they are actively seeking work, but ALMP measures 
offered by the PES can also be made available to them. The revised Social 
Service Act of 1998 even specifies that the “Social Service Board shall 
consult with the local Employment Services” about suitable programmes 
prior to SA recipients participating in municipal programmes (Thorén 
2008, 51). This collaboration between employment and welfare intensified 
during the 1990s, in particular with the launch of the Youth Guarantee 
(Ungdomsgarantin) for young, disadvantaged jobseekers (1998) and the 
Activation Guarantee (Aktivitetsgarantin) for the long-term unemployed 
(2000).12 More specifically, municipalities can send jobseekers to the PES 
to participate in various measures, while the PES can seek assistance from 
municipalities, in particular when it comes to the long-term unemployed 
who have gone through various stages of activation. These PES clients 
are then often placed into work-experience and practical-training pro-
grammes, organised by local municipalities (interview, DEMPL).
 In Austria, the co-operation between local welfare offices, which ser-
vice social assistance recipients, and employment offices in charge of both 
UB and UA recipients, has also increased substantially. In recent years, 
especially when the Social Democrats reclaimed power, the possibility 
of establishing “one-stop” centres became a salient political issue (inter-
view, CDA). However, the reluctance by the Christian Democratic coali-
tion partner and the resistance of various Länder governments, especially 
Kärnten, has prevented a real merger of PES and welfare offices along 
German lines. It has, however, been agreed that social assistance recipi-
ents who are deemed “capable of working” will be sent to the nearest lo-
 THE EMERGENCE OF THE ACTIVATION PARADIGM
cal employment office, where they will be exposed to the same activation 
measures as any other jobseeker (interview, AMS).
 Finally, Irish local welfare offices still issue unemployment benefits and 
other assistance payments, while FÁS offers job-placement, counselling 
and training services to jobseekers (insured and uninsured) and employed 
workers alike. However, the mutual collaboration and contact between 
welfare offices and FÁS has greatly intensified in recent years. In fact, one 
observer has described this trend as “the most important change” in the 
organisation of the Irish labour market regime (interview, CDI). Welfare 
and FÁS staff engage in frequent exchanges, share data, and refer custom-
ers to each other’s offices. In contrast to most other European countries, 
neither the FÁS nor the welfare office are sufficiently equipped with the 
resources or staff to adequately assist the most disadvantaged jobseek-
ers. This is why a network of additional and institutionally separate Local 
Employment Services (LESs) was established in the mid-1990s during a 
period of massive (long-term) unemployment (see chapter VII for more 
details).13 FÁS employment officers can refer “disadvantaged” customers 
to the LES, where they receive special services and staff-client ratios are 
much lower. The LES are embedded in a dense network of stakeholders, 
including local employers, local voluntary and community sector groups, 
and union-run employment centres. One interviewee described this divi-
sion of labour by referring to FÁS as the “primary doctor” and the LES as 
the “specialist” (interview, FÁS5).
VI.2.d Private Placement Agencies and Competitive Tendering
Consistent with the New Public Management philosophy, many govern-
ments have also sought to increase external competition in the provision 
of services. An important step in this direction includes the abandonment 
of long-held placement monopolies, which has not only allowed new pri-
vate sector actors to enter the market but also forced PESs to modernise. 
While the UK never ratiﬁ ed the 1949 ILO Convention 96, which prohibited 
employment services that charge fees, many European governments only 
allowed private employment agencies (PREAs) to operate during the 1990s, 
including Denmark (1990), the Netherlands (1991), Sweden (1993), Austria, 
Germany and Finland (1994). In 1997, the ILO then adopted the Employ-
ment Agencies Convention C181, which formalised the end of the PES mo-
nopoly (Phan-Th uy et al. 2001, 152). Th e scope of activities of private place-
ment agencies remains varied, ranging from less than one percent market 
penetration (daily full-time equivalent as a percentage of total employ-
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ment) in Denmark and Sweden, to one to two percent in Austria, Germany 
and Ireland, and more than four percent in the UK in 2006 (Report Com-
missioned by Eurocitt 2007, 8). Despite their limited role, collaborations 
between public and private employment services are often encouraged 
by governments, especially with respect to labour market data exchange. 
Some PESs have even begun to contract PREAs as programme providers 
for speciﬁ c clients. For instance, the centre-right government in Denmark 
began involving private placement providers for “weak groups” such as 
“seniors, refugees or immigrants” in 2001 (Bredgaard and Larsen 2007, 9). 
Germany introduced an “entitlement” as part of the Hartz reforms so that 
unemployment beneﬁ t recipients receive a placement voucher with which 
they can purchase PREA services after they are unemployed for over three 
months. Likewise, in 2009, the bourgeois Swedish government introduced 
a new “coaching” tool that allows jobseekers to consult private providers, 
who are then reimbursed by the Swedish PES.
 Beyond liberalising private placement services, PESs have generally 
become more “outward-looking actors” seeking to collaborate closely 
with private businesses, employers, and providers of a variety of services. 
Working closely with businesses and employers is part of the PESs’ new 
“customer-service orientation” that includes maximising the efficiency 
and the quality of matching vacancies with qualified applicants. Increased 
reliance on and collaboration with private service providers, in turn, has 
not only increased the number of actors involved in the labour market, 
but has also increased the reliance on more competitive tendering pro-
cesses. While service “contestability” has a long tradition in the UK, the 
Nordics have also begun to rely on external providers to deliver soft and 
occupational skills courses (personal conversation, SOFI). While Sweden 
had already begun introducing steps to shift services from public to private 
providers in the 1990s, Denmark followed suit in 2002 as part of the “More 
People in Work” reform process. Since then, external actors, including la-
bour unions, UI funds, education institutions etc., have been involved in 
competitive bidding procedures, establishing a “quasi-market” for the pro-
vision of these services for the ﬁ rst time in Danish history (Bredgaard and 
Larsen 2007, 8; Hendeliowitz and Woollhead 2007, 130). Th is trend toward 
including for-proﬁ t, private actors has gradually expanded since then, and 
peaked with the decision to “municipalise” all employment services (Jør-
gensen 2009). Th e not-for-proﬁ t voluntary and community sectors, in 
turn, continue to play a small role in the Nordics, mainly because of the 
long tradition of public sector predominance in welfare service delivery 
(personal conversation, SOFI, see also Th orén 2008, 53f.).
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 In the Continental cases, the delivery of training courses has always 
been “outsourced” to private training providers, traditionally linked 
to or entirely operated by either the labour unions or employer asso-
ciations. Because the social partners were represented on PES manage-
ment boards that are in charge of the bidding, accusations of favourit-
ism arose over time and the PESs were accused of mismanagement and 
inefficiency (for Austria, interviews, BMWA1, 2; for Germany, DGB1; 
Metall NRW). Austria began to first use open, competitive bids with the 
creation of its “new” PES in 1994, a trend that was strengthened in 2001. 
Germany followed suit in 2002/3 as part of the Hartz package. Finally, 
the Irish PES has also “become a very outward-looking organisation 
with their own contacts” (interview, CDI), and in particular, Specific 
Skills Training courses are increasingly provided by private actors. But 
in Ireland the motivation was not to generate “better and cheaper” ser-
vices (like in Denmark or Sweden) or to avoid accusations of favouritism 
(like in Austria and Germany). Instead, it was a pragmatic response to 
the drastic expansion of the demand for apprenticeships, which filled 
the training facilities, and rapidly changing course curricula to which 
private providers seemed to be able to respond to quicker (interviews, 
FÁS 1, 3, and 4).
VI.2.e Case Management and New Contractualism
The NPM philosophy that has underpinned much of these institutional 
developments has also trickled down to the daily workings of the PES. 
Far-reaching changes have occurred, particularly in the relationships 
between individual jobseeker and employment officers, now typically 
referred to as “customers” and “case managers” respectively. Individual 
case management, i.e., the delivery of individually tailored employment 
services, codified through individual action plans are now in use in all 
EU countries, and early intervention schemes are part and parcel of this 
new common paradigm. In this context, the negotiation of IAPs sym-
bolises the reliance on a new, moral rather than legal, contract between 
the state and its citizens (cf., Sol and Westerveld 2005). While many 
countries were already using IAPs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, their 
use has expanded from youth and the long-term unemployed to almost 
all customers, regardless of their benefits status. These contracts serve 
multiple functions, including the reduction of the moral hazards as-
sociated with the receipt of allegedly passive benefits, the increase in 
PES operations’ transparency, and the clear delineation of the rights and 
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responsibilities for both the state and the individual. In other words, 
the IAPs are seen not only as a “policing” tool, but also as a means for 
improving the jobseekers’ level of personal initiative and the quality of 
state assistance.
 The production of IAPs is a time-consuming and costly exercise. As 
a result, not all PES customers can expect a fully detailed plan. In or-
der to identify those clients that benefit most from IAPs, the “profiling” 
of jobseekers into different categories has become a central element in 
case management. This profiling may take place formally (through stan-
dardised, “objective” procedures) or informally (based on the “subjective” 
observations of a case manager).14 In most cases, clients are categorised 
according to their “distance” from the open labour market, and, as a re-
sult, specific instruments become available or are discarded. Profiling 
takes place, for instance, in Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Ireland and 
is currently being discussed in many other European countries, including 
the UK. Following the OECD recommendations of 1997, profiling in the 
aforementioned countries means that the jobseekers who are deemed “job 
ready” will not receive detailed IAPs. Case managers expect that most “job 
ready” clients will find employment on their own within a short period of 
time. When, however, a “crisis point” is reached – typically after three or 
six months, depending on the person’s age and qualifications – the job-
seeker is invited for a longer interview and an IAP is created. Jobseekers, 
in turn, with initial profiles that indicate the need for PES assistance will 
typically receive an IAP early in their unemployment period.
 Another crucial development was the introduction of a tiered structure 
of services and an expansion of self-service modes of delivery (Watts and 
Sultana 2005, 61). These reforms – which were also encouraged by the 
OECD and HoPES – have been required to reduce the tension between 
the need to deliver more individually tailored services, which necessitate 
more time and effort, and the simultaneous requirement to cater to an 
ever-increasing number of customers, which is caused by the activation 
of previously passive groups and the increased inflow of social assistance 
recipients to employment offices. In response, most local employment 
offices have been reorganised so that clients without appointments can 
access job vacancies, use free phone help lines, and other informational 
services in the office lobby, while clients with appointments are assisted 
more formally at customer desks. Some PESs are increasingly also making 
use of a variety of online services accessible from home, a service that is 
highly developed in the Scandinavian countries.
 THE EMERGENCE OF THE ACTIVATION PARADIGM
VI.2.f Conclusions
Most PESs have undergone a wave of reforms inspired by (or are at least in 
line with) the philosophy of NPM and the EU/OECD recommendations, 
including the following common trends: First, all six PESs under discus-
sion have moved from a system of “management-by-regulation” to one 
of “management-by-objective”.15 This has also increased concerns about 
the overall performance of PES programmes, triggering a shift from in-
put to output targets, on the one hand, and an increased emphasis on 
customer and staff satisfaction, on the other. Quality, meanwhile, is “en-
forced” through independent, third-party evaluations, which scrutinise 
the operations of individual programmes. Second, the new political agen-
da to raise overall employment levels and the normative underpinnings 
of mutual obligations has broadened the scope of activation to include 
social assistance recipients and other “inactive” people. As a result, ei-
ther “one-stop centres” were created, which combine welfare and employ-
ment offices under one roof (e.g., Denmark, Germany, and the UK), or, 
if the institutional separation has been preserved, welfare and employ-
ment offices have begun to work more closely together, sharing custom-
ers, programmes, and partners (e.g., Austria, Ireland, and Sweden). Third, 
the vast majority of European countries now permit private employment 
agencies to enter the market. In some cases, PESs co-operate with PREAs 
though the exchange of data, labour market information, etc. In others, 
PESs enter into contracts with PREAs that then deliver specialised tasks. 
Most PESs also increasingly rely on quasi-market mechanisms, primarily 
competitive bids, to select their service providers. The introduction of 
quasi-market mechanisms is, however, limited to skills provision, while 
other social services continue to be delivered mostly by not-for-profit ac-
tors. Generally speaking, European PESs have become outward-looking 
organisations that are more actively engaged in building new local part-
nerships and networks.16 Finally, all of the PESs now rely on IAPs for large 
segments of their customer base in order to establish a contractual basis. 
This benefits jobseekers and the PES employees alike, because IAPs indi-
vidualise and customise services, make labour market programmes more 
transparent, and increase the accountability of both the case managers 
and PES clients.
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VI.3 Financial Dimension
VI.3.a Sources of Revenue: Frozen Imagery
A necessary condition for the success of activation strategies is the avail-
ability of employment opportunities. In this context, both the OECD 
and the EU have discussed labour market institutions and labour costs 
as potential impediments to employment growth. The debates about la-
bour market institutions (LMI), such as employment protection legisla-
tion, statutory minimum wages, and co-ordinated wage-setting arrange-
ments, have remained largely ideologically driven and statistical findings 
continuously show ambiguous results. At the risk of oversimplification, I 
argue that right-leaning actors typically favour the flexibilisation of wage-
setting agreements and labour market deregulation, and left-leaning ac-
tors generally favour the observance of existing regulations that protect 
already employed workers’ wages and employment contracts. Similarly, 
left-leaning actors prefer high minimum wages that offer a decent stan-
dard of living, while right-of-centre actors favour no, or very low mini-
mum wage floors to reach market-clearing levels. As outlined in chapter 
V, economists have yet to provide clear evidence for the (interactive) ef-
fects of any of these labour market institutions on employment levels and 
growth. Recent studies suggest, for instance, that high EPL standards on 
their own do not necessarily have a negative impact on the overall level of 
unemployment, but may only affect particular groups (cf., Commission of 
the European Communities 2006; OECD 2006a). Similarly, if union cov-
erage is high and trade union confederations strong, co-ordinated wage-
setting mechanisms may even promote job growth if and when moderate, 
binding wage increases can be agreed upon (cf., OECD 2006a).17
 Th is brief overview shows that neither the EU nor the OECD can oﬀ er 
a clear prescription for core LMIs. However, both international organisa-
tions agree that reducing non-wage labour costs is a compelling way for 
governments to foster investments in jobs by ﬁ rms and thus spur employ-
ment growth. In other words, shifting the allocation of revenues for labour 
market and social policies from payroll contributions to general taxation 
is seen as a feasible method to increase the international competiveness of 
ﬁ rms and to stimulate investments in new jobs. How to compensate for the 
lost revenues that accompany payroll reductions remains controversial and 
thus issuing changes may prove to be a diﬃ  cult political endeavour. On the 
one hand, raising taxes elsewhere – even when presented as a trade-oﬀ  – 
may remain very problematic as no political party wants to be seen as being 
responsible for tax increases. On the other hand, simply reducing payroll 
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contributions by cutting services and/or beneﬁ t levels may not be accept-
able to left-leaning voters, labour unions, and other socially oriented actors.
  The following table illustrates non-wage labour costs for full-time 
workers for the years 2000 and 2006. The table illustrates that the Anglo-
phone welfare states and Denmark in particular have lower levels of pay-
roll taxation. However, despite the expectations outlined above, there has 
been no radical shift toward a substantial reduction in non-wage labour 
costs, for neither workers nor employers. One can observe only a slight 
reduction of non-wage labour costs for employers in Austria, Finland and 
Italy, but also substantial increases in France and the Netherlands. There 
have been barely any changes to average workers’ (AW) burdens, and if so, 
these changes point in the opposite direction in some of the cases to what 
would result from the EU and OECD’s the recommendations.
Table 24 Workers and Employers’ Social Security Contributions (SSC), 
2000 and 200618
2000 2006 Change in % points
Employee
SSC 
Employer
SSC
Employee
SSC
Employer
SSC
Employee
SSC
Employer
SSC
Austria 18.1 31.63 18.1 28.86  0 –2.77
Belgium 13.1 34.7 13.1 34.72  0  0.02
Denmark [1]a +8+
3% AW
 0.6% AW  8+
3% AW
 0.6% AW [-1]  0
Finland 7.2 26  7 24 –0.2 –2.0
France 13.52 35.95 13.6 41.05  0.08  5.1
Germany 20.5 20.5 21.4 21.4  0.9  0.9
Greece 15.9 27.96 16.0 28.06  0.1  0.1
Ireland  4.5  8.5  4.0  8.5 –0.5  0
Italy  9.19 34.08 9.19 32.08  0 –2.0
Netherlandsb 31.15+
0.6%AW
 7.4 31.7+
2.44%AW
14.36  0.55+
1.84%AW
 6.96
Portugal 11.0 23.75 11.0 23.75  0  0
Spain  6.4 30.6  6.4 30.6  0  0
Sweden  7.0 32.92  7.0 32.28  0 –0.64
UK 10 12.2 11 12.8 1.0 –0.6
a Mandatory contribution to institutions outside the government sector (not considered a 
tax in the OECD Taxing Wages report).
b The majority of these contributions is levied on taxable income. In the Netherlands, these 
aspects of social contributions are commonly considered part of the income tax.
Source: OECD Special Feature: Tax Reforms and Tax Burdens 2000-2006, 47ff , own calculations
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Based on the findings in table 24, one could argue that there has been very 
little institutional change, corroborating the above theorised difficulty in 
reducing or shifting tax burdens. The differences across and within re-
gime types remain pronounced, and no overall trend of convergence in 
regards to payroll contributions can be identified.
VI.3.b Expenditures – A Cost Reduction Trend?
With respect to labour market policy expenditures, clear country-speciﬁ c 
diﬀ erences are identiﬁ able. As expected, the Nordic countries (plus the Neth-
erlands) are the most generous, the Continental ones plus Ireland occupy a 
middle position, and the Mediterranean states and the UK are the least gen-
erous in the late 1990s. Since then, however, a slight trend of convergence is 
visible. Belgium as well as the least generous countries have tended to increase 
their spending (e.g., Austria, Spain and the UK), while the most generous have, 
at times signiﬁ cantly, reduced their spending eﬀ orts (e.g., Germany, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Netherlands, and Sweden). As a result, absolute spending 
patterns became more homogenous and the diﬀ erence between the highest 
and lowest spenders had narrowed substantially by 2007.
Table 25 Public Expenditures on ALMP as Percentage of GDP in West European 
Countries, 1997-2007
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Change
1997-
2007
AT 0.45 0.46 0.55 0.52 0.57 0.56 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.71 0.68 0.23
BE 1.10 1.27 1.23 1.08 1.14 1.03 1.14 1.15 1.08 1.09 1.30 0.20
DK 1.71 1.81 1.99 2.02 .. 2.02 1.91 1.85 .. .. 1.31 -0.40
FI 1.41 1.15 1.06 0.89 0.82 0.84 0.90 0.95 0.89 0.89 0.86 -0.55
FR 1.22 1.16 1.22 1.19 1.15 1.11 1.05 0.95 0.90 0.92 0.92 -0.30
DE 1.10 1.16 1.27 1.19 1.15 1.25 1.25 1.15 0.97 0.88 0.77 -0.33
GR 0.30 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. n/a
IE 1.26 1.15 1.06 0.95 0.88 0.80 0.71 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.62 -0.64
IT .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.63 0.57 0.50 0.46 n/a
NL 1.42 1.48 1.51 1.51 1.54 1.60 1.56 1.40 1.33 1.22 1.09 -0.33
PT 0.51 0.57 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.61 0.53 0.02
ES 0.40 0.56 0.85 0.79 0.74 0.72 0.71 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.40
SE 2.12 2.47 2.24 1.76 1.66 1.58 1.25 1.22 1.29 1.36 1.12 -1.00
UK 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.33 0.30 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.32 0.07
Source: OECD.stat, extracted on 30 June 2009
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A somewhat different picture emerges, however, when we also consider 
the level of unemployment in each country. In other words, when con-
trolling for the number of jobseekers, the relative spending of Denmark, 
Finland, France, and Ireland has increased rather then decreased, which 
thus changes the impression presented above. Only Germany, Sweden 
and now also Portugal emerge as countries that have actually cut expendi-
tures. Moreover, while Denmark and the Netherlands, and further behind, 
Sweden, remain the most generous countries, the distinction between the 
Liberal and the Continental countries has become less pronounced. Based 
on these calculations, the laggards include not only the Mediterranean 
countries and the UK, which was to be expected, but surprisingly also 
Germany in recent years.19
When analysing the spending priorities of these countries in greater detail, 
one begins to recognise signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences within and across regime 
types. As the following two tables illustrate, Denmark (prior to 2007), Swe-
den and the Mediterranean countries spent more money on employment 
or work subsidies than other European countries (except Belgium in 2007), 
Table 26 Spending on ALMP as Percentage of GDP Divided by the Standardised Rate 
of Unemployment in West European Countries, 1997-2007
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Change
1997-
2007
AT 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.04
BE 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.05
DK 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.45 .. 0.47 0.35 0.35 .. .. 0.36 0.05
FI 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.01
FR 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.02
DE 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.09 -0.02
GR 0.03 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. n/a
IE 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.01
IT .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 n/a
NL 0.26 0.34 0.43 0.49 0.57 0.51 0.36 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.04
PT 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 -0.01
ES 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.08
SE 0.21 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.18 -0.03
UK 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.02
Source: OECD.stat, extracted on 30 June 2009
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while most of the Continentals (plus Ireland) tend to rely on publicly funded 
works projects at the local level.20 It is evident, however, that there is a clear 
trend in all European countries (except Spain) to cut expenditures involving 
direct job creation. Th ese cuts are in line with OECD and other programme 
evaluations that suggest that direct job creation has generally experienced 
little success in assisting participants in their progression into the open la-
bour market. Th e maintenance of (some level of ) direct job-creation mea-
sures remains an appropriate tool, however, when policymakers seek to 
provide job opportunities to jobseekers facing severe hurdles. Examples of 
these programmes include the Community Employment scheme in Ireland, 
work in so-called social-economy ﬁ rms (sozio-ökonomische Betriebe) in 
Austria, and the new JobPerspektive in Germany (see below in this chapter).
 With regard to spending on active labour market training, the Nor-
dic countries, this time including Finland, emerge as the most generous 
countries. But also here, one finds a discernable trend toward reducing 
expenditures in the Nordic cluster as well as in other relatively generous 
countries such as France and Germany. Large-scale increases, in turn, are 
visible mostly in Austria. Overall, Britain, Greece, and surprisingly, the 
Netherlands appear as the countries with the lowest spending levels on 
pre-employment training. The following tables summarise these findings.
Table 27 Total Public Expenditure on Employment/Work Subsidies as Percentage of 
GDP in Western European Countries, 1997-2007
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Change
1997-
2007
AT 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.02
BE 0.12 0.26 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.42 0.30
DK 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.47 .. .. 0.13 -0.32
FI 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.01
FR 0.30 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 -0.17
DE 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.00
GR 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.21 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.06 .. n/a
IE 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.08
IT 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.31 0.42 0.37 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.05
NL 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.06
PT 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.03
ES 0.08 0.21 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.24
SE 0.48 0.45 0.49 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.51 0.48 0.00
UK 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Source: OECD.stat, extracted on 30 June 2009
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Table 28 Total Public Expenditures on Direct Job Creation as Percentage of GDP in 
Western European Countries, 1997-2007
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Change
1997-
2007
AT 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00
BE 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.43 0.34 0.35 0.34 -0.11
DK 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .. .. 0.00 -0.18
FI 0.35 0.25 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 -0.27
FR 0.24 0.30 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.20 -0.04
DE 0.25 0.31 0.34 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.07 -0.18
GR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .. n/a
IE 0.56 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.29 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 -0.35
IT 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04
NL 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.11 -0.13
PT 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.03
ES 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.02
SE 0.41 0.35 0.19 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.41
UK 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Source: OECD.stat, extracted on 30 June 2009
Table 29 Total Public Expenditures on Training as Percentage of GDP in Western 
European Countries, 1997-2007
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Change
1997-
2007
AT 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.37 0.16
BE 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.02
DK 0.68 0.74 0.84 0.77 0.74 0.70 0.62 0.54 .. .. 0.33 -0.35
FI 0.66 0.53 0.47 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.37 -0.29
FR 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.27 -0.17
DE 0.44 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.44 0.36 0.24 0.33 0.28 -0.16
GR 0.14 0.2 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 .. n/a
IE 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 -0.05
IT 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.2 0.18 0.18 -0.05
NL 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.10 -0.09
PT 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.20 0.03
ES 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.02
SE 0.57 0.95 0.90 0.66 0.67 0.60 0.36 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.20 -0.37
UK 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.05
Source: OECD.stat, extracted on 30 June 2009
WORK INCENTIVE DIMENSION
To summarise, while traditional country cleavages remain with respect to 
spending generosity, theses diﬀ erences have become less pronounced over 
time. When we consider spending priorities, however, it has become ap-
parent that diﬀ erent countries prefer diﬀ erent measures. As the literature 
on path dependency predicts, the Nordics tend to be the most generous in 
overall spending terms and with respect to public funding of training for the 
unemployed, which is often seen as the most prominent instrument associ-
ated with ALMPs. Th e Nordic countries are also the most generous in terms 
of employment subsidies, which are paid to employers upon hiring particu-
lar unemployed persons. Th e Continental welfare states and Ireland occupy 
a position in the middle and tend to promote publicly funded employment 
in local communities as well as wage subsidies paid to workers. Th e UK and 
the Mediterranean welfare states tend to spend the the least overall and es-
pecially with respect to training programmes for the unemployed.
VI.4 Work Incentive Dimension
VI.4.a Negative Non-Financial Work Incentives
In accordance with the expectations articulated in the section on the nor-
mative and cognitive labour market dimension, the following overview 
will show that there has been a convergence on an “activating” benefits re-
gime through a mix of both positive and negative non-financial work in-
centives. Quite systematically, countries across all regime types have ap-
plied non-financial negative incentives to tighten access to state benefits 
through stricter availability criteria. These criteria include benefits tar-
geting, which is typically achieved through more selectivity (fewer people 
qualify for benefits), and a combination of a higher density of contacts, 
coupled with the verification of work availability through regular sign-ins 
with the local employment and welfare agencies, which are intended to 
reduce benefit abuse. Moreover, active job-search requirements are ap-
plied earlier and more systematically during an individual’s period of un-
employment. For instance, in some countries, unemployed jobseekers can 
be directly placed into a new job during the time of initial registration 
for benefits payments or during intensive follow-up interviews (e.g., Aus-
tria, Germany, Greece, and Portugal). In other countries, jobseekers have 
to underwrite their work availability and job-search commitment before 
benefits payments begin, which is then further tested in post-registration 
intensive interviews (e.g., Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and the UK). In the case of Sweden, benefits can be curtailed retro-
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spectively if there is doubt about the applicant’s availability for work and 
whether she is actively seeking work (OECD 2007c, 7ff ).
 Availability criteria also include tighter definitions of “suitable job of-
fers”, e.g., how long workers can be expected to travel to work, or what an 
appropriate reduction in wage expectations might be. The definition of 
suitable job offers has frequently been widened or even completely abol-
ished (OECD 2007c, 7ff ). For instance, Denmark makes no reservations 
for jobseekers, meaning they must theoretically accept any “appropriate” 
job offer they qualify for. In most of the other countries, jobseekers have 
a limited period of time at the beginning of one’s unemployment dur-
ing which they can refuse offers outside of their field or when wages are 
below their typical earnings (e.g., 13 weeks in the UK, 100 days in Aus-
tria and Sweden, three months in Ireland and Finland). Similarly, some 
countries, including Sweden, Belgium, Austria and Denmark, require the 
unemployed to be willing to travel up to three or four hours to work daily, 
effectively requiring them to relocate. In most cases, the highest demands 
for mobility are on young, single jobseekers, while families with children 
are typically not required to move.
 Requiring greater mobility from jobseekers not only increases the pool 
of workers available to employers, thus making vacancies easier to fill, 
but it also reduces overall wage pressures. Lower wages and a reduction 
in job vacancies, in turn, can have a positive impact on structural unem-
ployment levels. However, pressuring jobseekers too quickly into inap-
propriate jobs may reduce productivity levels (as highly qualified workers 
will not reach their full potential) or increase dissatisfaction in the work-
place (also reducing productivity and potentially encouraging industrial 
strife and/or high turnover). Therefore, finding the appropriate balance 
between labour market efficiency and productivity is difficult and coun-
tries tend have their own definitions about what constitutes a “suitable” 
job for their jobseekers. While it is difficult to “quantify” changes in these 
regulations over time, qualitative reviews show that almost all of the EU-
15 countries have tightened their availability criteria, with Austria and 
Ireland in the forefront (cf., Hasselpflug 2005).
VI.4.b Negative Financial Work Incentives
Th e extent to which negative ﬁ nancial incentives are used is much more 
varied. Th ere are still great diﬀ erences in the generosity of cash transfers and 
the use of “exit options”. Th e following table provides an overview of initial 
unemployment beneﬁ ts (UB) levels (as a percentage of the previous average 
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wage) in 2001 and 2006 for three types of workers: a low-income, average 
and high-income worker, averaged across various income types, including 
single persons, one and two-earner households, with and without children.
While no clear pattern is immediately discernable from this table, it is ap-
parent that Greece, Ireland, Italy and the UK are among the least generous 
countries regarding low-income jobseekers, while Belgium, Greece, Ireland 
and the UK are among the least generous for average and high-income cli-
enteles. Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, and surprisingly 
Portugal and Spain, are the most generous regarding low-income jobseek-
ers, while Germany, France and Portugal are the most generous for high-
income earners. Perhaps more striking than the regime-atypical diversity is 
the lack of welfare “retrenchment” in entitlement levels. With the exception 
of the Nordic countries, where a moderate cut across clienteles is noticeable, 
beneﬁ ts have remained stable and maybe even increased (most notably in 
Ireland and the UK as well as Italy for low- and average-income workers).
Table 30 Average Net Replacement Rates for Unemployed Persons at the Initial Stage 
of Unemployment at Diff erent Earning Levels, 2001 and 2006
Ø 67% of AW Ø 100% of AW Ø 150% of AW
2001 2006 Change 2001 2006 Change 2001 2006 Change
Austria 70 70 0 68 67 -1 56 53 -3
Belgium 76 75 -1 61 60 -1 47 47 0
Denmark 91 90 -1 73 71 -2 60 58 -2
Finland 83 80 -3 74 70 -4 61 58 -3
France 80 81 +1 74 71 -3 72 71 -1
Germany 77 77 0 74 74 0 71 69 -2
Greece 60 60 0 45 47 +2 34 35 +1
Ireland 63 67 +4 51 56 +5 39 44 +5
Italy 62 70 +8 63 72 +9 58 57 -1
Netherlands 82 82 0 72 74 +2 61 61 0
Portugal 81 84 +3 83 85 +2 87 84 -3
Spain 80 81 +1 74 73 -1 56 54 -2
Sweden 88 88 0 74 71 -3 58 56 -2
United 
Kingdom
58 63 +5 46 50 +4 34 37 +3
Average 75 76 +1 66 67 +1 57 56 -1
Source: http://www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, last accessed on 2009/04/14, own 
calculations
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 The following table provides a similar snapshot of cash-transfer levels 
to the long-term unemployed, that is, the averages for the same family 
types after 60 months of unemployment. This table shows a somewhat 
different pattern and some regime-specific trends are discernable. The 
percentages indicated here include, if applicable, a combination of un-
employment benefits, social assistance payments, family allowances and 
housing subsidies after tax.
Table 31 clearly indicates that the Continental welfares states of the Medi-
terranean variant, including Greece, Italy and to some extent Spain offer 
little or no assistance to long-term unemployed jobseekers and otherwise 
inactive citizens, reflecting their family-based welfare support systems. 
The Nordic welfare states along with Belgium, the Netherlands and Ire-
land are above the average for all income clienteles. The UK is also con-
sistently right around the average, which shows that regime type is a very 
crude indicator, albeit, somewhat better than for initial unemployment 
Table 31 Average Net Replacement Rates for Long-term Unemployed Persons at 
Diff erent Earning Levels, 2001 and 2006
Ø 67% of AW Ø 100% of AW Ø 150% of AW
2001 2006 Change 2001 2006 Change 2001 2006 Change
Austria 67 62 -5 57 55 -2 47 36 -11
Belgium 71 73 +2 58 58 0 45 39 -6
Denmark 79 77 -2 63 62 -1 52 42 -10
Finland 76 73 -3 62 59 -3 48 39 -9
France 60 60 0 45 44 -1 32 30 -2
Germany 72 67 -5 63 53 -10 61 38 -23
Greece 18 18 0 15 15 0 12 10 -2
Ireland 71 76 +5 57 62 +5 43 41 -2
Italy 20 20 0 17 17 0 14 11 -3
Netherlands 71 74 +3 53 59 +6 40 39 -1
Portugal 50 50 0 38 38 0 28 26 -2
Spain 47 46 -1 36 35 -1 27 24 -3
Sweden 72 69 -3 54 52 -2 42 35 -7
United 
Kingdom
62 63 +1 49 50 +1 37 34 -4
Average 60 59 -1 48 47 -1 38 32 -6
Source: http://www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, last accessed on 2009/04/14, own 
calculations
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benefits payments. Perhaps most strikingly, literally all of the countries 
have reduced transfers for the high-income bracket with the most sig-
nificant cuts institutionalised in Germany, followed by Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden. Increases, in turn, are rare and mostly noticeable in Ireland 
and the Netherlands for low and average incomes only.
 While it has been established that there is great diversity regarding the 
generosity of negative ﬁ nancial incentives, there is also continued diver-
sity regarding the duration of beneﬁ ts payments, both within and across 
regime types. However, many governments have shortened the eligibility 
duration for unemployment beneﬁ ts, in some cases, quite dramatically. 
Examples include the UK, where the UB duration was reduced from 12 
to six months in 1996; Germany, where UB payments were cut from 32 
months to 12 months in 2005 for adult jobseekers (older workers with long 
work biographies may receive beneﬁ ts for up to 24 months); Ireland, where 
UB payments were reduced from 15 to 12 months in October 2008; Den-
mark, where the duration of UB was gradually reduced from nine to four 
years, albeit with compulsory activation that may start as early as after 
three months after becoming unemployed; and Sweden, where the cen-
tre-right government reduced the duration of beneﬁ ts payments in early 
2007 to 60 weeks total, albeit with a reduction in payment generosity after 
40 weeks already (OECD 2007b). In this context, another common trend 
in many European countries has been the abolition of the possibility of 
re-qualifying for UB payments after participation in active labour market 
programmes (e.g., Denmark, Germany, and Sweden). Th e following box 
illustrates unemployment insurance beneﬁ t durations along regime lines.
Box 13 Maximum Unemployment Benefi ts Duration in Months for Prime-Aged 
Workers, Indicating Changes in the Duration of UB Benefi t Payments from 
mid-1990s to 2008
Anglophone Europe
 • Ireland (15  12)
 • UK (12  6)
Nordic Europe
 • Denmark (108 48)
 • Finland (23)
 • Sweden (28  14)
Continental Europe (centre)
 • Austria (9)
 • Belgium (indefi nite)
 • France (23)
 • Germany (32  12)
 • Netherlands (24)
Continental Europe (south)
 • Greece (12)
 • Italy (6)
 • Portugal (24)
 • Spain (24)
Source: OECD, 1997d, 2007a
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In summary, while differences remain significant, recent developments 
suggest that there is a rather common trend toward reducing the dura-
tion of benefit payments, and no country in Western Europe has actually 
increased the duration of benefit payments. This trajectory is in line with 
empirical studies that suggest that unconditional UB payments paid over 
a prolonged period of time contribute to higher levels of long-term un-
employment (e.g., Esping-Andersen 2000b; Gangl 2002).21 It also seems 
to suggest that it is politically a more viable option to reduce benefit pay-
ment duration rather than its generosity.
 A final aspect that is closely related to the generosity and duration of 
unemployment benefits and other assistance payments is the availabil-
ity of “exit options”. Chapter IV has shown that during the early to mid-
1980s, the OECD promoted – under certain circumstances – the use of 
early retirement options as a way to alleviate high levels of unemploy-
ment and to “open up” job opportunities for younger workers. This ad-
vice was taken to heart by many Continental countries, including both 
Austria and Germany. But also the Nordics and to a lesser extent the 
Anglophone countries made use of this instrument. With the new po-
litical agenda of raising employment levels – and the experience in many 
countries that early retirement did not lead to the intended effect of 
lowering youth unemployment – this instrument has increasingly come 
under criticism and both the OECD and the EU now call for the abolish-
ment of these schemes and the parallel expansion of “lifelong learning” 
instruments to retain older workers in the workforce. Many European 
countries have subsequently begun to phase out or severely curtail early 
retirement schemes, including, for instance, Ireland, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, Sweden, and the UK. More specifically, in Sweden, the option 
for early retirement for labour market reasons was abolished in 1991, and 
the Partial Pension Scheme was phased out in 2001 (Anxo and Niklasson 
2004, 30). Similarly, in Ireland, the government has been gradually phas-
ing out the Pre-retirement Scheme since 2006. Instead, older workers re-
ceive a UA payment, which means, however, that they need to fulfil regu-
lar work availability requirements. Germany also introduced substantive 
legislative changes in the fall of 2005. Access to early retirement schemes 
has been limited and the early retirement age is being gradually raised 
from 60 to 63 years of age, while the regular retirement age will gradually 
rise from 65 to 67 years of age.
 Smaller path corrections have also been undertaken in Austria and 
Denmark. In June 2006, as part of a Welfare Agreement between the so-
cial partners, the Danish government and the main opposition parties 
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agreed to retain the “right” to an early exit, but raised the entry age from 
60 to 62, in line with the increase in the age of regular retirement from 65 
to 67. Moreover, the special rule for older workers, which “forced” older 
workers who had been unemployed for more than two-and-a-half years 
into early retirement, was also abandoned, while a “right” to a senior job 
offer on conditions reached by the social partners was introduced, effec-
tive 1 January 2008. Similarly, in Austria, the use of early exit options has a 
long tradition and Austria has been the “taillight” with respect to employ-
ment rates for older workers (see figure below). As late as 1 January 2000, 
the Austrian conservative-populist government managed to introduce a 
new “old-age part-time” law (Altersteilzeit), which allowed older workers 
with long working biographies to reduce their working hours by 40 to 60 
percent, while receiving wage compensation from the Austrian PES in re-
turn. The goal of the programme was to encourage older workers to actu-
ally work longer by allowing them to adjust their own working hours. As 
the uptake of the programme rapidly exceeded the government’s expecta-
tions, access was tightened in 2004 by gradually raising the age threshold 
from 50 to 55 years of age for women and from 55 to 60 years for men.
 Moreover, in line with reducing the use of early retirement schemes, 
most European governments have made significant attempts to cur-
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tail the excessive use of disability pensions. Access has been tightened, 
cases re-reviewed, and programmes closed off to new entrants. Promi-
nent examples of these developments include the Netherlands and the 
UK, but recalibration efforts have also been made in Austria, Denmark, 
Ireland and Sweden, while Germany already has a rather strict disabil-
ity benefits system. As it is difficult to find reliable and comprehen-
sive comparative data on the use of exit options, including early retire-
ment, disability pensions and even other forms such as prolonged UB 
payments or social partnership arrangements, the employment rate of 
older, male workers aged 60 to 64 is used here as an approximation of 
the availability of such measures. While the data does not control for 
fluctuations in overall unemployment or improved health of the work-
ers, it can nevertheless provide an indication of the change in activity 
levels of older workers, which are directly affected by the availability of 
exit options.
 As expected by the described policy changes above, figure 4 shows 
that there has been a rather significant increase in the employment levels 
of older, male workers in most European countries, especially Finland, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. The main exceptions include Belgium, 
France, Italy and Portugal. In Portugal, however, the level of employment 
has been fairly high over the past number of years.
 In summary, the data and empirical analyses suggest that the “nega-
tive” work incentives category displays a somewhat mixed picture. On 
the one hand, there has been an increase in the emphasis on non-finan-
cial negative incentives, including benefits conditionality and a tighter, 
more targeted access to benefits. This means that periods of joblessness 
are interrupted earlier by state authorities, job-search requirements have 
been tightened, and the definition of “suitability” has often been loos-
ened. Thus, the expectations for jobseekers have increased, which is con-
sistent with the normative shifts built on the predominant “mutual obli-
gations” philosophy. On the other hand, with regard to financial negative 
incentives, major country differences – although no regime-specific ones 
– remain especially when considering the generosity of state transfers. 
Likewise, while benefits levels have been stable in some countries, others 
have seen decreases, which were often made possible indirectly through 
new indexation methods such as ending automatic benefits adjustments 
to inflation. In turn, with respect to the duration of benefits payments, 
many countries have reduced the length of time jobseekers have access to 
benefits, abolished the possibility to re-qualify for UB payments through 
participation in ALMPs, and introduced compulsory activation at an ear-
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lier stage of the joblessness period. Similarly, while there is no uniform 
trend across Europe, most countries have abolished or severely reduced 
the availability of early exit options.
VI.4.c Positive Non-Financial Work Incentives
Individual Action Plans
While the previous section pointed out that jobseekers are under more 
pressure today to actively seek jobs, there has also been more pressure 
on welfare and employment offices to support these efforts in a more 
positive, client-oriented way. One trend is that jobseekers are assigned 
a personal case manager or supervisor, who motivates and guides job-
seekers in their search efforts. PES case managers in all EU-15 countries 
now formulate an IAP for most of their jobseekers, codifying both parties’ 
rights and responsibilities. In most countries, exceptions for drawing up 
an IAP are made only when clients are considered immediately job-ready 
and therefore are expected to find in the near future a job without much 
PES assistance. Despite the extended use of IAPs, the timing differs for 
the various countries. In some countries, e.g., Austria, Germany, Sweden, 
and the UK, IAPs are formulated during the initial registration interview 
or during a second intensive follow-up interview, which is typically held 
within the first four weeks of unemployment. In these countries, the initial 
IAPs are less detailed. More elaborate ones follow when a “crisis point” is 
reached (typically after three months of joblessness) or when jobseekers 
are “flagged” as being at risk of drifting into long-term unemployment. In 
other countries, including Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, or Spain, an initial 
IAP is formulated only after a crisis point is reached, again, depending on 
the jobseekers’ age and profiling category after three, six, or nine months 
of unemployment (OECD 2007c, 56ff ).
Provision of Occupational and “Soft” Skills Courses
Regarding the instruments applied, or the content of the IAPs, all six Eu-
ropean countries in this study have improved and expanded vocational 
guidance and job-counselling services in recent years. A critical part of 
the job-counselling services is the increased use of “soft skills”, which are 
often group-based courses that typically aim to improve the basic job-
search, motivational and presentational skills. This focus goes hand-in-
hand with the overall “work-first” orientation, i.e., the goal to match job-
seekers with available vacancies more quickly and more effectively. The 
PESs also increasingly offer more and better opportunities for non- and 
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low-skilled individuals to acquire basic literacy and numeracy skills, or to 
complete a diploma equivalent to a secondary-level school degree.
 With respect to more costly, high-end training courses, there has been 
a trend toward shortening the duration of these courses – especially in 
Austria and Germany – and to deliberately select only qualified jobseek-
ers, who are more likely to progress into gainful employment after course 
completion (for Austria, see Lutz and Mahringer 2007, 206). In both Aus-
tria and Germany, labour unions and other stakeholders are concerned 
that their systems have become somewhat unbalanced in favour of short-
term “soft skill” courses at the expense of traditional training courses (in-
terviews, AK, DGB1, DGB2, ÖGB). It is important to note, however, that 
Austria is still operating within a general trend of increasing spending 
on ALMPs, including training, while Germany has gone through major 
organisational reforms following the Hartz IV reforms, which temporar-
ily inhibited the full delivery of training courses. Accordingly, there was a 
sense that both governments in office in 2009 were trying to “course cor-
rect” and to make access to training more balanced. Both Nordic countries 
in this study have experienced significant cutbacks in high-level training 
under their centre-right governments. For instance, the Danish govern-
ment has significantly reduced its skills upgrading efforts for jobseekers 
since 2001, while they have boosted job-search requirements, which has 
been described as a shift “from a significant focus on social integration 
to a much greater emphasis on social disciplining” (Larsen and Mailand 
2007, 99). Similarly, the Swedish government has more openly embraced 
a “work-first” approach and has, as a consequence, also reduced labour 
market training options (Fiscal Policy Council 2009). As both of these 
countries started at very favourable levels, they continue to remain gener-
ous compared to the rest of Europe.
 Developments in occupational skills training are somewhat different 
in the Anglophone countries. While Ireland has continued to offer high-
level training to qualified jobseekers (Specific Skills Training, SST), a va-
riety of preparatory courses for jobseekers who are not quite ready to 
participate in SST courses, as well as a wide range of apprenticeships, the 
UK has improved its support for low-skilled people in work instead. The 
UK’s unique strategy is based on one empirical finding and one norma-
tive conviction. With respect to the latter, policymakers in Britain firmly 
believe that the main task of the PES is to find work for jobseekers and 
not to equip them with occupational skills (which is an individual respon-
sibility). As regards the former, empirical studies suggested that adults 
learn better in a work setting than in PES training centres. Studies also 
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showed, however, that employers are more likely to invest in workers who 
already have skills than in those who do not (interview, DWP5). In con-
sequence to these findings, UK policymakers concluded that jobseekers 
needed first and foremost assistance with their job searches, and then, 
once in employment, they should be offered ways to improve their quali-
fications to the point where further skills investments become attractive 
to employers. New Labour’s flagship programme, Train to Gain, which 
was launched in 2006, seeks to achieve precisely these outcomes by offer-
ing low-skilled workers fully-paid access to training (both on and off the 
job), while also offering employers subsidies to compensate for the lost 
man-hours (Page and Hillage 2006). Training, which is delivered through 
Learning and Skills Councils, can include literacy and numeracy skills, 
vocational qualifications, and leadership and management training. With 
Train to Gain, the government effectively introduced an Adult Level 2 
Entitlement to adult workers, i.e., a legal “right” to attain first full Level 2 
qualifications free of charge. As of 1 August 2007, there is also an Adult 
Level 3 Entitlement for young adults between the ages of 19 and 24. The 
government also expanded the number of available apprenticeship posi-
tions to 250,000, with a goal of 400,000, and abolished all age restric-
tions, thus making apprenticeships also available to older workers. Last, 
the Leitch Review, requested by Gordon Brown and published in 2006, 
has challenged the purely “work-first” strategy of the JCP and triggered 
a debate within government and corresponding ministries of how to link 
employment and training services. These debates have led to pilot pro-
grammes in which local JCPs work closely with the Learning and Skills 
Councils to provide jobseekers joint employment and skills advice ser-
vices (interview, DfES).
 In summary, great variations in skills enhancement remain across re-
gime types. There is a trajectory, however, among the “high spenders” 
(Denmark, Germany, and Sweden) to cut costs through customer target-
ing and focusing more strongly on vocational guidance rather than on 
training. In turn, there is also a trajectory among the “low spenders” (Aus-
tria and the UK) to increase expenditures on training. In the case of Aus-
tria, the focus has been on the unemployed, while the UK  has opted to 
make basic skills training more accessible to low-skilled workers.
The Provision of Childcare
Probably the most regime-typical diversity – and yet gradual convergence 
– can still be found with regard to additional employment-related services 
such as childcare. While the issue of childcare has become salient in all 
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European countries – and the 2002 Barcelona European Council enshrined 
the goal of providing childcare to 90 percent of all children between three 
years of age and the mandatory school age – as well as to at least 33 per-
cent of children under three years by the year 2010, few Member States 
are equipped to reach this ambitious target.22 In particular, countries with 
very limited access to childcare, such as the Mediterranean welfare states 
including Italy or Spain show correspondingly low levels of female em-
ployment. In turn, it is the Nordic countries, including Denmark, Finland, 
and Sweden that continue to provide exceptional services for parents in 
general and female jobseekers in particular (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2004). An important leg-
islative change took place, however, in Denmark in 1995, when the So-
cial Democrats followed the Swedish example set in 1985, and introduced 
a statutory “right” to high-quality, accessible, and aﬀ ordable childcare. 
While the responsibility to oﬀ er these childcare places has continued to 
rest with local authorities, the government’s legislative mandate has been 
seen as a step toward  re-centralisation of the Danish welfare system.
 In other words, while Danish and Swedish institutional developments 
predate the EES and the Barcelona Summit, and thus serve as inspiration, 
much political activity has occurred in the “Anglophone” welfare states 
since the late 1990s and in the “centre” Continental welfare states, particu-
larly since the mid-2000s. In both of these regions – with the exception 
of France and Belgium – childcare facilities are sparse and the traditional 
male breadwinner model is still deeply ingrained in society. However, in 
recent years, governments from both ends of the political spectrum have 
increasingly addressed childcare needs. For instance, the governments of 
Austria and Germany have pledged to signiﬁ cantly improve the infrastruc-
ture of childcare facilities for children under the age of three. In Germany, 
it was the Red-Green government, that ﬁ rst addressed this issue on 1 Janu-
ary 2005 with the issuance of the childcare expansion act (Tagesbetreuung-
sausbaugesetz, TAG), which envisioned the creation of 230,000 new child-
care places by the year 2010. Th e successive Christian Democratic Minister 
further pushed this agenda and, in April 2007, the federal government, the 
Länder, and the local authorities committed themselves to providing ei-
ther a childcare place or access to a childminder for 35 percent of children 
under the age of three, which means 750,000 childcare places by 2013 (for 
more details, see chapter VII). In Austria, in turn, the right-wing coalition 
government, which was in power from 2000 to 2006, showed little interest 
in expanding childcare provisions. Instead, the government signiﬁ cantly 
increased child beneﬁ ts with the explicit goal of encouraging low-skilled 
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women to exit the labour market (interview, IHS1).23 However, when a So-
cial Democratic-Christian Democratic coalition government returned to 
oﬃ  ce in late 2006, Austria made the provision of childcare a key issue 
(Weishaupt 2009). Th e government, inspired by German developments, 
promised to subsidise the creation of 5,000 places annually, with a total 
target of 50,000 places (interviews, WKÖ2, WIFO).
 The UK and Ireland have also seen a dramatic increase in both the 
salience and political will to provide more and better access to childcare. 
Although they started out with very limited institutional capacities, both 
countries recently initiated and delivered national childcare strategies to 
expand the provision of childcare places and improved the assistance of-
fered to single parent jobseekers with unfulfilled care needs. More specif-
ically, the Irish government launched a series of programmes, including 
the 1998 Equal Opportunities Childcare Programme (EOCP I), the Equal 
Opportunities Childcare Programme 2000–2006 (EOCP II), and the Na-
tional Childcare Investment Programme (NCIP) 2006-2010. While the 
EOCP I and II were intended to tackle child poverty through improving 
employment opportunities for low-income, often single-parent families 
to whom private childcare was unaffordable, the NCIP targeted the gener-
al population by creating an additional 50,000 places nationwide by 2010 
(for more details, see chapter VII). The UK’s New Labour government 
made access to affordable childcare one of its key promises in as early 
as 1998 and subsequently initiated a comprehensive ten-year Childcare 
Strategy in 2004. The Strategy is intended to provide financial support 
and co-ordinate the activities of local authorities and their partners in 
delivering high-quality, affordable childcare to parents with children up 
to the age of 14. Furthermore, parents with children aged three or four are 
now “entitled” to 15 hours of childcare (interview, TUC2).
 To summarise, while both Continental and Liberal welfare states (ex-
cept for France and perhaps Belgium) are still characterised by a general 
lack of affordable, high-quality childcare providers, the state-led provi-
sion of childcare has gained in salience and substantial legislative initia-
tives have followed. While emerging skills shortages in many industries 
was certainly an important element in fostering this agenda24 – policy-
makers hoped that qualified, young mothers would return to work more 
quickly when childcare needs were fulfilled – most observers argued that 
the EU has also made a positive contribution toward this goal. (Interview-
ees in Austria, Germany, and Ireland acknowledged the EU’s role, while 
interviewees in the UK did not mention the EU as a reason why the gov-
ernment pursued childcare initiatives).
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VI.4.d Positive Financial Work Incentives
While this brief overview of non-ﬁ nancial positive incentives suggests a gen-
eral trajectory toward the provision of individually tailored services, coupled 
with continued, but narrowing diﬀ erences in regard to occupational training 
measures and an EU-wide eﬀ ort to expand the provision of childcare places, 
the following section will show that there is very little evidence of convergence 
with respect to ﬁ nancial incentives. In the ﬁ nancial context, the EU and the 
OECD have often advocated recalibration of national policies to incentivise 
accepting low-wage employment over collecting beneﬁ ts. Indicators for the 
existence of appropriate ﬁ nancial work incentives include (a) the level of 
taxation for low-wage and average-wage employment, (b) the generosity of 
statutory minimum wages (SMW) and other regulations that guarantee a 
wage ﬂ oor above social beneﬁ ts, and (c) in-work and/or negative income tax 
credits available to compensate for low incomes. Th e following two tables 
summarise the average tax rates (personal income tax plus social security 
contributions) and gross statutory minimum wages (per hour, US dollars at 
2005 market exchange rates and constant prices) in 14 European countries.
Table 32 Average Tax Rates for Full-time Workers at Two Wage Levels, 2000 and 2005
 Personal Income Tax plus Employee Social Security Contributions
2001 2006 Change 2001 2006 Change
67% APW 67% APW 2000-2005 APW APW 2000-2005
Austria 25.6 26.6 +1.0 31.0 32.7 +1.7
Belgium 35.8 34.8 -1.0 35.8 41.9 +6.1
Denmark 40.8 38.7 -2.1 44.1 40.8 -3.3
Finland 28.1 25.0 -3.1 34.2 31.3 -2.9
France 25.7 26.0 +0.3 28.8 29.0 +0.2
Germany 38.1 36.4 -1.7 44.5 42.5 -2.0
Greece 17.4 16.5 -0.9 21.1 23.7 +2.6
Ireland 11.1 7.9 -3.2 20.3 15.3 -5.0
Italy 23.7 22.4 -1.3 28.2 27.3 -0.9
Netherlands 32.6 31.9 -0.7 33.2 32.5 -0.7
Portugal 17.3 15.6 -1.7 22.4 21.2 -1.2
Spain 14.7 15.8 +1.1 19.8 20.2 +0.4
Sweden 31.7 29.2 -2.5 33.7 31.3 +2.4
UK 22.2 23.5 +1.3 25.5 26.6 +1.1
Average 26.1 25.0 -1.1 30.2 29.7 -0.5
Source: http://www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, last accessed on 2009/04/14, own 
calculations
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Tables 32 and 33 clearly indicate that Liberal economies, especially Ire-
land, and the Continental welfare states of the southern variety, including 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and to some extent Italy, i.e., countries that pro-
vide the lowest cash transfers to the long-term unemployed, also emerge 
as the countries with the lowest tax rates on low-wage work. It is however, 
only the two Liberal countries that also offer a rather generous statutory 
minimum wage, while Italy has no SMW and the existing SMWs in Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain are comparatively low. Therefore, the incentives to 
pick up gainful but low-wage work are significantly higher in Ireland and 
the UK than in the southern Continentals. Moreover, both Ireland and 
the UK combine generous SMW with additional in-work tax credits that 
make almost any type of low-wage work more attractive than a “life on 
benefits”. More specifically, the New Labour government replaced the 
Conservatives’ Family Credit with a more generous Working Families Tax 
Credit (WFTC), while the Irish government effectively exempted every-
one earning the national minimum wage from income taxation. Accord-
ingly, both countries – the UK more systematically than Ireland – place 
considerable weight on “making work pay” and the governments in both 
countries have promoted “work by payment through the tax rather than 
the benefit system” (Wells 2001, 244).
 In turn, the countries with the highest tax burdens on low-wage in-
come are found in Denmark, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden in that order. This latter group is thus composed of those coun-
tries that also tend to pay above-average cash transfers to the long-term 
unemployed. Two countries, Belgium and the Netherlands, offer gener-
Table 33 Gross Statutory Minimum Wages (if applicable), 2000 and 2005
 Per hour, USD at 2005 Market Exchange Rates and Constant Prices
 2000 2005 Change
Belgium 9.24 9.21 -0.03
France 8.62 9.72 1.10
Greece 4.67 5.03 0.36
Ireland 8.26 9.24 0.98
Netherlands 10.43 10.60 0.17
Portugal 3.11 3.13 0.02
Spain 4.12 4.27 0.15
United Kingdom 7.88 9.47 1.59
Source: Immervoll 2007, 9
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ous SMWs, while Germany, Denmark and Sweden do not offer this legally 
established minimum wage. If the latter three countries want to improve 
the incentives to seek and accept low-wage work, they are confronted 
with four choices: (1) reduce benefit levels, (2) pay subsidies to workers, 
(3) reduce tax levels, and/or (4) introduce a minimum wage above benefit 
levels. While the vast majority of workers in Denmark and Sweden remain 
covered by collective wage bargaining agreements, which effectively serve 
as a “functional equivalent” to a minimum wage, German workers in the 
low-wage sector are increasingly left out.  Accordingly, the German Social 
Democrats, while in office from 1998 to 2009, focused on the introduc-
tion of a national minimum wage. As the Social Democrats needed the 
support from the CDU/CSU to pass legislation through the Parliament’s 
upper chamber, only a compromise could be reached with which the gov-
ernment could make certain sectors’ collective wage agreements gener-
ally binding (cf., Weishaupt 2010b). On the one hand, the Social Demo-
crats extended the “posting workers act” (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz, 
AEntG) to a number of new sectors, including the commercial cleaning 
services and numerous other industries, covering some 1.8 million work-
ers. On the other hand, the Social Democrats “revived” the dormant 1952 
“minimum labour conditions act” (Mindestarbeitsbedingungengesetz, 
MiG), allowing the federal ministry for employment to impose minimum 
wage regulations in sectors that are not sufficiently covered by collective 
bargaining agreements and pay extremely low wages.
 The centre-right governments in Denmark and Sweden, in turn, have 
focused more heavily on tax reductions in recent years. In Denmark, the 
Liberal-Conservative government first introduced a general tax freeze in 
2001 to discipline public spending. In 2004, an in-work tax credit (beskæft-
igelsesfradraget) was introduced and the threshold “for the first progres-
sion step, the so-called middle tax, was raised” (OECD 2008b, 110). The 
explicit aim of these reforms was to “reduce the distortions on the labour 
market and to improve incentives to work” (Skatteministeriet 2004, 2). In 
2007, an additional agreement on lowering taxes on earned incomes was 
reached and a Tax Commission established to present ideas for further 
tax cuts by 2009. Similarly, the Swedish bourgeois coalition government 
issued various tax reforms in between 2007 and 2009, lowering the mar-
ginal tax rates for low and middle income workers, and introducing and 
subsequently enhancing and simplifying an in-work tax credit (Govern-
ment of Sweden 2008, 71). The Swedish government’s explicit aim of tax 
reforms was similar to Denmark’s: to “restore the work-first principle and 
fight labour market exclusion” (Government of Sweden 2008, 1).
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 In addition to advancing “making work pay” initiatives through lower-
ing tax burdens, in-work tax credits, and appropriate (minimum) wages, 
the payment of employment/wage subsidies and participation in public 
works projects for the unemployed are often seen as alternative ways to 
provide employment opportunities to jobseekers facing severe hurdles. 
During the 1970s-1990s almost all of the European governments offered 
some type of “work experience” scheme and thus often functioned as 
the “employer of last resort”. However, since the mid- to late 1990s, most 
governments have reduced or entirely phased out these types of schemes. 
This trend was most pronounced in the UK, the Nordics and some Con-
tinental welfare states, while Ireland retained a large-scale programme 
and Austria a smaller version. More specifically, Sweden relied on direct 
job creation during the 1970s and 1980s and even expanded its use in the 
early 1990s, when unemployment skyrocketed from about two to eight 
percent (excluding jobseekers in ALMPs) and employment dropped from 
over 80 percent in 1989 to some 70 percent in the mid-1990s (Timonen 
2003, 5). During the mid-1990s, the Swedish government used large-
scale work experience projects to keep jobseekers “active” and almost 15 
percent of the workforce took part in some version of ALMPs (Timonen 
2003, 99). While the traditional “relief work” projects were mainly or-
ganised by local authorities for social assistance recipients, a new work 
experience programme called “working-life development” (ALU) was 
introduced to employment offices in 1993, primarily focusing on envi-
ronmental and cultural employment (OECD 1996d, 91). ALU attracted 
a large number of not-for-profit organisers, including labour unions, as 
the workers came at no cost and it targeted mainly people who were at 
risk of falling into long-term unemployment. However, with a general 
reduction in unemployment since the late 1990s, Sweden’s Social Dem-
ocratic and the more recent centre-right governments have gradually 
phased out direct job-creation measures, retaining such options only for 
the very long-term unemployed. Denmark has also shifted its emphasis 
away from direct job-creation measures. While the Social Democratic 
government introduced a new scheme called Pool Jobs as recently as 
1996 (PLS Consult and Jensen 1997, 57), the subsequent centre-right co-
alition government prioritised private job growth. Accordingly, the cen-
tre-right government abolished all of its public employment measures, 
including Pool Jobs and Individual Job Training (Knuth et al. 2004, 61), 
and streamlined its previously 32 different labour market schemes into 
three covering both insured and uninsured workers: (1) guidance and 
upgrading of skills and qualifications (50 percent); (2) practical work 
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training in enterprises (five percent); (3) employment subsidies (45 per-
cent, of which 30 was paid to public and 15 private employers) (Hansen 
2007, slide 5).
 The UK government has also almost entirely phased out the use of di-
rect job-creation schemes when compared to their peak in the late 1980s. 
At that time, the Conservatives’ flagship programme was called Employ-
ment Training, which offered work experience opportunities to young 
and disadvantaged jobseekers. While the Conservative government 
planned – if elected – to introduce a new “workfare” programme dubbed 
Project Work, the newly elected Labour government launched their New 
Deal instead. Direct job creation in the social and environmental sectors 
as well as employment subsidies paid to employers were retained as three 
of the four “options” in the New Deal – the fourth being full-time edu-
cation. While temporary work in the voluntary and community sectors 
was a response to societal actors demanding this option, participation in 
the environmental task force was mainly seen as an instrument to “test” 
the willingness of benefit recipients to fulfil their “duties” (interview, 
DWP1). However, due to the DWP’s strong focus on “work first” and the 
generally positive economic performance of the British economy since 
the late 1990s, the use and availability of direct job creation has remained 
relatively limited, while employers only hesitantly used employment sub-
sidies.
 The German government has also reduced the use of direct job cre-
ation, but has refrained from entirely abolishing such schemes. With the 
Hartz reforms, Germany’s classic direct job-creation programme (ABMs) 
has been drastically reduced and, more recently, it was decided that ABMs 
will eventually be completely phased out. Newly introduced “employment 
opportunities”, commonly known as One-Euro Jobs, now offer some work 
experience to many long-term unemployed. However, these “employment 
opportunities” are much shorter in duration (typically six months), of-
fer only marginal financial incentives (about  1 per hour as a “top-off ” 
to assistance payments), and do not have a built-in training component. 
Moreover, jobseekers are increasingly expected to accept “atypical”, often 
precarious, employment, including temporary employment, part-time 
work, and so-called “mini-jobs”. Because participants are allowed to keep 
some of their transfer payments, this development can be described as a 
de facto wage subsidy, which has been utilised by some 650,000 workers. 
On a much smaller scale, the government also offers “job integration sub-
sidies” (Eingliederungszuschüsse and Entgeltsicherung) for “weaker” can-
didates, such as the long-term unemployed, the low skilled, older work-
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ers, or women returnees, who gain full-time employment. More recently, 
the Social Democratic ministry for employment also introduced a new 
scheme called JobPerspektive, which subsidises employers’ wage costs by 
up to 75 percent when job opportunities for very long-term, highly disad-
vantaged, unemployed jobseekers are created.
 In Ireland, the largest direct job-creation scheme, Community Employ-
ment (CE), is still popular and widely used. CE offers part-time work ex-
perience and various training elements to disadvantaged workers. Mostly 
single mothers are attracted to the scheme as it offers flexible working 
hours and often includes childcare options. It is community and volun-
tary sector actors who run these CE projects, which are approved and 
monitored by FÁS to ensure quality standards (interviews, FÁS1; INOU1). 
However, in line with a general reduction in unemployment – but not 
without some loud protests – the Irish government has gradually reduced 
CE places from a peak of 40,000 in the mid-1990s to 20,000 places in 2008 
(for more details, see chapter VII). Wage subsidies, in turn, are mainly 
paid through the Back to Work Allowance (BWA) scheme and the Family 
Income Supplement (FIS). BWA allows the unemployed to retain part of 
their welfare benefits for up to three years upon acceptance of a job. BWA 
is now available after two years of unemployment (previously five). FIS, in 
turn, is an allowance for low-income households with parents engaged in 
low-wage work.
 In Austria, social-economy firms (sozial-ökonomische Betriebe) enjoy a 
similar level of popularity among participants and are strongly support-
ed by the Social Democrats, the labour unions, and the Chamber of La-
bour (Arbeiterkammer). The social-economy firms offer work experience 
to insured jobseekers with particularly difficult backgrounds, including 
former drug addicts, alcoholics or ex-convicts. The majority of costs for 
social-economy firms are covered by the PES and participation in the 
scheme is typically six months, but can in rare cases be extended to one 
year. Workers in social-economy firms receive professional, pedagogic 
support and assistance with their job-search efforts. Other instruments 
that target “weaker” jobseekers, such as older workers and the long-term 
unemployed, include employment subsidies (Eingliederungsbeihilfen), 
which are paid to employers for a limited period of time to offset the 
lower productivity levels of these workers.25 New instruments have also 
been introduced for women returnees after their child-bearing years to 
help them re-elevate their skills.
 A final measure for jobseekers is the provision of business start-up 
subsidies, which are available in almost all EU countries. However, their 
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use is often limited, and often restricted to qualified unemployment 
benefits recipients. Even among those countries that, comparatively 
speaking, spend the most on business start-up subsidies, the spending 
levels are below one-tenth of one percent of GDP. The following table 
illustrates this trend. Spending levels below 0.005 of GDP are indicated 
as 0.
To summarise this section on positive work incentives, we find that 
governments have generally improved non-financial work incentives 
by modernising job-counselling services and extending the use of “soft 
skill” courses intended to prepare jobseekers to more quickly re-enter the 
workforce. There has also been a trajectory towards reducing the costs 
of occupational skills training courses in most of the Continental and 
Nordic countries by selecting participants more carefully and by short-
ening the duration of these courses. The Liberal economies, however, 
have moved in the opposite direction. Ireland has continued its invest-
Table 34 Public Expenditures on Business Start-up Subsidies as Percentage of GDP in 
Western European Countries, 1997-2007
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Change
1997-
2007
AT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
BE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DK 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .. .. 0.00 -0.05
FI 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00
FR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03
DE 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.05
GR 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.02 .. n/a
IE 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04
IT 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
NL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PT 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04
ES 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.06
SE 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.05
UK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: OECD.stat, extracted on 30 June 2009
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ments in occupational skills training for the unemployed, while the UK 
engaged in strategies to improve the skills of workers with no or low 
skills, once they found employment. A strong trajectory toward conver-
gence – albeit, with significant differences remaining – has also been 
visible in addressing the issue of childcare through state-led initiatives 
and strategies. Most notably, central governments are increasingly sub-
sidising and steering the activities of local governments, thus effectively 
recentralising authority.
 With respect to financial work incentives, there is a slight trend toward 
reducing the tax burden for low-wage work, while most countries have 
also begun to reduce the availability of public works projects (Denmark, 
Germany, Sweden and the UK). In turn, “making work pay” strategies 
show a distinct, regime-typical pattern. The liberal countries employ a 
combination of relatively generous SMWs, low taxation, and in-work tax 
credits, while the Nordics have increasingly relied on tax cuts, combined 
with employment subsidies and tight activation measures. Finally, the 
Continentals seem to struggle the most when trying to provide an appro-
priate mix of financial work incentives that combines elements of lower 
taxation with wage/employment subsidies and/or appropriate minimum 
wages.
VI.5 Conclusions
This long and yet necessarily simplified comparison of the experiences in 
Western Europe in general and in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, 
Sweden, and the UK in particular, leaves us with two questions. First, are 
labour market policy paradigms converging? And second, how do the ob-
served changes affect the three regime clusters outlined in chapter IV, 
i.e., do the models associated with competing “worlds of welfare capital-
ism” still fit with their descriptions? This final section addresses these two 
questions.
VI.5.a Convergence or Persistent Diversity?
This overview has shown that there has been a trend toward convergence, 
which is most pronounced on the ideational dimension. EU Member 
States, facing common challenges associated with economic globalisa-
tion, the rise of the service industry, demographic change, and changing 
family structures, and being constrained by the common European mar-
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ket and a single currency, increasingly define both causes of, and rem-
edies for, unemployment in structural and individual terms. By attribut-
ing joblessness to jobseekers’ motivation and qualifications, policymakers 
increasingly believe in their ability to affect the level of unemployment 
through supply-side labour market policies. This cognitive shift has been 
accompanied by a normative reorientation and a new political agenda. 
Work is now seen as the best form of welfare, and policymakers from 
almost all political spectrums openly embrace the concept of “mutual ob-
ligations”. With this turn to activation, the political agenda is no longer to 
merely reduce unemployment, but to activate all “able-bodied” persons, 
through which individual achievement and self-reliance is maximized, 
welfare state dependency reduced, and the sustainability of the European 
Social Model attained.
 This ideational convergence, in turn, has led to a reorganisation of 
Europe’s Public Employment Services in line with the prescriptions 
of NPM theories and the recommendations articulated by the OECD 
and the EU. EU-wide reform trajectories with regard to the organisa-
tional dimension include (a) the introduction of management-by-ob-
jective systems (and herein, a shift from input to output targets); (b) 
independent, third-party programme evaluations; (c) the introduction 
of “one-stop centres” or, alternatively, the closer collaboration between 
local welfare and employment offices, which also increasingly blurs the 
line between the rights and responsibilities of UB and SA recipients; 
(d) the encouragement of local partnerships and attempts to mobilise 
all relevant stakeholders; (e) the promotion of quasi-markets and con-
testability in service provision, in particular for the delivery of soft and 
occupational skills courses, and finally; (f ) the contractualisation of the 
relationship between individual jobseekers (clients) and employment 
officers (case managers) through the widespread use of individual ac-
tion plans.
 The ways in which these ideational and organisational changes have 
affected the financial and the work-incentives dimension are less pro-
nounced, and therefore, convergence is less visible. On the one hand, 
with respect to the financial dimension, there is a general trend toward 
reducing some ALMP expenditures, particularly for direct job-creation 
measures, and for occupational skills training courses in those countries 
that traditionally spend heavily in this area. With respect to financing 
ALMP measures, however, there is as of yet no clear trend toward shift-
ing away from payroll to general taxation as advocated by the EU and 
OECD.
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 The work-incentive dimension, in turn, offers a rather mixed picture, 
with elements of both convergence and persistent diversity. With re-
spect to the generosity of benefits, there has been little or no change 
and significant country specific differences remain. There has been, 
however, a trend toward reducing the duration of benefits payments 
across regime types, including, for instance, Denmark, Germany, Ire-
land, Sweden, and the UK. In turn, great differences remain with re-
spect to the strategies that individual countries employ to “make work 
pay” and regime-specific trajectories are clearly noticeable. While the 
Anglophone countries rely on a combination of in-work tax credits 
and relatively high statutory minimum wages, the Nordics are willing 
to subsidise private and public employment, while raising work in-
centives through general tax reforms. The Continental welfare states 
have meanwhile struggled with the delivery of a comprehensive “mak-
ing work pay” strategy and significant inactivity traps have remained. 
Moreover, while many countries have dramatically reduced or even 
completely phased out the availability of early exit options for labour 
market reasons, such options are still accessible and attractive in both 
Austria and Denmark. In other words, with respect to both negative 
and positive financial incentives, national and regime-typical differ-
ences remain significant. 
 Moreover, in all of the countries included in this study, the use of 
positive and negative non-financial incentives has been accelerated and 
countries increasingly use similar measures. Convergence is clearly no-
ticeable, reflecting the impetus that comes with the “activation para-
digm” and the associated “PES service model” that transcends regime 
trajectories. On the one hand, benefits have become more targeted, eli-
gibility has been tightened, and job-search and suitability criteria have 
been strengthened. On the other hand, job-placement and counselling 
services have been expanded and improved, a wider variety of providers 
offer (more specialised) services, and access to additional services has 
been widened. Most notably – and again, strongly promoted by both 
the EU and the OECD – such services include expanded access to af-
fordable childcare, even in those countries with traditionally strong 
male breadwinner models. The following table shows the main similari-
ties and differences in the six primary cases of this study.
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VI.5.b Three Worlds of Welfare or Just One?
Before I address the final question about the continued usefulness of 
the “three worlds of welfare capitalism”, I would like to reiterate that this 
chapter has focused only on a particular section of labour market policy 
regimes, namely labour market governance and policies, while deliber-
ately disregarding other labour market institutions, such as employment 
protection legislation and wage-setting arrangements. With this in mind, 
the message of this chapter is clear: there has been a trajectory of conver-
gence across regime types, which is stronger in some areas, i.e., those as-
sociated with activation policies and the “PES service model”, and weaker 
in others, i.e., those associated with the generosity of benefits, expendi-
tures, the financing of labour market policies, and the actual toolkit of 
measures. This trajectory is therefore generally associated with particular 
institutional mixes found in two regime types: the Nordic model (high 
levels of activation, high levels of economic activity, and state-led child-
care provision) and the Anglophone model (“making work pay”, more in-
dividual responsibility, and more market mechanisms).
 The developments described in this chapter have shown that the Nor-
dic cases – especially after centre-right governments took office – have 
increasingly become concerned with cost containment and the effective-
ness of their labour market programmes. In both cases under discussion, 
governments have fully embraced “making work pay” strategies, while 
downsizing their occupational training efforts and phasing out direct 
job-creation schemes (cf., Larsen and Mailand 2007, 99). They have also 
stressed a discourse of self-reliance, in contrast to one based on safety nets 
for the vulnerable (Marston et al. 2005, 144). Lastly, they have introduced 
quasi-market mechanisms for the provision of employment and training 
services, while reducing the influence of the social partners (Larsen 2005, 
129). All of these developments have moved the Nordics a small but sig-
nificant step closer to the Anglophone ideal, where one expects to find 
such institutional preferences.
 In turn, the Anglophone cases have implicitly (Ireland) or explicitly 
(UK) endorsed a “rights and duty” rhetoric, have actively sought to in-
crease activity levels and employment rates, and have launched national 
strategies to make childcare more readily available to families, effectively 
challenging male breadwinner norms. Moreover, Ireland launched a com-
prehensive array of ALMPs, including a variety of high-quality occupa-
tional skills training courses. Similarly, the UK has recently been engaged 
in a national strategy to tackle skills shortages in large segments of the 
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population and introduced “entitlements” to second and third level quali-
fications. All of these developments suggest that the Anglophone coun-
tries, with Ireland in the lead, have moved incrementally but significantly 
toward “more state” rather than “more market” policies and as such, have 
embraced important elements of the “service-centred” Nordic welfare 
states.
 Lastly, the Continental regime types have also been in flux, aspiring to 
elements of both the Nordic and the Anglophone ideal types. By seeking 
to achieve the Lisbon employment targets, the two Continental countries 
examined here have increasingly adopted activation measures for insured 
workers and social assistance recipients alike, have engaged in attempts 
to bring employment and welfare services closer together – thus mov-
ing toward a more universal approach – introduced quasi-market mecha-
nisms for the selection of providers delivering occupational skills courses, 
expanded their low-wage sectors, and most recently, began to offer state 
assistance and leadership in providing childcare facilities. These develop-
ments therefore include both a stronger reliance on market forces (the 
Anglophone expectation) and a more interventionist role for the state (the 
Nordic expectation), effectively challenging core elements of Continental 
welfare states, including the subsidiarity principle (the central govern-
ment has taken on responsibilities normally assumed by municipalities), 
the insurance principle (the long-term unemployed and social assistance 
recipients now receive identical treatment), and the male breadwinner 
model (important steps toward reconciling work and family life have been 
taken). In other words, the two Continental case studies have moved a 
significant step closer to both the Nordic and the Anglophone models, 
effectively leading to a hybridisation of their regime type. As such, I argue 
that the new labour market policy paradigm that is emerging across all re-
gime types effectively combines both old and new institutional premises, 
i.e., Nordic and Anglophone traditions, incorporates new institutional 
elements often found in the NPM literature, while, however, retaining 
important elements of historically grown labour market instruments. In 
other words, institutional hybridisation is most pronounced in the Con-
tinental welfare states, but the Nordic and Anglophone countries have 
also borrowed elements from one another. The common elements that 
run like a “golden thread” through reform efforts in all of the six countries 
can be best captured by referencing the “activation paradigm” and the as-
sociated “PES service model”. This trajectory, in turn, can be understood 
as a clear indication of the influence of the EU and the OECD and labour 
market reform processes. The following figure illustrates this argument.
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Figure 5 The Core Elements of the Activation Paradigm
Activating Labour Market Policy
• Early interventions
• Individually-tailored case management
• Benefi ts conditionality
Employment Promotion 
• Enlarged scope of PES activities
• Work fi rst (focus on soft skills)
•  Expansion of state-led childcare 
provision & active ageing
•  Rewards for work (“making work 
pay”)
PES Service Model
• Management-by-objectives
•  Independent review/quality 
management
•  Fusion of employment and 
welfare agencies
• Introduction of quasi-markets
• Customer orientation
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VII Explaining Transformative Change in Two Crucial Cases
While chapter VI has offered an empirical overview of the institutional 
changes that have taken place in Western Europe over roughly the past 
decade, this chapter will shed light on the political processes underlying 
these institutional changes. The analytical focus thus shifts from policy to 
politics and from institutions to actors. Since an in-depth analysis of six 
country cases goes beyond the scope of this book, I will focus on two of 
the six cases. Germany and Ireland have been selected as “crucial” cases, 
or cases “particularly informative for theory development” (George and 
Bennett 2005, 253). Germany is the archetypical Continental welfare state 
and co-ordinated market economy (CME), which makes it a “most likely” 
case for a path-dependent trajectory. Germany is also, however, one of 
the world’s largest economies and the economic “engine” of the European 
Union. As such, pressures raised by proponents of the Globalisation The-
sis should therefore be particularly prominent there. However, in chapter 
VI, we saw that Germany’s institutional trajectory significantly deviates 
from the path-dependency hypothesis, and it also fails to clearly conform 
to a trajectory toward a US-style endpoint. As such, an actor-centred 
analysis becomes crucial to explain why and how Germany’s transforma-
tive institutional changes occurred, leading to the hybridisation of its la-
bour market policy regime.
 Ireland represents an empirically interesting case because it has be-
come a source of inspiration for many of the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries that recently acceded to the EU. This is to say, the “Irish 
example is important because it shows how an output boom, supported 
by sensible changes in labour market structures and policies, turned one 
of Europe’s worst performing labour markets into one of the best in less 
than a decade” (Walsh 2004, 19, emphasis added). Analytically, Ireland 
is interesting because it has significantly diverged from its British coun-
terpart in many (but not all) respects. While this trajectory has already 
been labelled as hybridisation by leading scholars in the field (e.g., Zeitlin 
2003; NESC 2005a) – an assessment, that I corroborated in chapter VI – 
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in this chapter, I seek to explain when, how, and why Irish policymakers 
have introduced these “sensible changes”. My goal is to shed light on the 
circumstances and motivations that have led Irish policymakers to “mix 
and match” policies and structures from various regime types, which, in 
turn, allows me to explain how this process of hybridisation has become 
possible politically.
VII.1 Explaining the Process of Hybridisation in Continental Europe: 
Germany as a “Least Likely” Case
VII.1.a  The Kohl Era: From Collective Optimism to Tightening the 
Screw through “Powering”
When the Berlin Wall collapsed on 9 November 1989, the German gov-
ernment faced unforeseen economic, political, and social challenges. 
German reunification and the subsequent Monetary, Economic and So-
cial Union on 1 July 1990 brought about the near collapse of the entire 
East German industrial infrastructure, triggering an “employment catas-
trophe” (Schmuhl et al. 2003, 538). The most dramatic aspect was the 
situation of “marginal” groups such as women, who had previously been 
employed in sectors that were hit hardest by unification; school leavers, 
because there were far too few apprenticeships available; and unskilled 
workers, who had become redundant in the new market economy. While 
the government continued to artificially reduce unemployment through 
the generous provision of early exit options to older East German workers 
and governmentally subsidised “short-time work” (Kurzarbeit), the vast 
majority of jobless East Germans participated in programmes organised 
by the German PES, such as work promotion projects (Arbeitsbeschaf-
fungsmaßnahmen, ABMs) and (re-)training measures. During the period 
between November 1989 and November 1994, “56 of all East Germans 
participated – often more than once– in BA programmes” (Schmuhl et 
al. 2003, 541, my translation). At its peak in the first quarter of 1991, more 
than two million (about one in four) East Germans were employed in this 
so-called second labour market. Therefore, it was “active” labour market 
policy that prevented social unrest and unemployment rates from reach-
ing levels as high as 35 percent (Schmuhl et al. 2003, 541).
 During these initial months after reunification, all of the involved ac-
tors shared the belief that massive state interventions were necessary 
to jumpstart the East German economy and that labour market policy 
could and would contribute to another “economic miracle” (Schmuhl et 
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al. 2003, 557). In particular, ABMs were considered important “bridges” to 
regular employment, and the government and the social partners jointly 
called upon city and local authorities, churches, and charities to create 
employment opportunities in the second labour market. This massive 
use of ALMPs – which was coupled with a generous and widely available 
early retirement option – led to a cost explosion, which would require 
additional revenue. The Kohl government was, however, not interested in 
shifting the costs of labour market policies away from payroll contribu-
tions and toward general taxation, which meant that payroll contributions 
had to be dramatically increased. Accordingly, on 1 April 1991, unemploy-
ment insurance contributions were raised from 4.3 percent to 6.5 percent 
(Streeck and Trampusch 2005, 177, table 1).
 By the end of 1992, the initial optimism had given way to cost and ef-
ficiency concerns and the prevailing concepts on “active” labour market 
policy were increasingly seen as inadequate. In response, the government 
“tightened the screw” on the benefits regime, while it also tried to contain 
expenditures on active measures. One of the most important cost con-
tainment efforts included the reduction of the scale of both the ABM and 
training measures in 1993 and then again in 1994. Moreover, the “substi-
tute” (originäre) unemployment assistance (sUA) payments, paid to work-
ers who did not qualify for unemployment benefits but had a contribution 
record of at least five months, was limited to one year; training allowanc-
es became optional rather than rights-based payments; allowances paid 
during participation in AMB were reduced; and professional develop-
ment courses were terminated. On 1 January 1994, for the first time since 
1982/83, unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance payments 
were also reduced, this time by one percent for the unemployed with chil-
dren and three percent for those without. These cost containment mea-
sures were further supported by the promotion of part-time work, self-
employment, and the opening of job-placement and matching services to 
private actors (Schmuhl et al. 2003, 578ff ).
 With respect to social assistance recipients, the government gradually 
introduced workfare-style measures. Even though social assistance had 
de jure always been conditional on participants’ willingness to work, this 
“workfare condition remained dormant” since most SA recipients were con-
sidered not ready to assume employment (Voges et al. 2001, 71). However, 
when more and more “employable” persons were in receipt of SA payments 
during the 1980s, local authorities began to oﬀ er a range of active labour 
market measures under the label of Help towards Work (Hilfe zur Arbeit, 
HzA). While participation remained predominantly voluntary, the SA re-
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cipients’ options included (a) participating in public employment projects, 
oﬀ ered by public, charity, or church-based organisations, that were “addi-
tional” (i.e., they did not interfere with private investment in employment) 
and of community interest; (b) access to some education and training; and 
(c) wage subsidies. Due to the costs associated with these measures, their 
coverage was uneven and “oﬀ ers” varied signiﬁ cantly across localities and 
regions (Voges et al. 2001, 83). Th e character of the HzA changed sub-
stantially in 1993, when the government recalibrated this framework by 
loosening the restriction for the creation of public works projects – HzA 
jobs could now also be oﬀ ered by private employers – and by requiring 
local authorities to apply (the threat of ) sanctions to “uncooperative” SA 
recipients.1 A subsequent law issued in 1996 further speciﬁ ed sanctions for 
SA recipients declining “activation” oﬀ ers. In particular, young jobseekers 
were exposed to more conditionality during the 1990s, which resembled 
the British, Danish, and Swedish experiences during this same period.
 Despite these measures, unemployment, which had exceeded the sym-
bolic three million mark in 1993, continued to rise and rapidly approached 
the four million mark in 1997. At the same time, public debt as a share of 
GDP increased by more than 20 percent from 41.3 percent in 1991 to 63 
percent in 1996, while the annual budget deficit breached three percent 
in 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1996 (Manow and Seils 2000, 151, table 4). As such, 
Germany was on its way toward missing two key European budgetary tar-
gets established in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – 60 percent and 
three percent respectively – which were prerequisites for the adoption of 
the euro. Accordingly, the government deemed more cost containment 
measures necessary and a more radical overhaul of the German labour 
market policy regime appeared desirable. How to reform the system, how-
ever, remained a controversial issue. Not surprisingly, these politically 
difficult times led to massive divisions and realignments within the social 
partners. While labour market policymaking had been largely consensual 
throughout the entire post-war period and characterised by negotiated 
package deals, the immediate period after the mid-1990s would be marked 
by a series of conflicts in which one party’s gain was the other’s loss. At the 
same time, the very pillars on which the social partners’ success was built 
began to crumble. On the one hand, labour union membership declined 
dramatically throughout the 1990s, while labour union leaders – some-
times helplessly – watched “the de facto decentralisation of collective 
bargaining” (Streeck and Hassel 2003, 113).2 These developments effec-
tively weakened the unions’ political clout, intensified insider-outsider 
cleavages, and led to disagreements over the best way forward within the 
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labour movement. Employers, on the other hand, were increasingly di-
vided by their size. Small and medium-sized businesses (the Mittelstand) 
voiced their discontent with the growing non-wage labour costs and high 
wage settlements, while large companies were willing to cave in to these 
pressures in exchange for peaceful industrial relations (Streeck and Has-
sel 2003, 108).3 Moreover, the Federal Confederation of German Employ-
ers’ Associations (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, 
BDA), which negotiates wage agreements with the Confederation of Ger-
man Trade Unions (Deutscher Gerwerkschaftsbund, DGB) and therefore 
traditionally takes more moderate, consensus-oriented positions, was 
increasingly at odds with the powerful Federation of German Industries 
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI), which demanded more 
radical, neo-liberal path corrections.
 In the midst of these competing interests, which did not leave any 
room for the formation of actor realignments strong enough to find a 
consensual solution, Klaus Zwickel, leader of IG Metall, approached the 
government with a compromise offer. Zwickel proposed wage conces-
sions in exchange for a pledge by employers to create more jobs and the 
government’s promise to give up on further cuts in social programmes. 
However, this realignment of political forces – potentially giving way to a 
German version of “competitive corporatism” – did not materialise when 
in early 1996 the FDP in alliance with the BDI’s President Hans-Olaf Hen-
kel raised the stakes and demanded a complete overhaul of the German 
welfare state, rejecting the current proposals as too modest. The FDP, 
which had made dramatic electoral gains in three regional (Länder) elec-
tions in early 1996, saw their increasingly neo-liberal position confirmed 
and further promoted a consolidation of the federal budget and tax cuts, 
which would only be feasible if the welfare state was substantially reduced 
(cf., Bispinck 1997; Streeck and Hassel 2003). When Kohl failed to reject 
these claims, the fragile alliance collapsed before it had even started and 
left behind a painful rift between the government and the unions (Streeck 
2003). In September 1996, the government introduced a series of cuts to 
the German welfare state, including a curtailment of sick pay, an increase 
in the retirement age for women, and a loosening of German employment 
protection standards. While these cuts sparked massive demonstrations 
and were opposed by the labour unions and the Social Democrats, they 
were loudly praised by the employers’ associations.
 On 24 March 1997, the Third Book of the Social Code (Sozialgesetz-
buch, SGB III)4 was introduced, which represented a “profound turn-
around in German labour market policy” (Rabe and Schmid 1999, 21, my 
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translation). The SGB III represented a departure from the original labour 
market course enshrined in the AFG of 1969 in many ways. On the one 
hand, the goal of reaching full employment was no longer endorsed, nor 
was the state considered a strong intervening force. Instead, the focus 
shifted to market force and labour market policy would thereafter only 
play a marginal role (Schmuhl et al. 2003, 584). Furthermore, the employ-
ment offices would intervene earlier in cases of unemployment, i.e., after 
six months, and more responsibilities were shifted to the individual job-
seeker. More specifically, the criteria “under which recipients of benefits 
could refuse a job” were further tightened, while “particular benefits of 
passive labour market policy” were cut and “active labour market policy” 
curbed (Zohlnhöfer 2003, 146). At the same time, social assistance offices 
were also encouraged to enlist long-term unemployed SA recipients in 
workfare-type employment programmes (cf., Voges et al. 2001).
 In summary, even though social scientists typically argue that the “rel-
evance of these reforms to labour market outcomes is indirect and lim-
ited” (Wood 2001, 389), the 1990s were, nevertheless, characterised by a 
major political reassessment, which resulted in substantial cutbacks in the 
Bismarckian welfare state, representing signiﬁ cant challenges to core el-
ements of Continental labour market policy regimes. On the one hand, 
the insurance principle (workers who have contributed to the insurance 
system enjoy certain privileges, such as access to high-quality ALMPs) and 
the equivalence principle (the preservation of one’s social status in case of 
unemployment) were under pressure, while open confrontation with the 
labour movement had become an acceptable reality.5 On the other hand, 
the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government had clearly taken a “neo-liberal” 
path, prioritising free market forces, while increasingly perceiving ALMPs 
as a threat to the creation of new employment opportunities (Schmuhl et 
al. 2003, 584f ). Accordingly, atypical and precarious employment oppor-
tunities were promoted, the eligibility and generosity of beneﬁ ts tightened, 
and a growing number of jobseekers were shifted into social assistance, 
which in turn, was increasingly linked to work obligations.6
VII.1.b  The Schröder Era: Moving from “Active” to “Activating” Labour 
Market Policy
“If we don’t manage to reduce the unemployment rate signiﬁ cantly,
then we neither deserve to be re-elected nor will we be re-elected”
Gerhard Schröder, 1998 (my translation)
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Initial Success and the Introduction of an Activation Pillar
On 27 September 1998, after 16 years in the opposition, the Social Demo-
crats reclaimed the Chancellor’s Office, now in a coalition with the Green 
Party,7 effectively reshuffling the composition of the entire government 
for the first time since the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The Social Democrats’ late victory was at least partially due to Gerhard 
Schröder’s promise to significantly reduce unemployment levels. It was 
also built on SPD party leader Oskar Lafontaine’s efforts to unite the So-
cial Democrats in the Bundesrat in the years leading up to the general 
election. For this purpose, Lafontaine had actively solicited the support 
of the labour unions, who had become disgruntled with the cuts in the 
German welfare state. It was not surprising then, that one of the first leg-
islative acts of the new Red-Green government – now with a legislative 
majority in the Bundesrat and thus facing few veto points – was the re-
versal of some of the most controversial reforms introduced by the previ-
ous government. Most importantly, the reductions in sick pay were an-
nulled and employment protection legislation reinstituted to be enforced 
in firms with a minimum of five (previously ten) employees. In addition to 
reversing some of Kohl’s most controversial reforms, the government also 
almost immediately launched a special programme for youth (Jugend mit 
Perspektive, JUMP) as it had been outlined in the SPD party manifesto.8 
JUMP represented the first de facto “activation” policy introduced by the 
new Red-Green government, aimed at finding/creating jobs for 100,000 
young people. Like the New Deal for Young People launched in Britain 
and the youth activation efforts initiated by the French Social Democrats 
during this period, young jobseekers received “an offer to participate in 
the programme and to agree on an appointment for consultation” (Heide-
mann and Rademacker 2004, 362).9 Weak sanctions were imposed on 
those who did not sign up for the programme or failed to agree on an in-
dividual action plan. JUMP quickly exceeded its target of 100,000 young 
people, as “the offer of involvement was taken up in the very first year by 
200,000” (Heidemann and Rademacker 2004, 363). As such, the activa-
tion of young jobseekers through “soft” measures, or the application of 
primarily positive work incentives, was in line with the first pillar of the 
recently launched EES, which the Social Democrats – in stark contrast to 
the Christian Democrats – had openly endorsed.
 In addition to prioritising the fight against youth unemployment, the 
Red-Green government also promoted a series of gender-equality mea-
sures, reflecting the priorities of the EES’s fourth pillar. The government 
launched a new programme “Women and Work” in 1999, which was set 
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out to challenge the persisting norms of the male breadwinner model. The 
programme included a series of special measures to reduce youth unem-
ployment among female jobseekers, including incentives for school leav-
ers to seek employment in male-dominated areas, appeals to firms to hire 
women, and financial support for business start-ups. The government’s 
gender-equality efforts subsequently received an “external” boost in 2000, 
when the Lisbon Summit enshrined the European employment target for 
women of 60 percent (Ostheim and Zohlnhöfer 2004, 394). The Social 
Democrats, however, failed to address the issue of childcare provisions 
during their first term. Instead, the government followed the regime-typ-
ical response and expanded universal childcare benefits (for more details, 
see Korthouwer 2008; Weishaupt 2010b).
 Discussions about more substantive labour market reforms, in turn, 
were passed along to the tripartite “Alliance for Jobs, Training and Com-
petitiveness” (Bündnis für Arbeit, Ausbildung und Wettbewerb). The gov-
ernment initiated these high-level meetings with representatives from the 
unions and employers associations almost immediately after the new gov-
ernment came into office. The Alliance’s first official meeting took place 
in December 1998. The government hoped to renew the consensual spirit 
of German corporatism, while the Alliance was deemed the most appro-
priate forum to discuss potentially sensitive issues such as labour market 
reform. Within the context of the Alliance, the Chancellor envisioned a 
successful conclusion of moderate wage increases to boost employment, 
while the strengths and weaknesses of the German labour market were 
to be assessed in a report that placed the German system in a compara-
tive context. Accordingly, the working group Benchmarking Germany was 
created to compile comparative data and write a report that would guide 
Germany’s labour market reforms. However, the Red-Green govern-
ment’s attempts to promote a tripartite solution in the context of wage-
settlement agreements similar to the Irish and Dutch examples were built 
on shaky foundations from the start. On the one hand, the roundtable’s 
success depended on the goodwill of the social partners because Ger-
man governments were prohibited by law from intervening in wage ne-
gotiations (Bertelsmann Stiftung 1999, 45). More specifically, the German 
constitution (Article 9, § 3) enshrines the right of the social partners to 
negotiate wage agreements without state interference (Tarifautonomie). 
On the other hand, and more importantly, disagreement over wage settle-
ments within the government would quickly become a sore spot for the 
negotiators. Chancellor Schröder had not expected Finance Minister and 
Party Chair Oskar Lafontaine and his Secretary of State to “encourage 
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high union wage claims which, they argued, were needed to increase de-
mand and thereby improve employment” (Streeck and Hassel 2003, 115). 
The return to traditional Keynesian thinking in the Finance Ministry, and 
the corresponding high wage demands by the unions, created rifts within 
the Social Democrats, while the reversal of the Kohl reforms had already 
frustrated the employers association and the business community. In oth-
er words, the Alliance was built on a fragile political foundation consist-
ing of feuding coalitions, which effectively undermined the half-hearted 
attempt to institutionalise a German version of “competitive corporatism” 
from the start. 10 The Alliance quickly turned into a bilateral forum be-
tween the government and either the employers or the unions instead of 
a tripartite roundtable. Negotiations stalled and – at least initially – the 
Alliance produced little of substantial value (cf., Streeck 2003).
 Despite the gridlock in the Alliance, the economy continued to im-
prove throughout 1999, which the government hoped would alleviate the 
unemployment problem on its own. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder saw 
no need to rush into major labour market reforms,11 and Labour Minister 
Walter Riester, a more traditional Social Democrat, chose to concentrate 
on – and successfully concluded – a substantial pension reform (inter-
views, BMAS1, SPD3). These three factors, i.e., the improving economy, 
the Chancellor’s lack of initiative, and the Ministry’s priority to reform 
the German pension system rather than the labour market, are particu-
larly significant when we try to understand the slow pace of progress dur-
ing Schröder’s first term. This deliberate inactivity with regard to labour 
market reform throughout 1998 and 1999 – despite Schröder’s electoral 
promise – represented a missed “window of opportunity” for at least four 
reasons. First, the Red-Green government controlled the majority of seats 
in the Bundestag and thus would have been in a situation to successfully 
pass its own policies. Second, the economy experienced an upward trend, 
thus generating new jobs, which would have made the introduction of 
“activation” measures less controversial. Third, Hans Eichel (SPD) re-
placed Oskar Lafontaine as Finance Minister in March 1999, who had re-
signed after numerous clashes with Chancellor Schröder. Eichel, in turn, 
quickly abandoned Lafontaine’s neo-Keynesian policies and made debt 
consolidation and price stability his first priorities. And finally, Gerhard 
Schröder was elected chair of the SPD, thus uniting the Chancellorship 
and party leadership for the first time since Willy Brandt. The “removal” 
of the traditionalist leadership within the SPD could have been exploited 
to successfully realign the SPD internally and lead backbenchers along a 
new path of modernisation.
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 Despite the government’s slow-moving approach to labour market re-
form and the Chancellor’s lack of leadership on this issue – which sets the 
German Social Democrats apart from the developments in Denmark and 
the UK – the Alliance prompted not only moderate wage increases for 
many years, but also the launch of various pilot programmes including 
the Mainzer Modell, which assessed the employment-generating eﬀ ects 
of subsidies for low-wage employment in the private sector. More impor-
tantly, however, the government was eventually able to forge an agreement 
within the Alliance on a second, comprehensive activation eﬀ ort, the Job-
AQTIV Act in 2001 (A = activation, Q = qualiﬁ cations, T = training, I = 
(self ) initiative, and V = Placement). Th e Job-AQTIV Act reﬂ ected the gov-
ernment’s ambition to continue with the creation of an “activating” welfare 
state by institutionalising an additional “fourth” labour market pillar, lay-
ered on top of the existing framework (interview, DGB1). Th is activation 
pillar included early interventions, client proﬁ ling, and individualised in-
tegration contracts for jobseekers, while the pre-existing supply-side pillar 
was enhanced through earlier and wider access to (re-)training measures, 
and the demand-side pillar was expanded through more publicly funded 
employment. Th is new “four-pillar” framework – demand-reducing “early 
exit” options being the fourth pillar – was supplemented through a more 
rigorous promotion of gender equality, improved labour market monitor-
ing and evaluation measures, and an explicit commitment to reach full 
employment. Th e government’s reorientation toward “soft” proactive and 
preventative measures therefore represents not only an explicit incorpora-
tion of the European Employment Strategy’s guidelines and recommenda-
tions, but also a revival of AFG principles, which the previous government 
had oﬃ  cially abandoned (i.e., an interventionist state that can proactively 
steer both the level and structure of unemployment). Th e government’s 
Job-AQTIV Act deliberately left out, however, the most controversial is-
sues at the time, including a reform of the beneﬁ ts system, the expansion 
of “atypical” work such as temporary work contracts, a reduction of non-
wage labour costs, and the expansion of a (private) low-wage sector.
 In summary, despite the government’s failure to prioritise labour mar-
ket reform – which had been expected, based on the 1998 election cam-
paign promises – the Red-Green government’s first term still represents 
an important course correction. The orientation of labour market policy 
under the Social Democrats was significantly less “neo-liberal” in charac-
ter than what the CDU had envisioned (i.e. local workfare policies, more 
flexibility, and more atypical work). Instead, the SPD endorsed a “soft” 
activation of young jobseekers in 1998, mobilised the social partners in 
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a tripartite Alliance (1998-2002), promoted gender equality (1999, 2001), 
and passed the proactive Job-AQTIV Act (2001), effectively institutional-
ising a shift from active to activating labour market policy. Since the SPD 
manifesto of 1998 already largely agreed with the EES’s main thrust, it is 
difficult to argue that the EES “caused” the government’s policy decisions. 
However, the EES most likely served as a “catalyst”, which sped up institu-
tional developments (cf., Büchs and Friedrich 2003). It also “empowered” 
actors in favour of these concepts to advance their positions, and allowed 
the Red-Green government to legitimise its proposals by referring to the 
EES and National Action Plans (NAPs). Perhaps more importantly, the 
Red-Green government’s attitude toward the EES was certainly different 
from that of its predecessors. Both the SPD and the Greens welcomed a 
European Employment Pact and binding targets for the reduction of un-
employment, and both parties embraced “soft” activation, i.e., supply-side 
instruments that enhance jobseekers’ employability in contrast to “hard” 
sanctions that force jobseekers to accept employment of any kind (cf., 
Ostheim and Zohlnhöfer 2004, 388f ).
Failed Realignments and the Demise of the Schröder 
Government
Despite the (limited) progress produced by the Alliance, the government 
continued to face a divided political landscape toward the end of its first 
term, while the political constellation in the Bundesrat had shifted in fa-
vour of the CDU/CSU and FDP. The opposition parties continuously chal-
lenged the government on its labour market reform choices and called 
the Job-AQTIV Act a “hotchpotch” of incoherent instruments, while de-
manding much more dramatic measures, including a reduction of non-
wage labour costs and stricter controls over jobseekers. More generally, 
political stakeholders remained aligned roughly along ideological lines 
with diametrically opposed positions on almost all of the important po-
litical decisions, including the effects of employment protection legisla-
tion, the role of an expanded low-wage sector and atypical work, and the 
future of Germany’s generous benefits system. The latter issue would be-
come a particularly salient topic. With an election rapidly approaching, 
the CDU/CSU argued that unemployment assistance payments needed 
to be reduced to the level of social assistance, while the FDP favoured a 
merger of unemployment and social assistance in addition to a limitation 
of unemployment benefits payments to a maximum of one year. At that 
time, even the Greens promoted the idea of an amalgamation of unem-
ployment and social assistance (FAZ 2001). This mismatch of interests 
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was further aggravated by disagreements over wage settlements, which 
effectively produced gridlock in Alliance negotiations and brought a De-
cember 2001 meeting to a halt, while the bursting of the “dot.com bubble” 
and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 triggered a global economic 
downturn and a domestic reversal of unemployment trends.
 When Labour Minister Riester promised to tackle these controversial 
issues after the 2002 federal elections, many political analysts anticipated 
a continuation of Germany’s infamous Reformstau, or reforms on a very 
small scale and at an extremely slow pace. However, Chancellor Schröder 
decided to pursue a diﬀ erent, unilateral route in early 2002. Rather than 
“muddling through” these divisive times, Chancellor Schröder strategical-
ly seized a moment of political turmoil when, in January 2002, ﬁ ve employ-
ment oﬃ  ces were accused of having misreported job placements in 70 per-
cent of a total 5,100 cases (Collier 2004, 12). On 22 February, in response 
to this “placement scandal”, Chancellor Schröder announced the creation 
an independent “Commission for Modern Labour Market Services” (Kom-
mission für Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt) to address the lin-
gering problems of the German labour market. Schröder appointed Dr. 
Peter Hartz, Labour Director on the Board of Management of Volkswagen 
(VW) to chair the commission. Peter Hartz, an SPD and IG Metall mem-
ber, was well known for his successes in restructuring VW without having 
to lay oﬀ  employees while actually opening new VW production plants in 
former East Germany rather than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Th e other 
14 members of the so-called Hartz Commission included at least one from 
every major social group, except the opposition parties. Th e labour unions 
were represented by Isolde Kunkel-Weber (Ver.di) and Peter Gasse (IG 
Metall), the employers by Hanns-Eberhard Schleyer (Zentralverband des 
Deutschen Handwerks, ZDH), the public employment service by Wilhelm 
Schickler (Hessian regional employment oﬃ  ce), the local authorities and 
former East Germany by Wolfgang Tiefensee (Mayor of Leipzig, SPD), and 
the Länder by Harald Schartau (Labour Minister in North-Rhine Westpha-
lia, SPD). Moreover, various CEOs represented business interests, while 
management and consultant strategists from Goldman Sachs and McKin-
sey were brought in to assist in reforming the Bundesamt für Arbeit.12 Two 
senior academics, Günther Schmid and Werner Jann, were also included. 
Meanwhile, the Minister for Labour and Social Aﬀ airs in Berlin served as 
the host of the meetings (Hartz and Kloepfer 2007, 208f ).13
 On 17 August 2002, only weeks before the upcoming federal elections, 
the Hartz Commission presented its final report to the Chancellor, which 
was written after numerous visits to various “best practice” sites includ-
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ing, inter alia, Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands (interview, WZB1). 
As the elections were approaching rapidly, the unions and the traditional-
ist wing of the Social Democratic party had quickly been manoeuvred into 
a position in which they had to go along with the proposed reforms, since 
open dissent would only aid the opposition in the elections (Streeck and 
Hassel 2003, 119).14 While the unions offered their “tacit” support, Chan-
cellor Schröder had also hoped for the support of the business community 
for the Hartz reforms report. However, despite their approval of the re-
forms, the business community sided with opposition candidate Edmund 
Stoiber (CSU) in the run up to the federal elections and BDA President 
Dieter Hundt, BDI President Michael Rogowski, and Hartz Commission 
member Hanns-Eberhard Schleyer (ZDH) all failed to attend the ceremo-
nial presentation of the Hartz report (Hauschild and Noe 2002).
 The first two – less controversial – legislative packages, the I and II 
Acts for Modern Labour Market Services, henceforth Hartz I and II, were 
presented to the Bundestag ten days prior to the federal elections.15 Hartz 
I was designed to promote and expand temporary employment contracts 
through the establishment of Personal Service Agencies (PSAs).16 These 
PSAs were supposed to be introduced in new “one-stop public employ-
ment centres” (zentrale Anlaufstellen), which were to be established for 
all jobseekers. Th e use of PSAs was inspired by the Dutch experience with 
temporary jobs and the government hoped that they would serve as real 
stepping stones to regular employment (interviews, WZB1, Ver.di2). Hartz 
I also aimed to improve the quality and speed of job placements, while re-
quiring workers to immediately inform their local employment oﬃ  ces upon 
receiving a notice of job termination. Hartz II, in turn, was designed to 
expand the low-wage sector through the introduction of “mini” and “midi” 
jobs, which expanded exemptions/reductions for employees’ payroll taxes 
up to a ceiling of  400/800 respectively. Hartz II further introduced busi-
ness start-up subsidies to unemployment beneﬁ ts recipients (Ich AG).17 
Both of these measures were meant to activate jobseekers, especially those 
who had experienced long periods of unemployment, by easing their re-
entry into the workplace and by restoring their self-worth and conﬁ dence 
(Hartz and Kloepfer 2007, 224).
 Despite the creation of the Hartz Commission, the Social Democrats 
– but not the Greens – had called for the continuation of the Alliance in 
their manifesto, hoping that the strained relationship with the unions 
could eventually be mended. Soon after the elections – which Schröder’s 
Red-Green coalition won with a razor-thin majority – a new impetus 
for tripartite talks came from Hubertus Schmoldt, chair of the Mining, 
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Chemicals, and Energy Union (Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, 
Energie, IG BCE) who called for new negotiations. The presidents of 
 representative business organisations, including the German Association 
of the Chambers of Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskam-
mertag, DIHK), the BDI, and the ZDH, welcomed the initiative as long 
as the talks could “take place in a climate without ‘taboos’ and [were] not 
open to the public” (Behrens and Niechoj 2003). On 10 December 2002, 
Wolfgang Clement (SPD), the new reform-oriented “super” Minister for 
the Economy and Labour Affairs (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Arbeit, BMWA), met with DGB President Michael Sommer and the BDA 
President Dieter Hundt BDA to discuss a revival of the tripartite talks 
and scheduled a top-level meeting for the spring of 2003. However, by 
February 2003, the meetings already seemed increasingly unlikely after 
the labour unions concluded that there were “unbridgeable differences 
between themselves and employers’ organisations” (Funk 2003c). Ear-
lier that month, after an unexpectedly sharp rise in the unemployment 
figures, Dieter Hundt had offered a – in the eyes of the unions lopsided 
– six-point job-creation plan. Hundt suggested that employers would 
provide vocational training to every qualified young person in exchange 
for wage moderation, ‘opening clauses’ in collective agreements, less 
stringent job protection, lower social security contributions, and no tax 
increases in the near future.
 Even though Chancellor Schröder had been warned by leading Ger-
man economists that sweeping labour market reforms could not be 
reached without the support of the unions, Schröder decided to continue 
his confrontational course and announced his Agenda 2010 on 14 March 
2003. The Agenda 2010 comprised an ambitious policy package aimed at 
“achieving full employment in Germany by the end of the first decade of 
the 21st century, reviving economic growth and re-establishing financial 
sustainability for German social insurance institutions” (Collier 2004, 
22). With respect to the labour market, the Agenda explicitly limited the 
government’s manoeuvrability to economic supply-side measures, in-
cluding the promotion of a more flexible labour market by “reversing the 
reversal” to ten employees at which employment protection legislation 
would be enforceable, and the issuance of personal income and corporate 
tax cuts, stimulating private consumption and economic activity. The 
Agenda also outlined a major overhaul of the benefits system, including 
the limitation of statutory unemployment benefits to twelve months (18 
months for workers over 55 years of age) and the introduction of a single, 
means-tested assistance payment that would be paid after the expiration 
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of statutory unemployment benefits, replacing the dual system of un-
employment and social assistance payments. The drastic changes in the 
benefits system went beyond the proposals outlined in the Hartz Com-
mission. Indeed, they closely resembled the proposals that the FDP had 
presented during their 2002 election campaign. When Schröder threat-
ened to step down, the Agenda was subsequently approved by 90 percent 
of the Social Democratic delegates during an extraordinary party confer-
ence on 1 June and by over 90 percent of the Green delegates on 14/15 
June (Stuttgarter Zeitung 2003).
 The reaction to the Agenda was mixed. On the one hand, the employ-
ers’ organisations offered broad support for what they perceived to be 
long overdue reform policies, calling it an “important step in the right di-
rection”. Similarly, leading economists and the CDU supported the Agen-
da, while siding with the employers’ concerns that the reform proposal 
did not go far enough.18 On the other hand, the unions rejected the pack-
age as too socially unbalanced. Some union leaders were literally outraged 
by the Agenda, calling it “immoral”, “completely incomprehensible and 
superfluous” while “shifting wealth from the bottom to the top” (Funk 
2003a). While the merger of the UA and SA did not universally lead to 
benefit cuts – indeed, the overall retrenchment was rather modest for 
many jobseekers19 – the message sent to the German people was a differ-
ent one: after twelve months of unemployment, jobless workers regress 
into ALG-2, a flat-rate, means-tested, and highly stigmatising income 
support. As such, the reforms constitute a significant shift away from the 
Bismarckian ideal of status preservation via a receipt of generous benefits 
based on merit toward a Beveridgian ideal of income support for those in 
need (cf., Eichhorst et al. 2006; Knuth 2006).
 Despite union dissatisfaction, the cabinet passed Hartz III and IV on 
13 August 2003. On 26 September 2003, the federal government passed a 
seperate bill with a Red-Green majority reducing the duration of unem-
ployment benefits from 32 to 12 months (18 for workers over the age of 55) 
and introducing a reform aimed at more flexible hiring/firing practices. 
On 17 October 2003, the Bundestag passed Hartz III and IV. Hartz III, as 
outlined in chapter VI, introduced the massive reorganisation of the Fed-
eral Labour Office “remodelling it after private job-placement agencies 
and renaming it the Federal Job Agency [Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA]” 
(DW-world.online 2003). On 19 December, the Hartz III act passed both 
houses and was thus signed into law. The new Hartz III Act, however, no 
longer matched the Commission’s vision. The Commission wanted a one-
stop centre for all of the unemployed, regardless of their previous employ-
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ment history under the direct administration of the BA. The regional-
level PES, in turn, were pictured as Competency Centres, charged with 
promoting and fostering regional economic activity and structural inno-
vation, which, in turn, would stimulate new job growth (cf., Hartz Com-
mission 2002). The opposition parties, however, under the leadership of 
Roland Koch (CDU), Edmund Stoiber (CSU) and Christian Wulff (CDU), 
opposed not only the de facto abolition of the regional PESs, but also fa-
voured local authorities as delivery agents for local labour market policy 
(Handelsblatt 2003). As such, the CDU revived their preference for local 
workfare, which was then reflected in the compromise reached between 
the CDU/CSU and the SPD. Accordingly, the clientele of “able-bodied” 
jobseekers was split into two separate groups (the insured, short-term vs. 
the uninsured and/or long-term unemployed), with two separate sets of 
codified rules and instruments (Social Code Book II vs. Social Code Book 
III), two different sources of financing (payroll vs. general taxation), two 
principals (the federal PES vs. the BMAS/local authorities), two guiding 
principles (an “enabling” work-first approach vs. basic income support), 
and two separate service providers (employment agencies and ARGEn/
local authorities). In short, while the Hartz Commission had envisioned – 
and thus followed the 1997 OECD recommendations (see chapter V) – a 
“single gateway” for all jobseekers, delivering a coherent set of policies 
for all jobseekers under one roof, the newly introduced system created 
two sets of “one-stop centres” with different sets of logic and goals. An 
important unintended consequence of the system was that the PES had 
a built-in incentive to “park” insured clients with little prospect of find-
ing employment within 12 months. More specifically, as the PES knows 
that customers who are not successfully placed into employment will be 
transferred to an ARGE or Opt-out Commune after 12 months, they have 
incentives to select only customers who are likely to benefit from ALMPs 
for more expensive activation measures. Municipalities also had an in-
centive to classify as many people as possible as “able-bodied” since they 
would then receive more federal funding. Persons who are not considered 
to be able to work, in turn, continue to receive SA payments which must 
be financed from municipal budgets. The “revised” Hartz III Act there-
fore failed to achieve one of the core ambitions of the Hartz Commission, 
namely the abolition of Germany’s infamous “switchyards” (Verschiebe-
bahnhöfe), where responsibility for various benefits recipients is shifted 
from one authority – and budget – to the next (e.g., Trampusch 2000b).20
 Finally, on 2 July 2004, the Bundesrat passed the remaining parts of 
the previous bills, which introduced the controversial “unemployment 
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compensation II” (Arbeitslosengeld II, ALG-2). This policy was at the core 
of the sensitive sections in Hartz IV, i.e., the consolidation of unemploy-
ment assistance and social assistance. As envisioned in the Agenda 2010 
– but not the Hartz report – the bill stipulated that the unemployed would 
only receive the newly designated ALG-2 after 12 months of unemploy-
ment. The long-term unemployed received a flat-rate benefit, which was 
means-tested and paid only to those who “seriously” sought work. On 
average, cash benefits for single people living in West Germany were set 
at   345 (for those in the east, the level was   331), which were further 
supplemented by rent and heating allowances.
 Despite – or rather because of – the “success” of the reform-minded 
Social Democrats in pushing through the most significant reforms since 
the introduction of the AVAVG in 1927, this last bill strained the party 
internally, while highlighting old, inner German divisions: all five East 
German states, including those governed by the SPD, voted against the 
legislation, while all 11 West German states, including those governed 
by the CDU, voted in favour of Hartz IV. As such, the years 2003 and 
2004 marked the height of an “informal Grand Coalition” between the 
Social Democrats and the CDU/CSU, jointly overcoming institutional 
hurdles, while deepening the rift between the SPD and the unions. It also 
marked a low point for unions themselves, who were publicly conceived 
as the main stumbling block to reforms. Opinion polls held in early 2003, 
showed that 42 percent of respondents wanted unions to have less influ-
ence on government policies and only 28 percent wanted them to have 
more. In 1999, the numbers were reversed: 21 percent in favour of less 
and 49 percent in favour of more union influence (Funk 2003b).21 Busi-
ness and employers’ associations, in turn, adopted a joint declaration 
in March 2004 on the government’s reforms, which underscored their 
relentless pressure to continue the reform process. The BDA, BDI, DIHK 
and ZDH declared: “We will support the government as long as, first, 
the necessary structural reforms improve ... the climate for investors and 
consumers and, second, the burdens – taxes, social security contribu-
tions and bureaucratic burdens – on individuals and firms are lessened” 
(Funk 2004). While the CDU/CSU, employers, and businesses tempo-
rarily aligned with the Chancellor, disenfranchised voters – primarily 
in former East Germany where unemployment remained concentrated 
– began to organise mass demonstrations, which were quickly supported 
by the labour movement. Despite this popular uprising, the government 
did not renege on its reforms and Hartz IV was enacted on 1 January 
2005.
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 After the successful launch of Hartz IV, the Social Democrats plunged 
into a deep crisis as voters blamed the Schröder government for disman-
tling the German welfare state, breaking with traditional social demo-
cratic values, and causing unnecessary economic hardship for countless 
benefits recipients. SPD membership rapidly declined and public approv-
al ratings were at an all-time low. When the Social Democratic govern-
ment of North-Rhine Westphalia lost to the CDU in regional elections 
on 22 May 2005 – after forty years in government – the Chancellor an-
nounced early federal elections. New elections seemed to be the only op-
tion left to legitimise the Chancellor’s government. Schröder hoped that 
voters would renew his mandate, which would then help him reign in the 
dissenting voices within his own party. However, despite a surprisingly 
close election – the SPD received 34.2 percent, while the CDU received 
35.2 percent – the Chancellor had, once again, underestimated the politi-
cal clout of his former SPD colleague Oskar Lafontaine. Lafontaine had 
founded his own party, the Elections Alternative Work and Social Justice 
(Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit, WASG) in early 2005 
and re-emerged as a prominent political figure in the anti-Hartz IV, anti-
Agenda 2010 movement. WASG subsequently formed an formal alliance 
with the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the successor of the East 
German Socialist Unity Party (SED).22 The emergence of a party with a 
clear anti-reform agenda that was to the left of the Social Democrats dra-
matically affected the SPD’s ability to manoeuvre, not to mention the en-
tire German political landscape. Now, there was not only an electoral op-
tion for voters, including union members, who were dissatisfied with the 
nature of the reform, but with five political parties gaining seats in Parlia-
ment, it became increasingly difficult to form a “traditional” coalition on 
the centre left (SPD and Greens) or the centre right (Christian Democrats 
and Liberals). On 18 September 2005, the SPD and Green Party then failed 
to win a mandate to govern, Schröder resigned, and Germany’s second 
Grand Coalition under the leadership of Angela Merkel (CDU) was sworn 
into office.23
 While the divisive benefits system reform certainly overshadowed the 
Social Democrats’ second term, the government did manage to address 
other policies within the “work-welfare nexus”, including gender issues. 
With respect to “negative” work incentives for women, the Hartz reforms 
compelled the spouse of an unemployed worker to actively seek work. Put 
differently, the male breadwinner norm had been successfully challenged 
from “below”, as previously “inactive” partners are now obliged to register 
as unemployed (with all its consequences) to receive benefits. However, 
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the male breadwinner norm remained intact for women with a working 
partner. Inactive spouses (typically women) of working partners contin-
ued to enjoy tax privileges, receive “free medical care by virtue of the 
contributions paid by her husband and enjoy a widow(er)’s pension if the 
breadwinner dies” (Knuth 2006, 11). With respect to “positive” incentives 
intended to enable family life and work, the Social Democrats triggered a 
new public debate that focused on the lack of childcare places in (West) 
Germany. This shift, however, came very late in the Social Democrats’ 
second term, i.e., only after being in office for six years. While the issue 
of childcare provisions had been “very controversial” during the Social 
Democrats’ first term (interview, SPD3), the environment became slowly 
less unsympathetic during the course of their second term. On the one 
hand, the EU’s childcare targets set at the Barcelona Summit in March 
2002, and the preparation and subsequent publication of an OECD coun-
try note that had criticised the poor childcare infrastructure in Germany 
(OECD 2004b), empowered the new Minister for Family Affairs Renate 
Schmidt (SPD) and legitimised her efforts to promote the expansion of 
childcare in Germany (cf., Siems 2004a).24 On the other hand, the media 
increasingly referred to Sweden and France as family-friendly nations, 
while identifying Germany’s low fertility rates and its shrinking popu-
lation as looming dangers for Germany’s economic competitiveness and 
the sustainability of its welfare state (Henninger et al. 2008; Ahrens and 
Blum 2009). Nevertheless, when the Minister brought her proposal to the 
Bundestag, the CDU, local authorities, and various socially conservative 
groups quickly protested against her plans to create 230,000 childcare 
places by 2010 (Siems 2004b). While the CDU opposed the proposal be-
cause it “discriminated” against women outside the workforce, the local 
communities feared the government’s “breach” of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple. When Schmidt subsequently split the legislative proposal into two 
parts, she was able to pass an important childcare expansion act (Tages-
betreuungsausbaugesetz, TAG) on 1 January 2005 because the new version 
did not require the approval of the CDU-dominated Bundesrat (Schmitt 
2004).25
 Inspired by Swedish policy, Schmidt also proposed a new parental al-
lowance (Elterngeld). The goal was to provide incentives for (well-off ) 
parents to have children and stimulate the father’s involvement in the 
upbringing of his children (Soldt 2004). While quarrels about the actual 
design of the Elterngeld and the early elections triggered by the Chancel-
lor prevented its swift enactment, it became law on 1 January 2007. Since 
then, a parent on leave after the birth of their child receive 67 percent of 
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their previous income for 12 months, with a ceiling of  1,800 and a mini-
mum payment of  300. The parental leave duration can be extended to 
14 months, if the other spouse, typically the husband, opts to stay at home 
for two months as well. Single parents receive the parental allowance for 
14 months, as they fulfil the dual role of father and mother. As such, the 
new act was intended to promote gender equality, incentivise having ba-
bies, and improve the reconciliation of work and family life by providing 
financial stability to young parents. Taken together, the parental allow-
ance and the childcare acts are supposed to complement each other by 
easing the transition from work to family life and back to work, through 
the provision of a (shorter, but financially more attractive) leave option 
and the subsequent access to a childcare facility, if the family chooses to 
do so (interview, SPD4).
 In addition to promoting access to childcare facilities, the Social 
Democrats and Greens had also begun to advocate “all-day” schools, i.e., 
schools that would not end mid-afternoon and would thus provide a safe 
place for school children while both parents were at work. Since edu-
cation policy, like childcare policy, is firmly in the hands of the Länder 
governments, the federal government could not just institute a national 
programme. Instead, the government needed to offer financial support 
and agree on nationwide outcomes with the Länder. Accordingly, in 2003, 
the government began offering multi-billion euro federal subsidies to en-
able the creation and operation of all-day schools throughout Germany in 
the coming years.
 In summary, the Social Democratic period can certainly be character-
ised by a substantial reassessment of labour market policy toward acti-
vation and a commitment to introduce a modern “PES service model”. 
However, the degree of reassessment with respect to family policy, that 
is, the acceptance and promotion of a dual breadwinner model was more 
modest and incorporated (too) late. However, important legislative steps 
were taken that paved the way for the development of a more “women-
friendly” welfare state, including a substantial increase in childcare plac-
es. These steps, however, only became possible because of the publication 
of an OECD report, the issuance of the Barcelona targets, and the media, 
all of which “de-legitimised” the traditional German model and provided 
political leverage to push through reforms that ran against the interests 
of a powerful opposition. Other EU and OECD “recommendations” as-
sociated with lifelong learning and flexicurity remained largely absent in 
the German discourse. This development therefore suggests that some of 
the OECD recommendations, and in particular, the “hard” EU targets on 
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activation policy, childcare places, and employment rates, had a real im-
pact on policy design, while others did not (yet). I would argue that it was 
precisely this deliberate “selectivity” by the Social Democrats that may 
have sealed the Chancellor’s electoral fate. In other words, while the Hartz 
reforms required significant sacrifices from a portion of the Social Demo-
crats’ core constituency, an earlier and/or more systematic introduction 
of “positive” features associated with “make work pay” (as in the British 
context), or “lifelong learning” and the “gender mainstreaming” (as in the 
Danish and Swedish context), or the matching of flexibility with security 
(as in the Danish and Dutch context) could have allowed the Chancellor 
to reconcile the newly emerging divisions. However, the rather confron-
tational course of the Chancellor after the 2002 elections effectively alien-
ated large parts of the left-leaning electorate, including the labour move-
ment. In particular, the Chancellor’s failure to persuade his own party of 
the appropriateness and necessity of the Hartz IV Act, which effectively 
undermined Germany’s longstanding equivalence principle, while failing 
to convincingly introduce elements of a Nordic equity principle, became 
an electoral liability. For many voters, all that was left was a perceived tra-
jectory toward Anglophone marketisation, associated with (unnecessary) 
economic hardship, particularly in the east parts of Germany. Accord-
ingly, deep intraparty divisions, a disgruntled labour movement, and the 
rise of the Left Party on the far left gave way to the alignment of a powerful 
“anti-Hartz” coalition, a constellation of political forces that effectively 
undermined the modernisers in government and subsequently brought 
about Schröder’s demise.
The Grand Coalition – Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
While it may be too early to reach definitive conclusions about the ef-
fects of the partial reshuffle that brought the CDU back to the Chancel-
lor’s office in 2005 – albeit with the SPD as the junior partner – three 
important developments under the grand coalition need to be highlight-
ed (for a more detailed overview, see Weishaupt 2010b). First, the Min-
istry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMfSFJ), 
headed by Ursula von der Leyen (CDU), mother of seven children, built 
on and exceeded the Social Democrats’ approach to the provision of 
childcare places in Germany by proposing an even more rapid and radi-
cal expansion. While her proposal was only half-heartedly supported by 
the more conservative wing of her party – and loudly opposed by leading 
Catholic Church leaders – the Social Democrats and Chancellor Merkel 
supported her push forward.26 At a childcare summit in April 2007, the 
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federal government, the Länder, and the local authorities committed to 
reaching the EU’s Barcelona targets by providing either childcare places 
or access to a child minder for 35 percent of children under the age of 
three, equal to 750,000 childcare places by 2013.27 Based on a cabinet 
resolution, the federal government earmarked four billion euro to reach 
this target, which was expected to cover about one-third of the costs 
(interview, BMAS5). In September 2007, the Cabinet decided that – in 
the long run – parents should have a “statutory right” to a childcare 
place, therefore following the Danish and Swedish examples. As such, 
a conservative-led government pursued a “progressive” strategy that is 
traditionally at odds with the traditional male breadwinner model. This 
policy choice thus reflects a gradual, but significant normative reas-
sessment at least on part of the Christian Democrats, who were in a de 
facto alignment with their Social Democratic coalition partners (Ahrens 
and Blum 2009). This is not to say, however, that this course correction 
has not gone uncontested. Mainly the more conservative CSU under 
the leadership of Edmund Stoiber insisted that they not “discriminate” 
against women who choose to mind their children at home. In a politi-
cal compromise, Chancellor Merkel then promised to introduce addi-
tional cash benefits (Betreuungsprämie) by 2013. These cash benefits 
would then be paid to parents who prefer raising their children at home, 
thus forfeiting the use of a public childcare place (am Orde and Schmitt 
2008).28
 Second, the short-lived “super ministry” established in 2002 was bro-
ken up into its original parts: a Ministry for Economics and Technology 
(BMWi) and a Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS). The new 
BMAS was headed by Franz Müntefering (SPD), a “strong supporter of, 
and believer in, the EES” (interviews, BMAS5, BMAS6, SPD2, SPD3). 
Müntefering continued to push through significant changes to the pen-
sion regime, which had direct consequences on the labour market. The 
pension reform will gradually raise the regular retirement age from 65 
to 67, while the early retirement age will gradually raise from 60 to 63. 
Both of these “hard” legislative changes are intended to increase the aver-
age retirement age of German workers, and were accompanied by “softer” 
measures, including the Initiative 50-plus and the Perspektive 50-plus. 
An employers’ association representative (interview, Metall NRW) ex-
plained that these “hard” legislative changes were a major breakthrough 
that would have “a real impact on business behaviour”. This was the case 
because in the past, large firms (and their employees) seldom expected 
anyone to work beyond the age of 57. Thus employers stopped investing 
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in the skills of their older workers, who were often just in their mid-40s. 
Now that companies expect to retain their employees until the age of 63, 
if not 67, the incentives structure had changed, and investments in older 
workers’ skills would become much more likely.
 The “soft” Initiative 50-plus, in turn, introduced new “active” measures 
to supplement the pension reform and to further promote a normative 
shift away from early exit. The Initiative 50-plus includes both wage and 
employment subsidies to employers and employees, thus providing incen-
tives to take on work/hire older workers. It also includes the creation of 
additional, long-term employment opportunities in the “second labour 
market” for workers 58 and older. Under the heading of “life long learning”, 
the access to in-firm training opportunities was also expanded: Workers 
aged 45 and older (previously 50 years) in firms with less than 250 employ-
ees (previously 100 employees) can now receive a “training voucher” with 
which they can “buy” further qualifications, leading to a certification. In 
addition to the Initiative 50-plus, Müntefering initiated the Perspektive 
50-plus which is targeted at older, often long-term unemployed jobseek-
ers (aged 50-64). More specifically, through the Perspektive 50-plus, the 
BMAS supported the launch of 62 regional employment pacts in which 
employers, local PESs, ARGEn/Optionskommunen, and other stakehold-
ers joined forces in an effort to provide older workers with a fair chance 
for decent employment.
 Third, while both the Social Democratic BMAS and the Christian 
Democratic BMfSFJ pursued reform strategies that conformed to the 
EES and the revised OECD Jobs Study, there was also one legislative “set-
back”. In an attempt to “sharpen their social profiles” (personal conver-
sation, SPD Parliamentary Group), both Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
SPD Chair Kurt Beck agreed to reverse parts of the controversial Hartz 
reforms by (re-)extending the benefit duration for older. Based on a com-
promise between the CDU and the SPD, the German PES then offered 
a staggered receipt of ALG-1 between 15 and 24 months, depending on 
the recipients’ age. Beck and Merkel defended this “minor adjustment” 
by reference to the equivalence principle, which suggests that workers 
who had contributed to the system for decades should have the “right” to 
draw on benefits for an extended period of time. While this strategy was 
well received by voters, it ran counter to the “paradigm shift” that Franz 
Müntefering had attempted to initiate, and directly affected the very in-
centive structures he wanted to create. When Franz Müntefering failed 
to prevent this politically motivated manoeuvre, he resigned his post as 
minister.29
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 To summarise, this brief overview of the Grand Coalition years has 
shown that institutional evolution is a complex game in which policymak-
ers are engaged in “puzzling” and “powering”, or trying to find new solu-
tions to existing problems and maximising electoral support. The EES has 
certainly inspired – and helped to legitimise – Germany’s path-altering 
legislative initiative that will create a dense, nationwide network of child-
care facilities. Similarly, the EES has been a major source of inspiration for 
Franz Müntefering’s pension reform that will increase the average age at 
which workers exit the labour market, closes early exit corridors, and pro-
motes life-long learning and older workers’ activities through the launch 
of the Initiative 50-plus and the Perspektive 50-plus. However, the EES 
could not prevent “politics as usual” from taking place. In a vote-maxi-
mising manoeuvre – which could draw legitimacy from socially engrained 
norms and long-standing traditions – legislative proposals extending the 
duration of UB payments for older workers were pursued, and supported 
by large factions in both the CDU and SPD.
VII.2  Explaining Hybridisation in the Liberal World: Turning Vice into 
Virtue in Ireland
While German institutional developments have been characterised by the 
gradual, and at times rather late, inﬂ uence of European ideas – including 
activation (1998/2001), state-led public childcare provision (2005), and an 
active ageing strategy (2006) – and intense political struggles along ideo-
logical lines, the Irish trajectory comprises a largely consensual (albeit, not 
necessarily harmonious) development of institutional capacity building, in 
the absence of large-scale ideological divisions. Th e Celtic Tiger experi-
ence can roughly be divided into two episodes: a ﬁ rst era, lasting from 1987 
to 1997, which was characterised by (a) the establishment of a social part-
nership norm, which has been labelled “competitive corporatism” (Rhodes 
2000a; Hardiman 2002), leading to moderate wage deals, industrial peace, 
and employment growth; and (b) the (massive) expansion of ALMPs (with 
the help of ESF money), in particular of the demand-side variety (e.g., the 
Community Employment Scheme). During this ﬁ rst phase, Ireland was not 
only able to substantially reduce high levels of unemployment, but also 
consolidated its budget and reined in inﬂ ation, which were necessary pre-
conditions to becoming a member of the Eurozone.
 The subsequent era – up until the 2008 global financial crisis – saw the 
maturation of a “developmental welfare state” (NESC 2005a), designed to 
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overcome Irish institutional shortcomings, such as the “negative” effects 
associated with the Anglophone welfare cluster (inequality, poverty, and 
underachievement) and the male breadwinner norm, which had led to 
low female employment rates and gender inequality. During this second 
period, the EU/ESF gradually lost its financial importance. The recom-
mendations of the EES and the OECD, in turn, served as an institutional 
compass and a political lever for civil servants and societal actors alike to 
recalibrate Ireland’s passive and minimalist welfare state through the in-
troduction of an activating labour market policy that rewards (low-wage) 
work, a national childcare strategy that enables more women to retain 
their participation in the workforce, and attempts to address the concerns 
of older workers in the Irish knowledge economy.
VII.2.a The Genesis of the Celtic Tiger: Negotiated Partnership
As shown in chapter IV, Ireland’s policymakers decided to opt for a ne-
gotiated partnership route rather than a marketisation approach in 1987. 
This approach was a conscious decision by the (minority) Fianna Fáil (FF) 
government, building on a National Economic and Social Council’s strat-
egy paper, which had been developed jointly by the NESC secretariat, 
employer representatives and union leaders (O’Donnell and O’Reardon 
1997; O’Donnell and Thomas 1998; Hardiman 2002). The subsequent first 
partnership round was concluded with the issuance of the Programme 
for National Recovery (PNR), which was mainly concerned with reach-
ing a deal on wage moderation, securing industrial peace,30 and moving 
toward the consolidation of the public budget in an attempt to tackle the 
overwhelming economic distress. While the unions were at that time – 
not surprisingly – rather sceptical about the PNR’s goals to keep wage in-
creases down, their decision to participate would become the foundation 
of the Celtic Tiger economy, and subsequently strengthened and institu-
tionalised Irish social partnership.31
 The second round of social partnership negotiations, which were again 
– as all subsequent negotiations – based on a strategic framework estab-
lished by the NESC, was then concluded in January 1991 with the Pro-
gramme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP). While the PNR had 
contributed to increasing levels of economic growth, it failed to signifi-
cantly reduce unemployment. Accordingly, in addition to securing wage 
moderation, which was hoped to stimulate employment growth, PESP 
proposed an area-based approach to unemployment and social exclu-
sion. The most important new labour market policy measure in this con-
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text was an “advanced” version of the demand-side Social Employment 
Scheme, entitled Community Employment Development Programme 
(CEDP).
 When unemployment began to increase again in 1991, the general elec-
tions held in November 1992 were primarily fought on the issue of unem-
ployment, in particular its long-term variant. More than doubling its seat 
share, the Labour Party emerged as a confident actor, and the FF reached 
out to Labour to form a coalition government under the leadership of Al-
bert Reynolds (FF) as Taoiseach, or Prime Minister. Ruairi Quinn (Labour 
Party), the “founding father” of the SES, became – once again – Minister 
for Enterprise and Employment (DEE) from 21 January 1993 through 17 
November 1994 (cf., Quinn 2006). Under Labour’s watch the multipartite 
National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) was set up in 1993 to moni-
tor, analyse and evaluate labour market programmes and social policy 
measures and to propose alternative ways of moving forward. The NESF 
operated parallel to the NESC and was also given the task of co-ordinating 
“a variety of community and voluntary interests including activists for 
the unemployed, disability rights, poverty issues, the elderly, and others” 
(Hardiman 2005a, 4).
 During the subsequent social partnership negotiations of January/
February 1994, leading to the Programme for Competitiveness and Work 
(PCW), the government committed itself “to introducing a new Commu-
nity Employment (CE) venture that would enable the unemployed to un-
dertake work of public or social value while it provided work experience 
and development training” (Taylor 2005, 41). In preparation for the launch 
of the new CE, the DEE eliminated the distinction between black spots and 
other areas in the CEPD, streamlined the programme and co-ordinated it 
for its nationwide operations (interview, MIN). Th e newly launched CE 
then created 40,000 job opportunities in local communities, replacing the 
SES, the CEDP, and Teamwork.32 Th e CE’s massive size represented a net 
increase of some 20,000 places within less than a year, making it Ireland’s 
most important ALMP measure. Starting in 1994, the government gradu-
ally phased in training modules to the CE – which were mainly ﬁ nanced 
by ESF money – and increased the size of local CE projects. Larger CE 
projects were then eligible for the appointment of supervisors assisting CE 
participants. While the Progressive Democrats criticised the fact that the 
CE was a voluntary programme, the vast majority of politicians endorsed 
the scheme due to its “double dividend” nature (NESC 2005a, 75), or its 
ability to oﬀ er meaningful work to disadvantaged groups and its function 
as “the backbone of thousands of voluntary organisations and communi-
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ty groups” (Fitzgerald 2005, 129). In addition to recalibrating the CE, the 
government introduced the Back to Work Allowance scheme (BTWA) in 
1993. Th e BTWA allowed long-term unemployed persons over the age of 
23 “to retain 75 per cent of their existing beneﬁ ts for the ﬁ rst year, 50 per 
cent for the second and 25 per cent for the third and ﬁ nal year” (Fitzgerald 
2005; Taylor 2005, 65). As such, participation in BTWA made virtually any 
low-wage employment more attractive than remaining on unemployment 
beneﬁ ts (Tansey 1998). Besides the CE, BTWA quickly become the second-
largest programme, culminating in 2000 with 39,000 participants (Walsh 
2004, 17).
 In November 1994, the Fianna Fáil-Labour coalition government un-
expectedly collapsed when Labour withdrew its support after a series of 
FF scandals, which also led to the resignation of Reynolds and the ap-
pointment of Bertie Ahern as the new party leader (Kavanagh 2001, 155f ). 
Subsequently, a “Rainbow Coalition” consisting of Fine Gael (FG), Labour, 
and the Democratic Left emerged without having to hold new elections.33 
This (partial) governmental reshuffle, however, did not lead to a major 
departure from the previous course on labour market policy. Neither did 
it affect the prevailing partnership norm, as a “consensus on the desir-
ability of this approach” had been established also among the more scepti-
cal political parties, including FG (Hardiman 2002, 6). But, not only had 
national partnership become a constant feature in Irish policymaking, 
compliance with this – in principle voluntary – wage-setting mechanism 
had also been surprisingly high. In other words, even the non-unionised 
sector, which includes many foreign companies, closely followed the wage 
agreements (Sexton and O’Connell 1996, viii). As such, the social part-
nership approach helped Ireland to reverse its previous path of spiralling 
budget debts, inflation, and unemployment, while also offering a forum in 
which external constraints that emerged with the European Union’s rapid 
developments to establish a common currency could be “internalised” 
(Hardiman 2005a, 25).
 In 1996, following the recommendations offered by the multi-stake-
holder Task Force on Long Term Unemployment, set up in 1994 to assess 
two NSEF reports published in December 1994 and 1995, the government 
created a series of additional labour market instruments, including (a) 
the Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI) exemption scheme, which offered 
subsidies to employers in an attempt to encourage recruitment of certain 
benefit recipients; (b) the Jobs Initiative Programme (JIP), designed to 
provide full-time employment for a “hard core” of long-term unemployed 
people aged 35 or older; and (c) the Youth Progression Programme (YPP), 
 EXPLAINING TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE IN TWO CRUCIAL CASES
targeting the younger unemployed, 18 to 19 years of age. The YPP was a 
direct response to those critics who had argued that the CE “deliberately 
exclude[ed] young people” (Irish Times 1994). The YPP targeted up to 500 
young jobseekers and was Ireland’s first step toward activation as it of-
fered individual, intensive support plans to prevent the young on the Live 
Register from drifting into long-term unemployment (Irish Times 1996). 
In 1996, upon the recommendation of the NESF, the Local Employment 
Services (LESs) were launched. The LESs were to collaborate closely with 
local employers and provide “more in-depth engagement over time with 
unemployed clients who are further from the labour market” (Fitzgerald 
2005, 128).
 In summary, the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s were characterised by (a) the es-
tablishment of a peaceful and ﬁ nancially attractive economic environment 
for foreign investors; (b) a realignment of all political parties and stake-
holders in favour of national partnership deals in which wage moderation 
served as “the glue”; and (c) an intensiﬁ cation and expansion of a wide 
variety of active labour market measures, in particular, but not exclusively 
the demand-side oriented CE and the supply-side oriented BTWA.
VII.2.b  Ireland the Good – but Occasionally Reluctant – European 
Pupil: Introducing Activation, Childcare, and Active Ageing
When Fianna Fáil returned to office in 1997, now in a coalition with the 
more market-liberal Progressive Democrats, the Irish economic crisis 
was a relic of the past. The Irish economy had grown at an annual rate of 
8.5 percent per annum since 1994, almost four times as fast as the EU-15 
(Hardiman 2002, 10). Likewise, overall employment rose by more than 
five percentage points from 1992 to 1997 – from 50.9 to 56.2 percent – 
while unemployment had fallen from over 15 percent to some ten per-
cent since 1993 (OECD 2006a). However, despite these rapid improve-
ments, the “single greatest problem facing Irish society remain[ed] the 
high proportion of long-term unemployment and the associated pov-
erty and social exclusion” (O’Donnell and Thomas 1998, 124). Accord-
ingly, promoting employment growth and tackling entrenched unem-
ployment problems were key issues for the incoming government. For 
this purpose, the FF-PD government sequentially introduced a variety 
of measures, including (a) “soft” activation and a recalibration of Irish 
ALMPs, (b) “making work pay” through a reduction of income tax bur-
dens, coupled with a (generous) statutory minimum wage, (c) expanding 
the female workforce through the individualisation of taxation and im-
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proved access to (public) childcare; and (d), most recently, active ageing 
and lifelong learning measures, which allow older workers to improve 
their (basic) skills. Many of these reforms were addressed in the context 
of partnership negotiations, which became both more inclusive as the 
voluntary and community pillar was invited in 1997 – this had been ini-
tiated by the previous government under Labour’s watch – and broader 
in scope by addressing more social issues (cf., O’Donnell and Thomas 
1998, 126).
Activation of the Unemployed
Among the new government’s first actions was the swift launch of the 
Preventative Strategy in September 1998. The core element of the Pre-
ventative Strategy was to “tighten the screws” for young benefit claim-
ants by introducing more stringent job search requirements (interview, 
UCD2).34 Accordingly, all jobseekers under the age of 25 would receive a 
letter from the Department of Social and Family Affairs (DSFA), inviting 
them for an interview at the nearest FÁS office after six months of being 
unemployed. At the interview, the suitability of jobseekers for job vacan-
cies or active labour market measures was assessed, an Individual Action 
Plan was drawn up, and referrals to Jobs Clubs or the LES were made. 
This Preventative Strategy was, to a large extent, a direct “response to 
Guideline 1 of the EES, which committed Ireland to assist the unem-
ployed after a certain period by offering them a job or an employability 
support” (O’Donnell and Moss 2005). As such, the EES was very influen-
tial in determining the direction of this change (interview, DETE2, FÁS3, 
ICTU2, UCD2), while it also provided a political lever and external le-
gitimacy for civil servants in the Department for Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment (DETE), who had been eager to introduce such a scheme 
(interview, CDI). This shift toward activation – which was a “quite new 
concept in Ireland” (interview, ICTU2) – was subsequently reinforced in 
the bi-annual meetings of the Heads of PES, where “everybody commits 
to activation” (interview, FÁS1).
 The launch of the Preventative Strategy was, at least partially, also a 
product of the groundwork prepared by the previous government. In oth-
er words, the successful and swift launch of this new activation measure 
became politically possible because the Rainbow Coalition had already 
launched the Youth Progression Programme for 18 and 19 year olds, which 
entailed individualised, intensive support plans, while a governmental 
White Paper published in May 1997 also foresaw the gradual expansion of 
this scheme to youth aged 18-21 (Carthaigh 1997).
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 When subsequent studies confirmed the effectiveness of Irish acti-
vation policy (e.g., OECD 1999a; O’Connell 2002) – despite its “soft” 
character35 – it enjoyed widespread acceptance. Accordingly, the Pre-
ventative Strategy was first expanded to other age groups, i.e., to those 
aged 25 to 54 in 2000, after nine months of unemployment in 2000, 
and the timetables were gradually tightened. Since 2006, all jobseekers 
aged 18-64 are “activated” after three months of unemployment (FÁS 
2006, 49). That same year, unemployment benefits and unemployment 
assistance schemes were renamed Jobseekers’ Benefits and Jobseekers’ 
Allowance to further reflect the new work orientation in Irish labour 
market policy.
 In summary, the FF-PD government – inspired by the EES – intro-
duced Ireland’s first formal and systematic approach to interacting 
with jobseekers and established a comprehensive “activation” and “PES 
service model” paradigm based on early intervention, individual case 
management, and contractualised action plans (cf., Burke 2006, 2). Con-
sidering “activation” in the Irish context, it should also be mentioned 
here that the LES network was placed under the FÁS umbrella in 1999 
(Fitzgerald 2005, 128). This decision was made after the publication of 
disappointing LES results regarding their counselling, guidance and 
placement services (NESF 2000b). While LES offices retained their sep-
arate status and a remit to provide “specialised services” to jobseekers 
facing additional hurdles, they were from that point on under contract 
with FÁS, which included the setting of detailed outcome and process 
targets (interview, FÁS5).
Recalibration of Active Labour Market Policy
While the introduction of activation measures found widespread sup-
port across partisan lines and societal stakeholders, the new FF-PD gov-
ernment’s attempts to reform the ALMP toolbox faced significant re-
sistance. Following the OECD’s recommendations and drawing on the 
independently run evaluations published in the Deloitte Touche Report, 
Mary Harney (PD), Tanaiste (Vice Prime Minister) and Minister for the 
Department for Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE), suggested 
excluding up to 8,000 people from the CE on 1 October 1998. Mary Har-
ney had welcomed the report’s conclusions on the grounds of both ef-
ficiency and ideology. On the one hand, she argued that such a cut would 
generate “between 44 million (pounds) and 58 million (pounds)”, while 
adequately reflecting changing economic conditions (Yeates 1998). In 
1998, the CE had reached a new record, employing 41,000 unemployed 
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people, while the Irish unemployment rate was down to 7.5 percent 
and still falling (PARTNERSHIP 1997, 16; OECD 2005b, table 14). On 
the other hand, based on her ideological convictions, she had great an-
tipathy towards the demand-side oriented programme and considered 
the CE economically of “no value” (Quinn 2006, 225). Mary Harney’s 
proposal to reduce CE numbers was also supported by IBEC as employ-
ers had become increasingly disillusioned with a programme that had 
failed to significantly improve participants’ chances to move into the 
private labour market (interview, IBEC). Accordingly, IBEC began “call-
ing for a reduction of 12,000 in the numbers on community employment 
schemes, by only targeting the hardest to place and the most at risk of 
poverty” (Suiter 1998). IBEC also suggested raising the age threshold at 
which people can enter CE schemes from 21 to 25, while arguing that 
some of the money spent on CE could be better spent on courses in 
Specific Skill Training and other “market-led training” courses for the 
unemployed (Suiter 1998).
 In January 1999, the government announced that the number of places 
in CE schemes would be cut by 2,500. Even these modest cuts, howev-
er, encountered great resistance from the social partners, including the 
Irish National Organisation for the Unemployed (INOU) whose repre-
sentatives claimed that the government “failed” to provide assistance 
for the long-term unemployed, and ICTU, arguing that such cuts were 
“unacceptable” (Yeates 1999b). Nonetheless, in July 1999, Mary Harney 
announced that she would overhaul the CE by raising the participation 
age to 25, increasing the waiting period for people wishing to repeat a 
one-year scheme, introducing a three-year “lifetime participation” cap, 
and cutting 5,000 places. In exchange for these reforms, the young single 
parents who were hardest hit by the CE overhaul were to be redirected 
into 800 extra places in “mainstream training courses” (Yeates 1999a). 
Subsequently, Mary Harney also promised a new programme, the Social 
Economy Programme (SEP), which would create up to 2,500 full-time 
jobs in the social economy for the older, long-term unemployed by 2002 
(Yeates 2000).36
 When on 20 August 1999 the DEE announced that the CE was “sched-
uled to be phased out over the next five years”, CE supporters rallied 
quickly to its defence, including the INOU, ICTU, SIPTU, the Confer-
ence of the Religious of Ireland (CORI), the Labour Party, Sinn Fein, 
as well as activists in many local communities, which increasingly de-
pended on the provision of the CE’s services (Dunne 1999). The social 
partners claimed that the cuts were “totally unacceptable and in breach 
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of specific agreements reached under Partnership 2000”, the national 
partnership agreement reached in 1997 (Dunne 1999). Most, if not all, 
socially concerned actors argued that cutting CE places in response to 
job growth failed to acknowledge the special needs of the long-term, 
often older or otherwise disadvantaged workers and overlooked the 
valuable contributions made to local communities (interviews, ICTU1, 
CORI, and INOU1). Although the plans to phase out the CE entirely 
were quickly discarded and the participation rate remained as high as 
37,500 in 1999 – when unemployment had fallen below six percent – the 
government, now in negotiation with the social partners, was able to 
gradually reduce the CE to 30,000 in 2000, roughly 28,000 by 2002, and 
to 20,000 in 2008.37
 While the government gradually reduced the demand-side oriented 
CE, it also shifted new resources first to supply-side oriented instru-
ments for unemployed jobseekers, and subsequently made “lifelong 
learning” of workers in employment a real priority. Between 1998 and 
2008, FÁS more than doubled the number of apprenticeships, while also 
significantly increasing participation in the Foundation Training, which 
prepares low-skilled jobseekers for Specific Skills Training. With the 
rapid increase in apprenticeships, FÁS training facilities quickly filled 
up, which then led to the introduction of (outsourced) Sponsored Train-
ing, where jobseekers waitlisted for FÁS training programmes could be-
gin taking training and education courses. In roughly 2003, DETE and 
FÁS also began to prioritise the improvement of skills for workers al-
ready employed. FÁS had realised that there was a “sizeable proportion 
of people who have below second level education”, whose competences 
needed to be improved (interview, FÁS3). Accordingly, a series of initia-
tives were introduced under the label of lifelong learning, a focus that 
had “trickled down” from the Lisbon Agenda (interview, FÁS4). Among 
those programmes were the Competencies Development Programme, 
which provided financial assistance to employers who train their em-
ployees (available at various skill levels), the Skills for Work programme, 
designed to help employees with basic skills demands (such as literacy, 
numeracy, basic computer skills), and the Excellence Through People 
Award, which formally recognised companies’ training efforts. The fol-
lowing table reveals the FÁS’s shift from a demand-side to a supply-side 
focus regarding unemployment.
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Making Work Pay
While the government reshuffle in 1997 led to some important policy 
changes with respect to labour market policy, the impact on tax policy 
was even more pronounced. The new Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy 
(FF) and Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) Mary 
Harney (PD) quickly developed a “coherent and sustaining approach on 
taxing labour, while making economic growth their key priority” (inter-
view, UCD2). Their initial tax reforms mainly benefitted the middle- and 
upper-class households rather than low-income families. This occurred 
despite the agreements reached in Partnership 2000, much to the irrita-
tion of the opposition (cf., Hardiman 2005a, 18). Over time, however, the 
marginal tax rate fell from its peak at 68.5 percent in 1984 for an unmar-
ried industrial worker on average wages (Walsh 2004, 17), to just 20 per-
cent in 2007 (OECD 2007d).38
 In 1998, the FF-PD coalition government also set up a National Mini-
mum Wage Commission to come up with an appropriate rate for a na-
tional minimum wage. In April 2000, a national minimum wage of  5.59 
was introduced under the National Minimum Wage Act. Since then, the 
minimum wage has been repeatedly increased, most recently (on 1 July 
2007) to  8.65, making it one of the most generous in Europe. Moreover, 
since the early 2000s, the government has effectively “removed all those 
on the national minimum wage from the tax net” (Government of Ireland 
2005, 39).
Table 36 FÁS Throughput, 1998-2006
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Appren-
ticeship
7,151 10,316 13,193 17,654 18,656 17,179 16,357 17,748 17,400
Specifi c Skills 
Training
14,607 18,356 16,022 14,691 15,525 15,225 8,861 8,882 8,253
Foundation 
skills 
8,305 11,090 10,722 12,606 12,597 12,053 11,870 14,178 13,117
Sponsored 
Training*
- - - - - - 2,613 2,423 1,669
Total Training 30,063 39,762 39,937 44,951 46,778 44,457 39,701 43,231 40,439
Employment 
Programs 
58,522 58,919 55,230 48,941 43,750 36,907 31,793 32,101 32,126
Total 88,585 98,681 95,167 93,892 90,528 81,364 71,494 75,332 75,565
* This was included in the (mainly) Specifi c Skills Training program prior to 2004
Source: FÁS 2006
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 To summarise, when combining the effects of pay gains for low-wage 
workers in the national partnership agreements, the introduction of a 
“quite generous” national minimum wage and tax cuts/credits aimed at 
the low-wage workers, Ireland’s “make work pay” strategy has taken “a 
huge amount of people” out the income tax net at the lower level (inter-
view, DETE2), which “undoubtedly contributed to an improvement in the 
absolute position of low paid workers” (cf., Dobbins 2004).
Women and Work
In addition to significantly reducing workers’ income tax rates, the FF-
PD also pushed through the “individualisation” of tax bands in 2000. As 
shown in chapter IV, individualised taxes are typically found in the Nor-
dic countries and challenge the male breadwinner norm as “the returns 
to a second income earner in a household” are substantially increased 
(Walsh 2004, 17). Not surprisingly, the government faced loud resistance 
to this policy from the main opposition party (Fine Gael), the Archbishop 
of Dublin, the Irish Family Planning Association as well as many socially 
conservative voters (cf., Brennock 1999). However, the government did 
not renege on its decision because it believed that the reforms would ad-
vance the economic opportunities of women (interview, UCD2).
 While pushing through tax reforms was largely in line with the FF and 
PD market-oriented ideology, an expansion of state-led childcare pro-
vision was more difficult to accept politically. As such, the provision of 
childcare was initially mainly placed in the context of tackling child pov-
erty and assisting low-income families, while the government – fearing 
an electoral backlash – chose to gradually and significantly increase the 
provision of universal child benefits, which, so they argued, offered a “real 
choice to parents” (McCreevy cited in IBEC/ICTU 2005, 27).39
 Some first attempts to improve childcare provision, however, had pre-
viously been obtained as part of the Partnership 2000 agreement and 
therefore was achieved still under the Rainbow Coalition. The agree-
ment foresaw the establishment of an Expert Working Group on Child-
care to develop a national childcare strategy. The Working Group was 
subsequently established and produced its report in 1999 in which it was 
argued that there was a “virtual crisis in the childcare supply” and that 
the lack of childcare places was “one of the most significant barriers to 
women accessing and participating in the labour force” (Report of the 
Partnership 2000 Expert Working Group on Childcare 1999, iv). Almost 
immediately after the publication of this report, the government launched 
an Equal Opportunities Childcare Programme (EOCP), which advocated 
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the improvement of the quality and quantity of childcare places, mainly 
in disadvantaged areas, and the introduction of a co-ordinated approach 
to deliver childcare services. Under the EOCP, 33 City/County Child-
care Committees (CCCs) were established to govern – with the input of 
the social partners – local childcare needs. The Department of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform (DJELR) also established the National Child-
care Co-ordinating Committee (NCCC) in 1999, again with social partner 
representation, to advise the government on the development of childcare 
services, develop a co-ordinated national approach, and to co-ordinate 
the workings of the CCCs (SIPTU 2005, 7).
 Shortly thereafter, the EOCP II (2000-2006) was launched as part of 
the Irish National Development Plan 2000–2006 (NDP) with the objec-
tive to (a) improve the quality of childcare; (b) maintain and increase the 
number of childcare facilities and places; and (c) introduce a co-ordinated 
approach to the delivery of childcare services (Government of Ireland 
2003b, 11). The EOCP II received significant funding both from the Eu-
ropean Social Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), totalling  181.8 million. The Exchequer provided an additional 
  317.2 million, adding up to a total budget of just under   500 million 
(IBEC/ICTU 2005, 15). Despite these efforts, formal childcare remained 
very limited in its availability and one of the most expensive in Europe, 
even after tax allowances and subsidies were taken into account (Immer-
voll and Barber 2005, 21f; NESC 2005a, 135).
 While the pressure to address the issue of childcare provision de-
veloped slowly during the late 1990s, it rapidly gained salience after 
the turn of the millennium, especially when the ECOP II was about to 
reach its conclusion (e.g., IBEC/ICTU 2005). As women’s labour market 
participation had dramatically increased during the boom years – from 
some 40 percent in 1994 to over 58 percent in 2005, growing faster than 
anywhere else in the OECD world – it became apparent that the par-
ticipation of women had been a crucial ingredient in Ireland’s economic 
success story, particularly as women had become as well as – if not bet-
ter – educated and trained as men (Sweeney 2006, 11). Women’s rising 
labour market participation, especially the extremely high participation 
rate of young women in their 20s, also meant that there was a great 
potential for an economic backlash when these women would decide to 
have children in their 30s, thus withdrawing from the labour market and 
causing major skills shortages in Ireland’s knowledge economy (inter-
view, FÁS4). Accordingly employers (and some policymakers) became 
interested in addressing issues related to the reconciliation of work and 
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family life, while the labour unions saw this as an area where they could 
promote developments toward an expansion of working women’s rights. 
In other words, in contrast to Germany (and the UK), the Irish social 
partners quickly aligned on this issue and jointly began lobbying the 
government to make childcare available through public funds (cf., IBEC/
ICTU 2005, 1). The EU’s Barcelona targets, the EES,40 and various OECD 
reports and recommendations41 served as a legitimisation for the social 
partners’ demands and a lever for their lobbying activities (interviews, 
IBEC, ICTU2, NESC). In addition, “more than 20 childcare and chil-
dren’s rights organisations” joined the social partners’ demands in 2005 
(Holmquist 2005).
 Facing continuous pressure from domestic and international sources 
to do more than merely rely on improved universal child benefits and 
tax credits to make childcare accessible to average families, the govern-
ment committed itself to directly investing in childcare places during the 
partnership negotiations in 2006 (called Toward 2016). Accordingly, the 
government launched a new National Childcare Investment Programme 
(NCIP) 2006-2010 as the successor to EOCP II with a target of an ad-
ditional 50,000 childcare places by 2010. While the NCIP will directly 
create 5,000 after-school, and 10,000 pre-school education places, the 
bulk of the new childcare places are to be created by private and vol-
untary sector actors, who can apply for large monetary grants to defray 
the capital costs of developing a childcare facility. Grants are available 
also to individual or group childminders who offer childcare services in 
their homes. As such, the NCIP marks an important departure from the 
EOCPI and II, because it is an explicit attempt to directly invest in the 
creation of childcare places and to improve the reconciliation of “work 
and family life” among average families, in contrast to the previous ex-
clusive focus on families in economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
(interview, NESC).
 The National Childcare Strategy (2006-2010) also introduced new 
entitlements to parents with children under the age of six, including a 
new direct and tax free Early Childcare Supplement payment to parents, 
amounting to  1,000 annually (paid in four instalments); improved ma-
ternity and adoption leave (see table 37 below); an increase in maternity 
benefits (the maximum rate has been increased by  16.60 a week); and 
a new programme to foster educational opportunities for children and 
adults in economically deprived areas.
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In summary, like their German counterparts the FF-PD government tried 
to find a compromise that would be acceptable to proponents of both the 
male breadwinner and the dual breadwinner model. By committing to the 
expansion of the availability, affordability, and quality of childcare plac-
es and simultaneously expanding childcare benefits, introducing a new 
supplement (available irrespective of employment status), and improving 
both paid and unpaid maternity leave, the government hoped to satisfy 
the electoral concerns of their socially conservative Catholic constituency 
and address the concerns/recommendations of employers, unions, child-
care organisations, the EU, and the OECD alike.
Older Workers
Ireland has a favourable old age dependency ratio, a relatively high fertil-
ity rate (cf., Government of Ireland 2003a, 29), and an employment rate 
for older workers (55-64) of 54 percent in 2007, which is well above the EU 
target of 50 percent for 2010 (Government of Ireland 2007, 45). Likewise, 
the current Eurostat data (2005) shows that the average exit age from the 
workforce is 64.1 years, the highest in the EU. Because of this favourable 
situation, “active ageing” did not receive much attention among employers 
(interview, IBEC), while ICTU members “were not dying to work longer” 
(interview, ICTU1). Nevertheless, during the early 2000s, the European 
Commission and the OECD repeatedly called upon the Irish government 
and the social partners to “expedite the long-awaited lifelong learning 
strategy and also to intensify eﬀ orts to promote in-company training, in 
particular for older workers” (NESF 2003, 48; OECD 2006b, 100). Th ese 
calls from external actors intensiﬁ ed worries that had slowly come to the 
fore during the late 1990s, when unemployment dropped rapidly and la-
bour shortages became prevalent (most importantly, see NESF 2000a).
 However, the government remained initially reluctant to push through 
legislation that specifically targeted improving the skills of older work-
Table 37 Maternity and Parental Leave Entitlements
Pre-March 2006 March 2006 March 2007
Paid Maternity Leave 18 weeks 22 weeks 26 weeks
Unpaid Maternity 
Leave
8 weeks 12 weeks 16 weeks
Parental Leave 14 weeks 14 weeks 14 weeks
Total entitlement 40 weeks 48 weeks 56 weeks
Source: National Childcare Strategy 2006-2010
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ers. Likewise, the social partners did not make the issue of older workers 
a top priority, and accordingly, no mention of older workers is found in 
the partnership agreements reached in 2000 and 2003 (cf., Government 
of Ireland 2000; Government of Ireland 2003c). Rather, the government 
issued various legislative acts to prevent age discrimination, while rely-
ing on flexible work arrangements to generate job opportunities for older 
workers.42 In 2002, however, the government set up a taskforce for life-
long learning, which triggered the introduction of a National Framework 
of Qualifications (NFQ) formalising accreditation in 2003, while the Na-
tional Training Fund (NTF) set up in 2000 provided the financial means 
for a range of schemes aimed at raising skill levels among Irish workers.43 
As such, the government embedded its commitment to older workers 
within the effort to enhance the overall skill levels of the Irish workforce. 
Older workers were expected, however, to benefit disproportionately 
from the new formal accreditation system because they were “more likely 
than younger workers to have acquired skills that have not been formally 
recognised” (OECD 2006b, 100). In September 2005, the government also 
included the new “One-Step-Up” initiative – subsuming both the Com-
petencies Development Programme and the Skills for Work programme 
outlined above – into its budget to promote workplace education, espe-
cially literacy and numeracy.44 While “One-Step-Up” is not an ALMP, it is 
designed to provide transferable skills to workers, which – similar to the 
“Train to Gain” programme in Britain (see chapter VI) – enables workers 
to progress to the next level on the NFQ.
 In the meantime, the social partners also became more sensitive to the 
issues related to older workers. While IBEC joined the unions’ calls, it 
was ICTU that “really pushed the issue of older workers in the [Toward 
2016] partnership agreement” (interview, NESC). In a large-scale politi-
cal compromise, the Toward 2016 agreement foresaw a three-pronged 
strategy to address older workers: first, following the recommendations 
of the EU and the OECD with respect to “early exit” schemes, the Irish 
government decided to phase out its Pre-retirement Allowance (PRETA) 
scheme introduced in the early 1990s. 45 This policy change was supple-
mented “by the decision to extend the Preventative Process and associ-
ated supports to those over 55” (Government of Ireland 2006, 35), which 
meant that older workers who became unemployed would receive the 
regular Jobseeker’s Allowance and had to fulfil all regular job-search and 
availability criteria. Second, the government promised to provide addi-
tional measures to help upgrade older workers’ skills, including access 
to apprenticeships that are typically reserved for young workers.46 And 
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third, the government – like in Germany – launched a campaign “to pro-
mote a cultural mindset change” with regard to older workers (Govern-
ment of Ireland 2006, 35).47
VII.3 Conclusions
Both Ireland and Germany have sequentially introduced similar public 
policies over the past decade, despite very different welfare state trajec-
tories, actor constellations, and problem situations. Both countries in-
troduced a “fourth” labour market pillar based on activation, i.e., early 
interventionism, case management, and individual contractualism. In 
Ireland, this change was launched with the 1998 Preventative Strategy for 
young jobseekers, which was mainstreamed to include adults in 2000, and 
expanded to also include older workers in 2006. In Germany, nationwide 
activation was first introduced with JUMP for young jobseekers in 1998. 
Subsequently, the concept was expanded through the Job-AQTIV Act in 
2001 and later mainstreamed through the Hartz reforms. Both countries 
also pursued – at times reluctantly – a state-led strategy for the provi-
sion of childcare facilities. Facing opposition from socially conservative 
groups adhering to the male breadwinner norm, both countries have cou-
pled the expansion of childcare with additional cash benefits made avail-
able to women who choose not to engage in employment. And, finally, 
both countries adopted, more recently, strategies that combine the phas-
ing out and/or limiting the use of “exit options” with the introduction of 
(a) new labour market measures designed to upgrade the skills of older 
workers (plus prolonged access to public works programmes), and (b) po-
litical campaigns to overcome societal misconceptions about older work-
ers. Based on these common institutional developments, the influence of 
both the OECD and the EU on policymakers’ reassessments in key policy 
fields, including an “activating” labour market policy, the reconciliation of 
work and family life through the provision of affordable childcare places, 
and lifelong learning and active ageing, is hard to “argue away”.
 However, welfare state trajectories and actor constellations have cer-
tainly conditioned the shape of these processes of institutional conver-
gence and regime hybridisation. Since 1987, Ireland has successfully com-
bined a socio-economic path typically associated with the Nordic regime 
type, including consensus-seeking partnership, women-friendly social 
welfare and tax policies, and universal access to pre-employment ALMPs, 
with Anglophone elements such as a flexible labour market, low taxa-
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tion, and economic openness.48 Irish success is, at least in part, based on 
“conscious” policy making on parts of the decision makers, the absence 
of a strong ideological left-right divide, and the consensus orientation of 
the centrist Fianna Fáil (Hardiman 2005b, 44), which has been in office 
since 1997.49 Therefore, the absence of major political reshuffles and the 
institutionalised inclusion of all of the main policy stakeholders through 
national partnership agreements, allowed for the successful alignment of 
political forces in favour of “puzzling” rather than a juxtaposition of com-
peting coalitions, pursuing change through “powering”. In other words, 
Irish policies since 1987 have been “based on mutual understanding be-
tween the government and the social partners on the fundamental eco-
nomic and social priorities” (Schweiger and Wickham 2005, 16).
 In Germany, in turn, major ideological rifts within and across the so-
cial partners and the main political parties have made “inclusive” coali-
tion building impossible. When the Social Democrats returned to power 
after sixteen years in opposition, they initially sought to reintroduce a 
partnership-based policymaking style through the creation of a tripartite 
Alliance for Jobs. However, when the Alliance stalled and the economy 
stagnated, Chancellor Schröder resorted to a more unilateral approach in 
2001, which produced the controversial Hartz proposals and the Agenda 
2010. Even though the Chancellor had failed to convince his fellow So-
cial Democrats and the labour movement that his reform plans were ad-
equate, he was able to push legislation through Parliament by building 
an “informal” Grand Coalition with the Christian Democrats. However, 
outraged by the alleged attack on the German welfare state, many voters 
ceased to support the SPD, the labour unions felt betrayed, and a new 
political party, the Left Party, emerged as a political force, enticing the 
support from former Communists in Eastern Germany, as well as disillu-
sioned unionists and disgruntled Social Democrats in the West. While the 
loud “anti-Hartz” and “anti-Agenda-2010” voice of the Left Party effec-
tively de-legitimised the Social Democrats’ reform efforts, also the sup-
posed “winners” of the reforms – the employers and business associations 
– turned their backs on Schröder, when they sided with the Christian 
Democrats in the run-up to the 2005 election. In short, it was Schröder’s 
failure to successfully align forces in a cross-class coalition in support of 
his reforms that ultimately led to his downfall.
 When in the fall of 2005, a Grand Coalition under the leadership of 
Angela Merkel (CDU) took office, both parties began to attend to the vot-
ers’ concerns about recent welfare cuts and the large majority of both 
Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats fully embraced a “wom-
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en-friendly” welfare state and “active ageing” policies. These policies were 
promoted by the new Minister for Family Affairs Ursula von der Leyen 
(CDU), who advanced the creation of childcare facilities, and by the Min-
ister for Employment and Social Affairs Franz Müntefering (SPD), who 
spearheaded a supportive strategy for the promotion of longer working 
lives, making the overall trajectory of the German welfare state largely 
consistent with the EU and OECD agendas. However, while the Grand 
Coalition internalised much of the open political conflict, the exact “mix” 
of welfare policies remained controversial, especially as the Left Party and 
the unions continue to adhere to more traditional ALMPs, and socially con-
servative parts of the CDU/CSU objected to the promotion of a “progres-
sive” family policy. As a result, policymaking in Germany has continued 
to be characterised by both “puzzling” and “powering” and a process of 
“contingent convergence” remains likely for the foreseeable future.


VIII Conclusion
In concluding this book, I would like to revisit the three central questions 
posed in the introduction, including:
(1)  Do national labour market policy reform eﬀ orts exhibit covariation 
across Western Europe, and if so, how and why?
(2)  What impact, if any, have the recommendations of international or-
ganisations such as the OECD and the EU had on national reform 
agendas?
(3)  Have recent reform activities, in the context of the OECD Jobs Study 
and the EES, fundamentally transformed the historic composition of 
national labour market policy regimes, and if so, to what eﬀ ect?
Given the rapid developments associated with the economic and financial 
crisis that has haunted the global economy since 2008, a fourth section 
reflects on government responses to the crisis and closes with an inter-
pretation of the long-term consequences of the crisis on the “activation 
paradigm”.
VIII.1  Do National Labour Market Policy Reform Eff orts Exhibit 
Covariation across Western Europe, and if so, How and Why?
The principal theme in this book has been my claim that transformative 
institutional changes follow actors’ reassessments about existing institu-
tions’ capacity to tackle problem situations. This book has thus offered a 
new “lens” to better understand the origins and evolution of contempo-
rary labour market policy regimes by focusing on changes in predominant 
worldviews, i.e., the causal and normative ideas about the causes of, and 
remedies for, high levels and, often, persistent unemployment and inac-
tivity. Tracing how new ideas evolve and spread – often through the active 
proliferation of the OECD and the EU – and how these ideas have (not) 
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been interpreted, internalised and implemented, has been the focus of 
this book. I have argued that it is precisely the acceptance or rejection of 
new ideas that has allowed – or prevented – the emergence of new actor 
constellations and coalitions, which are critical in stimulating the pro-
cesses of institutional convergence, divergence and hybridisation.
 The manpower paradigm that originated in Sweden during the 1940s 
and 1950s triggered a phase of labour market policy convergence during 
the 1960s in most parts of Western Europe. Policymakers shared the view 
that full (male) employment could be reached and sustained through in-
terventionist macro-economic and industrial policy. In this context, the 
development of “active manpower policy” became a critical element to 
support economic growth and societal welfare. The associated “manpower 
revolution” was built on the assumption that labour market policy needed 
to be organised centrally by the state, who, in turn, would solicit the ac-
tive support of the social partners. Programmatically, it concentrated on 
two pillars, including (a) a supply-side pillar with a focus on the provision 
of qualified labour to avoid bottlenecks in production, to support rapidly 
growing opportunities in new export markets, and to assist companies 
in their efforts to modernise and rationalise; and (b) a demand-side pil-
lar that offered sheltered employment for disadvantaged groups and the 
possibility to bridge short periods of (seasonal) unemployment with more 
generous benefits. Labour market policy was thus seen as an important 
supplement to macro-economic and industrial policies, but was – at that 
time – not intended to fight mass unemployment. Most Western govern-
ments, irrespective of their partisan constellations, embraced these new 
ideas inspired by the Swedish Model, which were circulated and advocat-
ed at a variety of OECD conferences, workshops, and field reviews – often 
under the leadership of Gösta Rehn – and available in print in numerous 
OECD recommendations and associated publications. Major legislative 
initiatives were accepted in parliaments, which were more often than not 
dominated by liberal or conservative political parties at that time. The 
most important examples include the Austrian Christian Democrats’ 1969 
labour market promotion act, or AMFG, the German Grand Coalition’s 
1969 work promotion act, or AFG, the Danish Liberal-Conservative coali-
tion government’s decision to create a national PES, the Labour Market 
Board, in 1969, the centrist Fianna Fáil’s creation of the Irish National 
Manpower Service (NMS) in 1971, or the British Conservatives’ introduc-
tion of the Manpower Service Commission (MSC) in 1973.
 The oil crises, in turn, produced two reactions: first, a consolidation, 
but also a reorientation, of manpower policy during the mid-1970s, and 
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second, a divergence of instruments and the emergence of competing par-
adigms. More specifically, during the initial phase of the economic crisis, 
governments believed that the economic downturn was temporary and 
that their newly introduced manpower policies could be used as effective 
instruments to cushion the socio-economic effects of unemployment. Ac-
cordingly, manpower policies were strengthened and often recalibrated so 
that they mainly operated on the demand side. Even though alternative 
ideas about the causes of and remedies for skyrocketing unemployment 
began to circulate during the early 1970s, these ideas failed to challenge 
policymakers’ normative and cognitive beliefs in any signiﬁ cant way at that 
time. Th is “manpower consensus”, however, was subsequently shattered 
when the second oil crisis led simultaneously to increasing unemployment 
and inﬂ ation rates. By the early 1980s, not only Keynesianism had lost its 
credibility, but an increasing number of centre-right politicians also em-
braced the new “monetarist” orientation of economic governance, which 
was promoted by Milton Friedman and other economists at the University 
of Chicago. Th is reorientation included the removal of so-called labour 
market rigidities, such as stringent employment protection legislation, 
high minimum wages, co-ordinated wage bargaining, or generous ben-
eﬁ ts. Labour unions and social democratic parties alike ﬁ ercely contested 
this interpretation, which meant that their transposition into public policy 
was mixed, and institutional alternatives were actively sought. While there 
was a shared perception that the welfare state was in crisis (OECD 1981), 
no consensus could be reached either about the root causes of unemploy-
ment or its most appropriate remedies. Accordingly, throughout the early 
1980s, the OECD issued a variety of recommendations, including labour 
market deregulation, a reduction in the supply of labour through “innova-
tive” early retirement schemes and working-time reductions, as well as an 
expansion of active labour market policies. Th is disagreement with respect 
to the most appropriate “solution” to stagnating if not rising levels of un-
employment then led to diverging institutional strategies.
 The Anglophone world, led by two fiscal conservatives, Prime Minis-
ter Thatcher and President Reagan, largely followed the monetarist par-
adigm, which consolidated the institutional configuration of a “liberal” 
welfare state and production regime. In the UK, this strategy necessitated 
confronting and eventually breaking the unions’ backbone in order for the 
government to be able to decentralise wage agreements, to gradually dis-
mantle the tripartite Manpower Services Commission that was in charge 
of co-ordinating labour market policy and vocational training, to signifi-
cantly reduce employment protection, and – at a later stage – to pursue 
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a shift toward a tighter benefits regime and less encompassing ALMPs 
with very weak training components. During the mid-1980s, Ireland also 
followed a path of wage decentralisation that the Irish government hoped 
would ease unemployment and inflationary pressures. However, the Irish 
economy did not recover. On the contrary, the unfavourable situation be-
came worse. In a concerted effort, the tripartite National Economic and 
Social Council presented an alternative strategy in 1986, which laid the 
foundation for Ireland’s partnership-based reform approach. Based on the 
successful alignment of employers and labour unions, and supported by 
the main opposition party, the Irish government was able to conclude a 
comprehensive, national partnership agreement in 1987, in which moder-
ate wage setting was agreed to in exchange for tax cuts and an expansion 
of social and welfare policies. Even though some voices among the labour 
unions and the opposition were initially sceptical, a second partnership 
package followed in 1990 and, since then, social concertation had been 
the norm, distinguishing Ireland from its British neighbour.
 Continental Europe attempted to reduce labour demand through reduc-
tions in working hours, the introduction and rapid expansion of various 
“early exit” schemes, and a signiﬁ cant growth of public works programmes. 
ALMP training programmes, in which participants could often stay for 
several years, also remained an important measure, especially in Germany, 
but less so in Austria. Th is strategy of reducing the overall supply of la-
bour was preferred and supported by the social partners, who remained 
crucial actors in welfare reforms. It was also acceptable to the centre-right 
Christian Democrats, who were less inclined than their Anglo-American 
conservative counterparts to fully incorporate a monetarist paradigm. Th e 
Nordic exemplars, in turn, sought a strategy that was based on heavy in-
vestments in the welfare state, thereby creating new jobs in the service 
sector. Th e strong inﬂ uence of social democracy, strong labour unions, 
and the rapid emancipation of women and associated pressure groups 
provided the necessary political will and societal support to expand state 
interventions, and thus substantially increase tax burdens. ALMPs were 
massively expanded in Sweden under both the Social Democrats and the 
centre-right, four-party coalition government. Conservative-Liberal ruled 
Denmark also increased their use, albeit, on a much smaller scale. Like her 
continental neighbours, however, the non-socialist coalition in Denmark 
promoted “early exit” programmes – most importantly the efterløn scheme 
– which had a major impact on reducing unemployment.
 In summary, the 1980s were characterised by the failure to produce a shared 
labour market policy paradigm. Th is resulted in the issuance of a variety of 
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OECD recommendations, and a divergence in national reform trajectories 
which, in turn, led to the emergence of the famous “worlds of welfare capitalism”.
 Finally, during the late 1990s, a new consensus gradually emerged 
across Europe, largely irrespective of regime types and across partisan 
divisions. During the early 1990s, however, ideational dissent was still 
prevalent as the main prescriptions for reform were based on the results 
of the extensive OECD Jobs Study, conducted in the period 1992-1994. 
The OECD’s message prioritised the reduction of unemployment through 
labour market deregulation and welfare retrenchment, which was justi-
fied by referring to the US with its seemingly stellar labour market, and 
embedded in the theoretical concept of NAIRU. Yet, moving to a US-
style labour market was not an option for most of the European political 
actors, especially the centre-left and allied labour unions. Even though 
left-leaning actors acknowledged that existing measures had failed to re-
duce, if not contributed to, large-scale and often persistent unemploy-
ment, recalibration rather than retrenchment of European welfare states 
was envisaged. Moreover, many European policymakers started to believe 
that unemployment was a European rather than a purely national issue 
during the 1990s as the Maastricht Treaty consolidated the European 
single market and paved the way for the establishment of a common cur-
rency. In an attempt to establish an alternative way forward, the European 
Union members put forward the European Employment Strategy, which 
was modelled on the OECD, but was more inclusive, deliberative, and am-
bitious. The message of the EES – in contrast to the OECD JS – was not 
focused on deregulation and (only) reducing unemployment, but rather, 
on rebalancing welfare rights and responsibilities by turning overly pas-
sive welfare institutions into active ones. At that time, Denmark emerged 
as the new Nordic model state, while Tony Blair’s Third Way philosophy 
inspired many reform-oriented policy makers across Europe. As such, it 
was Anglo-Nordic rather than US ideals that became the foundation for a 
new, decidedly European labour market policy paradigm.
 More specifically, while both the UK and Denmark transformed their 
labour market policy regimes into very distinct models, they shared “ac-
tivation” as a focal point, which was located somewhere between the 
Anglo-Saxon confidence in market mechanisms and Puritan ideals of 
self-reliance, and the Nordic emphasis on state interventions and social 
investments. Reviving, but also repackaging, old Swedish ideas associated 
with the “work line”, labour market benefits should no longer be seen as 
a citizen’s automatic right. Instead, recipients of benefits had an obliga-
tion to seek employment, participate in appropriate measures, and accept 
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gainful employment whenever possible. The normative justification of 
this new “activation paradigm” was based on the abandonment of the so-
cial-democratic belief that the unemployed were “victims” of the market, 
a notion, which previously had “ruled out” any obligations for jobseek-
ers. Social Democrats now accepted obligations, and even the application 
of sanctions, under the terms that mandatory activation measures were 
of high quality and welfare recipients were offered a “menu of options” 
from which they could choose. This rebalancing of welfare “rights” and 
“responsibilities” thus legitimised the continued existence of European 
welfare states, promised to make welfare states sustainable to future gen-
erations (which was an important aspect for centre-left politicians), and 
separated “deserving” from “undeserving” welfare recipients (which was 
dear to centre-right politicians). When both the EU and the OECD ad-
opted the Anglo-Nordic concept of activation, these ideas were quickly 
diffused, accepted and internalised across Western Europe.
 Part and parcel of the successful implementation of activation poli-
cies was also the modernisation of PESs, which entailed a focus on new 
business-like governance systems and improved and streamlined provi-
sion of services. In the broad context of New Public Management, PES 
reforms across Europe were conducted with similar goals, including mak-
ing public services more effective, efficient and transparent. While the 
interpretation of NPM ideas was certainly contingent on specific histori-
cal trajectories and actor constellations, common trajectories neverthe-
less included a focus on performance management through the issuance 
of quantitative targets, quality management through the conducting of 
customer surveys and programme evaluation, case management codified 
in the widespread use of individualised action plans, and turning PESs 
into outward-looking organisations that collaborate more closely with 
relevant stakeholders, while increasingly relying on competitive bids to 
select third-party service providers.
 Last, and in contrast to the beliefs held throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s, the new “activation paradigm” brought an end to the belief that re-
ducing unemployment could only occur by accepting lower employment 
levels. Instead, the new belief was that overall employment rates could 
and should be raised, thus activating not only the unemployed who re-
ceived social benefits, but also a variety of other “inactive” people. Raising 
the overall level of employment in turn would stimulate job growth in the 
private sector as new services were needed, more money spent as more 
people had greater disposable incomes, and employers had a larger pool 
of available workers, which made the market more dynamic. In order to 
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reach “inactive” persons, the functions of PESs were extended and labour 
market policy more systematically linked to family, education, old-age so-
cial security, immigration, and tax policy. This latter view is not limited 
to the EU, but the OECD also performed an ideological “turnaround” in 
the sense that its most recent series, including Babies and Bosses and Live 
Longer, Work Longer, propagate active state interventions – in contrast to 
market solutions – through the launch of comprehensive lifelong learning 
measures and the expansion of childcare places.
 It is important to reiterate that this consolidated “activation paradigm” 
has led to both the convergence on a variety of ideas, measures, and in-
struments and the persistence of institutional differences, which is mostly 
visible with respect to positive and negative financial incentives. In other 
words, EU members continue to differ with respect to the generosity of 
their benefits – but increasingly less with respect to the duration of those 
benefits – as well as their choice of how to “make work pay”. Institutional 
convergence, however, can be seen when considering most of the nega-
tive and positive non-financial incentives. Thus, a tighter, more condi-
tional benefits regime has been coupled with efforts to modernise public 
employment services through a customer orientation and a business-like 
operation, as well as an expansion of the state’s responsibilities by fo-
cusing on the prevention of (long-term) unemployment, active ageing, 
lifelong learning, and the expansion of childcare places. As such, the new 
paradigm is one that seeks to introduce market mechanisms into the op-
erations of the state, while simultaneously also strengthening central poli-
cymakers’ influence in new policy areas that were previously under the 
jurisdiction of municipal authorities or the social partners.
 As such, even though European countries have not become identical 
and ideological diﬀ erences persist with respect to the exact balance and 
combination of negative and positive incentives, the overall orientation of 
European labour market policy has been recalibrated along similar lines, 
with a shared understanding of the main problems facing European welfare 
states, and with the common goal to increase the overall level of employ-
ment in Europe. Th e common vision of a “European Social Model” is thus 
based on a new social contract that is explicitly re-commodifying, but one 
that also seeks to limit social hardship through enabling social policies and 
a more gender-neutral welfare state. Th e result is that neither a purely Nor-
dic nor Anglo-Saxon model serves as the “focal point”, but rather a mix of 
both worlds, adjusted for national speciﬁ cities and problem situations. Th e 
table below summarises all three phases of institutional evolution identi-
ﬁ ed in this book.
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Table 38 Evolution of European Labour Market Policy – Thought and Practice
Decade
(global economic 
environment)
Normative/Cognitive 
Developments
Labour Market Policy
1960s
(sustained econo-
mic growth; full 
employment;  era of 
the “Golden Age” of 
the welfare state)
Dominant idea:
 • Keynesianism
Main objective:
 • Full employment
Main method:·
 •  Counter-cyclical macro-eco-
nomic demand management
Emergence of Active Manpower 
Policy (1950s and 1960s)
 •  Supplementary supply-side 
instrument to aid with:
  º Economic growth
  º Industrial restructuring
  º  Bottlenecks of unemploy-
ment
  º Individual mobility
1970/80s
(oil crises trigger 
global economic 
downturn; era of 
“stagfl ation”)
Dominant idea:
 • Keynesianism challenged in 
1970s; emergence of moneta-
rism in 1980s
Main objective:
 •  Full employment (1970s) 
gives way to price stability 
(1980s)
Main method:
 •  Demand-management 
(1970s) gives way to 
structural reforms; compet-
ing strategies lead to the 
divergence/consolidation of 
regime clusters (1980s)
Active Manpower Policy (1970s) 
turns into Active Labour Market 
Policy (1980s)
 •  New remit for labour market 
instruments:
  º Fight mass unemployment
  º  Expansion of public work 
projects
  º  Expansion of  wage/em-
ployment subsidies
  º  More training, specifi cally 
for the unemployment 
 •  Introduction of demand-
reducing measures (early reti-
rement, disability pensions)
1990/2000s
(end of Cold War; 
era of “permanent 
austerity”)
Dominant idea:
 •  Pure form of monetarism not 
accepted, search for “Euro-
pean Social Model”
Main objective:
 •  Hard currency plus high 
employment rates and social 
cohesion
Main method:
 •  EMU (1990s) plus activation, 
PES service model, and state-
led strategy to make labour 
markets more inclusive 
(2000s)
Activating Labour Market Policy 
(since mid to late 1990s)
 •  Prevention of long-term 
unemployment through 
early interventions, individu-
alised case management and 
more benefi t conditionality
 •  Focus on the provision of 
proper incentive structures & 
customer orientation
 •  Enhanced scope (activation 
is placed at the nexus of 
welfare and work, including 
tax, family, education, and 
welfare policy)
 •  Enhanced reach (unemploy-
ed plus “inactive” persons
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VIII.2  What Impact, if any, have the Recommendations of International 
Organisations such as the OECD and the EU had on National 
Reform Agendas?
Many researchers are sceptical about the impact of “soft” mechanisms for 
the co-ordination of European public policy. The common argument is 
based on the assumption that actors do not care about soft mechanisms 
because they are not legally enforceable or binding and thus, policymak-
ers have no incentives to pay any attention to them (e.g., Schäfer 2004; 
2005; Idema and Kelemen 2006; Büchs 2007; Citi and Rhodes 2007; Hart-
lapp 2009; Kröger 2009). Likewise, many interviewees have argued that 
the impact of the EU/OECD’s peer review processes has been limited, and 
if a convergence were to occur, these trends would have emerged even in 
the absence of international deliberations.
 In this book, I have presented theoretical and empirical reasons why 
we should be sceptical about this kind of claim. Theoretically, I have ar-
gued that policymakers are often engaged in exercises of “puzzling”. In 
other words, policymakers are often confronted with problems for which 
no clear-cut solutions are easily identifiable, and likewise, the outcomes 
and consequences of reform proposals are not predictable. Accordingly, 
learning from – and with – other policymakers, facing, or having faced, 
similar challenges becomes a desirable strategy (cf., also Visser and 
Hemerijck 2003; Hemerijck 2007). With respect to policies located at the 
work-welfare nexus, the OECD offers a wide variety of reports, including, 
but not limited to the Economic Outlook, the Employment Outlook, Coun-
try Notes and Reports, and specialised series such as Babies and Bosses 
or Live Longer, Work Longer, which are not only valuable sources for new 
ideas, but also, and perhaps more importantly, provide “evidence-based” 
empirical findings, which reform-minded policymakers can utilise to le-
gitimise their legislative proposals.1 In turn, the EU peer-review mecha-
nisms associated with the EES, including the multi-annual meetings in 
EMCO, the bi-annual meetings in HoPES, and the thematic meetings via 
the Mutual Learning Process, have been fruitful forums for social learn-
ing and policy diffusion (e.g., Zohlnhöfer and Ostheim, 2005; Nedergaard 
2006; Heidenreich 2009; López-Santana, 2009; Weishaupt 2009; 2010a; 
Zeitlin 2005a; 2009). In contrast to Schäfer, who argues that scholars such 
as Jonathan Zeitlin “fail to recognise the limitations of deliberation” in 
the EU (2005, 16, my translation), I have shown precisely the opposite. 
More specifically, I have made the case that the “ideas” travelling back 
and forth from national capitals to Brussels and Paris had a substantial 
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impact on national debates, political agendas, and actual policy outputs. 
In particular, it is the EES that has been singled out as a particularly help-
ful device for “systematised learning”. This is to say, while members were 
already exchanging ideas and best practices prior to the Luxembourg Pro-
cess, it is “no longer ad hoc; it is now a formalised process” (interviews, 
BMAS4, BMAS6), which has helped shift “perspectives on problems and 
solutions” (interviews, AK, BMAS4, IHS2, DETE2).
 Admittedly, because policymakers like to claim “ownership” for new 
legislation, they often do not admit that they have “learned” from others. 
This poses somewhat of a challenge for researchers, who – like myself – 
trace the occurrence of policy diffusion and social learning. To illustrate 
this fact, a common response by policymakers in many of my interviews 
has been: “We don’t need someone in Brussels [or Paris] to tell us what 
to do. We can think for ourselves”. However, the empirical trajectory, i.e., 
the significant congruence between what the EU/OECD have suggested as 
“good practices” and what policymakers have articulated as their policy 
goals or even adopted as policy instruments, tells a different story. The 
EES – and, I would add, the OECD – have not only “raised the politi-
cal salience and ambitions of employment and social inclusion politics at 
the national as well as the EU level”, they have also “contributed to broad 
shifts in national policy orientation and thinking, involving the incorpora-
tion of EU [and OECD] concepts and categories into domestic debates” 
(Zeitlin 2005a, 450f ). Th e most obvious examples for such shifts in policy 
orientation and thinking include locating the causes of unemployment 
in structural features of labour markets (which necessitates supply-side 
responses); accepting mutual obligations (which runs counter to earlier 
beliefs that unemployment is largely outside of individuals’ control); and 
focusing on raising employment levels (which contradicts earlier prefer-
ences for a reduction of demand as a means to reduce unemployment).
 In turn, frequently used concepts and categories are activation, “the PES 
service model”, gender mainstreaming, active ageing, lifelong learning, 
and most recently, flexicurity. The use of, and reference to, these con-
cepts has substantially shaped national debates and has triggered, inter 
alia, the introduction of a variety of activating labour market polices, PES 
reform, the extension of the quality and availability of (public) childcare, 
and the improvement of employment opportunities for women and older 
workers. Even if policymakers were not interested in advancing these is-
sues, they could no longer simply ignore the international discourses or 
OECD/EU recommendations. As one interviewee (Metall NRW) stated – 
and many others confirmed – policymakers cannot “discuss these debates 
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away”. As such, the room to manoeuvre has become more restricted than 
before and passing legislation that runs against EU/OECD recommenda-
tions has become more difficult, but – of course – not impossible.
 In conclusion, it is important to reiterate that the deliberations at the 
EU/OECD level are not designed as processes in which “Brussels bu-
reaucrats” or “Paris technocrats” lecture Member States on how to run 
a national economy or welfare state. Instead, the processes of peer-re-
view need to be seen as opportunities for Member States who want to 
learn from one another (interview, DGEmpl3). In other words, if Member 
States can be “persuaded” about the appropriateness, necessity, and/or 
viability of “good practices” found in other Member States, emulation will 
follow. That the recommendations can serve as inspiration for domestic 
reformers has been confirmed in a variety of interviews (interviews, AK, 
BMAS6, and CDI). This works through open deliberations and the unre-
stricted flow of ideas, both vertically, i.e., as a “two-way interaction” be-
tween national policymakers and officials at the respective international 
organisations (cf., Zeitlin 2007), and horizontally, i.e., as a “level-field in-
teraction” among policymakers and experts gathered at roundtables, such 
as EMCO or HoPES. In these deliberations the EU [and presumably the 
OECD] see their members’ institutional diversity as representing a “natu-
ral laboratory for policy experimentation” (Mario Joao Rodrigues, cited 
in Zeitlin 2003, 17), from which particular experiences in some states are 
brought to the attention of others.
VIII.3  Have Recent Reform Activities, in the Context of the OECD Jobs 
Study and the EES, Fundamentally Transformed the Historic 
Composition of National Labour Market Policy Regimes, and if so, 
to What Eff ect?
The trajectory outlined throughout this book suggests that, during the 
1970/80s, three readily identifiable regime clusters emerged in the Euro-
pean context, centred on Sweden, Germany, and the UK. These clusters 
were analytically distinguishable because they differed on their ideational 
underpinnings and their main institutional configurations. More specifi-
cally, the Nordic cluster combined the universality principle (generous 
access to welfare services – including ALMPs – based on citizenship, fi-
nanced mainly by general taxation), the equity principle (achieving social 
homogeneity, while not tolerating social exclusion), the dual breadwinner 
norm (high and voluntary female labour market participation, encour-
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aged by access to public childcare and individual tax bands), and the part-
nership norm (involving the social partners in labour market policymak-
ing and implementation).
 The Continental cluster, in turn, combined the insurance principle (ac-
cess to welfare services – including ALMPs – based on contributory his-
tory), the equivalence principle (the welfare state preserves workers’ – and 
their dependents’ – status in case of job loss), the male breadwinner norm 
(low female labour market participation mainly due to lack of childcare 
support and unaccommodating school and store hours, supported by 
generous and long maternity leave schemes), and the partnership norm 
(involving the social partners in labour market policymaking and imple-
mentation).
 Finally, the Anglophone cluster combined a weak universality principle 
(universal access to flat-rate income support at a low level and weakly 
institutionalised ALMPs, financed mainly by general taxation), the mar-
ket principle (individuals are responsible for their own fate), the male 
breadwinner norm (low female labour market participation mainly due 
to lack of childcare support), and weak social partnership (social partners 
increasingly excluded from policymaking and “free-for-all” expectations 
predominate in wage-setting negotiations).
 In the 1990s, and even more so in the early 2000s, however, most of 
these regime-typical principles were challenged through the spread of the 
“activation paradigm”. In the Nordic cluster, the revisiting, consolidation, 
and spread of such ideas have accelerated a variety of market-type reforms 
with the aim to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of labour 
market programmes. Most notably since the inception of centre-right 
governments in both Denmark and Sweden, major institutional changes 
have taken place that are typically associated with the Anglophone cluster: 
(1) benefits conditionality has been tightened and a tougher “work-first” 
approach is increasingly acceptable; (2) ALMPs have been recalibrated by 
reducing the use of demand-side measures and curtailing the availability 
of extensive training measures, while increasing “make work pay” instru-
ments through the tax system; (3) the influence that the social partners 
have on labour market policymaking has been severely weakened; and 
(4) PESs have been exposed to more competition in awarding contracts 
for the implementation of various services and programmes. Accordingly, 
the universality principle has seen a shift from “education first” to “work 
first”, the equity principle has been somewhat compromised in favour of 
the Anglophone market principle, and the social partners – in particular 
the unions – are increasingly “on the defensive”.
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 In turn, the Anglophone countries have moved toward the Nordic clus-
ter. Most notably, there has been a move away from “residual universal-
ism” and toward “selective universalism”. More specifically, by substan-
tially reforming the tax and benefits systems, and introducing a national 
minimum wage in both Ireland and the UK, a “life on benefits” has be-
come less attractive than (low-wage) work, which is subsidised through 
tax credits and other transfer payments. Moreover, access to free in-work 
training has been introduced through the One Step Up scheme in Ireland 
and Train to Gain in the UK. In other words, for those who can partici-
pate in the workforce, new universal programmes have become available, 
while the welfare state for the jobless has remained limited. Likewise, 
both countries – in particular Ireland – have improved relations with the 
social partners. While Ireland has moved to a system in which the social 
partners are involved in every major decision with regard to the labour 
market, the UK has also shown significant improvements, most notice-
ably in the creation of the Minimum Wage Commission, in which both 
the TUC and CBI are represented. Finally, both Ireland and the UK have 
launched national childcare strategies with the dual objective of reducing 
child poverty (which constitutes a move toward a more equitable society) 
and improving female employment rates (which is a necessary condition 
for the establishment of a dual breadwinner norm). Clearly, these devel-
opments have become possible because centre-left parties (Fianna Fáil 
and New Labour) have been in office over the past decade, but they cer-
tainly also reflect their respective governments’ ambition to approximate 
a Nordic welfare model.
 Finally, the Continental cluster shows an institutional pathway that 
eﬀ ectively combines Anglophone and Nordic elements, while retaining 
other regime-typical features. Both the insurance and the equivalence 
principles have become increasingly challenged. In a “negative” sense, the 
increase in beneﬁ ts conditionality and the substantial reduction in UB 
duration in Germany forces workers to accept work not only faster, but 
also to possibly accept signiﬁ cant pay cuts. Th is change therefore brings 
Austria and Germany closer to Anglophone market principles because the 
workers’ insurance history and status are less important than before. In a 
“positive” sense, however, Austria has dramatically increased its ALMP 
expenditures, while Germany’s Hartz reforms permit former SA recipients 
to access most of the ALMPs, previously only available to insured workers. 
In this sense, Germany has moved a small step toward universalism, while 
Austria’s labour market interventions help to foster a more equitable so-
ciety. Moreover, the male breadwinner norm was – more recently – chal-
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lenged by both countries’ ambition to substantially improve childcare in-
frastructures (for Austria, see also Weishaupt 2009). Both countries largely 
followed a similar strategy in which the national government provided large 
amounts of “seed money” to local authorities, thus enabling them to create 
new childcare places, expand pre-school hours, and hire new teachers and 
childminders. In Germany, this trend was ﬁ rst initiated by the Social Dem-
ocrats, but subsequently extended by the Christian Democrats. In Austria, 
in turn, such changes could only be introduced after the government re-
shuﬄ  e in 2006, which brought the Social Democrats back into oﬃ  ce. 
 Th ese ﬁ ndings therefore suggest that constitutive elements in all of the 
“worlds of welfare capitalism” have been weakened in recent years. While 
welfare states continue to diﬀ er in many respects, they increasingly share 
common ideas and ideals, institutional diﬀ erences across clusters are less 
sharp, and reforms are less regime-speciﬁ c in character. At least with re-
spect to their labour market policy regimes, it is thus argued that welfare 
states have undergone a process of hybridisation that was triggered and 
accelerated by the emergence of the common “activation paradigm”. Ac-
cordingly, I concur with Colin Crouch, who argues – by referring to Zeitlin 
(2003) – that regime typologies are unnecessarily static and rigid, which, 
in turn, “render[s] learning almost impossible” (Crouch 2005, 31). Instead 
of “labelling” individual country cases as examples of certain theoreti-
cal models, while considering all those features which do not ﬁ t as noise 
(Crouch 2005, 69), Crouch suggests an analytical approach that is able to 
capture empirical diversity by considering “to what extent each of a se-
ries of models can be found within [each] case” (Crouch 2005, 68). With 
this book, I hope I have taken the ﬁ rst step toward that goal. I have cor-
roborated the existence of three “models” that crystallised in the 1970/80s, 
while admitting, however, that these “models” were not perfectly homog-
enous. I have also identiﬁ ed each of these models’ constitutive pieces, or-
ganised along four principles/norms. And ﬁ nally, I have shown how inno-
vative actors have combined various elements of these models in new ways 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.
VIII.4  Reactions to the Global Financial and Economic Crisis and the 
Future of the Activation Paradigm
The financial and economic crisis that began in 2008 has confronted Eu-
ropean welfare states with the most severe employment challenge since 
the 1970s. In particular, the most deregulated labour markets in this study, 
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including Denmark, Ireland, and the UK, have seen the most drastic and 
most rapid rise in unemployment. But also Sweden has seen a substantial 
increase in unemployment numbers, despite its regulated labour market. 
Austria and Germany, in turn, have been able to minimise job losses, at 
least at the time of writing. The following table summarises recent trends 
in unemployment levels in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, 
and the UK.
The extremely rapid and unexpected increase in unemployment – after 
many years of employment growth – is a particularly striking conse-
quence of the crisis. In the UK, for instance, the Guardian reported on 
17 April 2008 the UK’s lowest unemployment claimant count of 794,300 
since 1975 (Seager 2008). Yet, almost exactly one year later, on 23 April 
2009, Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling had to signal that the 
jobless queue would almost quadruple to more than “three million by the 
end of next year” (Elliott 2009). Likewise, in Ireland, the spring of 2008 
seemed promising, and ESRI, the Economic and Social Research Insti-
tute, predicted that Ireland would “outperform” its EU neighbours and 
foresaw a “strong economic rebound in 2010” with economic growth rates 
Table 39 Harmonised Unemployment Rate as Percentage of Civilian Labour Force, 
2008 through 2009, Quarters
Q-1
2008
Q-2
2008
Q-3
2008
Q-4
2008
Q-1
2009
Q-2
2009
Q-3
2009
Q-4
2009
AT 4.2 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.7 4.6 5.1 5.3
BE 7.1 6.3 7.7 6.8 7.9 7.5 8.2 7.9
DK 3.3 3.0 3.4 3.5 5.2 6.0 6.1 6.7
FI 6.7 7.3 5.6 6.0 7.6 9.6 7.5 8.2
FR 7.8 7.4 7.6 8.3 9.3 9.2 9.4 10.0
DE 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.8 7.8 7.5 7.5 7.1
GR 8.3 7.2 7.2 8.0 9.4 8.9 9.3 ..
IE 4.7 5.2 6.7 7.5 10.1 12.0 12.6 12.5
IT 7.0 6.7 6.1 7.0 8.0 7.3 7.3 8.8
NL 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.9
PT 7.8 7.4 7.8 8.0 9.0 9.3 10.0 10.3
ES 9.6 10.4 11.3 13.9 17.4 18.0 17.9 18.9
SE 6.3 6.7 5.6 6.1 7.9 9.0 8.1 8.2
UK 5.1 5.2 6.0 6.2 7.1 7.6 8.0 ..
Source: OECD.stat accessed on 12 March 2010
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above five percent (Tansey 2008). However, already by the fall of 2008, the 
economic climate had significantly changed as a collapse of the construc-
tion sector and a dramatic fall in exports triggered a decline in employ-
ment and consumer spending (NESC 2009). For the first time since 1983, 
employment contracted at the same time as unemployment increased 
sharply, tax receipts declined, and the national budget deficit threatened 
to double in 2010 (Smyth 2008; Irish Times 2008). By spring 2009, the 
government faced a money market in turmoil, a dried-up financial sector, 
a burst housing bubble, unemployment in double digits, and collapsing 
tax revenues.
 The two Anglophone countries reacted, however, rather differently to 
the crisis. The Brown government in the UK issued a massive stimulus 
package that was designed to “rescue” the financial sector, unfreeze credit 
markets, and cushion the effects of the housing crisis. With respect to the 
labour market, Brown announced a moratorium on planned JobCentre 
Plus closures and promised more money for frontline staff (Economist 
2008). A package worth three billion pounds followed, which included 
more generous contracts to providers of the Flexible New Deal – who had 
threatened to pull out of the scheme as they are only paid when they place 
jobseekers into jobs – additional resources for JCP to hire more person-
nel and open longer hours, recruitment subsidies for firms that employ 18 
to 24-year olds who had been out of work for more than 12 months, and 
direct job-creation measures with the aim to generate 250,000 jobs over 
the following two years (Elliott 2009). As such, the government expanded 
both supply-side instruments that are designed to assist jobseekers to find 
available jobs whenever possible, and demand-side ones, which are in-
tended to keep jobseekers attached to the labour market.
 The Irish government’s primary concern, in turn, was to convince in-
ternational creditors that the solvency of the state was not at risk. Ac-
cordingly, the government issued tough budget consolidation measures 
through job and expenditure cuts in the public sector, large-scale savings 
in public programmes, tax increases and new levies on insurance policies 
(Collins et al. 2009). In contrast to the UK – and many other European 
governments – Ireland aimed to save billions in public expenditures and 
remained hesitant – or perhaps unable – to expand labour market pro-
grammes, which resulted in hefty criticism from the opposition, business 
groups and labour unions as the government was perceived to not ad-
equately address the unemployment crisis (Slattery 2009). As unemploy-
ment continued to soar, the NESC produced a strategy report in March 
2009 which called upon the government to – inter alia – “stimulate the 
CONCLUSION
creation of ‘21st century’ equivalents to the special labour market pro-
grammes that were introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s”(NESC 
2009, xiii). While a large-scale response by the government did not follow, 
various (small) steps were taken in the subsequent months. In April, the 
government unveiled an emergency budget in response to the country’s 
deteriorating finances, which included “an Enterprise Stabilisation Fund 
to help protect jobs” (Dobbins 2009a). The Enterprise Stabilisation Fund 
would then support 181 projects throughout 2009, supporting approxi-
mately 7,500 jobs (Éireann 2010). During the summer, the government 
also outlined plans to launch a Temporary Employment Subsidy Scheme 
– funded through the European Commission – which would provide sup-
port to companies in their attempts to retain workers. Further measures 
included the Employer Jobs Incentive Scheme, through which companies 
recruiting a person who had been unemployed for at least six months 
would be exempt from paying payroll taxes (PRSI) for the first year of that 
employment. The government then also introduced a “short-time work” 
scheme – supported through the European Social Fund – where workers 
work for three days and receive unemployment benefits and training for 
two days each week for up to one year (Dobbins 2009b; OECD 2009b, 
8). Additional resources were also made available to enable FÁS to dou-
ble job-search support, to expand existing skills-enhancing programmes 
from 66,000 places in 2008 to 130,000 in 2009, and to immediately – 
rather than after three months – “activate” young jobseekers aged 18 or 19 
(Éireann 2010; see also OECD 2009b, 13).
 In the Nordic cases, the crisis first and foremost spurred new debates 
about the Swedish and Danish currencies’ volatility and the prospects of 
joining the Eurozone. In Denmark, the Danish National Bank had to in-
tervene in the foreign-exchange market to counter speculative attacks on 
the krone, which resulted in higher interests rates. Higher interest rates, 
in turn, were translated into higher mortgages and credits for the Dan-
ish people (Pop 2008). As Denmark had been able to generate budget 
surpluses for the past 13 years (Copenhagen Post 2009), the government 
could issue two bailout programmes for banks in January 2009, press on 
with its plans to cut taxes, while putting forward various, albeit moder-
ate, measures to cope with employment losses. In contrast to most other 
European countries, Denmark did not make “any arrangements of direct 
support to firms which are at risk of having to reduce employment” (Stu-
vøy and Jørgensen 2009). The main instrument to “bridge” months of low 
productivity due to weak demand was a “work-sharing” scheme, which 
was limited to a maximum of two periods of 13 weeks. A worker who is 
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placed on “work-sharing” is paid by the company during working days 
and receives unemployment benefits – if a member of an UI fund – or 
means-tested social assistance otherwise during days without work. The 
government also pushed the activation threshold for jobseekers under 
the age of 30 forward from six to three months (OECD 2009b, 12), and 
“automatically” increased its expenditures on ALMPs.2 Last, the govern-
ment also increased funding for the further training of employed work-
ers, enabling them more and faster access to such measures.This has been 
welcomed by employers, who are now able to utilise this time by training 
their workers “after a long period of a high demand in the market” where 
this type of opportunity had not presented itself (Stuvøy and Jørgensen 
2009).
 Sweden’s conservative government, in turn, reacted in as early as De-
cember 2008 with Europe’s most extensive – in relative terms – stimulus 
package (Gamillscheg 2008). The automobile industry, however, did not 
receive any special state aid – which is in stark contrast to Austria and 
Germany. Instead, the automobile and other industries only received “res-
cue loans” to facilitate the economic restructuring or liquidation plans 
of adversely affected companies. More direct state support was issued in 
the form of a massive tax reduction for the construction sector, allocat-
ing  92 million for the restoration of roads and railways, and channelling 
more money to local governments to avoid redundancies in the public sec-
tor (Lovén 2009). Th ese eﬀ orts to prevent job losses were coupled not only 
with decreases in payroll taxes and the introduction of other tax cuts to 
stimulate job creation through the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill of 2009, but 
also with the expansion of labour market policy programmes. More specif-
ically, the government provided additional resources to the PES, increased 
the number of places available in work-placement schemes, initiated an 
expansion of education and training measures, appointed regional “co-
ordinators” to promote regional co-operation when redundancy notices 
were issued, and introduced new “coaching” measures that involve private 
placement agencies with the aim of improving job-placement and counsel-
ling services (Government of Sweden 2009; see also OECD 2009b, 15).
 The reactions to the crisis in the two Continental cases were very simi-
lar. Both countries started in fairly good condition. German employment 
levels were at an all-time high in 2008, while Austria had reached full em-
ployment with an unemployment rate below four percent. Both countries 
had been pursuing balanced budgets, and in both cases, grand coalitions 
had been formed between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, 
internalising major political conflicts. In both cases, the governments 
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reacted with extensive economic stimulus packages – roughly the same 
size, relatively speaking – which combined (payroll) tax cuts with public 
investments into education, infrastructure and public housing. In both 
countries, with Germany leading the way and being more generous, the 
government also provided financial incentives for the purchase of new 
cars (Der Standard 2009). With respect to labour market policies, both 
countries increased their budgets for ALMPs, hired new PES staff to cope 
with the increased demand, and created incentives for companies to re-
cruit/retain apprentices. The main instrument, however, was the “short-
time work” measure (Kurzarbeit), which allowed companies to reduce the 
working hours of their workers, while the PES (partially) compensated 
these workers for loss of income. The duration a worker can be employed 
as a “short-time worker” was temporarely lengthened in both countries 
from three and six months in Austria and Germany to 18 and 24 months 
respectively. In both countries, these “short-time workers” could utilise 
their newfound “spare” time to invest in their vocational skills. This extra 
training was subsidised via the ministry of employment. The Kurzarbeit 
measure in both countries was clearly the governments’ most important 
instrument to avoid major job cuts.
 This admittedly brief overview shows that neither the “activation para-
digm” nor the “PES service model” has become obsolete since the crisis. 
In fact, no European country has relaxed activation requirements, while 
some – predominantly Denmark and the UK – have actually increased the 
activation threshold for young workers (cf., OECD 2009a; 2009b). Both 
the European Commission and the OECD have repeatedly stressed the re-
inforcement rather than the easing of activation measures (e.g., Commis-
sion of the European Communities 2009; OECD 2009a, 2009c), and the 
overall focus of national governments has been to “maintain the course” 
with respect to labour market policy and to minimise the loss in overall 
levels of employment. There has not been any noticeable trend of rebal-
ancing ALMPs in favour of passive programmes, and demand-reducing 
ALMPs continue to be rare. Instead – and in stark contrast to the years 
following the oil crises – most governments have attempted to “bridge” 
the cyclical downturn through a shortening of working hours, stimulat-
ing employment growth through tax cuts, and improving job prospects 
of (low-skilled) workers through better access to education and training 
programmes.
 Overall, there is reason to be optimistic. European labour markets en-
tered the crisis with significantly higher levels of employment than ever 
before, healthier levels of debt, and low levels of inflation due to the Sta-
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bility and Growth Pact. Moreover, policymakers have focused on qualifi-
cations measures to improve the vocational skills of workers, and “acti-
vation blueprints” have been prepared for when the economy rebounds 
and new jobs become available. When the recession ultimately comes to 
an end, the economic recovery will probably be more rapid and the long-
term financial costs to the welfare state will be less severe than in the 
1980s.
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 List of Interviews and Personal Conversations
 In Chronological Order, by Country1
 Austria
WIFO Researcher at Institute for the Study of the Economy (WIFO); 
Section for Labour Market, Income and Social Policy, 4 June 
2007.
IHS1 Researcher at the Institute for Graduate Studies (IHS); 
Centre for Employment, Qualifications, and Innovation 
(EQUI), Vienna, 4 June 2007.
AMS Public Employment Service (Arbeitsmarktservice); Head of 
Labour Market Board, 6 June 2007.
BMWA1, 2 Two representatives of the Ministry for Economics and 
Labour; Labour Market Division (II/5), 6 June 2007.
ÖGB Austrian Labour Union Federation (ÖGB); Division for 
Labour Market and Education Policy, 8 June 2007.
WKÖ1 Chamber of Commerce (City of Vienna); Division for Social 
Policy, 8 June 2007.
IHS2 Researcher at the Institute for Graduate Studies (IHS); 
Department for Economics and Finance, Vienna, 11 June 
2007.
WKÖ2 Representative of Chamber of Commerce (National); 
Division for Social and Health Policy, 13 June 2007.
BMWA3 Representative of the Ministry for Economics and Labour; 
Labour Market Division (II/10), 14 June 2007.
AK Representative of Austrian Chamber of Labour; Division for 
Employment Policy, 15 June 2007.
BMWA4 Representative of the Ministry for Economics and Labour; 
Labour Market Division (II/3), 15 June 2007.
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 Germany
SPD1 Representative of the German Social Democratic Party 
(SPD); Chair of BAG-IF (sheltered employment for people 
with disabilities), Cologne, 15 March 2007.
HBS Representative of the Hans-Böckler Foundation; Researcher 
in Economics and Social Policy Division, Düsseldorf, 28 
March 2007.
BMAS1 Representative of the Federal Ministry for Labour and 
Social Affairs (BMAS); Labour Market Division (IIa1), 
Berlin, 3 April 2007.
BDA1, 2 Two representatives of the Confederation of German 
Employers (BDA); Labour Market and Social Policy & 
Labour Law, Berlin, 3 April 2007.
SPD2, 3 Two representatives of the German Social Democratic 
Party (SPD), Berlin, 4 April 2007.
WZB1 Senior Researcher at the Social Science Research Centre 
Berlin; Division for Labour Market Policy, Berlin, 4 April 2007.
Metall NRW Employers’ Association for Metal Firms, North-Rhine 
Westphalia; Division for Labour Market Policy, Düsseldorf, 10 
April 2007.
BMAS2 Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS); 
Labour Market Division and rotating EMCO member, Bonn, 
11 April 2007.
CDU1 Representative of the German Christian Democratic Party 
(CDU); former regional government minister, Bonn, 16 April 
2007.
INFAS Institute for Applied Social Sciences; Labour Market Policy 
Evaluations, Bonn, 16 April 2007.
DGB1 German Labour Union Federation; Regional Chair for Köln, 
Leverkusen, Erft, Berg, Cologne, 24 April2007.
IQA Researcher at the Institute for the Quality of Work; 
Division for Labour Market Policy, Gelsenkirchen, 3 May 
2007.
DST German Assembly of Cities (Deutscher Städtetag); former 
Chair, Cologne, 3 May 2007.
DHIK German Chamber for Industry and Trade (DIHK); Division 
for Labour Market and Immigration, Berlin 23 May 2007.
ZDH German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH); Division 
for Social Security, Berlin, 23 May 2007.
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BMAS3 Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS); 
European Employment and Social Policy, Berlin, 24 May 
2007 and 17 January 2008.
WZB2 Senior Researcher at the Social Science Research Centre 
Berlin; Division for Labour Market Policy, Berlin, 24 May 
2007.
DGB2 German Labour Union Federation (national representative); 
Labour Market Division, Berlin, 24 May 2007.
BMAS4 Representative of the Federal Ministry for Labour and 
Social Affairs (BMAS); Labour Market Policy Division, 
Berlin, 25 May 2007.
Ver.di1 United Service Sector Union; Division for Social Policy, 
Berlin 25 May 2007.
IZA Researcher at the Institute for the Study of Labour, Division 
for Labour Market Policy, Bonn, 30 May 2007.
BA1 Federal Employment Agency (BA), International Relations, 
Nuremberg, 14 January 2008.
BA2 Representative of the Federal Employment Agency (BA), 
Division Social Code Book II, Nuremberg, 15 January 
2008.
SPD4 Representative of the German Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), Parliamentary Group, Working Group on Labour 
Market and Social Policy, Berlin, 17 January 2008.
Ver.di2 United Service Sector Union; Division for People Without 
Incomes, Berlin 17 January 2008.
BMAS5 Representative of the Federal Ministry for Labour and 
Social Affairs (BMAS), Labour Market Division, IIa4 
(Women’s issues), Berlin, 17 January 2008.
 Ireland
DETE1 Department for Enterprise, Trade and Employment 
(DETE); Labour Market Policy Division (European 
Employment Strategy), 12 April 2006.
ICTU1 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU); Research Officer, 
Labour Market and Social Policy, 17 April 2006.
UCD1 Professor at University College Dublin (UCD); School for 
Politics and International Relations, 13 April 12006, 27 
April 2006, 28 February 2007, and 9 January 2008.
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NESC National Economic and Social Council (NESC); Director, 18 
April 2006 and 27 February 2007.
CORI Conference of Religious of Ireland (CORI); Justice Division, 
19 April 2006.
INOU1 Irish National Organisation for the Unemployed (INOU), 
24 April 2006.
IBEC Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC), Senior 
Economist, 25 April 2006 and 28 February 2007.
MIN Former Minister (DEE and Finance), currently Member of 
Parliament, Labour Party, telephone interview, 15 May 2006.
YOUTH Representative of Department of Education, Division 
Youthreach, 26 February 2007.
FÁS1, 2 Two representatives of FÁS, Employment Services/Social 
Inclusion Division & Research Unit (Skills and Labour 
Market), February 27, 2007; FÁS1 again on 8 January 2008.
TRIN Lecturer at Trinity College, 28 February 2007.
DETE2 Department for Economy, Trade and Employment (DETE); 
Labour Market Division, 1 March 2007.
FÁS3, 4 Two representatives of FÁS, both Research Unit (Skills and 
Labour Market), 1 March 2007.
ICTU2 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), 1 March 2007.
FÁS5 Two representatives of FAS, Local Employment Services 
Division, 8 January 2008 (accompanied by FÁS1).
UCD2 Professor at University College Dublin (UCD), Michael 
Smurfit School of Business, 8 January 2008.
INOU2 Irish National Organisation for the Unemployed (INOU), 9 
January 2008.
 UK
LSE Professor at London School of Economics and Political 
Science (LSE), Department of Political Science, 2 May 2006.
TUC1 Trade Union Congress, Division for New Deal, 3 May 2006.
BE Bank of England, Monetary Policy Committee, 3 May 2006.
DWP1 Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), New Deal, 
Phone Interview, 12 May 2006.
HMT HM Treasury, 8 May 2007.
DWP2 Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), Senior 
Economist, 8 May 2007.
LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND PERSONAL CONVERSATIONS
DWP3, 4 Two representatives of the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), Skills Unit, 9 May 2007.
DWP5 Representative of DWP, Economics and Labour Market 
Division, May 9, 2007 and 10 January 2008.
IES1 Researcher at the Institute for Employment Studies, Skills 
and Training, Brighton, 10 May 2007.
UO1 Professor at University of Oxford, 14 May 2007.
UO2 Professor at University of Oxford, 14 May 2007.
CESI Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion (CESI), Director, 
16 May 2007.
DfES Department for Education and Skills (DfES), Skills Division, 
Phone Interview, 18 May 2007.
IES2 Researcher at Institute for Employment Studies, New Deal, 
Brighton, telephone interview, 18 May 2007.
JCP1, 2 Two representatives of JobCentre Plus (JCP), one of them 
via a conference call, 10 January 2008.
 Denmark
CARMA Senior researcher at Centre for Labour Market Research 
(CARMA) at Aalborg University, telephone conversation, 
20 August 2009.
 Sweden
SOFI1 Two researchers at Institute for Social Studies (SOFI), 
personal conversation, Stockholm, 8 May and 28 May 2008.
PES-SE1 Senior civil servant at the Swedish Public Employment Service 
(AF), International Relations, Stockholm, 11 August 2009.
DEMPL Two senior civil servants at the Ministry for Employment, 
Division for Labour Market Policy, Stockholm, 17 August 
2009.
IFS Senior researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies, 
personal conversation, Stockholm, 18 August 2009.
CSE Representative of the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, 
Stockholm, 19 August 2009.
PES-SE2 Two civil servants at the Swedish Public Employment 
Service (AF), Stockholm, 20 August 2009.
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SOFI2 Senior researcher at Institute for Social Studies (SOFI), 
personal conversation, 21 August 2008.
VÄXJÖ Senior researcher at Växjö University, School of Health 
Science and Social Work, and senior researcher from 
Uppsala University, personal conversation, Stockholm, 14 
August 2009.
 European Union
CDI Country Desk Officer, Ireland, 21 May 2007.
CDA Country Desk Officer, Austria, 22 May 2007.
DGEmpl1 DG Employment, Social Affairs & Equal Opportunities, 
Social Protection Committee, 29 October 2004; personal 
conversation, Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
DGEmpl2 Representative of DG Employment, Social Affairs & Equal 
Opportunities, 22 May 2007.
DGEmpl3 Representative of DG Employment, Social Affairs & Equal 
Opportunities, Employment Strategy Unit, 9 July 2008.
EMCO1 Formerly member of EMCO & Representative for Germany, 
29 October and 2 November 2004; personal conversations, 
Madison, Wisconsin, USA.
EMCO2 EMCO and DG Employment & Social Affairs & Equal 
Opportunities representative, 21 May 2007

 Notes
 Chapter I
 Following Esping-Andersen (, ), I define a policy regime as “the specific 
institutional arrangements adopted by societies in the pursuit of work and 
welfare”. 
 The latter term is borrowed from Friedman ().
 The separation of policy changes into cognitive shifts, political (i.e., agenda) 
shifts, and policy shifts was inspired by a presentation by Jonathan Zeitlin 
(see also, Zeitlin ).
 In the European context, Sweden is also identified as a NPM frontrunner. 
When the Social Democrats returned to office in , their self-proclaimed 
goal was to reform the public administration that was seen as “too slow, too 
rigid, too centralized, too large, and too bureaucratic” through decentraliza-
tion, deregulation, and delegation/devolution. (Forssell , -). Like-
wise, the Swedish PES was restructured by Allan Larsson in the mid-s 
through the introduction of MBO techniques and and decentralization (cf., 
http://www.arbetsformedlingen.se/go.aspx?c=, last accessed on  July 
.)
 To be precise, this analysis is confined to England and does not include 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.
 France, which is not discussed in this study, also followed this trajectory by 
remodelling its labour market administration along Swedish lines in  
(Morel ). Italy, however, did not, and has in many respects remained an 
outlier (Mazzoleni ). Note also that Greece, Portugal, and Spain were 
under military dictatorships until , , and  respectively.
 Chapter II
 More recently, scholars have begun to develop a fourth type, which is identi-
fied as discursive institutionalism (Schmidt ).
 FROM THE MANPOWER REVOLUTION TO THE ACTIVATION PARADIGM
 Following Pollitt and Bouckaert (, f ), I define a trajectory as “an in-
tentional pattern – a route that someone is trying to take”. A trend, in turn, 
is “simply some pattern in the data (e.g., if rainfall goes up every year for ten 
years, that is a trend.)”
 Since the early s, there has been a rapidly growing body of “rational 
choice” literature that does not see institutions as equilibrium outcomes. For 
a good review, see Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel ().
 Historical institutionalists are also conscious, however, of the context in 
which these power struggles take place. This is to say, many historical insti-
tutionalists operate under the premise that there is never a total tabula rasa 
and newly emerging institutions always reflect some elements of pre-existing 
ones (e.g., Skocpol ; ; see also, Zeitlin a).
 Pierson also argues that the structure of a political system affects the likeli-
hood of institutional stability. In other words, the more “veto points” there 
are in a system, the harder it is to rapidly push through radical changes. These 
veto points include constitutional features such as bicameralism, federalism, 
or judicial review and “veto players” such as coalition partners, dual execu-
tives, etc. (Pierson b). 
 The “effective number” refers to political parties that have an actual chance 
of winning electoral representation and thus the potential to affect legislative 
outcomes (cf., Lijphart ).
 I am grateful to Jonathan Zeitlin for suggesting these terms. 
 Other scholars using a two-fold categorization of labour market regime types 
include Lødemel and Trickey (), who differentiate between two worlds, 
applying either a “work first” or “human-capital development” strategy. 
 Handler may also fit into the partial convergence category, because he per-
ceives continued diversity regarding “typical” jobseekers for whom the Euro-
pean welfare state remains intact. 
 The term “contingent convergence” was first coined by Anton Hemerijck. 
 A sixth category specifically addressing the needs of disabled jobseekers is 
often included as well. However, in this book, no special attention will be 
paid to this group because a different operational and normative logic applies 
to the process of assisting disabled persons to find work.
 Social wages refer to transfer payments plus other benefits, such as housing 
subsidies, access to medical care, etc.
 Childcare support may include instruments such as access to childcare facili-
ties, but also parental, maternal, paternal leave schemes, which enable the 
parent to care for the child, as well pre-school and school hours that affect 
the opportunities for a parent to reconcile (part-time) work and family life.
NOTES
 Chapter III
 In , the foundrymen’s union created the first unemployment insurance 
fund for its members in Britain. Within ten years, five more unions followed, 
and by , some “. million workers, largely higher skilled and paid, were 
in unions with out-of-work benefits” (Heclo , ).
 Sweden’s late introduction is based on the Conservative government’s reluc-
tance to introduce such a scheme on the national level. The establishment of 
a national UI system, however, followed quickly after the Social Democrats 
assumed power in  (cf., Wadensjö ). For a more detailed historical 
overview of the Swedish case, see Wadensjö ; . 
 However, as public exchanges co-existed alongside union-, employer- and 
voluntary sector-based exchanges, their numbers remained modest and 
there were only public labour exchanges for some occupations (cf., Hülber 
).
 Like in Austria, the extent to which public offices were created remained lim-
ited and they fulfilled only “niche” functions. This was mainly due to the fact 
that Denmark had already established its nation wide, union-run UI system 
in , which allowed the unions to “dominate” all aspects of policy that was 
related to the labour market. Hence, “placement activities of the public em-
ployment service had been confined to marginal groups of jobseekers (such 
as disabled persons and people with no qualifications at all) and marginal 
demand for labour (e.g. seasonal employment in agriculture, part-time chair-
women in private households etc.)” (Aage Tarp , ).
 Rudolf Meidner was actually born in Breslau, then in Germany, but went into 
exile in Sweden after the Nazis came to power (Meidner , ). 
 For instance, the scope of vocational training for adults increased more then 
tenfold, from some , participants in  to about , in  (OECD 
a, ). 
 While this basic structure, first established in , is still present today, it 
has become more complex with additional layers, including more Directo-
rates and semi-autonomous bodies.
 The OECD legitimised its focus on full employment and the advance of active 
manpower policies, in turn, by referring to the ILO resolution of  on a 
“Full Productive and Freely Chosen Employment Policy” (OECD , ).
 Sweden was the first country represented in a series of  publications on the 
labour market policy regimes of OECD Member States, published between 
 and the late s.
 About one month later, on  June , the ILO also passed Convention  
Concerning Employment, which compelled Member States to pursue an “ac-
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tive” labour market policy, “designed to promote full, productive and freely 
chosen employment” (ILO , Article ).
 In , the Social Assistance Act came into force, which introduced a single, 
unified structure for social assistance claims (Madsen , ).
 However, in contrast to Sweden, Denmark did not introduce a separate un-
employment assistance (UA) pillar.
 For a study of the origins of German vocational training, see Kathleen Thelen 
(; ).
 Another important development was the launch of a “concerted action” 
(Konzertierte Aktion) in , which mobilized all of the main societal stake-
holders in order to reach full employment and price stability simultaneously. 
The Konzertierte Aktion resulted iter alia in the passing of the Stability and 
Growth Act (Stabilitäts- und Wachstumsgesetz). However, the Konzertierte 
Aktion was subsequently abolished in .
 The Austrian government did, however, grant the social partners representa-
tion on all advisory committees and councils at the national, regional, and 
local levels after the war.
 As unemployment hovered at about two percent during the first two post-
war decades, most of the unemployed would frequently find work without 
ever setting foot in an Employment Exchange office (Beale , ).
 I thank Graham Wilson for suggesting this term.
 NIEC was the predecessor of today’s National Economic and Social Council, 
responsible for providing the government with information about ways to 
achieve economic growth and social justice. 
 Likewise, Portugal created its National Employment Service (SNE) in , 
while Greece completely overhauled its PES (OAED) in , renamed it 
Manpower Employment Organization, and created seven regional direc-
torates (OECD , f and ). In France, the OECD recommendations 
triggered the Ortoli Report, which subsequently led to the creation of the 
Agence Nationale Pour l’Emploi (APNE). In contrast to Germany (and, 
to some extent, Sweden), France, however, maintained separate training 
(AFPA) and unemployment insurance (UNEDIC) institutions (Phan-Thuy, 
et al. , )
 Chapter IV
 To be entirely correct, Keynes’s General Theory did not consider inflation. 
However, after Phillips’ discovery, Keynesianism was quickly revised so that 
an acceptable point on the Phillips Curve was reached (Hall , ). 
NOTES
 Moreover, the Labour Ministers re-affirmed their commitment to full em-
ployment, while a progressive reduction of inflation was envisioned (OECD 
b, ). The commitment to full employment further demonstrated poli-
cymakers’ hesitance to embrace the monetarist paradigm because monetar-
ists believed that a certain level of unemployment is necessary to keep infla-
tion in check.
 Moreover, the late s were also years of volatile industrial relations, which 
further hampered the government’s ability to push through unpopular re-
forms.
 In , the Commission worked on a proposal to develop the Equal Oppor-
tunities Act, which subsequently came into force in .
 Denmark had joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the so-called 
“Snake in the Tunnel”, in  and would join the European Monetary System 
(EMS) in .
 This programme was subsequently recalibrated and renamed, first Individual 
Job Training and then Job Training.
 The combination of counter-cyclical deficit spending, competitive wage-
setting agreements, and pegging the Austrian schilling to the German mark 
would become known as Austria’s version of Keynesianism, or Austrokeyne-
sianism.
 To make matters worse, national insurance contributions and taxes had also 
been rising steadily from  percent in  to  percent of net earnings in 
 (Rhodes b, ).
 While unemployment remained low, the extremely high levels of inflation 
resulted in tense industrial relations as the development of “real wages had 
been negative since the middle s” and ideological clashes between the 
LO and the SAF became “common” (Thoursie and Wadensjö , ). 
 The Great Conflict of  was the largest strike in more than  years, af-
fecting some , workers. The traditional Swedish consensual spirit was 
at stake and employers increasingly demanded industry-wide, as opposed to 
nation wide, wage agreements.
 Nation wide implementation was achieved by .
 Even though counter-cyclical spending was less pronounced, Scharpf and 
Schmidt remind us that Sweden was “the only European democracy that 
[continued to use] macro-economic policy to prevent job loss” (Scharpf and 
Schmidt a, ).
 For instance, in , the government pushed through “a one-hour reduc-
tion of the working week without wage reductions, with the effect of a total 
wage increase of about  percent per year” (the social partners’ conciliation 
proposal suggested a reduction by one-and-a-half hours, leading to a wage 
 FROM THE MANPOWER REVOLUTION TO THE ACTIVATION PARADIGM
increase of about four percent) (PLS Consult and Jensen , ). Despite 
massive political protest and a wave of wildcat strikes, the government re-
mained firm in its decision.
 While the AMS has administrative power over the AMU, the main influence 
over the training of the unemployed was through “its role as a purchaser” 
(OECD c, ). 
 Over time, the active line grew into an “availability test” intended to sort 
out the “deserving” from the “undeserving” welfare recipients (Rosdahl and 
Weise , ).
 However, as outline above, the removal of the automatic cost-of-living ad-
justment led to a gradual decrease in the “value” of benefits.
 This is a slightly different argument from Trampusch (), who sees this 
development as an example of drift, i.e., the government’s non-interference 
as a cause for institutional change. 
 The government’s accreditation of childrearing years to a woman’s calcula-
tion of old-age social security further promoted conservative family values 
because access to these benefits was only available when women refrained 
from participating in the work force (Schmid and Oschmiansky b, 
). 
 Schools typically end at midday, while stores closed at  p.m. Moreover, in 
contrast to American schools, German school children have a series of short-
er, one-to-two week long breaks, throughout the school year, roughly every 
four to six weeks, and a six-and-a-half week summer vacation.
 The reference to ravens is based on the connotation that raven mothers leave 
their young before they are able to fly.
 The discrepancy between the national unemployment figures used in this 
section and the standardised ILO figures presented in the appendix are due 
to Austria’s stricter criteria of what constitutes employment.
 In the s, training was equally available for both employed and unem-
ployed workers.
 The Community Enterprise Programme replaced the Special Temporary Em-
ployment Programme.
 Job Clubs was a US-inspired project that offered its members resources and 
new techniques for the most efficient job-hunting methods, while the Restart 
Course was a project designed to improve jobseeker motivation and initiative 
(Price ).
 The employers, in turn, endorsed the social partnership agreement because 
decentralised wage bargaining had not been particularly successful. Wage in-
creases had been moderate, but still “outstripped inflation, thereby reducing 
firms’ competitive position” (Sexton and O’Connell , ).
NOTES
 For a similar assessment compare Siebert , who writes: “Whereas Europe 
looks like a more or less homogenous train on the track to the welfare state in 
the s and the s, marked diﬀ erences in the institutional approaches of 
individual countries have developed since the mid-s” (Siebert , ). 
 Even though Sweden, unlike Denmark, does rely on substantial payroll con-
tributions, the money is not used for designated expenses as in the Continen-
tal examples, but rather flows into the general state budget. 
 The labour force participation rate is the sum of employed workers plus those 
seeking work.
 Early-exit expenditures for labour market reasons only, i.e., “regular” early 
retirement spending is not captured in this table, which is why spending in 
Germany, for instance, appears comparatively low. Likewise, disability pen-
sions introduced in Sweden in  and , which allowed older workers to 
withdraw from the labour market, are also not included (personal conversa-
tion, SOFI).
 Chapter V
 Please see this chapter’s appendix for data on unemployment levels and em-
ployment rates.
 Since the late s, the OECD analytically juxtaposed “active” labour mar-
ket policy – comprising job-placement and matching services, and supply-
side and demand-side measures – with the receipt of transfer payments and 
demand-reducing measures, which were relabelled as “passive” labour mar-
ket policies.
 At that time, the US “outperformed” Europe with its unemployment rate of 
six percent compared with the EU-’s . percent (Riding ). Moreover, 
the (open) unemployment rate in Sweden, the previous “model” for emula-
tion, skyrocketed – despite the massive expansion of ALMPs – from below 
two percent in  to almost ten percent in  (cf., OECD Labour Force 
Statistics). 
 Training and education, however, still played a significant role in the JS. But 
rather than applying massive ALMPs, the OECD recommended reforming 
education and training systems, improving pre-school education, reducing 
early school leaving, introducing broader school curricula, and encouraging 
the co-operation between firms and schools (cf., The Economist ).
 As of  January  UNICE is called BUSINESSEUROPE. 
 The EEI was a very active working group within the Party of European Social-
ists (PES) created in late . The EEI supported Delors’ initiatives and was 
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an active proponent of a European employment policy (cf., van Riel and van 
der Meer ).
 The Westendorp Reflection Group was first established in June .
 The Commission proposals were unacceptable, mainly because they included 
a hard target of seven percent unemployment (Raveaud ).
 The countries singled out as the most successful cases, include the Neth-
erlands and Ireland, but also Denmark, New Zealand, and the UK were all 
mentioned as cases with positive achievements. It was also mentioned that 
the US “seems to have improved an already good performance”, while Swe-
den and Finland were identified as appearing at “the other end of the spec-
trum”, but showing significant improvement (OECD b, f ). Mean-
while, the large continental countries, including France, Germany, and Italy 
were identified as cases in which structural unemployment had actually 
increased. 
 In fact, the OECD Secretariat could build on the original JS, which had al-
ready called for three interrelated modernization steps, including () the in-
tegration of three PES services, including placement and counselling serv-
ices, the payment of unemployment benefits and the management of labour 
market programmes (often referred to as “one-stop service centres”); () reg-
ular contact between benefit claimants and the PES to maintain job search 
efforts, and () the elimination of placement monopolies (cf., Phan-Thuy, et 
al. , ). 
 The World Bank also contributed to the spread of NPM ideas through the 
publication of the  World Development Report (World Bank ). 
 The extent to which NPM encourages the privatisation of public services var-
ies both across time and space. The early writings were much more based on 
privatisation, while more recent texts focus more on “re-engineering” public 
governance through competition and benchmarking. Likewise, in the non-
European, Anglophone countries, including Australia, New Zealand and to 
some extent the US, privatisation is much more important than in the Euro-
pean context (cf., Meier and Hill , ). 
 The Commission adopted a NPM-style programme in early  entitled 
Sound and Efficient  Programme (SEM), which aimed to instil a bet-
ter culture of resource management in the Commission’s system (Mathiasen 
, ). 
 The EU Commission was also careful not to recommend the “contestability” 
of PES services (interview, DGEmpl).
 HoPES was set up as a forum in addition to, but separate from, EMCO. The 
two bodies are headed, however, by the same DG Employment Director, who 
co-ordinates both of their activities.
NOTES
 HoPES also supports the daily activities of national PESs by collecting and 
disseminating labour market data and has set up EURES, a pan-European job 
portal.
 Likewise, the study argued that the EU requirement to regularly write Na-
tional Action Plans had consolidated and reinforced the use of MBO instru-
ments in those countries that had introduced such instruments already be-
fore the launch of the EES (Mosley, et al. , iii). 
 Other high profile members included Günther Schmid, former member of 
the Hartz Commission (see chapter VII) and Maria João Rodrigues, often 
dubbed the “mother of the OMC”.
 For a good overview of the different meanings of the European Social Model, 
see Jepsen and Serrano Pascual (). 
 Quite tellingly, a Lexis Nexis search for “flexicurity” using the rubric Euro-
pean Information Service revealed eight “hits” for the time period  January 
 to  December , compared to  hits between  January  and 
 July . 
 For the wide range of activities subsumed under flexicurity at the European 
level, see http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/
flex_steps_en.htm, last accessed on  April .
 Interestingly, this report identifies Sweden as having “flexicurity-oriented 
policies”, even though Sweden still has strict EPL, which is typically consid-
ered to be the antithesis to flexicurity. 
 However, not all actors share this optimistic vision. Labour unions and other 
actors on the political left in particular fear that flexicurity is a Trojan Horse 
that will lead to asymmetrical institutional outcomes, favouring employers to 
the disadvantage of workers (Keune and Jepsen ).
 European countries studied, include Austria, Belgium (two communities), 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United King-
dom. Reports are available at http://www.oecd.org/document//,,
en_______,.html, last accessed  July .
 The OECD text subsequently argues that strict EPL have “indirect” effects by 
compromising the employment prospects of groups with “entry problems” 
such as older workers, women, or LTU (OECD a, ). It is quite striking, 
however, that the EU Commission begins its treatment of EPL by saying “[a]
ccording to analytical evidence, strict EPL ... decreases the entry rate from 
unemployment into work”, and only subsequently clarifies that this relation-
ship actually holds only for particular groups (Commission of the European 
Communities , ). In other words, the EU approaches the same findings 
in the reverse order, which sends a different message to the reader!
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 Many interviewees, however, noted that the annual cycle is too tight and that 
they preferred a two- or even three-year cycle instead. 
 The disappearance of NAPs in favour of NRPs has, however, led to “greater 
unevenness in national employment policy reporting and a loss of European-
level monitoring capacity” (Zeitlin b, ).
 During the s, the Dutch model was heavily debated. However, as Dutch 
job growth was mainly achieved through a reduction in working hours and 
the expansion of part-time work, mimicking the Dutch strategy seemed un-
desirable for many of the other European countries.
 All three countries relied – at least partially – on labour-shedding strategies, 
including the extensive use of the “disability option” (NL and the UK) and 
early retirement for labour market reasons (DK).
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 Leading labour economists believed that labour market policies could af-
fect levels of unemployment anywhere from  to  percent (Calmfors 
, ).
 While it is not entirely clear which kinds of effects can be attributed to active 
and activating policies in this context, they probably had a positive impact, 
especially considering the fact that employment rates continued to grow, de-
spite the global economic turbulence caused by the burst of the “dot.com 
bubble” in  and the terrorist attacks on  September .
 The flipside to the large-scale activation necessarily means that new employ-
ment opportunities are not always full-time, secure, and well-paid jobs. The 
risk is therefore that “any” job may become appropriate in the eyes of the 
state if certain employment targets are to be reached. In particular, but not 
exclusively, many labour unions have become concerned with the growth of 
“atypical” jobs and the potential displacement of regular employment op-
portunities, especially in the Continental context (interviews, DGB; DGB; 
ÖGB). Similarly, Thelen and Palier () have described this trend as a “du-
alisation” of labour markets, characterised by a core of traditional “good” 
jobs, and a rapidly growing segment of peripheral, “atypical” and often pre-
carious employment contracts. The political challenge must therefore be to 
ensure that “atypical” work becomes a “steppingstone” rather then a “dead-
end street” for activated workers.
 The Manpower Services Commission had already used some performance 
targets in the s. However, the scale and importance was rather modest at 
the time (interview, DWP). 
NOTES
 In , about , JCP clients were categorised as so-called “revolving 
door” clients, i.e., clients that rotate in and out of work and benefits (in-
terview, CESI). This pattern suggested that the system was “failing” for this 
subgroup of clients and a different approach was necessary.
 While Ireland used some elements of MBO, a Commission funded research 
project, published in  found that MBO techniques in Ireland had lit-
tle substantive influence (Mosley, et al. , iv). Since the publication of 
this report, new FÁS Chairman Brian Geogheghan (-) significantly 
expanded the use of performance targets as part of the newly initiated FÁS 
Strategy Vision statements (interview, FAS). 
 A survey conducted by researchers at the Social Science Centre in Berlin 
(WZB) in , found that Belgium (Flanders), Finland and Norway also in-
troduced full MBO systems throughout the s, while Belgium (Walloon), 
Portugal and Spain adopted some MBO elements (Mosley, et al. , iv). 
 Th e German PES had already considered the introduction of MBO structures 
in the late s, and subtle steps towards performance-oriented management 
were developed in the Arbeitsamt  reform project (interview, DGB).
 It must be noted, however, that the German PES has been using MBO 
techniques only for a short period of time, and an interviewee noted that 
the actors involved still needed to learn how to use the system (interview, 
BA).
 In December , the German Federal Constitutional Court declared the 
ARGEn unconstitutional and mandated their reform by . At this point 
in time, it is not clear what the new institutional design will look like, but 
continued close collaboration between welfare and employment offices is ex-
pected. 
 The administration of UB payments has been retained with the Unemploy-
ment Insurance (UI) funds, i.e., job centres need to solicit the approval of 
benefit payments/sanctions from UI funds. 
 In , the centre-right government replaced these programmes with the 
(rather similar) Job Guarantee for Young Workers (jobbgaranti för ungdomar) 
and Job and Development Guarantee (Jobb- och utvecklingsgaranti) for the 
long-term unemployed. 
 The LES provided an array of services to disadvantaged jobseekers and were 
linked to Area-Based Partnerships (ABP), i.e., limited multi-partnership 
companies to promote local economic development and job growth. While 
the LESs were originally only responsible to the ABPs, the government de-
cided to integrate them into FÁS in the late s.
 The “objectivity” of standardised procedures is by no means guaranteed. For 
instance, in Germany, case managers informed me that they can “manipu-
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late” the system, if needed, by entering certain data in the system to obtain 
the desired profiling category for the client.
 While similar trajectories are also identifiable in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
France, Finland and most of the other European countries, the PESs in South-
ern Europe remain laggards. The reason for the lack of convergence is most 
likely one of underdeveloped institutional capacity and the strong devolution 
to regional jurisdictions.
 Another important trend not discussed in this book includes the increased 
commitment to improve the services for, and collaboration with, local em-
ployers. As such, the PES “service model” targets both employers and job-
seekers alike.
 As far as governments are able to, they try to convince the social partners to 
settle on internationally competitive wage increases. For an overview of this 
trend of “competitive corporatism” see, for instance, Rhodes (). This fea-
ture, however, is often criticised by union leaders in neighbouring countries. 
Putting pressure on low-wage settlements forces other unions to engage in a 
“race to the bottom” and one country’s (employment) gains become another 
country’s losses (interview, DGB).
 If applicable, starting rate only. 
 Note that this is a rather “rough” insight as the expenditures refer to na-
tional spending levels. In many instances, however, ALMP programmes are 
delivered and managed by local or regional authorities, which means that the 
numbers in this table may not be complete. Moreover, while the use of tax-
credits is functionally equivalent to in-work wage subsidies, wage subsidies 
are considered ALMP expenditures, but tax credits are not. These features 
might skew the interpretation of the data. 
 The Liberal countries, including Ireland and the UK, in turn, use a combina-
tion of statutory minimum wages and negative income taxes to reward low-
wage employment. As both of these instruments are not considered ALMPs, 
they are not included in the table below (but see section  on work incentives 
below).
 In his study, Gangl also shows that while unemployment benefits paid over 
a long duration prolongs unemployment spells, they are also associated with 
higher post-unemployment wages (particularly in the German context). 
Therefore, he argues that UB should “subsidise” workers’ job search activities 
and thus reduce the “scar effects” of unemployment.
 Interestingly, the EU has not set any targets for the provision of childcare 
to older school children even though in the Continental countries, where 
full school days are rare, childminding in the afternoon is still a barrier for 
(mostly) women to take up full employment.
NOTES
 The receipt of child benefits was conditional on families not exceeding a cer-
tain wage threshold for the second wage earner, effectively promoting single-
income families for those women with limited wage prospects (interview, 
WIFO).
 Increasingly, governments also seek to reverse the trend of low birth rates 
through the expansion of childcare. 
 There was also a Kombilohn or wage subsidy paid directly to jobseekers, 
which started in . It was seen as a failure, however, because only a total 
of some  unemployed workers made use of this instrument.
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 As a consequence, HzA measures steadily increased from its inception in the 
late s, when some , SA recipients participated (Voges, et al. , 
) to , in  (Schmuhl, et al. , ).
 Decentralisation was particularly pronounced in former East Germany, 
where employers withdrew their memberships from employers associations 
to avoid collectively agreed-upon wage settlements. Similarly, East German 
workers’ councils voluntarily accepted below-settlement wages in order to 
prevent job cuts. I thank Wade Jacoby for bringing this to my attention.
 It was the larger firms that also disproportionately benefited from training 
and retraining ALMPs and took advantage of the early exit options to shed 
their access labour (interviews, CDU, ZDH).
 In the mid-s, the government came up with the goal to write one single 
Social Code, legally codifying all of German social policy. The Social Code 
includes a series of “books”, each regulating a specific dimension of the wel-
fare state. There are currently  such books. 
 The divisions between the political left and right in turn led to open political 
alignments, unprecedented in Germany’s post-war history. The labour move-
ment not only supported but actively campaigned for the Social Democrats, 
while the BDA President Dieter Hundt called upon the CDU/CSU and FDP 
to continue their path and make further welfare state expenditure cuts. 
 By empowering local authorities, the government tried to strengthen the sub-
sidiarity principle. 
 The Greens emerged as a political party in  and gained seats in the Bun-
destag for the first time in . 
 JUMP built on the experiences from a pilot programme launched by the 
Social Democrats in Kalk (North-Rhine Westphalia) in  (interview, 
SPD).
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 Integration agreements (Eingliederungsvereinbarung) had already existed 
in the past, albeit in a different form for a number of the long-term unem-
ployed and those considered difficult to place. Rather than presenting a 
“contract” between the jobseeker and the employment centre, these inte-
gration agreements were intended to build a bridge between potential em-
ployers and the jobseeker, offering up to six months wage subsidies to firms 
willing to “try out” one of these clients. These agreements were phased out 
in . 
 While the spring  wage round concluded with an above-average settle-
ment, the subsequent agreements have seen a modest increase in wage levels, 
leading to a de facto drop in incomes.
 The Chancellor advocated a “calm” approach to politics, i.e., the Politik der 
ruhigen Hand.
 Florian Gerster, subsequent Director of the restructured PES, would fre-
quently participate in the Commission meetings as well. 
 It is also noteworthy that the social partner representatives were not leading 
figures such as Dieter Hundt (BDA) or Wilhelm Adamy (DGB). This was a de-
liberate attempt to depoliticise the meetings and make room for compromise 
(interview, SPD). 
 It is important to note, however, that the DGB was willing to support the 
Hartz concept under the condition that the Chancellor promised not to ease 
employment protection standards (Kündigungsschutz) or interfere in wage 
settlements (Tarifautonomie) (interview, DGB). Moreover, the original 
Hartz report did not make any specific recommendations on the generosity 
of benefits, while suggesting paying UB between six and  months, depend-
ing on a jobseeker’s age and contributions history (Hartz Commission ). 
As such, the popularly used name “Hartz IV” for the controversial piece of 
legislation that was issued subsequently – as part of the Agenda  – is in 
principle a misnomer. 
 While Hartz I did not need the approval of the Bundesrat, Germany’s upper 
chamber representing all  federal states (Bundesländer), Hartz II passed 
the Bundesrat on  December  after some minor adjustments requested 
by the CDU/CSU. 
 The labour unions agreed to the expansion of temporary jobs since the So-
cial Democrats had promised that wages would be based on collective agree-
ments. However, when a clause was included in the final legislative text that 
allowed temporary job agencies to refer to “any” collective agreement, em-
ployers quickly adopted the (low) wage settlements reached by the Christian 
Trade Union Federation (CGB), which is not a member of the DGB. The DGB 
was then pressured to downgrade their own wage settlements, which effec-
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tively undermined the introduction of “fair wages” to temporarily employed 
workers (interview, DGB).
 Hartz II also envisioned so-called Job Floaters, which, however, failed to de-
liver many new jobs (Handelsblatt ). The idea was that firms that agreed 
to hire a long-term unemployed worker would receive attractive loans, issued 
by the government, of up to  ,. 
 Keeping an eye on her constituency, Angela Merkel, the CDU Party Leader 
indicated, however, that some reforms may go too far and she opposed curbs 
on unemployment benefits for older workers.
 A study conducted by the Institute for the Study of Labour (IAB) has shown 
that about  percent of previous UA recipients have lost their assistance pay-
ments entirely, while some four percent progressed into work or retirement. 
Th erefore, about  percent of previous UA recipients now receive ALG-. Th e 
ALG- payments are below previous UA payments for about  percent (on 
average some  ), while about  percent receive more (on average  ). 
Long-term, prime-aged men in former East Germany are often considered the 
main “losers” of the new beneﬁ ts system (Bruckmeier and Schnitzlein ).
 In reaction to these critiques, the BA attempted to reduce the alleged “park-
ing” of clients by earmarking certain budget items to be spent on disadvan-
taged jobseekers (interview, BDA, BA).
 In June , IG Metall had to call off its four-week strike for a -hour 
workweek in eastern Germany after no agreement could be reached. IG 
Metall had demanded a three-hour reduction to bring eastern firms in line 
with western firms. However, employers insisted this difference was a com-
petitive advantage that secured investments in jobs for the eastern Ger-
man plants. The media, some western German works council members, 
and members of the government were very critical of the strikes and feared 
that they would adversely affect the entire German economy, which further 
diminished the popularity of the unions. The IG Metall strike was the first 
one they had lost since the mid-s and Klaus Zwickel had to resign as 
the union chair.
 The two far-left parties officially merged in  to create the Left Party (Die 
Linke). 
 Even though the left-leaning parties, including the SPD, the Greens, and the 
Left Party, won more than  percent of the votes, the Social Democrats’ 
refusal to form a coalition with the former Communists prevented a left-led 
government from taking office.
 The positive impact of the Barcelona targets was confirmed in many inter-
views, including HBS, SPD, SPD and BMAS, while the OECD report was 
mentioned in many newspapers at that time.
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 The parts related to the child and youth assistance laws (Kinder- und Jugen-
dhilfegesetz), which were the ones requiring the approval of the Bundesrat, 
Germany’s upper chamber, were separated out.
 On  January , the TAG was further supplemented by more generous 
deductions for parents who utilise childcare facilities. 
 A discourse on the “quality” of child minding has been largely absent, how-
ever, and it is not clear what exactly these childcare places entail.
 These cash payments might, however, prove counter-productive as low-in-
come families may opt not to go to work, preferring instead to receive the 
transfer payments (interview, INQA).
 Franz Müntefering’s official reason for resigning was, however, his wife’s ill 
health.
 The decline in industrial strife was also fostered by the  Industrial Rela-
tions Act that mirrored the UK Employment Acts of  and . The Act 
was a deliberate attempt by the FF government to “provide a stable industrial 
relations environment” to foreign, mainly US, investors by limiting union 
power in regards to strike initiation and picketing (Schweiger and Wickham 
, ). 
 While the conclusion of the PNR represents a major political breakthrough, 
many observers quickly forget that the success of the PNR was partially se-
cured by an “international economic upturn and a drop in the inflation rate, 
which turned a modest pay-and-tax-cuts deal into an increase in real dispos-
able income” (Hardiman , ).
 To provide a reference, in the - period there were roughly , 
unemployed people in Ireland (Indecon , ).
 The Democratic Left was founded in  and merged with the Labour Party 
in . 
 The government saw the need to “tighten the screws” because a study con-
ducted by Ireland’s Central Statistics Office had shown that about  percent 
of all Live Register claimants did not appear to be actively seeking employ-
ment, which was “the largest [percentage] in any OECD country” (Walsh 
, ).
 While the letter indicates possible benefits sanctions upon refusal to attend 
an interview, the actual application of sanctions is extremely rare (interview, 
DETE). 
 The SEP was designed as a social rather than as a labour market programme. 
Accordingly, it did not make labour market progression a real target and was 
located in the Department for Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs.
 The CORI interviewee explained that , participants is a “realistic” cur-
rent figure because more places would be difficult to fill in times of almost 
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full employment. However, he and the INOU interviewee were very con-
cerned about the gradual phasing out of the Jobs Initiative as its participants 
are particularly vulnerable and need special assistance.
 The most recent tax reforms effectively reduced the tax burden to  percent 
for individuals with an income of less than  ,, and  percent for in-
comes exceeding  ,.
 However, the increase in childcare benefits was often criticised because it 
is (a) not sufficient to truly help low-income families (the additional   
covered only about one-quarter of the monthly childcare fees for one child); 
(b) an inappropriate instrument to fight child poverty; and (c) stimulates, if 
anything, the demand – rather than the supply – for childcare places, which 
was already high (Timmins ). 
 Throughout the early s, the European Commission repeatedly stressed 
that while childcare provision was growing, “it is nowhere near the commit-
ment to provide childcare for ‘ of children between  years and school 
going age and  of children under  years’” (Government of Ireland , 
).
 In November , an OECD team visited Ireland and subsequently pub-
lished a -page country note, in which it stated that “significant energies 
and funding” will be needed to create a care system that can sustain Ireland’s 
full employment economy (OECD a, ). Similarly, in , a report pub-
lished by the OECD suggested that female employment rates could be raised 
to about  percent by reliance on relatives, friends, and neighbours, who 
could fulfil these care needs. However, for increases above  percent, public 
interventions were needed (OECD a). Moreover, an OECD working pa-
per predicted a drastic increase in the need for childcare places in Ireland as 
young, skilled women increasingly decided to start a family. In other words, 
the extremely high employment rate of young women could become a liabil-
ity if formal childcare remained limited in its availability and one of the most 
expensive in Europe (Immervoll and Barber , f ).
 The FF-PD government issued two important pieces of legislation, including 
the Employment Equality Act of , which “prohibits discrimination on the 
grounds of age and provides for positive action for those aged over  years of 
age [while the] Equality Authority [has been] engaging in proactive initiatives 
in this area” (Government of Ireland , ). In July , the Equality Act 
 was introduced to comply with three EU equality directives. This act 
extended the Employment Equality Act,  (and the Equal Status Act,  
which further prohibits discrimination on various grounds).
 The Fund is resourced by a . percent levy on employers, covering some  
percent of all insured employees (OECD b).
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 Because free secondary education was not available until the s, basic 
skills shortages are particularly pronounced among older workers.
 In April , prior to Toward , the government had removed hurdles 
for PRETA recipients to (temporarily) engage in paid work by allowing them 
to return to PRETA in case of a new spell of unemployment.
 Other measures available to older workers include the Return to Education 
programme aimed at increasing basic skill levels of adults including and the 
Core Skills Programme, which is available to Community Employment par-
ticipants and is being implemented nationwide by FÁS. Moreover, the gov-
ernment allows people aged - to participate on CE for a maximum of six 
years, instead of three. At the end of the program, participants can receive 
their Jobseekers Allowance again. The Community Employment scheme re-
mains the most popular programme among older jobseekers. Three-quarters 
of all men aged - in FÁS ALMP programmes are in CE, and more than  
percent in the case of women (OECD b, ). Last, FÁS and ICTU have 
put in place a Workplace Basic Education Scheme for older workers, address-
ing literacy, numeracy and basic computer skill issues. 
 Moreover, the government removed the compulsory retirement age of  to 
enable people to remain at work as long as they wished (Government of Ire-
land , ). 
 It must be noted here that the Irish welfare state has failed to serve all of the vul-
nerable groups equally. Instead, as expected in the Anglophone cluster that pri-
oritises work as the best form of welfare, Ireland has seen a “dramatic” increase 
in the (relative) rates of poverty “for groups outside the labour force (particu-
larly for retired people and people who are ill or disabled” (NESC b, ). 
 Likewise, Bertie Ahern was Taoiseach from  to , while Charlie Mc-
Creevy served as Finance Minister and Mary Harney as Minister for Enter-
prise, Trade and Employment uninterrupted from  to . 
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 While governments in some countries chose not to refer to the OECD as an 
ideational inspiration for political reasons, they may, however, use OECD 
statistics to prove that there is a “need” for new legislation (cf., Armingeon 
and Beyeler ).
 Because funding for ALMPs in Denmark is indexed to the unemployment 
rate, automatic increases are triggered whenever the labour market situation 
deteriorates (OECD b, ). 
NOTES
 List of Interviews and Personal Conversations
 Many of these interviews have been conducted to acquire “background infor-
mation” and most of the interviewees were ensured their anonymity. Thus all 
of their names have been withheld. All of the interviews were conducted on a 
face-to-face basis, unless noted otherwise.
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